

THE
CONCEPT OF
SELF-LUMINOSITY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN
ADVAITA VEDĀNTA



By
Dr. Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi

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The concept of self-luminosity is central to the understanding of the vedāntic, particularly the advaita doctrine of ātman. I am glad to note that Dr. Chaturvedi has been able to do justice to the complicated ontological and epistemological issues involved in the conception. The work is a contribution to the study of the Advaita Vedānta.

Prof. N. K. Devaraja
Ex. Director
Centre of Advanced study in
Philosophy, B. H. U.

The problem of Knowledge of Knowledge has been a subject of earnest discussions in the traditions of Indian Philosophy. The author has put forth the advaita vedānta concept of self-luminosity as a comprehensive hypothesis, which accounts for the transcendental mystic experience of advaita, and also reconciles divergent views to varying orders of phenomenal experience. The work thus emerges as a constructive survey of the vedānta philosophy of experience as through controversies, the key concept is gradually worked out in historical perspective. The author analyses and elucidates the metaphorical usages, put forth as genuine philosophical concepts in the traditional texts, and seeks to re-state them in the light of the basic suppositions of advaita philosophy.... The study brings the spirit of bold and dispassionate assessment to traditional learning and breaks new grounds.

Dr. S. S. Misra
Prof. & Head, Deptt. of Sanskrit
and Prakrit Languages,
Lucknow University.

I have no hesitation in saying that Sri Chaturvedi's specialised study of the concept of self-luminosity of Knowledge is a highly satisfactory piece of research. The author has shown remarkable detachment and open-mindedness in evaluating the achievements of the different vedāntic writers and suggesting an all comprehensive approach as consistent with the true spirit of the vedāntic thought. His views are on the whole well-balanced.

Prof. A. E. Solomon
Gujarat University, Ahmedabad

To

Dr. Hanayama Rabi -
with regards —

G.L. Chaturvedi

1-11-1988

The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta

By
Dr. Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi

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To,

My Parents

Prefatory Note

The concept of self-luminosity of knowledge is a pivotal concept in the Advaita vedānta philosophy of experience. It is not merely a concept to be analysed or elucidated; it is a hypothesis which, while serving to offer a coherent account of vedānta philosophy of experience, brings in its trail, a number of challenging problems which must need be solved within the framework of the system. There are obvious gaps and inconsistencies in the traditional exposition of self-luminosity and this dissertation at places ventures to inquire if the vedāntic view may be stated more plausibly.

Almost all schools of Indian philosophy agree with the commonsense realism in holding that the knowledge reveals its object as it is. However, along with the knowledge of the object, we are also aware of our awareness of it; i.e. while knowing the object, we also know ourselves as knower of it. When I know the table, I also know that I know the table. The nature and the *modus operandi* of such a knowledge have been the subject of sharp controversy in the systems of Indian philosophy. Three possible lines of thinking may be adopted on the problem. In the first place, one may deny the direct apprehension of knowledge at all and cut the problem at the very outset. 'Knowledge of knowledge' will be here explained as a case of hypothetical inference, as has been done by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. The second alternative accepts a direct apprehension of knowledge and tries to explain it on lines of direct apprehension of objects. The Nyāya realists favour this approach. The third view accepts direct apprehension of knowledge, but maintains that knowledge is not a thing, and as such its manifestation should not be explained on the analogy of the knowledge of the external objects. Knowledge is by nature self-manifesting and the instrumentality of the means of cognising is irrelevant in so far as the manifestation of knowledge is concerned. Knowledge reveals the object as well as its own identity just as a lamp while illumining the objects illumines itself. This view technically called the doctrine of self-luminosity, at once places knowledge at a level higher than the object which is dependent on it, and is espoused and contested in the systems for its idealistic implications. The concept of self-luminosity evolves through subtle gradations of sympathies and defines and redefines itself as it is adopted by the systems of Sāṅkhya, Buddhism, Jainism, Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkara Vedānta—modifying itself to suit the function supposedly ascribed to it in a given system.

The *Tattvapradīpikā*, the monumental work of Citsukhācārya represents 'culmination of the vedānta thinking on the subject. It is the first comprehensive and complete study of the problem in vedānta system; it remains also the final one, because the subsequent works such as Advaita Siddhī, Gauda Brahmanandī, Nyāya candrikā and others make hardly any positive contribution to our understanding of the problem. Hence it is the views of Citsukhi that are taken to represent the traditional Vedānta view, and are taken up for criticism and reconstruction in the course of the present study.

In this text the relevant study is divided into two parts, devoted respectively to 'Defining' and 'Proving' of self-luminosity. In the former part eleven definitions of self-luminosity are successively put forth and examined from the Vedānta standpoint. Barring the final (eleventh) definition which is upheld as a consummate and flawless formulation of self-luminosity, all the preceding formulations appear to have been given up as inadequate on grounds that either they unduly extend to the phenomenal experience (*vṛtti jñāna*) or they fail to apply to the Absolute, which alone must be held as self-luminous in the Absolute sense of the term. The other part is devoted to proving that the consummate definition (*avedyatve satī aparokṣa vyavahāra योग्यत्वम्*) corresponds to a fact and is not an unproved assumption.

Citsukha poses the problem of self-luminosity in a complete perspective. But it is noted that he fails to impart requisite flexibility to his construction of the theory so that inconsistent implications may be reconciled in a comprehensive theory of experience with self-luminosity as its key concept. It is shown that Citsukha's critique of self-luminosity suffers from two obvious defects: Firstly, he seeks to define self-luminosity of the Absolute which is hypothetically indefinable, and secondly, he is inclined to deny self-luminosity to the phenomenal exemplifications of experience, which may be definable. It calls into question his whole project for the quest of an appropriate definition, rendering his first ten definitions superfluous and the last one as an impossibility. In view of this, the task of reconstructing Citsukha's exposition consists in supplementing it with twin suppositions—indefinability of the self-luminosity of the absolute and the notion of degrees of self-luminosity. The former supposition relieves the vedāntin of the impossible task of defining self-luminosity as a distinction of the absolute against the the radical convictions of the system. The latter one imparts the requisite flexibility to the vedānta concept. Self-luminosity as the indefinable inconceivable feel of the bare identity of the absolute is the

ultimate irreducible nucleus of all experience. It is reflected in the infinite variety of manifestive principles, which are clearly conceivable as self-luminous in contrast to the world of objects the recipient of their effulgence. Their freedom or self-luminosity may be defined in terms of their independence of the aid of the lesser order of luminaries, with reference to which they may be termed as unknowable. 'Unknowability' (*avedyatva*) is a relative term and hence relative notions of self-luminosity may be consistently upheld with regard to the dependent, the relative or derivative orders of the phenomenal experience. The numerous connotations of self-luminosity examined by Citsukha may thus be ascribed to the different orders of experience.

It has been shown that all systematising (systematic expositions) is an structure of interrelated propositions, postulates theories assumptions and explanatory hypotheses etc. which are arranged according to the diminishing order of immediacy, self-evidence or necessity; thus every term in the structure derives its immediate or necessary character from the preceding term, which is of higher order in the hierarchy, and transmits it to the lower order of immediacy (luminosity), just succeeding it, till it reaches the final recipient locus, the object. That is how the light of experience (immediacy) reaches the farthest and the most obscure regions of the knowable. It is the light of the self-effulgent witness, which shines in all the derivative luminaries and to which they all owe their limited, effulgent or self-shining character in the structure. Beyond the witness self, there is the inconceivable indefinable self-feel of the absolute, which while remaining absolutely independent of the phenomenon of duality and distinctions, sustains and sanctions it, as it were from a distance. Properly understood, the vedānta theory of self-luminosity offer a philosophy of experience most complete and comprehensive of all.

The present study has been undertaken with triple objectives in mind : The presentation of the traditional vedānta view, its critique and based on it, a re-statement of the vedānta view. In view of it, the selection of the texts for the present study has been made in such a way that it may ensure a faithful presentation in historical sequence—and without being repetitive allows scope for a critical assessment and reconstruction. Not all vedānta texts which were studied for the purpose, could be used profitably, though an endeavour has been made to use almost all important texts of the system bearing on the problem in a significant way. The works of the eminent scholars like Dr. S.N. Das Gupta, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Prof. Ranade were much more frequently consulted than directly invoked. Other works such as Dr. Britindra Nath's 'Vivarana School of vedānta, Dr. S. K.

Saxena's 'Nature of consciousness in Hindu philosophy' Prof. A. B. Sastri's 'Studies in post-Śaṅkara dialectics', Swami Yogindrananda's edition of Citsukhī and the well-known translations of the texts (enlisted in the bibliography), have been of more specific help and provide the immediate background for the present study. The use of double inverted commas has been carefully reserved for the acknowledge material including translations. The references are given in the appendix at the end of every chapter.

During the session 1972-73, the author spent about a year at Varanasi preparing the ground work for this dissertation. Thanks to the generous efforts of Dr. S. V. Singh, the then Vice-Chancellor of the Varanaseya Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, who happened to supervise this work at the initial stages, the author had the opportunity of studying the texts of buddhism, mīmāṃsā and vedānta schools at the feet of the eminent sanskritists—Pt. Pattabhīram Sastri, Pt. Subrahmanya Sastri, Pt. Devasvarupa Misra and Pt. Kamalakant Misra. It is, however, to Swami Yogindranada, the editor of *Tattvapradīpikā* and the author of the Hindi gloss on it, that the author owes most by way of the study of texts and general discussions. During his stay at Varanasi, the author regularly visited the Saraswati Bhavan Pustakalaya and is thankful for the facilities availed.

The author here records his deep sense of gratitude to Dr. S. S. Misra, Prof. and Head of the Deptt. of Sanskrit, Lucknow University, who graciously consented to supervise this work at a difficult and delicate stage when the author was in dire need of generous and timely assistance. His valuable guidance and unstinted help offered despite his heavy academic and administrative assignments, sustained the author all through. Whatever is worthy of note in this work could never have been possible without his generous help. The author however accepts all responsibility for any errors and omissions that might have crept into the present investigation and craves the indulgence of the discerning readers. This work is our young and enterprising Perfect Printers first romance with a book and notwithstanding their limitations, they have sincerely tried to live upto it. The author is thankful to them. The timely co-operation of friends well wishers in this regard is also gratefully acknowledged.

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CHAPTER 1

The Concept of Self-Luminosity in the Upaniṣads

Upaniṣads represent not a system but a system of systems

The Upaniṣadic literature consists of the short, epigrammatic, self-contained, inspired observations of the seers in the face of Reality. There is no attempt at a system. Rather they represent as, Tagore puts it "a system of systems", and "the various rival schools of Indian thought display almost a pathetic anxiety to gain credence and respectability by enlisting the support of these sacred utterances for their respective doctrines."* Reality has been viewed freely and from different angles and the freshness, vividity and richness of the first impressions is not marred by attempts at abstractions. Though unity of a system may be denied to upaniṣads, it is far from suggesting that they have no unities at all. On the other hand, the dominant trends are fairly obvious : the first impressions intensified through parables and similes, a general conclusion hinted at through enumerations in differing contexts— no discerning reader can fail to take note of these 'thought patterns' of the upaniṣads. As the scriptures put it, 'one and the same reality has been variously stated by the seers'. The term 'pattern of thought' thus stands for the set of analogous utterances of the scriptures which exhibit a consistent whole of mutually entailing interdefining propositions, illumining one another's content like facets of a jewel.

A Vedānta system can be faithful only to a cross section of the upaniṣads

In fact any attempt to fit the teachings of upaniṣads into some grand design, a system-import as it must a scale of priorities and arrangements of basic and subsidiaries to eliminate incongruities, cannot succeed without doing some violence to these intensive and rather loosely knit 'thought patterns'. In this sense the charge of unfaithfulness to the text, so often levelled against Śaṅkara, applies to all system builders, including the author of the Brahmsūtra. Śaṅkara, like other system builders after him, took his cue from a set of scriptural utterances, mostly bearing on the nature of self and experience, which seemed to him to dominate the course of discussions in the upaniṣads. He employed all his scholastic resources

* Preface to Radhakrishnan's *Philosophy of 'Upaniṣads'* P-1

to show that they represented the central import of upaniṣadic teachings; making at the same time, the divergent *Śrutis* subservient to this central import. Whatever may be said of Śāṅkara's claim for recognition as the only faithful interpreter of upaniṣadic teachings, (it has been vehemently questioned by other system-builders) his study of a dominant 'thought pattern' of upaniṣadic utterances, which form the hard core of his system, is at once faithful and illuminating.

The present chapter, for the aforesaid reason, confines itself only to the study of a cross section of the Upaniṣads basic to Śāṅkara Vedānta. Even this study on the selective basis is beset with obvious difficulties---structural as well as conceptual. The vivid repetitive concrete and illustrative thinking of the upaniṣads suits meditation rather than disquisition. The sheer impetus of the felt images and visible thoughts hurries them from one idea to another, or at times, takes them to whirl in a pool of eddying images simply to intensify a vision, which at that stage of inadequate conceptualisation, and also owing to the peculiar nature of its content, could hardly be stated otherwise. It must be the primary job of a student of philosophy to disengage the images from the idea, to arrange them according to it and see how "vision individuals" exhibited in the analogous utterances, help clarification of the common idea, the 'concept'. Secondly, he must try to discover logical relations underlying these ideas and identify the principles of philosophy embodied in them.

The paradox of philosophising the 'unspeakable' However, as soon as we address ourselves to the primary attempt at philosophising i.e. elucidation of the concepts, we become aware of an inconsistency implicit in the exercise. The upaniṣads seek to instruct the disciple in the realisation of the self as the principle of 'pure experience'. As the ultimate spiritual reality, it transcends all linguistic as well as logical categories. Prior to all conceptualisation, it is simply suggested for mystical intuition through parables or through denials of the terms 'enumerative of the world of difference'; and yet the negations of mutually contradictory characters are equally applicable to the absolute without ever entailing any real contradiction to it—not only because it transcends 'categories of understanding' but also because no term can be conceived as related to it in any sort of logical relationship i.e. as its contrary, contradictory or both. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (I. VII) describes the 'blissful state' (*Turiya avasthā*) as follows :

"*Turiya* is not that which is conscious of the inner nor that which is conscious of the outer, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass of consciousness. It is not simple consciousness, nor is it

unconsciousness. It is unperceived, unrelated, incomprehensible, unthinkable and indescribable ; the essence of consciousness manifesting as the self. It is the cessation of all phenomena, it is peace, all bliss and non-dual".²

When Bhava was questioned by Vaskali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence....." teach me", said Vaskali, "most reverent Sir, the nature of Brahman". Bhava however remained silent. But when the question was put forth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed, but you do not understand, the Atman is silence".*

The paradox may be resolved by recognising a distinction between the scriptures which do and do not yield to philosophising

The scriptures as these pose a serious problem for the Vedantins. By denying the categories of understanding, they deny the very possibility of philosophical exposition with regard to their content. It becomes necessary therefore, to recognise at the very outset a distinction between the scriptures which state and analyse, and those which do not describe but simply serve as 'aids to realisation'.

While the former category of scriptures alone constitutes the legitimate domain for philosophical analysis, the latter one cannot be subjected to it without being paradoxical.

The aforesaid two scriptural instances, in which the experiences of 'silence' and of 'blissful state' (*Turiya*) have been pressed into service to symbolically evoke a 'feeling' of pure experience in a receptive mind, in no way attempt to describe the 'pure experience'. Such scriptures have a pragmatic value : they are valuable for *Sādhārā* they do not inform, or we may say, the sort of knowledge they aspire to impart is non-discursive and hence untranslatable into language. They 'infect' the mind of the novice with their 'aspiration', and in this sense simply remain aids to realisation. Scriptures as these cannot belong to the realm of philosophy; of course, they are available to the Vedantin as references, the guiding points which determine the direction of philosophical discussion for him, and respond to his call when language fail him. But this very distinguishing feature puts them beyond the legitimate field of philosophical analysis.

There are however other upaniṣadic utterances which state the pure principle of experience as the ultimate Reality and seek to offer a relational

* *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I p. 45 (S.N. Dasgupta).

account of it in terms of its 'immanence' and 'transcendence' with regard to the phenomenal world. Inductive evidences such as the analysis of 'deep sleep' etc., which bear out the possibility of pure experience, have also been offered. It is this variety of scriptures which offers possibilities of systematic philosophical speculations. From the ultimate point of view the Reality cannot be viewed in aspects of transcendence or immanence, because it has no aspects. But the necessity of preaching *Brahmavidyā* renders some sort of relational account, howsoever tentative it may be, indispensable. It is quite in line with the general attitude of the Vedantins towards philosophical inquiry. Philosophy does not hold a final answer to spiritual yearnings of the inquisitive mind. It cannot become a substitute for direct experience, which alone can terminate all doubts. But the value of philosophy or reasoned thinking as an aid to understanding the import of *Brahmavidyā* cannot be denied,

The scriptures amenable to philosophising classified : A deductive system of utterances and the set of inductive evidences supporting it,

Upaniṣadic reflections, amenable to philosophising, fall under two broad categories : Conceptual analysis and experiential evidences bearing it out. The first category consists of a set of analytically related sentences forming the core of a deductive system. At the base of it, there is a set of simple identity statements which seeks to state the concept of 'Pure experience'. It may be followed by another set of sentences which analyse the concept of 'pure experience' in terms of 'unknowable', 'unspeakable'. Here pure experience comes to be distinguished or analysed through its purely negative concomitance with unknowability, approximating the *kevalavyatireki* relation of Indian logic. Finally, we have a third group of sentences, which state the concept of 'pure experience' in positive terms, and describes it as 'innerlight', (*antastha jyotiḥ*), 'transcendental light' (*parama jyotiḥ*) and the 'light of self' (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*) thus yielding something like the *Kevalānvayī* relation of Indian logic, where in of the two significant terms, one cannot be defined without the other. The analogy of light illustrates the essentially revelatory character of all experience, whereas the predicates 'inner' 'transcendental' etc. serve to distinguish it from the phenomenon of material luminosity (*jaḍa prakāśa*).

The second category of reflections consists of the scriptures which are based on direct observations of 'experiential behaviour' (*anubhūti-vyavahāra*) and as such, offer psychological or empirical evidences in support of the fact of consciousness as brought out by the conceptual

analysis in the first category. The most significant among them is the analysis of waking, dream and dreamless states of experience. Other evidences of inductive nature offered in the form of analysis of 'belief' 'indubitability' and 'recollection' by the post-Sa'karites, may also be ascribed to this group.

THE SYSTEM OF DEDUCTIVE UTTERANCES FORMING THE CORE OF THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE

The Concept of Pure experience as stated in the Upaniṣads It was the ontology of experience and not the science of it—that engaged the curiosity of the seers. The problem of pure experience and its manifestation, therefore does not figure in Upaniṣads in its own right. It is rather indirectly, either through its identification with ultimate Reality, the Brahman, or as the esse of ātman, the innermost self of all beings, that the problem of 'pure-experience' has been stated and put to enquiry. To begin therefore, with the first category i.e. the deductive system of sentences we come across first in logical order, a set of identity-statements stating and affirming 'pure consciousness' as an eternal immutable fact. 'The sight of the 'seer says *Brāhadāryaka Upaniṣad*, never diminishes, because it is indestructible'³.

"As a lump of salt dropped into water, becomes dissolved in water and cannot be taken out again. but wherever we taste, it tastes salt, and even so my dear, this great endless infinite Reality is Pure Intelligence alone."
(Br. Up. II. 4. 12)⁴

"That Brahman is, knowledge and Bliss".
(Br Up. III. 9 28)⁵

Similarly, the following utterances state and affirm the fact of 'pure consciousness' in more or less analogous terms, through its identity with ātman the transcendental self.

'That effulgent and imperishable person in the body is the ātman'.
(Br. Up. II. 5. 1)⁶

'That Puruṣa of the nature of experience and in the midst of organs, is is the light within the heart'.
(Br. Up. IV. 3. 7)⁷

"As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside and is altogether a homogeneous mass of taste, even so this self, my dear has neither inside nor outside, and is altogether a homogeneous mass of taste".

Br. Up. IV. 5, 13)⁸

"That which is direct and immediate is Brahman".
(Br. Up. III 4. 1)⁹

Significance of these Scriptures

The seers of the upaniṣads, true to the name, preferred visualisation to conceptualisation and as such direct affirmations of 'pure experience' have been sparing in comparison to the copious evocations of its undifferentiated being through negation of the terms illustrative of difference. However, few though they are, the following points may be noted regarding these utterances. In the first place, the idea of 'pure experience' has been explicitly stated through the analogous Sanskrit expression '*Vijñāna ghana eva*'. Secondly, the sentence 'the sight of the seer never diminishes' is the nearest unequivocal assertion, affirming immutable factuality of 'pure experience' that we come across in the upaniṣads. Thirdly, the idea of experience as an 'a priori fact' independent of and presupposed by cognitive acts, is implied and strengthened through its identity with *Brahman*, the ultimate Reality and with *ātman*, the innermost self of all beings. It does not require much logical acumen to see that when the identity of one principle is affirmed with respect to two other principles, none of them can be essentially different from one another. However, the terms *ātman*, (self) *Brahman* (Reality) and *Vijñāna* (Consciousness) though they all, without contradicting one another are uniformly applicable to the one indivisible Ultimate Reality, acquire slightly differing connotations, as through the denials of supposed contradictories, they are permitted to emphasise different aspects of Reality. That is how the set of identity-statements, seemingly tautological, are made to yield vistas for understanding and elucidations of the problem of 'pure experience' by posing it on spiritual, ontological and psychological planes while demonstrating at the same time, the fundamental unity of experience, persisting unruffled through all the progressively self-dissecting sciences.

The concept of 'Pure experience' analysed in terms of denial of difference

Next to the identity statements one comes across a set of sentences, which purports to analyse the concept of 'pure experience' as laid down in foregoing identity statements. In every case, absence of distinctions and relationships predicated to 'experience', seeks to specify the meaning of its purity.

"This Brahman is without antecedent or consequent, without interior. This self, the all pervading is Brahman".

(Br. Up. II. 5. 19)¹⁰

"As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside and is altogether a homogeneous mass of taste, even so this self my dear, has neither inside nor outside and is altogether a homogeneous mass of Intelligence".

(Br. Up. IV. 5. 13)¹¹

"As a man fully embraced by his beloved wife, knows nothing that is without, knows nothing that is within, so does this infinite being (the self) when fully embraced by the supreme self knows nothing that is without, knows nothing that is within". (Br. Up. IV. 3. 21)¹²

"He is the self luminous and formless Puruṣa, uncreated and existing both within and without. He is devoid of Prāṇa, devoid of mind, pure and higher than the supreme Imperishable". (Mund. Up. II. 1. 2)¹³

"When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is the Infinite, the Realm of Bhūmā; where one sees something else, knows something else. That is the finite". (Chand. Up. VII. 24. 1)¹⁴

Absence of difference, variously enumerated as absence of 'inner and outer', of 'life-breath and mind', of 'antecedence and consequence', cannot of itself be a part of the meaning of the purity of experience, unless the 'unitive experience' or its character as 'undifferentiated continuum' is affirmed independently of them. It is remarkable, therefore, that in these sentences negations of the 'terms enumerative of difference', unlike the Buddhist usage, have been invariably tied down to affirmations of some positive character e.g. 'The Infinite', 'the Bhūmā', 'the homogeneity of taste', 'the effulgent Puruṣa', 'The transcendental Immutable',

The denials of pairs enumerative of difference have been successively ascribed to various substrates. However, the absolute negation of 'difference' can be significant only with reference to one substratum, whereas specification of the terms and conditions of operation of this difference alone can help intuition into the nature of the substratum, the Reality. The terms and conditions of the difference, therefore, have been specified as follows:

"For when there is duality, as it were. there one smells another, one sees another, one hears another, one speaks to another, one thinks of another, one knows another. But when everything else has become the self, then what should one smell and through what ; what should one see and through what ; what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what ? Through what should one know that owing to which all this is know—Through what my dear, should one know the knower". (Br. Up. II. 4. 14)¹⁵

Significance of the passage

The passage is significant for several reasons. First of all, it marks a decidedly higher level of abstraction, and the 'difference', hitherto suggested

The opening sentence thus sets forth 'difference' in the form of 'subject-object-duality' as a precondition of the operation of the means of knowledge as well as of the knowings effected by them. The object is a term of difference, the 'other' of the subject. Its distinction lies in its being apprehended as distinct from the knower, in the form of fragmentary cognitions described as 'the seeing, the hearing, the thinking' of the 'other'. It is through the denial of duality, that the object, its knowledge and the operations of cognitive mechanism effecting it have been denied in pure subject the knower. "When everything else has become the self, then what should one know and through what, i. e. when difference in the form of duality is absolutely negated in the knower, identical with pure experience—since absolute negation of difference of ideational or spiritual character cannot be meaningfully predicated of the two essentially independent principles, there follows negation of the three points of phenomenal apprehension originating in difference: the object, the means of its apprehension and the empirical self, the ego. In absence of difference, there can be neither the ego, nor the world of objects, nor the means of knowledge to apprehend these knowables as distinct from basal experience—since the means of knowledge cannot be operative with regard to the essentially indivisible homogeneous continuum of pure experience wherein there will be nothing to be effected. Nor will there be the empirical self, a relata of object in discursive thinking, the logical or psychological self know in reflection or introspection. The concluding part of the foregoing reflection is

*Through what should one know that owing to which all this is known—
through what my dear should one know the knower"*

Duality, object appearances and operations of the means of cognising as terms of the principle of phenomenalisation: Their significance as aids to elucidation of concepts assessed.

A careful reading of the passage suggests that though there is a marked tendency to hypostatise 'duality' as a basic principle of differentiation, the fact of duality or differentiation, its terms—objects, appearances, and the operations of the means of knowledge are all coextensive and interdefinable. They are all interlocked in a beginningless series of mutual dependence in such a way that the denial of any one of them may bring about, equally significantly, the idea of 'unitive experience' the pure subject', which is the substratum of the negation of phenomenality—because the denial of a single term leads to the denial of the entire interrelated series of phenomenalising conditions. It may be graphically represented as follows :

through enumerations, is clearly stated in terms of subject-object-duality. Then there is a conscious attempt to elucidate meanings of these terms, *subject* and *object*, as well as of *cognitive mechanism* which operates on and through them.

Self $\supset \sim \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{duality} \\ \text{objects and appearance} \\ \text{operation of means of cognition.} \end{array} \right.$

Of the three interdependent conditions of phenomenalisation, i. e. duality or differentiation, extension or objectifiability, and knowability (through means of cognition), it may be noted, if one is denied in the substratum of unitive experience, it entails denial of the other two in the Self. For example in the above passage, the negation of differentiation, or duality in the knower, 'when everything has become the self', brings about its idea of pure subject as 'unknowable' and non-objectifiable as stated in the concluding remark, 'Through what my dear should one know the knower'. In the same way through the denial of differentiation or duality, one is led to the denial of the very possibility of the means of cognition ever apprehending the 'knower' in its pristine glory. The means of cognition can be operative only in a world of difference and any attempt to catch the 'non-discursive' through them will end by catching only the reflection or 'appearance', or perhaps appearance of appearance, without ever touching the fringe of the underlying Reality. It is in this sense that when difference or duality is denied in the knower, unknowability' and non-objectifiability becomes part of the meaning of the substratum of the denial i. e. the knower. Similarly, while knowability through means of cognition is denied in the spiritual Reality, denials of difference and objectifiability becomes part of the meaning of spiritual reality. The device opens vistas for further elucidation of the meaning of self as well of other concepts basic to Vedānta philosophy, since the terms occurring in the foregoing equation are interdefinable. The technique has been extensively used in the Upaniṣads and by the Advaita Vedānta scholarship closely following them. Thus self-luminosity has been defined by Post Śāṅkarites in terms of the denial of 'knowability' in the self-experience. The basic mechanism of the technique, even its specific application as above, were however, made available to them only by the upaniṣads.

The notion of unknowability in Upaniṣads

The notion of freedom or self-sustained character of the transcendental experience has thus been brought home through the denial of its knowability. Citsukha, an authoritative exponent of the Vedānta

theory of 'self-luminosity' employs the notion of 'unknowability', in evolving his well-known definition of the concept. It is worthwhile to see how the notion of 'unknowability' has been presented in Upaniṣads.

In its most rudimentary sense, the term 'unknowable' is taken in the sense of 'not knowable through the means of knowledge'. The Upaniṣads abound in reflections which purport to show inadequacy of perception, inference and testimony with regard to be the ultimate Reality. It may be shown as follows :—

Inadequacy of perception Perception is the knowledge obtained through the instrumentality of sense-object contact. The sense organs are suited to reveal the objects only and as such cannot transcend their object-bound limitations to reach the non-objectifiable Reality underlying their operations. "*He cannot be reached by the eye*" says Muṇḍakopaniṣad,

"Nor by the speech, nor by other senses. He cannot be reached by Tapas, nor by other works". (Mund III. 1. 8)¹⁶

"There the eye cannot reach, nor speech nor mind". (Kena I. 3)¹⁷

"His form is not visible. No one can see him with the eye. We do not know how to instruct about him. He is different from the known and unknown". (Katha II. 3. 9)¹⁸

"He cannot be heard, he cannot be touched, he cannot be seen, he cannot be tasted, he cannot be smelt". (Katha I. 3. 9)¹⁹

Inadequacy of Inference Inference is the passage of mind from the direct apprehension of something to the knowledge of that which is not available for such apprehension through the instrumentality of invariable concomitance well established in mind. The widely held view in upaniṣads is that the bare inference (*anumāna*) is incapable of generating the knowledge of the highest Reality. The point is ably borne out by Prof. S. C. Sen :—

"The highest Reality with which new knowledge deals is described in the upaniṣads as 'beyond the reach of speech (i. e. the senses) and the mind', Brih. 4.4.20. characterises It as 'aprameya' i. e. 'unprovable by inference'. Maitri 6.7 describes it as 'beyond thought and argument.

Tait : 2. 4. says : From there speech turns back with the Manas, not being able to reach it."

Katha. 2. 9 says: 'It cannot be reached by argument or inference'.

Mund. 3. 2. 3. says: This self cannot be reached by argument nor by intelligence.

Kena 1.3 says: 'The mind cannot think it'.

Katha 6.12 says: 'Not by the speech nor by the mind can it be reached'.

Inadequacy of Testimony "Katha (I. 2. 23) and Muṇḍa (III.2.3) emphatically declare that the Brahman cannot be known by spiritual testimony (*napravacanena*) nor by reading of many *śrutis* or scriptures (*navahunā Śruteṇa*). In Brih: IV, we are told that Janaka who was well-versed in the Vedas (*adhītaveda*) and who had been taught many upaniṣads (*uktopanishadka*) by such renowned teachers as Satyakāma Jābāla, Vidagdha, Śakalya etc., did not know the highest truth when he was interrogated by Yājñavalkya. Thus it is clear that the knowledge of Brahman cannot be obtained from the mere testimony of scriptures i. e. from *Śābda*".*

The wider connotation of the term 'unknowable' It may be noted that in the upaniṣads knowledge is not a synonym of valid knowledge or of the knowledge effected through the valid means of knowledge, and as such the distinction of 'knowability' cannot be restricted to 'amenability' to the means of knowledge, nor can their denial be exhaustive of the significance of 'unknowability', although that too quite validly forms part of its meaning. The first and foremost condition for something to be 'known' is its presentability to consciousness as an 'object', its ideal differentiation from the ground of featureless awareness so as to ensure conditions of due difference for the operations of means of cognition and the resultant relational apprehensions. There may be other conditions or accessories also for specific experiences e. g. knowability pertaining to vision, needs, besides presentability as an object, the eye object contact, light etc. However, for all cases of discursive experience, presentation as an object remains a basic condition. The concept of 'unknowable' thus acquires wider connotation to include, in addition to the denial of all the aids to object apprehension, the denial of its most fundamental condition i. e. its presentability or objectifiability, its extension or formal projection. In this sense the self alone is truly unknowable.

It is in its character as non-objectifiable that the underlying reality has been identified in the upaniṣads as the knower, the subject, because it is only as a subject or a knower that the Reality can be logically upheld as the ground for absolute negation of the object. The very notion of the subject is exclusive of the notion of the object. Hence it is said:

* *Mystic Philosophy of Upanisads* p. 98.

"Verily-That Imperishable, O Gārgī, is never seen but is the seer. It is never heard, but is the hearer, it is never, thought of but is the thinker, it is never known but is the knower. There is no other seer but this, there is no other knower but this. By this Imperishable, O Gārgī, is the unmanifested ākāśa pervaded."

(Br. Up. III 8. 11).²⁰

Identity of self and experience as brought out on the basis of this

It is the knowability of the knower its presentability and apprehension, effected through the instrumentality of the cognitive mechanism that has been denied here. However, the knowledge of the knower as non-effected undifferentiable unitary experience, persisting in its own identity has not only been not denied but emerges out as the only intelligible interpretation of the passage.

This Identity of self and experience has been independently affirmed in the scriptures at various places. The self, for example, has been described as 'effulgent and unperishable' (*tejomayo-mṛtamayaḥ puruṣaḥ*—Br. up. 4.3.7), of the nature of experience midst the organs' (*Prāṇeṣu hr̥dyantarjyotiḥ*—Br. up. 4.3.7), and as altogether a homogeneous mass of Intelligence (*Kṛtsnaḥ prajñāna ghaṇa eva*—Br. up. 4.5.13). Significance of such 'identity' from the point of view of the problem at hand is that it excludes psychological differences from the concept of pure 'experience', just as the denial of duality excludes epistemological differences ensuring thereby its 'purity' as an undifferentiable unitive principle.

Differences in experience may be due to either external or internal factors. Epistemological differences are revealed in different cognition forms corresponding to the world of objects, and which, as ascribable to the principle of duality may be conceived as extraneous to the basal unitive experience. On the other hand, the differences revealed through introspection in a given experience, say between the invariable agency and the acts of cognition in the judgemental form 'I know this', constitute the internal variety of difference. It is the internal differentiation in the form of reflection or judgement that has been denied here—

"You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot know the knower of knowing. This is yourself, that is within all, everything else but this if imperishable"

(Br. Up. III. 4 2)²¹

The unknowable knower is the meta-principle of experience

The aforesaid passage furnishes yet another instance of the denial of knowability of the knower, with the difference that here the knower has been clearly specified in the first place as a meta-principle, i.

e. 'the seer of seeing', 'the hearer of hearing', 'the thinker of thinking', which is altogether different from the cogniser of things; secondly, this meta-principle has been affirmed as an all-pervasive, indivisible and immutable fact. The passage, with positive aspects of the principle of experience more pronounced, thus prepares ground for the consideration of the Śruti, which may conceive it in a more tangible way i. e. as a principle of revelation and offer its analysis in positive terms.

The aforesaid Śruti significantly introduces a distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing of seeings'. But what comprehends the acts of cognition must be qualitatively different from them in its character as 'knower of knowings' or as 'knowledge of knowledges'. The points of distinction as stated in the passage are : its basal or non-derivative character (that is within all), its ever-abiding nature, and its imperishability. What comprehends the act of cognition is thus itself not an act or a product thereof; not transient **and definable**, and as such, in the absence of any describable character not **comprehensible** through means of cognition. Hence its 'unknowability' emphasises the immutable or indivisible character of the metaprinciple. In contradistinction to the acts of cognition, the 'seeing of seeing' is an immutable fact, a principle of revelatory inwardness rather than an agency of cognitive acts. In fact the meta-descriptions of the knower e.g. 'the seer of seeing', 'the knower of knowing', the 'thinker of thinking' etc. affirm the experience as a revelatory principle in its basal non-derivative character with reference to which both the descriptions e.g. 'the knower of knowledge' and the 'Knowledge of knowledge, may be equally significantly applicable, as the distinguishing notions of agency and act pertaining to the knower and knowledge respectively are realised as extraneous to it.

The meta character of the spiritual reality has been consistently emphasised in the following utterances :—

"That which cannot be expressed by speech, but by which speech is expressed. That alone know as Brahman, and not that which people here worship.

(Kena. Up. I 4)²²

"That effulgent being is known as light of lights by the people who know the self.

(Mund Up. II 2. 9). ²³

"He is eternity among the transients, the principle of consciousness amidst the conscious beings."

(Kath. Up. II, 2 13). ²⁴

"He who inhabits all the beings, yet is within all the beings, whom no beings know, whose body all the beings are, and who controls all the beings from within. He is your self, the Inner controller, the Immortal"

(Br. Up. III. 1. 4).²⁵

"The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightning-not to speak of this fire, He shining, everything shines after Him. By his light all this is lighted".

(Kath. Up. 2. 2 15)²⁶

Meta-descriptions in their dual aspects represent the statement as well as the solution of the problem of self-luminosity in the upaniṣads

These meta-descriptions of experience in their dual aspects as statement of the problem as well as its solution, mark, in a sense, completion of the first phase of our survey. The 'knowledge of knowledge', described as 'consciousness of conscious beings', as 'light of light' 'the seer of seeing', 'hearer of hearing' is an indubitable fact. How it comes about is the problem. The schools differ as to the exact nature of such a knowledge and the manner in which it is arrived at. The upaniṣads seem to favour the view that such 'Knowledge is not effected or produced at all. Self-awareness or 'awareness of awareness' is the very being of awareness, which distinguishes it from the world of things and objects. Self-luminous experience is the experience itself stated discursively as a linguistic necessity. The self-luminosity of upaniṣads is not to be confused with the generally prevalent meaning of self-consciousness which, though of a slightly higher level than introspection or reflection, remains like them an exercise in differentiation.* If knowledge is not self-revealing, nothing can manifest it, no organ can apprehend it and no act can effect its manifestation. In fact any possibility of explaining meta-experience of the upaniṣadic description in terms of cognitive activity, introspection, reflection etc. is clearly set aside by the other part of the descriptions which lays down that such experience is essentially unknowable. Hence, the descriptions e.g. 'No sun sheds its light on it', 'which the speech cannot describe', 'who controls the earth, whom the earth does not know' coupled with meta-descriptions, affirm the essential homogeneity of the ground experience, its uneffectability with regard to itself. Thus, conjunction of the sentences affirming meta-character of experience with those denying its 'knowability', gives us a complete description of the self-luminous experience, although the scriptures do not explicitly say so. It was the author of *Brahma Sūtra* and later on Śaṅkara, who clearly understood the significance of the conjunction of the meaning of 'pure experience' and 'unknowability' and thus iden-

* Ranade in his brilliant study of the upaniṣads not only employs the unfortunate expression 'self-conscious' for self-luminous (*Svaparakāśa*), but also his treatment of the concept betrays singular unawareness of the significant way in which self-luminosity of the upaniṣads differs from self-consciousness, introspection and self-reflection. See the discussion titled 'Significance of self-consciousness' (*constructive philosophy of Upaniṣads*, pp. 197-203).

tified elements of a definition of 'self-luminosity' in them. However, the credit for offering a formal definition of 'self luminosity', is claimed popularly (though not very accurately) for Citsukhācārya. It does not need much discernment to see that his much acclaimed definition, 'That which remaining unknowable is capable of the usage of immediacy' (*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatvam*), does not say anything more than what has already been very explicitly stated in the upaniṣads.

The distinction between the ground Principle of experience and its phenomenal derivations

Another aspect of the meta-descriptions, significant for the Vedānta philosophy of experience is the distinction clearly hinted in the Upaniṣads, between the ontological principle of experience and its phenomenal derivations. 'He is eternity among eternal' 'the principle of consciousness among conscious beings', 'It is through the light of this great illumination that everything else derives its light'. These sentences affirm that the phenomenal manifestations of experience as well as their accessories i.e. physical luminaries—Sun moon etc. all owe their functional character to the ground experience which alone is truly effulgent and remains ever undisturbed in its identity as a principle of revelation. In this sense, the distinction between experience and object, the phenomenon and the Spiritual Reality underlying it is established as absolute.

II

THE REVELATORY CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

How experience comes to be conceived as light : A possible explanation

It may be an interesting problem of semantics to explain how 'knowledge' came to be conceived as 'light' in almost all languages and civilisations since times immemorial, and latter on became a synonym of it. In the upaniṣads the descriptions of knowledge as 'luminous' are significant in as much as they serve, not only as a helpful analogy but also as a 'guiding metaphor' determining the formation of the concept of experience from within. It is a measure of their significance that the author of Brahma-sūtra assigns some six apphorisms (grouped by Sankara under *Jyotiscaraṇā-dhikaraṇam* and *Anukrtyadhikaraṇam*) for an exclusive treatment of such Śrūtis. Their relevance for the present study can hardly be exaggerated in as much as the very concept of self-luminosity presupposes a revelatory account of experience.

'Pure experience' is unique and indefinable. It is neither a class concept nor does it belong to a class of which it may be defined as an specification. There can be only one possible way out of this impasse. By making it belong to a class on the ground of some observed similarity, howsoever superficial it may be, one can in the first place, find an easily recognisable description for it. Having thus fixed the 'unique' to a linguistic counter, a definition may be formed by ascribing to it a distinction which no member of the class will possess. That can be the only possible way of arriving at an understanding of the unique. Knowledge illumines the objects as light illumines the things. Knowledge helps a man in the orderly conduct of life just as the physical luminaries the Sun, the Moon, the lamp etc help the conduct of organism towards a purposive adjustment in the environment. Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, taking its cue from the obliging character of light in the orderly conduct of life, seeks to understand it by posing the question. 'What serves as light for man'? In a series of replies, the Sun, the Moon, the Speech and the self are held out as lights with which he, the *Puruṣa* 'Sits, goes out, works and returns'. Experience belongs to the phenomenon of light, in as much as it shows some similarities of effect, some sort of functional similarity with it. The Knower has, therefore, been described as '*divya*' or 'effulgent'.²⁷ He is formless transarence, 'the light of lights' (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*)²⁸. 'Illumining all directions, He shines like the Sun.'²⁹ 'That Supreme being is the transcendental light (*param jyotiḥ*), the light abiding in the innermost recesses of the heart (*ḥrdyantarjyotiḥ*)³⁰. That luminous being is vast, inconceivable, subtler than the subtle.³¹ 'That transcendental light is the being in first person'³².

It may be noted here that the aforesaid utterances are not simple propositions. While describing experience as light, they at the same time, distinguish it from the variegated phenomenon of physical or psychological light by qualifying it as the 'inner light' (*antastha jyoti*) the transcendental light (*param jyoti*).

Scriptures exhibiting sustained usage of luminosity for experience reproduced and their relevant contents analysed

The metaphor of 'light' has been most effectively used in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, where it serves to bring about the idea of subjectivity as non-derivative ground experience. King Janaka poses the question to Yājñyavalkya, 'what serves as light for man'? Through a process of successive elimination of mediate cognitions and their accessories, the sage leads the disciple round to grasp the reality of the basal unconditioned immutable light of experience, which is identical with self

(*ātmaivāśya jyotirbhavati*). The dialogue may be reproduced as follows :

"Yājñavalkya what serves as light for man?"

'The light of Sun, O Emperor, said Yājñavalkya' for with the Sun as light goes out, works and returns'.

'Just so, Yājñavalkya'.

'When the Sun has set 'Yājñavalkya' and the moon has set, what serves as light for man ?

'Fire serves as his light, for with fire as light, he sets, goes out, works and returns'.

'Just so Yājñavalkya'.

When the Sun has set-Yājñavalkya and the moon has set and the fire has gone out, what serves as light for man ?

Speech serves as his light, for with speech as his light, he sits, goes out, works and returns, Therefore, Your Majesty, when one cannot see even one's hand, yet when a sound is uttered, one can go then.'

'Just so Yājñavalkya'.

'When the Sun has set, Yājñavalkya, and the Moon has set and the fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what serves as light for a man ?

'The self, indeed is his light, for with the self as light he sits, goes out, works and returns'.³³

A careful study of the dialogue reveals that the idea of 'pure experience' variously stated as the 'light of self', the 'inner light', the 'light of lights', has been exhibited here in all these aspects. Knowledge alone can account for the meaningfully coordinated conduct of human beings. Experience is, therefore, the light by which 'He (the puruṣa) sits, goes out works and returns'. It shines even when all other lights, the light of Sun, Moon fire etc. are quenched. This shows that this alone is the basal originative effulgence, whereby all other lights are obliged and is, as such, fit to be described as 'light of lights'. Moreover, the light of experience alone can be described as 'inner light'. in its distinction from the corporeal luminaries, the Sun, the Moon, the fire etc. Besides exhibiting these positive aspects of pure-experience already hinted at earlier, the dialogue attempts to arrive at a clearer understanding of the concept of 'pure experience' by distinguishing it through successive negations of the conditions of mediacy; and also perhaps for the first time, unequivocally lays down self-luminosity as the unique distinctions of pure experience. Notable also is the fact that experience, in its

unmediated uninhibited effulgence, has been affirmed as identical with self, the *ātman*. The phrase '*ātmaivāśya jyotirbhavati*' may be taken to affirm the identity of self and experience as well as the identity of experience as self-effulgence.

It is thus, through a process of elimination that sage Yājñavalkya brings his royal disciple round to grasp the reality of the self-shining experience, identical with the the *ātman*. Elimination of the conditions of cognition may lead to the elimination of the distinctive forms of experience dependent thereon, without eliminating experience itself—which is unconditioned continuum of 'pure effulgence'. When all conditions of cognising are eliminated, when distorting modes of multiplicity of experience are dissolved, we, far from relapsing in a stage of utter void, and negation of experience, arrive at the very quintessence of experience in its pristine glory, which shines in and by itself, like the Sun, when it has nothing else to shed its light on.

The ground character of the spiritual inwardness, nonderivative nature of its effulgence, distinguished by unknowability or denial of accessories finds poetic expression in the Kathopaniṣad, through the sustained use of the imagery of light.

"The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightening — not speak of this fire. He shining, everything shines after Him. By his light all this is lighted."

(Kath. Up. II, 2, 15)³⁴

While the second line of the aforesaid Śruti brings out the character of the *ātman* as the highest principle of effulgence whereby all other luminaries derive their limited manifestive character, the first line serves to emphasise its 'unknowability' by upholding that no derivative or phenomenal luminary can illumine or shed its light on the *a priori* effulgence. It shines independently of them. Thus the notion of self-luminosity of the 'self' which consists in the essentially free unaided or unknowable character of its manifestation, has been most clearly brought out in the foregoing Śruti.

Two-term theory of experience comes to be re-explored through the conception of knowledge as 'light'.

The analogy of light thus illustrates the essentially revelatory character of experience, wherein it is visualised as the basal effulgence, illuminating the objects as well as its own identity as the illuminator. It reinforces the two-term theory of experience which is the characteristically upaniṣadic approach to the problem of experience.

In this account the basic and apparently irreducible postulates of the realistic epistemology i.e. the knower, knowledge, or means of knowledge

and the object known, are assimilated to one or the other of the mutually exclusive concepts of subject and object and we are offered an account of experience solely in terms of the 'principle of revelation' and the 'phenomenon revealed'. A distinction is however made between the 'basal' principle of revelation and the derivative phenomenon of luminaries, whereby the light of ground effulgence is brought to bear on the world of objects. While, at the transcendental level, the knowledge and the knower are assimilated to the single homogeneous unitive principle of revelation (*ātmaivāśya iyotirbhavati*), the cognitions, the means and the accessories of them, mental as well as physical, all have been assigned to the class of 'derivative lights', which mediate between the pure principle of revelation and the bare hypothetical entity 'the object'.

The entire phenomenon of 'derivative luminaries participates in the 'ground effulgence' in varying degrees :

The most important point regarding the 'derivative luminaries' is that they all seek to imitate or exemplify the 'principle of ground effulgence', in varying degrees. 'Following the light of this great illumination all this shines' (*tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*). The view leads to a graded account of experience in which cognition and its accessories are no

longer absolutely distinct and exclusive in as much as they together exemplify a common Idea. Fundamental distinction between the limited experience and its accessories cannot be upheld. For example, the cognition 'this is jar' and the light of lamp bearing on the jar, though belonging to altogether different planes of mental and material existence share, though in varying degrees, a common revelatory character with regard to the object of revelation. The unique distinction of the upaniṣadic philosophy of experience lies in its daring acceptance of the radical implications of their revelatory 'account of experience which invariably leads to a sort of Platonism. The scripture '*tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam, tasya bhāsā sarva-midam vibhāti*', unmistakably hints that all the possible shades and connotations of the term 'revelation' whether intellectual or material follow (imitate) The Idea of Revelation.

Self-luminosity as the distinction of the 'ground effulgence'

The distinction between the 'ground effulgence' and its 'phenomenal derivatives' has thus been emphasised as fundamental. The Self as the very identity of 'pure experience' is the principle of non-derivative light i.e. not owing its luminous character to some

other agency or act. This alone is truly self-revelatory in its absolute independence of the aids or accessories in contrast to the 'cognitions' which owe

their limited light to the ground experience on the one hand, and depend on the operations of the cognitive mechanism on the other. Self-luminosity is thus the unique distinction of the principle of revelation which, while obliging the object and cognitions as ground effulgence, never fails to reveal its own luminous character as part of its nature, because there can be nothing to mediate between the principle of revelation and its revelation. This can again be illustrated by the example of the physical phenomenon of light. Just as a lamp does not require the aid of another lamp, so knowledge as a principle of revelation does not stand in need of any further cognitive act for self revelation.

III

A CORROBORATING ANALYSIS OF THE STATES OF EXPERIENCE

Having so far analysed the meanings of the scriptures bearing on the nature of 'pure experience' and its further elucidation through the analogy of light, next in sequence, we come across the illustration of 'pure experience' in deep sleep and in the state of intense concentration or absorption. The analysis or clarification of an idea shows merely its consistency without vouchsafing its veracity or truth, for which purpose, it must be 'shown' as a fact of experience. The state of 'deep sleep' as different from the 'wakeful' and 'dreaming' states, illustrates the 'objectless experience' or 'non-objectified immediacy' as a fact of experience. Pure experience is directly evidenced though in a qualified sense in deep sleep. It is in this meta-psychical state, that the subject-object duality vanishes and the spiritual reality as undifferentiated continuum of experience is temporarily realised. It is the instantiation as it were, of a rule, a direct demonstration of what hitherto has only been a matter of brilliant speculation and analysis.

The Waking state

The three states of experience, the waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep have been examined in the upaniṣads in their physiological, psychological and metaphysical aspects. The present study concerns itself only with the metaphysical implications of these states. Of these, the first state of experience is the waking state. It is characterised by clear apprehension of objects through the sense organs. In this state the activity of the body which is said to operate through its 19 organs (*Chand. up. 18.2*) is determinant of experience. 'Wakeful consciousness', says Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad is the consciousness of external objects. It has seven limbs and 19 mouths. Its objects are coarse and physical.³⁵ The Prasna upaniṣad enumerates these 19 organs as five Prāṇas; eleven Indriyas, Buddhi Ahaṅkāra and Citta. We are reminded that between 'pure experience'

of dreamless sleep and the phenomenon of duality, the 'dream experience' has been provided for rather tentatively as an intermediary stage. In the midst of discussions on the nature of these states, the images visualising experience as a two-term affair creep in rather as reminders to serve that the three states of experience do not dilute the more basic distinction between the 'subject' and 'object', between the undifferentiated experience of deep sleep and the discursive and relational comprehension of the wakeful state. The dream experience enjoys an intermediary status. The following descriptions are illustrative of the two-term account :—

"Even as a large fish moves along both banks of a river, the hither and the farther, so also this person moves along both these states, the state of dream (or sleep) and the state of waking :

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 18)³⁷

and

"As a falcon or any other bird, having flown around in the sky becomes weary, folds its wings and is borne down to its nest, even so this person hastens to that state (of self) when he desires no desires and sees no dreams"

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 19).³⁸

The dream experience, its intermediary status discussed

Between these two poles of experience, occurs the twilight world of dreams with its luminous forms. The Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad (I. 4) attempts a definition as follows : "dream experience is the consciousness of the inner objects having seven limbs and twenty one mouths (senses), its objects are luminous and distinct."³⁹ The dream experience is thus closer to the realm of 'pure experience' since nothing mediates between 'experience' and its forms, the ideas. This is the intermediary state between the pure experience of deep sleep and the phenomenon of the wakeful experience.

"Verily there are just two states of this person, this world and the state of being in the other world. There is an intermediate third state, that of being in sleep (dream). By standing in this intermediate state, one sees both these states of being in the world and of being in the other world. Now whatever is the way to the state of being in the other world, having obtained that way, one sees both the evils and the joy."

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 9)⁴⁰

The intermediary character of the dream experience thus consists in its partial participation in the two irreconcilable states of wakeful experience and deep sleep. Compared to the wakeful state, the dream state is closer to pure experience since unlike the objects of the former, the objects of the dream state are ideal or effulgent in character and as such nothing mediates

between them and their manifestation. 'Unknowability' as the differentia of self-luminosity applies to dream objects precisely in the sense that they are not 'knowable' through the cognitive mechanism e.g. senses etc. Hence dream experience may be upheld as self-luminous in a relative sense of the term. It is evident from the following description of the dream state. The fact has been duly emphasised in the following descriptions of the dream experience.

"When He goes to sleep, He takes along the material of this all embracing world. Himself tears it apart. Himself builds it up ; He sleeps by His own brightness by His own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated."

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 9)⁴¹

Scriptures favour a relaxed usage of the term 'self-luminosity'

These utterances purport to describe the self in dream state as the creator as well as illuminator of the dream objects, i.e. the ideas. It has also been affirmed as self-luminous, and quite significantly for us, seems to underline the fact that in any account of experience faithful to the upaniṣads, the usage of the term 'self-luminosity' cannot be justifiably restricted to 'Pure experience', but extends also to other gradations of experience, broadly illustrated in dream, and waking states. The upaniṣadic evidences of self-luminosity of the 'person' in dream, are of significance in the present study, specially in view of the fact that the post-Śaṅkara scholarship has striven hard to restrict the usage of the term to 'pure experience' alone.

In dream state the principle of revelation is realised as self and other illumining

The dream state, in fact represents the second order of differentiation, the first being the act of conceiving of 'pure experience' as a principle of revelation i.e. emergence of discursive awareness of its identity, which is realised in terms of 'self-luminosity', as it comes to be intended as the ground of the negation of the world of appearances. It is termed as the (*sākṣī*), the witness self. In the dream state, the next order of differentiation, the principle of revelation is further realised as self luminous as well as other illumining. The 'other' here consisting of the 'idea objects', the luminous forms of dream experience (or in higher activities of the mind). Here the self and the 'other' are recognised as the two necessary referents of the principle of revelation. It is in this very sense that the 'person', the principle of revelation in dream state, can be significantly affirmed as the creator, illuminator and enjoyer of dream objects.

The problem of self-luminosity of the dream objects—the ideas

In the foregoing scriptures, the self has been affirmed as the creator as well as illuminator of dream objects which enjoy a decidedly higher status than the material objects by virtue of their being in closer proximity to the principle of revelation. They are the direct recipients of the light of the self. Barring their own forms, nothing mediates between the 'effulgent forms' and the 'principle of revelation', whereby they derive their limited effulgence. It is not so much in the 'person' in dream experience as in the 'dream objects' that the 'intermediary character' of the dream experience becomes evident. As recipients of the light of self on the one hand, they are in close proximity to the principle of revelation and as such enjoy a superior spiritual status; on the other hand, they possess a limited form, are transient and as such, partake in the nature of things. In fact, it is in the 'ideas', the effulgent forms, that the self-luminosity of experience first becomes obvious. A non-luminous idea is a contradiction in terms. Unlike a thing, an idea cannot occur without manifesting itself. Its manifestation is absolutely independent of the aid of means of cognition, enjoying thus a measure of unknowability and in this very sense may be called self-luminous.

The idea is knowable only in its presentability to the principle of revelation. However, here too, it enjoys a position superior to things. The dependence of the idea on the principle of revelation is of a peculiar sort. The idea depends on the principle of revelation not for its manifestation but for its 'manifestive or revelatory character'.

It has been quite significantly described in the upaniṣads as creation of the self, the principle of revelation. But, once created, it is, qua-luminous entity, co-extensive with luminosity i.e. in it the being and effulgence are co-extensive. It shines and manifests its identity independently of all aids so long as it exists. Here we have a definitive sense in which the self-luminosity can be predicated of the idea.

What the luminosity of the idea pathetically fails to manifest, is its own production and destruction, and this very limitation of the ideas makes the assumption of an eternal featureless principle of revelation imperative. The 'ideas' 'the luminous forms' represent a necessary step in the formulation of the Vedānta concept not only because the 'formless transparency' represents a logically higher stage of abstraction, but also because the discreet idea forms, and the burden of their privations unavoidably necessitates the supposition of 'pure principle of revelation'.

The dream and dreamless states signify different levels of experience and posit different conceptions of self-luminosity corresponding to them

It is notable that the difference between the Vedānta and the Buddhist conceptions of self-luminosity stems from the fact that while the Buddhist stops with dream experience and discovers in self-subsisting ideas the 'esse' of experience, the Vedāntin goes beyond that to affirm the principle of undifferentiated awareness, the 'pure experience' as illustrated in 'deep sleep' and 'blissful state'. The 'ideas' as spiritual creations, the Vedāntin may say, are undoubtedly finer than the phenomenon of gross objects, and may be called 'self-luminous' in a restricted sense. They remain 'object' nevertheless by virtue of their transient and finite character. They cannot cognise their own production and destruction, but presuppose a principle of comprehension which is distinct from them and to which they owe their finite effulgence. The dream experience or the world of ideas, far from exhausting the spiritual reality, just touches it at the outskirts; beyond it lies the realm of deep sleep, the state of common man's mystical experience wherein the self-shining experience is realised in its lonely splendour. It is free from the formal limitations of dreams just as the ideas of dream world are realised as independent of the 'objects' and the cognitive mechanism of the wakeful experience.

The Dreamless sleep illustrative of 'Pure experience' and its self-luminosity

It is in terms of deep sleep that the problem of 'pure experience' has been discussed in the upaniṣads. The mystical union of the self with 'pure-experience' and its undifferentiated character in deep sleep have been variously emphasised.

"That state is called suṣupti (deep sleep), wherein the sleeping one is free from desires and dreams, wherein the self realises its identity with pure experience and bliss".

(Mand. Up. I 5)⁴²

"This verily is his form which is free from craving, free from evils, free from fear. As a man, when in embrace of his beloved wife knows nothing without or within, so the person when in the embrace of the intelligent self knows nothing without or within. That verily is his form in which his desire is fulfilled, in which the self is his desire, in which he is without desire, free from any sorrow".

(Br. Up. IV 3 21)⁴³

All individual cognitions as well as the distinctions of good and evil based on such cognitions are dissolved in the state of union with self.

"There (in that state) a father is not father, a mother is not a mother, the worlds are not the worlds, the gods are not the gods, the Vedas. Then a thief is not a thief, the murderer, is not a murderer, a candala a Paulkasa,

is not a paulkasa, a mendicant is not a mendicant, an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all the sorrows of the heart". (Br. Up. IV. 3. 22)⁴⁴

We are reminded in no uncertain terms that negations of the knowledge of objects does not mean negation of knowledge as such. Denial of the forms of cognition leads to the affirmation of experience as formless transparency.

"Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep), he does not see, he is verily seeing, though he does not see for there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer, because of the imperishability (of the seer). There is not however a second nothing else separate from him that he could see".

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 32)⁴⁵

"In deep sleep it becomes (transparent) like water, the witness, one and without a second. This is the world of Brahman, your Mejesty".

(Br. Up. IV. 3. 32)⁴⁶

The 'pure experience' as the ever distinct and undisturbed and homogeneous background of effulgence shining through various modifications and adjuncts of wakeful and dream experiences, reveals its usual self in deep sleep. Its significance for Advaita philosophy lies in the very possibility of demonstration of auto-experience as a fact of observance. It shows not only that experience persists beyond the realm of cognitions and discursive apprehensions, but also that this state of transcendence alone is its true natural being, the state of blissful harmony with itself. It shows also insufficiency of the Buddhist idealism which does not go beyond the realm of idea and its limitation constitute *raison d'être*, for a more comprehensive approach to the problem self-luminosity which may take into account the fact of 'pure experience', clearly evidenced in deep sleep.

Throughout these scriptures, the idea of pure experience, as evidenced in 'deep sleep', has been consistently elucidated and emphasised in terms of denial of duality, and discursion with regard to it. Thus, the 'deep sleep' evidences not only the highest principle of revelation in common man's experience, but also demonstrates the absolute independence of its splendour i.e. its self-luminosity, by denying 'limitations', duality and division in it. In deep sleep, when the lights of the sun and the moon are quenched, when even the speech is silent, the self itself serves as light unto the Puruṣa (*ātmaivāśya jyotirbhavati*). This observation of Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, the significance of which has already been examined in some detail, stands out in upaniṣadic literature as one of the few most unequivocal assertions of self-luminosity of experience. It brings out the idea of self-shining identity

of the ground experience, the idea of its absolute freedom, by successive realisation of the incapacity and limitations of all other phenomenal luminaries.

The degrees of self-luminosity of experience, its ascertainment in terms of degrees of unknowability

The discussions of the states of experience and the analysis of the revelatory concept of experience go a long way to evidence that the upaniṣads subscribe to the notion of degrees of experience. One is tempted to ask whether there are degrees of self-luminosity corresponding to the degrees of experience.

The supposition, becomes unavoidable as one comes across the passages (as the following one) which show not only finer gradations of experience but also their relative transcendence or unknowability.

"Beyond the senses are the objects, beyond the objects is mind, beyond the mind is the Buddhi, beyond the Buddhi is Mahat, beyond Mahat is Avakta and beyond the Avyakta is the Puruṣa (Brahman). Beyond him there is nothing. He is final and the highest. That Brahma is hidden in all beings and does not shine. He is seen by the subtle sense with them sharp and subtle Buddhi".

(Kath. Up. III. 3. 12) 47

It may be recalled that "unknowability" or 'transcendence' when predicated of experience, becomes a measure of its freedom, i.e. a mark of its self-luminosity. The foregoing passage introduces the idea of relative unknowability and as such renders relative connotations of self-luminosity inevitable. The mediating revelatory factors occurring between the Puruṣa, the basal principal of revelation and the bare 'object', i.e. the Avyakta, the Mahat, the Buddhi the mind and the senses, have been graded in accordance with the degrees of participation in or proximity with the principle of revelation. Here every faculty of higher spiritual order is unknowable with regard to the lower order, which presupposes it and is obliged by it. The ideas of mind are thus declared beyond the senses i.e. are 'unknowable' with regard to them. Similarly, 'the forms of intellect', being of finer stuff, cannot be grasped by the mind. The Avyakta, the principle of duality and discursion, cannot be apprehended by the intellect, whose operations presuppose it and is as such unknowable with regards to them. The notion of 'graded unknowability' or graded transcendence variously emphasized in scriptures, makes the supposition of the degrees of self-luminosity i.e. the degrees of their relative freedom indispensable. The spiritual discipline in the ascent to pure experience, consists in the realisation of the ever widening horizon of freedom of experience through successive denials of the mediating factors. Hence

"A wise man should subdue his senses in the Manas, his manas in the Buddhi, his Buddhi in the Mahat and the Mahat in the tranquil self (i.e. Avyakta)".
(Kath. Up. III. 13)⁴⁸

Two senses of unknowability

Two senses of the term 'unknowable', the logical and psychological are prevalent in the upanisads.

The logical unknowability stems from the inherent incapacity or inapplicability of the lower order of manifestation to the higher one. Another sense which can be ascribed to the term in the light of the upanisadic usage takes the form of the denial of 'the motive, need or drive for the effective operation of the means of cognising. When one has the 'drive' of hunger, the cognitive mechanism connected with search of food, is put into action. But when the drive is satisfied, the corresponding mechanism becomes inoperative. Similarly in a hypothetical state, where all the drives are extinguished, the cognitive mechanism and the entire series of mediating factors is brought to a standstill. It is simply rendered superfluous. Both of these senses of 'unknowability', when predicated of experience, serve to throw into relief the meaning of the 'freedom' or immediacy of the experience. The former connotation, however, is of specific relevance for the philosophy of experience, whereas the latter one is significant for sādhanā or practical discipline for Brahman realisation.

Besides showing the Upanisadic base of the concept of self luminosity this survey unravels two significant postulates implicit in the upanisadic concept of experience and which though Saṅkara and his followers might have felt vaguely, certainly did not utilise in evolving Vedānta philosophy of experience. The first is that self-luminosity as a distinction, is not ascribable to the Absolute, which is devoid of all distinction, but only to the articulate Absolute, to the 'conceivable' the phenomenal appearance of it. The second is that there are degrees of experience and the degrees of self-luminosity correspond to them. Their significance in evolving a comprehensive vedānta philosophy of experience shall be examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

The Problem Of Self-Luminosity In Historical Perspective

Historical Survey ; In the foregoing chapter an attempt was made to
Its significance give a connected account of the Upaniṣads which
formed the core of Śaṅkara's philosophy of experi-

ence. It is now to be seen how the problem was posed and understood in some of the representative systems of Indian philosophy. This will help a proper appreciation of the intellectual background that must have intervened between the Upaniṣads and their illustrious commentator (Śaṅkara) and which must have influenced the latter's thinking on the subject.

The upaniṣads embodied the first flowering of Indian genius, embodying the ideal of philosophical wisdom that continued to inspire and beckon philosophers from their mystic heights. Attempts at systematic speculation into their intuitions, in a sense, mark fall from those heights as they had to begin inductively in most of the cases, and were bound by the limitations of language and logic necessary for all sustained and systematic thinking. The gap between the upaniṣadic and the commonsense view of things is most obvious in the respective concepts of knowledge. In the upaniṣads, as has been shown earlier, the term stood for the pure consciousness, whereas the early realistic systems, taking their cue from the usage of common parlance, used it in the sense of cognition. Much of the garbage of sham controversy in Indian philosophy may be traced to this double usage of the term *jñāna* knowledge and the failure of the brilliant dialecticians who could carry on their scholarly disputations to any length without ever elucidating the sense in which they used the term. From the Advaita point of view, the history of systems from early Sutra literature to the works of Śaṅkara may be viewed as an attempt to measure up this gap between the ideal and the commonplace of knowledge, an attempt towards a progressive realisation of the vision into a system, a struggle to find expression for the mystic experience that had been lost due to the very limitations of systematising. The direction of this Vedānta-bond evolution of systematic thinking is determined in course of disputations, as the commonplace notion of knowledge is continually exposed to scrutiny, leading, more often than not, to widening of supposi-

tion, a process which does not stop till it finds a comprehensive postulate, the ideal of pure experience. The gradual progress in the direction of a comprehensive assumption is obvious; as one proceeds from the Mīmāṃsā concept of knowledge as an act to Nyāya concept as a quality of self; then to the quasi-spiritual concepts of Sāṅkhya and Jainism, conceiving knowledge as plurality of consciousness or spiritual entities. These pluralities finally seem to dissolve into an absolute principle of consciousness as the uneasy groping of the race subconscious comes to an end by discovering a complete system equivalent of upaniṣadic lore in Śaṅkara.

The problem of self luminosity of knowledge, which was first posed in the upaniṣads chiefly with reference to the first ontological principle (as specified in the preceding chapter), subsequently came to be considered in various systems with reference to what the term 'knowledge' denoted to them. Thus while they still continued to pose the problem of 'self-luminosity of knowledge', what they were actually considering was the problem of self-luminosity of cognition, ideas, luminous forms and the conscious centres. All of them nonetheless fell short of the upaniṣadic view of knowledge. It does not require much erudition to see that these disputations of the different schools were altogether irrelevant to one another, as they were carried on with different connotations of the term *jñāna* (knowledge) in mind.

The consideration of their respective views on the problem of 'self-luminosity' may, however, be of help in understanding the Vedānta concept in a number of ways. In the first place, they help us in ascertaining the common meaning content of the term 'self-luminosity'. Secondly, the exposure of the insufficiencies of the rival accounts of self-luminosity vindicates the Vedānta concept, as the only true, consistent and self-sufficient hypothesis. Thirdly, they help us in constructing the integrated philosophy of experience which, with the transcendental self-luminous at the base, seeks to reconcile varying accounts of knowledge to specific levels of experience in a somewhat broad framework of upaniṣadic philosophy. It was with this very objective in mind that the theory of degrees of experience as an upaniṣadic postulate has been examined in detail in the preceding chapter.

I

In Upaniṣads

In the Upaniṣads as discussed earlier the term self-luminosity occurs with reference to the *ātman*, the transcendent self, which is separately identified with pure experience. However, it required a genius of the stature of Śaṅkara to ascertain what the term may exactly mean in the context of upaniṣadic philosophy. But even

before the advent of the illustrious herald of Vādānta philosophy, the term had already been in vogue in philosophical circles. It had acquired definite meaning (or meanings) and its implications were fully explored through disputations. Thus, while historically we can trace the concept of self-luminosity of experience to the upaniṣads, it is primarily due to the efforts of the scholars of Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā traditions, that we owe its earliest systematic expositions.

THE BUDDHIST VIEW ON SELF LUMINOSITY

The yogācāra view of self-luminosity has been represented in the works Dharmakīrti. His arguments in favour of self-luminosity are forceful, consistent and thoroughgoing, and notwithstanding the idealistic implications of some of them, are mostly of general significance ; so much so that the adherents as well as the adversaries of 'self-luminosity', recognise his exposition as the authoritative presentation of the case. His verses such as '*apratyakṣopalambhasya nārhadrṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*' (without apprehension of the cognition, the apprehension of the object too will not be established) have been freely quoted in the subsequent discussions of the problem in the prominent philosophical texts. (The verse is quoted in *Ślokavārtika*, *Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha* (p. 67) *Bhāmati* (p. 551) and many other well known treatises). In fact it is in the works of Dharmakīrti that we come across the earliest systematic and reasoned exposition of the problem of self-luminosity.

Self-luminosity exemplified in 'feeling'

The self-luminosity of experience is most clearly recognisable in the feelings of joy etc. It never happens that one is happy or sad without, at the same time, being aware of his feeling. It goes to the credit of Dharmakīrti that he clearly saw its significance as an argument for self-luminosity. The discussion of the problem in '*Pramāṇavārtika*' opens with the observation that the self (identity) of the feelings (of joy etc.) is not denotable, because they espouse nothing but their own self. Hence, they are self-luminous, and (their manifestations) do not follow speech¹.

The term self (*ātman*) stands here, not for the soul (an abiding principle of subjectivity) but for the identity of feelings etc. The point of the reasoning is that the identity of feelings etc. is non-distinct from their 'manifestation', and as such, they admit of no other signifier, but their own 'manifestation'. Notably, in the signification of an insentient object, say a 'jar' there is discernible distinction between the identity of the signified (object) and the

sign or the significant appearance. It is the apprehending knowledge distinct from the object that gives rise to the corresponding signification. On the other hand, in the case of feelings of joy etc., which survive only as 'manifestation', one can never have distinct denotations for the 'self' and the manifestation of joy etc. Here the (signifying) manifestation is invariably the very identity of joy (signified), which itself is non distinct from manifestation. The terms joy etc. denote the 'self-manifesting joy', and as such, the 'self-luminosity' of feelings flows from the very analysis of the 'meaning' of experience. Hence, it is pointed out that as regards things such as joy etc. the manifestation is infected with self. These things, manifestive of self, survive only as apprehension²

This argument of Dharmakīrti, as will be noted in the course of following chapters, was reproached by the well known post-sāṃkarites like Śrīhaṛṣa and Citsukhācārya.

Self-luminosity is a necessary assumption in the two-term account of experie-

Following his predecessors, Dharmakīrti emphasises that there are two forms of cognition i. e. the form of object (*artharūpatā*) and the form of experience (*anubhava-rūpatā*). with surpassing clarity, he points out that the two term account itself proves

the self-luminous cognition. It is owing to the seeing (manifestation) of cognition, which is of the very nature of the manifestation of identity (*svarūpabhūtābhāsa*)³.

It cannot be said that there is apprehension of the identity of knowledge (*svarūpābhāsa*) by another knowledge in the manner of (apprehension) of object, because the cognition being of the nature of non-object, how can there be experience of knowledge in the form of 'apprehended'. If it is said that the knowledge does not know its identity and form, then the entire world of experience will come to an end.⁴ Elucidating the point, the commentator observes : If knowledge is not known in the moment of its existence, how can it be apprehended in the (next) moment when it does not exist at all⁵. The manifestation of object is the manifestation of (the form of) knowledge itself, and that being non-available in the moment of its existence, there will be darkness all over⁶.

It is further pointed out that the knowledge which apprehends the object e.g. the knowledge of the blue etc., being of the nature of appearance of object, shines as extended or extrovert (*bahirmukhī*); whereas the knowledge which apprehends the self (identity) of cognition is firmly established in its character as introvert (*antarmukhī*)⁷ The introvert experience is the apprehender and as such can never become apprehended. Its very nature,

(which is introvert) debars it from becoming available for presentation to and apprehension by a subsequent cognition. The distinction of the 'knower' and the 'known' aspects of cognition having been established firmly, one cannot acquire the function of the other. Since the knower aspect cannot be manifest in the manner of the known, its self-luminosity becomes an unavoidable supposition, to account for its manifestation. It is in this sense that Dharmakīrti maintains that self-luminosity of experience must remain a necessary postulate in a two-term account of experience.

In fact if self-luminous cognition is not accepted, there will be no direct knowledge of the object itself. If a cognition is apprehended by another cognition, it will have to shine as extended like an object, such as blue etc. However, according to Yogācāra idealism, the knowledge of the object is non-distinct from the shining of knowledge as an object. Manifestation of the identity (self) of cognition in the form of object is called 'the apprehension of object', and if that identity itself is non-manifest, there will be no direct knowledge of the object itself. What else could be the meaning of the cognition of the object, except the manifestation of cognition in the form of object?⁸ The point is that in the manifestation of the object, the manifestation of cognition, i.e. its self-luminosity is implicit. If cognition is not manifest in the moment of its existence, even the direct knowledge of object will not be possible.

Just as owing to the forms such as blue etc. there is experience of the blue etc. even so owing to the identity of experience, there will be experience, of that identity) too⁹. It cannot be said that in experience, there is no determination as 'experienced', just as we have with regard to the object. Such determination, it is pointed out, is not available even with regard to the object. Besides, why should there not be such determination in cognition? just as in the 'seen' object such as white etc. such determination is due to its cognition-bound character (correspondence), even so in cognition such determination will be due to the self or existence bound nature of experience.¹⁰

Vividty as a referent of the self of experience and not a quality of it

There is manifestation of the white etc. in the form of vivid cognition. Is that vivid cognition the further appearance (rasarūpa) of 'manifestation', or the very self of it¹¹? If it is only a further appearance, then it is the 'appearance' that will be manifest.

The manifestation, itself remaining unmanifest, how will there be manifestation of the white etc. If on the other hand, the cognition is just the manifestation (of the thing) and not itself manifest, the entire universe will become

unmanifest¹². The conclusion is, therefore, unavoidable that the element of vividness in cognition refers to the very identity (self) of the cognition as manifest and not to any further manifestation (of quality, etc.) of manifestation.

Self-luminosity as a necessary assumption in a revelatory account of experience

It is necessary here to point out that the concept of self-luminosity 'presupposes the concept of knowledge as revelation (manifestation). By resorting to the logic of reduction, the aforesaid reasoning brings out the necessity of the revelatory concept of knowledge. If cognition is not the very fact of manifestation (appearance) of the thing, then one may conceive it as the manifestation of manifestation (appearance of manifestation as opposed to the reality of it) ; but in that case the manifest will be the 'manifestation of manifestation' and not of the fact of 'manifestation'. It leads to the absurdity of non-manifestation of manifestation. It also emphasises the fact that if manifestation is not manifest in itself, no further acts of manifestation can manifest it; what manifests itself in the further act of manifestation, is the 'manifestation of manifestation' and not the identity of the manifest.

(i) Therefore, the unitive cognition itself must be admitted as the fact of manifestation. According to yogācāra idealism, one and the same fact of manifestation manifests its identity, manifestation as well as its projection, in the object from. It will be untenable to accept two separate facts of manifestation one for the manifestation of the object and the other for the manifestation of the 'manifestation of the object'. Hence it is said—

The view that the cognition in the form of (the manifestation of object) is manifest by another cognition is untenable on account of the obvious defects (of infinite regressus etc.). Besides, how can even the cognition manifest the object, while itself remaining unmanifest? How can the manifestation, while itself remaining unknown enter into any relationship with the object giving rise to the apprehension in the form, 'This is known'¹³.

(ii) The cognition is a relation between the knower and the known. The aforesaid *Kārikā* very significantly points out that it is possible only when both the terms of the relation are manifest. The relational apprehension called cognition is not possible if one term of the relation (the self, the identity of cognition) remains unknown. Hence, in a cognition the knowledge and the object, both are manifest together in the form of determination, 'This is seen'. The apprehension of the 'other', is also a form of the apprehension of the self¹⁴. If some one says that it is the correspondence of object and

knowledge (distinct from it), that is called cognition (sight), then (we say) that this self-luminosity is established in the very fact of correspondence.¹⁵

The commentator points out that Dharmakīrti hints to a notable point of distinction between the idealistic and the realistic concepts of cognition. According to *yogācāra* idealism there can be no cognition of the object without the knowledge of that cognition in the form of the object¹⁶. The cognition unit, while manifesting the object, manifests its own identity as the apprehender of the object. This self-manifesting character remains the unique distinction of all cognitions. On the other hand, the realists point out that the bare correspondence of cognition with the object, will suffice to ensure manifestation of the object¹⁷, the manifestation of the self of cognition being altogether irrelevant and unnecessary as far the manifestation of the object is concerned.

Exposing the inconsistency of the opponents' view, Dharmakīrti points out that the correspondence notion of cognition suffers from the defect of mutual dependence. 'Correspondence' can be noted only between those things which are known (seen). However, no knower, can know a thing before knowledge. How can the Knower then ascertain correspondence of the thing with cognition¹⁸. The point is that according to the realists, there can be no cognition without correspondence, whereas the ascertainment of correspondence itself depends on cognition. It involves the fallacy of mutual dependence.

Those who do not take the term correspondence in the sense of self-luminosity can explain neither the manifestation of the object (which cannot take place before cognition) nor the manifestation of knowledge since they do not subscribe to the idea of 'self-luminosity'. It will thus finally lead to the end of all cognitive usage.¹⁹ Hence, concludes Dharmakīrti, that cognition itself manifests its identity (*sva rūpam*). If the cognition is unmanifest, even the object will become unmanifest.²⁰

(iii) If there are no external objects, how are we to account for their manifestations? The reply is : It is due to the infection of the 'object form in luminosity'. That luminosity (cognition) with that form shines by itself.²¹ Elaborating the point, the commentator says that the object is manifest by cognition owing to the infection of the form (corresponding to the object) in the self-luminous cognition. That luminous form i.e. the cognition in the form of object, born as immediate effulgence, shines by itself, and is not revealed by the 'other'²². In a two term account of experience, one term must be self-luminous. 'Of the cognition thus conceived as manifestation

infected with the form (of the manifest), the manifestation will be self-manifest, otherwise all attributes being the same, the object itself may be the manifestor of cognition²³.

According to Yogācāra idealism the manifesting idea and the manifest form (of object) are essentially identical. The form revealed and the form revealing are both constituted of the idea stuff. How can we then account for the difference of the 'revealed' and 'revealing', so clearly observed in all cognition. Why should we not say that it is the 'object form', which reveals the cognition instead of sticking to the usage other way round. The idealist points out that it is the 'self-luminosity' which distinguishes the revealing cognition from the 'revealed form'. Elaborating the point, the commentator says : The cognition in the form of object, being self-luminous, will (shine prior to the manifestation of the object) stand precognised; otherwise, without subscribing to its self-luminosity, the object too, being of the non-luminous nature, will be on par with cognition and will as well be the manifestor of cognition and 'the cognition with the object form' and 'the object form' will thus be mutual revelators of one another²⁴. Hence in our view, the cognition being of the nature of light is self manifesting, i.e. not manifest by the other. The other (the object) in revelation shines as this revelation is infected with form²⁵. Hence the usage of the cognition of objects.

Elaborating the notion of self luminosity, Dharmakīrti observes : Just as the relation of the manifestor and the manifested obtains not between two lamps but only between a lamp and its object (*āśraya*), in the same way, the cognitive usage based on the distinction of the manifestor and manifested, should be understood²⁶. It means that the relation of the 'cognition' and 'the cognised' pertains between 'cognition' and 'object' and not between cognition and cognition.

(iv) 'Memory' is cited as another proof for self-luminosity. The recollection of the past cognition also proves its self-luminosity. Elucidating the point, the commentator observes that only the known (manifest) is recollected. It cannot be said that the cognition is manifest by some other cognition and (is not self-luminous), because in that case there will be no apprehension of the long vowel etc., since the apprehending cognition being momentary, it will not survive to apprehend the long vowel which persists for more than a moment²⁷.

The problem comes in for more specific treatment in the later texts which evince an awareness of some further implications of the concept. The

Nyāya Bindu refers to the four varieties of perception :

(1) Sense perception (*indriya pratyakṣa*), (2) Mental perception (*manovijñāna*) (3) Self-apprehension (*ātma-samvedana*) (4) and extraordinary perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*). It is the third variety of perception, the *ātmāsam vedana*, which recognises the problem of the apprehension of the self (*identity*) of experience, and seeks to account for it in terms of self-luminosity. The feature whereby all the *citta*, and *caitta* manifest their own self or identity is called *ātma-samvedana*²⁸. The term *citta* stands for the cognition which apprehends the object whereas the term *caitta* signifies all other states of experience such as feeling of joy etc. as well as ideas, volitions, passions etc²⁹. Hence 'Every cognition of an external object is at the same time a cognition of that cognition. "Every feeling and every volition are connected with some object, but they also are on the other side- self-conscious"'.*

Self-luminosity as a reflex : the view of Dīnnāga

How such 'feeling of identity comes about at all ? Is it an effect, a reflex due to the apprehension of the object, or the very esse of the identity of experience? Dīnnāga maintains that self manifestation is of the nature of immanent result.

*"Sva-Samvitth phalam cāśya, tād rūpyād artha-niscayaḥ,
Viśaykāra evāśya pramāṇam, tenamīyate."*

(*Pramāṇa Samuccaya*, 1. 10)

In his own commentary on the aphorism, Dīnnāga observes : "The self feeling can be also (constructed as a kind) of resulting content (as against the act of cognising). Every cognising (mental state) is here (from one side) the reflex of an object, (from another side) it is a reflex of the (cognising) self. From among both these reflexes, the second, that one which represents self-feeling (can be regarded as a kind) of result."†

The self-luminosity or the feeling of the identity of cognition is thus construed as a result of its own reflex. The grasping or apprehending aspect of cognition emerges as emphasised following the reflexion of its extension to the apprehended. The twin aspects of cognition, the apprehending and the 'apprehended' are interdependent and mutually entailing. Though they have the appearance of being fundamental to every cognition, none of them belongs to the 'esse' of cognition, which is devoid of all aspects in the final analysis.

* *Buddhist, Logic Vol. I, p. 163.*

† *B. L. Vol. II, pp. 386-387.*

Self-luminosity as 'self-feeling' - Dharmottara, on the other hand, adopts a strikingly different line of explanation. Taking self-luminosity in the sense of self-feeling, he offers the following reasoning for it : The feeling of ease or 'indubitability' which invariably accompanies the cognition of object, say blue, has a form conforming to it in experience. This form cannot be the form of the object (the blue), since the two are experienced as different. The feeling of ease, which is experienced as quite different from the object blue, refers to the very identity of experience.³⁰ It is further maintained that there can be no such conscious state which will be absolutely devoid of all feelings.³¹ Dharmottara thus purports to evidence that self-luminosity understood as 'self-feeling' or 'assurance of its own existence', is a fundamental irreducible content of all experience. It is an *a priori* fact, which being prior to all mental activity, cannot be a result thereof.

Dharmottara's view marks an improvement on Diñnāga Thus we have here two possible views on the subject of self-luminosity: one, upheld by Diñnāga and his commentator, is that the 'self-feeling' is a result, a reflex of the apprehension of the object and is as such a co-ordinate aspect of it. The other view which may be taken to suggest an independent and somewhat more fundamental status to 'self-feeling', may be ascribed to Dharmottara, who radically differs from Diñnāga in maintaining that there can be no conscious state which is absolutely devoid of all feelings. It means that the 'feeling' which means here 'the self-feeling', is basic to all experience, and whether belonging to the absolute moment of cognition or not, it is at least independent of the apprehension of the 'object', and need not necessarily be construed simply as a reflex of the 'object apprehension'. The difference between the two views is minute but instructive, as it shows the stages of the evolution of the concept of self-luminosity. According to Diñnāga the self-feeling is a reflex of the object apprehension. From this it may safely be concluded that the negation of object-apprehension will entail negation of self-feeling' in the cognition. Dharmottara, on the other hand, seems to uphold the *a priori* character of 'self feeling', which, though it may be hinted at or conceived in terms of the denial of the 'object apprehension', is not a resultant reflex of object apprehension. Thus according to Diñnāga, 'self-feeling' is an 'appearance of the cognition, and not the reality of it. But according to Dharmottara, self-feeling is the reality, the very identity of cognition, and not the appearance of it. although its conceiving in terms of denial of 'object apprehension' may be an 'appearance'. To be and to be conceivable are not the same thing. Dharmottara's stand marks a departure, rather an improvement on Diñnāga, and was later

on developed by Sāntarakṣita and others under the constraint of Mīmāṃsā (Bhāṭṭa) criticism of self luminosity, and in its turn influenced Vedānta deliberations on the problem.

Thus on the basis of the Buddhist texts, self-luminosity may be understood in two, or rather three possible ways: (1) cognition, while apprehending the object is apprehending its own form and in that sense is self-luminous. (2) Slightly different from this, is the view of Dīnāga that 'self-reference' is implicit in the very occurrence of object apprehension, and is reflexively realised as self-feeling. (3) Then we have Dharmakīrti's view which upholds *sva-samvedana*' as a basic content of all cognitions, without attempting to tie it down to or making it dependent on object apprehension. Dharmottara's treatment of the problem unmistakably hints that self-feeling survives as the irreducible content of cognition even when it has no object to apprehend. The concept of self-luminosity in Buddhism, thus gradually evolves towards recognising an independent positive irreducible content of cognition. Of these possible connotations of 'self-luminosity', ascribable to different traditions (or texts) of Buddhism, the opponents generally take up the first one for refutation, and conveniently ignore the rest of them. However, as has been amply shown, apprehension of its own form is not the sole way in which self-luminosity can be understood even in the school of yogācāra idealism. Dr. A. K. Chatterjee rightly observes :

"Knowledge performs not two but three functions at once. An idea objectifies itself. This awareness itself must be immediately known. Consciousness is bifurcated into subject and object, and the subject knowing object must be aware of its knowledge".* It aptly serves to show the possibility of many-layered treatment of 'self-luminosity' in the Vijñānavādins school of Buddhism alone, other schools of the system leaving aside.

Examination of the Doctrine of self-luminosity by Kumārila

The chapter entitled 'Sūnyavāda' in *Slokavārtika* undertakes a detailed examination of the doctrine of self-luminosity. Although it is the Buddhist formulation of the concept that Kumārila has in mind, the objections he raises against the hypothesis of self-luminosity are of general significance. In fact, after the age of the upaniṣads the systematic thinking on the concept of self-luminosity was determined, to a very large extent, by the controversies which the supporters of the hypothesis had with the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas.

* *Yogacara Idealism*—Dr. A. K. Chatterjee.

Kumārila's opposition to the doctrine of self-luminosity is radical and thoroughgoing. The supposition of self-luminosity, it may be noted, is one way of accounting for the direct manifestation of experience itself, the other alternative being the possibility of the apprehension of the primary cognition by the subsequent cognition. The significance, of the doctrine of self-luminosity of experience, therefore, hinges by a more basic issue i.e. the question of reality of direct knowledge of experience. Kumārila questions the very possibility of the direct apprehension of experience, which the doctrine of self-luminosity presupposes and seeks to account for. Experience, he points out, can be neither self-luminous, nor is it capable of being apprehended by subsequent cognition. It cannot be self-luminous, because the illuminatedness (of the idea) is object-bound and has no capacity for self-reference. Nor can it be that one idea is apprehended by another, since there would be no end to such series³². In a cognition e.g. 'this is jar' the object jar alone is revealed but the cognition or the means thereof is never directly apprehended.

It is true that after the cognition of the object such as 'this is jar', there may follow the recollective cognition 'I know the jar'. And though it is true that the recollective cognition evidences cognisance of previous cognition, it is a case of presumption rather than of recollection or direct apprehension of primary cognition. "The notion of remembrance that enters into the element of subsequent cognition, is a mistaken one, because it is only the remembrance of the (cognised) object, that leads to the cognisance of a previous cognition (through *arthāpatti*)"³³. After the cognition of the object, whenever there is curiosity as to the specific cause of it, the recollected knowness (*jñātātā*) of the object is explained by presuming the existence of the previous cognition. Hence, contrary to the contention of the idealists, the cognition of the form 'I know the jar', far from being a case of recollection of the self revealing experience, is ascertainment of the previous cognition of the object through *arthāpatti*. Significantly, Kumārila points out that illumination is not synonymous with cognition. "The fire etc. that are known to be illuminators (of jar etc.) cannot be said to be themselves illuminable, because they do not stand in need of any other illuminator"³⁴. "Whenever they come to be cognised, it is only the sense organ that could be their cogniser, while in the cognising of the organ, the character of the cogniser would belong to the idea. And when this Idea itself comes to be cognised, we shall have another idea for its cogniser, and in no case can the same object be both cogniser and cognised"³⁵.

It becomes obvious that Kumāṛila's objection to self-luminosity stems from his conception of cognition as an act. A cognition, far from being a self-revealing fact, is a unique act of the soul, which is directed towards an object and effects its comprehension. An action, is inconceivable without reference to the agent to whom it is ascribed, the instrument by which it is effected and the object to which it imparts some distinction. What is significant is that the three points of an action, the nominative, the accusative and the instrumental are distinct and irreducible to one another. The cook is different from the act of cooking and its object rice etc. Similarly the act of cutting is different from the cutter and the tree etc. which may be the object of cutting. If knowledge is conceived as an act, the distinction between knowledge, knower and known is a necessary prerequisite. Not only this, there can be no knowledge if any of these terms of the cognitive situation is missing.

It may be noted that Kumāṛila's criticism of self-luminosity based on *kartr-karma-virodha* (exclusiveness of the agent and object) *kriyā-karma-virodha* (exclusiveness of the act and object) and *pramāṇābhāva* (absence of relevant means) stems from the aforesaid corollaries of the act theory of knowledge.

Kriyā-Karma-Virodha When it is said that knowledge is self-luminous or self-comprehending, it means that either the same cognition is cogniser as well as the cognised or that the act of cognition cognises itself. In the first instance, the nominative becomes identical with the accusative, whereas in the second instance, it is the action that is identified with the object i. e. becomes an object unto itself. These identifications, it is pointed out, are contrary to the established usage and are not supported by any known instance of action. In an action the agent, the instrument and the object are always distinct and irreducible. 'The act of cooking does not cook itself, or cutting does not cut itself, the finger tip does not touch itself or the point of a needle does not penetrate itself. These actions point to the objects different from them.

Kartr-Karma-Virodha Elaborating the contention, Kumāṛila duly emphasises that the act of cognition is essentially object-bound. "While functioning towards the comprehension of the object, the idea does not approach itself comprehensible. Hence, though the idea is illuminator, yet for its own comprehension it stands in need of something else"³⁶. In order that an idea may be comprehended, it must be presented as an object to a fresh act of cognition. But this too is not possible, since the idea is momentary and does not exist in the moment in which the subsequent idea, that may comprehend it, arises.

Pramānābhāva

The supporters of self-luminosity point out that it is no loss to the hypothesis of self-luminosity if experience does not exist till the conception comprehending it may arise. The theory of self-luminosity upholds that the cognition is revealed in the very moment of its existence. Unlike an object, which depends on cognition for its revelation, the cognition itself does not depend on anything for its manifestation. Hence in the absence of obstructing factors and in view of utter irrelevance of aids with regard to the manifestation of the self (identity) of cognition-the cognition must be admitted as self-luminous³⁷.

Against this Kumārila upholds that there can be no-knowledge if any of the three terms of the cognitive act, i.e. the nominative, the accusative and the instrumental, is absent. Although it is true that at the time of its appearance there is no obstructing factor to prevent manifestation of cognition, yet it is not apprehended, simply because there is no suitable means to effect it. Kumārila observes : "It is not merely because of the obstructing factors that the object is not comprehended. Even in absence of the specific accessories means etc. that there is absence of cognition"³⁸.

An estimate of Kumārila's polemics against self-lumino-
sity.

Kumārila distrusts the notion of self-luminosity chiefly because he thinks that the concept invariably leads to idealism by eliminating the independent existence of the object. "If the idea is said to be cognised at the time of the cognition of the object and in that case, the existence of the object would be struck off at its very root, and it is for this reason that we bring the objections home to them"³⁹. As has been shown, his refutation stems from his conception of Knowledge as an act. The finality of the distinctions of knowledge, knower and known, which has been the mainstay of his polemics, flows from the definition of knowledge as an act. It may also be noted that the act of cognising i.e. the object-bound operation of the means of cognition is essentially a mechanical or unconscious process. Once knowledge is identified with it, it can be safely demonstrated as non-self-manifesting and unconscious. What intermediary process intervenes between the eye-object (jar) contact and the resultant cognition 'I know the jar' is scarcely known to us. Kumārila identifies knowledge with the series of unconscious operations of cognitive mechanism and is broadly correct when he upholds it to be non-self-luminous. Besides, the posterity of philosophers owes him certain vital distinctions and points of clarification which helped future deliberations on the

problem. They may be noted as follows :

1. Kumāṛila was the first to distinguish between the 'cognition' and the manifestation (revelation).
2. He rightly affirmed that the subject and the object of knowledge are exclusive notions and the function of one should not be assigned to the other.
3. If knowledge is conceived as an act, the distinction between the knowledge (instrumentality), knower (agency) and known (accusative) flows from the analysis of the meaning of the term (knowledge) and as such must be basic to all epistemology having such a concept of knowledge at its base.
4. Direct apprehension of the cognitive act is not possible.

*Refutation of Kumā-
rila's views by
Śāntarakṣita*

It is fairly obvious that in his polemics against self luminosity, Kumāṛila is simply consistently working out the implications of his concept of knowledge as an act. Against him, however, one may point out that his very concept of knowledge is erroneous. The identification of knowledge with the intervening processes of cognitive mechanism is peculiar and is removed from the commonsense notion of knowledge. Even if an act of knowledge is a necessary supposition to account for the origination and destruction of cognition, it is the result (*phala*) of the act, rather than the act itself which is designated as knowledge. In common parlance, the term knowledge stands for the resultant manifestation e.g. 'this is jar' and not for the operations which effect it. It is with reference to this fact of manifestation that the theory of self-luminosity has been put forth. As will be clear from the following extracts, Śāntarakṣita has taken care to emphasise it in pointwise refutation of Kumarilas view on self-luminosity in Tattva-Saṃgraha.

"When the cognition is produced, it is produced as differentiated from all unconscious forms and it is in this fact of its being, 'not unconscious' that constitutes its self-cognisability"⁴⁰.

Elaborating the point, the commentator remarks: "When cognition is said to be self-cogniscent, it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself. What is meant is that it shines, becomes manifested by itself by its very nature, just like the light diffused in the atmosphere"⁴¹.

It is further pointed out (obviously with Kumāṛila's act theory of knowledge in mind) that "there can be no 'self-cognition' of the cognition in the sense that it is the 'action' and also the active agent, because one and the same entity, which is impartite in form, cannot have three characters. Hence the only right view is that the 'self-cognition' of the cognition is due to its being of the very nature of consciousness"⁴².

Examining Kumāṛila's view that the cognition does not cognise itself for want of necessary potency (relevant means of knowledge etc.) it is pointed out that all this is irrelevant. The aid of accessories and means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) etc. may be necessary to bring about a cognition, but once it is there, it is manifest without them. It is the very meaning of manifestation that it is manifest independently of the aids. Elucidating the point, the author of 'Tattva-Saṃgraha' offers a somewhat rudimentary definition of self-luminosity.

"It means that for the cognition of its own form the cognition does not need any other thing ; and yet it is not uncognised. This is what is meant by self-cognition".

It is interesting to note that 'the absence of relevant means (*pramāṇābhāva*)', which has been the reason (*hetu*) in Kumāṛila's argument against self-luminosity, now far from being so, comes to be viewed as a part of the meaning of self-luminosity and is put forth as a reason in support of it. It goes to the credit of Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa that his criticism constrained the author of Tattva-Saṃgraha to elucidate the notion of self-luminosity in the aforesaid manner, which set forth guidelines for all future definitions of self-luminosity.

It may be noted that the difference between Kumāṛila and the Buddhists stems from two distinct notions of cognition, and in spite of all ingenuity freshness and discernment of Kumāṛila's reasoning, one cannot help feeling that his identification of knowledge with the unconscious operations of cognitive mechanism is unusual and inconsistent with the established usage of the term as 'manifestation of the 'object'. It is the manifestive character which distinguishes the cognitive occurrence from all other occurrences and entitles it to be so designated. Kumāṛila's concept of cognition fails by ignoring this unique distinction of all experience and is for this very reason not only repudiated by his idealist adversaries, but is embarrassing even to the realists.

Nyāya critique of self-luminosity, and the theory of anuvyavasāya

Next only to the Bhāṭṭas, the schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism are conspicuous for their repudiation of the theory of self-luminosity. The Bhāṭṭas strike at the root of the problem by denying the very possibility of direct apprehension of cognition.

The Nyāya realist, on the other hand, while conceding that a direct knowledge of the mental phenomenon is no less certain than that of the external objects, simply questions the validity of self-luminosity as a suitable hypothesis to explain this directness of cognition. In fact, cognition is but one mode of the complex variegated mental phenomenon, which is open to direct introspection. By an act of 'looking inward' we can be directly aware of our cognition, just as we are aware of our feelings of anger, love, hatred etc. The Nyāya Sūtra observes: "the intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are apprehended through the internal organ."⁴⁴ It is the sense object contact which vouchsafes directness to a cognition (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-janyam jñānam pratyakṣam*)⁴⁵. Hence all that is needed to ensure direct apprehension of a cognition is the assumption of an internal sense, which may, as an instrument of introspection, explain our direct knowledge of psychic occurrences, like the external senses accounting for the perception of external things. The direct apprehension of cognition thus being explicable with the help of mind as the instrument of introspection, the assumption of self-luminosity becomes altogether unnecessary.

The concept of mind occupies an important place in Nyāya epistemology. It has been ascribed the dual functions preventing simultaneous occurrence of cognitions and serving as an internal organ for the perception of the mental phenomenon. The Nyāya realist will agree with the Bhāṭṭas and perhaps with better reason that in the moment of its existence, cognition is solely occupied with revealing the object, and hence the manifestation of cognition simultaneously with the object will not be possible owing to non-availability of opportunity and the relevant means. However, once the cognition of the object is produced, there is nothing to prevent its direct apprehension in the next moment. Hence, there can be two distinct acts of cognition with reference to a cognition, accounting respectively for the apprehension of the object and an introspection into that apprehension. The first act of cognition technically called '*vyavasāya*', manifests only the object and takes the propositional form 'this is jar'. This primary cognition (*vyavasāya*) itself can be apprehended by the secondary act of cognition which takes the form 'I know the jar' or 'I see the jar'. This second act of cognition is called *anuvyavasāya*. It is emphasised that the cognition brought about by the sense object contact is apprehended like joy etc., by the special mind-soul contact abiding in the soul⁴⁶.

The Nyāya theory of *anuvyavasāya* is criticised on the grounds that it leads to infinite regress. Besides, how can a cognition be a cogniser or an instrument to cognising as well as an object of cognition? Countering the objection, the Nyāya Sūtra maintains that the distinction of cogniser and cognised is functional. It is according to its role in a given cognitive situation that something may be ascertained as the cogniser, the means of cognising and the object cognised. The means-object-dispensation (*pramāṇa-prameya-vyavasthā*) is made according to whether something is the cause (goal) of human endeavour or is the cause of the apprehension of something⁴⁷. Thus the soul may be the cogniser in one cognitive situation and the cognised in the other. As to the charge of infinite regressus, it replies as follows: once the usage is explained, there is no justification in continuing the query to the infinite regressus⁴⁸. The idea is that once the valid linguistic usages separately referring to the cognition of the object and the cognition of that cognition are explained as cases of apprehension (*vyavasāya*) and introspection (*anuvyavasāya*), it will not be appropriate to extend the query further to the 'apprehension of the apprehension of the cognition' and so on ad infinitum. Such an exercise is not desirable because it will not serve any practical purpose.

The Nyāya theory viewed as an improvement on the Bhāṭṭa theory of knowledge

It has been customary to refer to the Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa views respectively as the 'Quality theory' and the 'Act theory of knowledge'. The distinction, though technically correct, is perhaps not as fundamental as it is made out. In fact all schools of thought, which uphold that knowledge is a product, subscribe to the Act theory of knowledge in some form or the other. The only difference is that while Kumārila and his followers identify knowledge with the cognitive act itself, the Nyāya realists, the Buddhists and the Prabhākarites identify knowledge with the resultant product thereof.

It is the nature of an act to produce certain effects in the object. The Bhāṭṭas, once they identified knowledge with the cognitive act, were simply consistently working out the implications of their theory when they claimed that knowledge produces the distinction of knowability (*jñātātā*) in the object, before it is known or revealed. It simply comes to mean that we do not know the object as it is, but only as affected by the knowing activity. The suggestion is repugnant to the spirit of common sense realism whose cardinal dictum is: 'Objects are revealed as they are'. The school of Nyāya realism, therefore, rejects the theory of *jñātātā*, and defines knowledge as a 'quality' rather than an 'act'. It preserves the integrity of the object in as much as it is now the subject (the soul) and not the object which becomes reci-

pient of the distinction (*atīśaya*) in consequence of knowledge. Thus knowledge distinguishes the subject as it subsists in it as a quality, whereas the object is simply 'revealed' or 'manifest' and not acted upon as the Bhāṭṭas try to make out.

This emphasis on the revelatory character of knowledge marks a definite advancement on the Bhāṭṭa epistemology and is the saving grace of the otherwise grossly mechanical Nyāya theory of knowledge. Significant also is the recognition of the fact that knowledge is not an isolated affair but belongs to the wider psychic phenomenon inclusive of feelings, emotions desires etc; and which together with cognition, belong to the self as its qualities. All these qualities of the self share the common characteristic of perceptibility through internal organ. Acceptance of direct apprehension of cognition and an attempt to account for it within the frame-work of a realistic epistemology is yet another creditable feature of the Nyāya theory. The gain in this direction is, however, only marginal. While the Naiyāyika succeeds in affirming as well as accounting for the fact of direct apprehension of experience (cognitions, feelings, etc.), experience itself has been relegated to the lowly position of a 'thing'. In Nyāya view, the 'cognitions' of things are things among things and are apprehended just as the things are apprehended. Curiously the Bhāṭṭas in their anxiety to preserve the integrity of the world of objects, reserved the privilege of direct apprehension to objects alone and unknowingly put their finger on the unique distinction of knowledge when they emphasised that the knowledge itself cannot be presented as an object. The Nyāya realist, in an apparently benevolent attempt to undo this injustice to 'experience'—of course without diluting the Bhāṭṭa assumption, that objects alone are directly revealed, makes the concept of the object so comprehensive as to bring cognisings also within its denotative range. For him, 'whatever is nameable, is knowable' (object). Neither experience nor soul, in fact nothing could be beyond the all comprehending arms of the 'thinghood' (*prameyatva*), its chilling deadening touch. However, there are aspects of Nyāya epistemology i.e. emphasis on manifestive character of knowledge, and recognition of a wider phenomenon of experience to which cognition belongs, which may be rightly acclaimed as a definite advancement towards a revelatory theory of knowledge. If the manifestive character distinguishes the knowledge from the object, as the Nyāya polemic tries to make out against Yogācāra idealist, then the distinction between 'revelation' and 'revealed' is fundamental, and to say that the 'revelation' itself becomes 'revealed' (*in anuvyavasāya*), amounts to erasing a distinction so laboriously secured. The task of accommodating the theory of self-luminosity to a realistic epistemology was left to Prabhākara.

*The Prabhākara
School of Mīmāṃsā
on Self-luminosity*

The Prabhākārites maintain that one and the same act of cognition invariably illumines the knowledge, the knower and the known (*sarvatra pramāṭṛ pramiti prameyeṣu triṣu samvidekaiva*—Pr. P.p. 168) It may

be exemplified as follows: The object e.g. a jar shines for me and not for others; it is the jar that shines and not the cloth and that this is a state of knowing as different from sleep. This tridal pattern is uniformly discernible in all experiences. It has been made clear time and again that the cognitive act, revelatory of the three aspects i. e. the cognition, the cogniser and the cognised, is one and the same (*meṃyā mātrāvabhāsarūpā samvidekā*—Pr. P. p. 171) This view, it is pointed out, is not only a faithful description of the cognitive situation but is also economical as it brings no extra assumption into play to explain the cognition of cognition in the fashion of the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas.

As every cognition is a case of tridal revelation, the logician's distinction between the proposition (*vyavasāya*) and the judgement (*anuvyavasāya*) is inconsistent and untenable. If the cognition itself is to be apprehended like an object, there shall be no distinction between the cognition of cognition and the cognition of the object (*svapara-samvedyayoranatisayaprasaṅgasyāt*—Pr. P. p. 168) Elaborating the point, the commentator observes: "There is no other act of cognition to comprehend the comprehension. If it were so, it would have been comprehended. Besides, if an act of cognition is posited as cognising the comprehension, that must lead to infinite regressus. It cannot be said that since there is no experience having experience as its object, it would lead to the contingency of non-availability and denial of experience. The objects, being insentient, expect to be established through some valid source of knowledge, that itself renders the acceptance of self-proved cognition indispensable. Otherwise the entire world plunge into darkness⁴⁹.

The author of *Nyāya Siddhi*, thus having shown that self-luminosity is a better supposition than *anuvyavasāya* to explain the manifestation of cognition, proceeds to define self-luminosity as follows :-

Self-luminosity (of knowledge) consists in its independence of the aid of another co-class knowledge with regard to self-bound usage (*sva-sambhādha vyavahāre*)⁵⁰. Unlike the subject and the object of a cognition, which depend on that cognition for the linguistic usage pertaining to them, the fact of cognition does not depend on any cognition other than itself for the self-bound usage. Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the proof for self-luminosity. Nothing will be manifest, if the cognition remains unmanifest. The manifesta-

tion of cognition however, cannot be explained as a case of apprehension of a cognition by subsequent cognition, since when it is not manifest in the moment of its existence, how can it be manifest when it is non-existent. In fact there never exists a light which is unmanifest (*prakāśasya tvāprakāśa-mānasya sattaiva nābhyyupeyate—Pr. P.p. 173*). The supposition of self-luminosity, is the only satisfactory explanation of the manifestation of cognition.

Prabhākara's contribution assessed

It goes to the credit of Prabhākara that he clearly saw for the first time the a-metaphysical character of the theory of self-luminosity. His epistemology is a bold demonstration of his finding that not only the theory of self-luminosity but also the theory of triple revelation of which it is a part, can as well be put to the service of realism as of idealism. It is true that the unity of revelation in a cognition is undeniable, but it does not mean that the revealed contents thereof are also identical. On the contrary, the triple appearances (of cognition, cogniser and cognised) in a single cognition, reflect the reality of the cognitive situation and their distinctness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of their distinct relationship with the cognition. While the self (soul) and the object are manifest as the substratum and the object of the cognition, the fact of cognition is manifest by the relationship it bears unto itself. According to the yogācāra school of idealism the distinct appearances based on these relationships are false impositions on pure cognition (*svalakṣaṇa*). The school of Prabhākara, on the other hand, maintains that these relationships are real and reflect the reality of the cognitive situation. In either case it remains purely a matter of conviction and not a deduction from the concept of self-luminosity. The theory of self-luminosity correctly understood does not favour any metaphysics, though the concept may be so defined as it may be dovetailed to and employed in understanding a metaphysical system. This conclusion is a landmark in the evolution of the theory of self-luminosity and signifies the distinctive relevance of Prabhākara to the present study.

Prabhākara's explanation of self-luminosity differs remarkably from the Buddhist (*vijñānavādin*) view of it. The Buddhists, who take self-luminosity in the sense of self-apprehension, take pains to emphasise that there is no inconsistency in cognition becoming an object unto its own effulgence. Prabhākara on the other hand, may say that the concept of self-luminosity does not involve violation of the law of exclusiveness of agency and accusative (*Kartṛ Karma bhāva-virodha*) and hence the Buddhist line of defence is altogether irrelevant. According to Prabhākara, the distinction between the respective manifestations of the self-substratum, the object and the identity of cognition is fundamental and in order to manifest itself, the cognition need

not become an object unto itself. The manifestation of cognition is due to the relation of identity it bears with itself. It is notable that the Buddhist exponents as well as the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā adversaries of self-luminosity took it in the sense of self-apprehension. Prabhākara's view that self-luminosity denotes not self-apprehension but the self-affirming identity of experience, cuts at the very root of these controversies and marks a definite improvement on the earlier views.

The first phase of the survey reviewed

With this analysis of Prabhākara's view on self-luminosity concludes the first phase of this study.

The concept of self-luminosity of knowledge was

put forth by the Buddhists in the contexts of their idealistic doctrines, and its implications were worked out in detail, for the first time. It was rejected by the Bhāṭṭas who questioned the very possibility of direct apprehension of experience. As they deny the very fact of direct apprehension of knowledge, its explanation in terms of the hypothesis of self-luminosity becomes redundant. The Nyāya realists on the other hand, while adhering to the position that object alone is capable of direct apprehension, widened the scope of the 'object' to include 'knowledge' in it. They accepted direct knowledge of knowledge just as they could have accepted the direct knowledge of jar etc., and accounted for it in terms of introspection or internal perception. The supposition of self-luminosity is hence found unnecessary. In Prabhākara's theory of tridal knowledge, the Buddhist doctrine of self-luminosity re-emerges without its metaphysics. What is distinctly reminiscent of the Buddhists is the insistence that the act of cognition manifesting the subject, the object and itself is one and the same. The Buddhists (*vijñānavādins*) pressed the supposition of tridal revelation into the service of their idealistic metaphysics, and emphasised that in the first place, the triple manifestation are forms of experience and not of things, and secondly these forms as appearances in the single moment of experience, must be ultimately false. Prabhākara, on the other hand, maintained that the distinct appearances of knowledge, knower and known in one and the same cognition do not necessarily be taken as unreal impositions on cognition; they may as well be construed as reflections of the terms of real relationships which are essential to a cognition, i.e. substratum (self), the object, and the identity of cognition. Pure cognition is a myth. It is always a relational affair. This insight of Prabhākara not only prunes the concept of self-luminosity of its idealistic implications but also sets aside any suggestion that the concept emphasises the superiority of thought over matter, since the difference between the self-manifest cognition and other-manifest object is now simply the difference of relationships they bear with cognition. Thus understood, there is nothing in the concept of self-

luminosity, which may lead to idealism or suggest that the Idea belongs to a superior order of being than the object.

The emergence of this chastened and a-metaphysical version of the early Buddhist concept of self-luminosity becomes possible mainly because the four systems--the Buddhists, the Bhāṭṭas, the Naiyāyikas and the Prabhākārites notwithstanding the differences, subscribe to a common connotation of knowledge which makes it possible for them to have a meaningful dialogue on self-luminosity. They all hold knowledge primarily as a transient and caused phenomenon and are distinguished from the group of systems which take knowledge as an abiding principle of consciousness. In these systems the problem of self-luminosity is posed with reference to the transient phenomenon of knowledge i.e. ideas and cognitions etc. It is conceived by the Buddhists and the Prabhākārites respectively as 'self-apprehension' and 'self-manifestation'. The Bhāṭṭa and the Nyāya adversaries too, who refute these concepts of self-luminosity and offer their own explanations of 'knowledge of knowledge', have the familiar connotations of the term 'knowledge' in mind, as they expose the inconsistencies of the aforesaid concepts of 'self-luminosity' and offer their own explanations of the problem of 'knowledge of knowledge'. A notable point is that in these systems, the controversies on self-luminosity centre around the transient phenomenon of knowledge (cognition ideas etc.), which though significant cannot be of unqualified relevance when the term knowledge (jñāna) is taken to denote an abiding principle of consciousness, and the problem of self-luminosity is posed with reference to that. Within a limited framework, however, their reasonings are, thoroughgoing and conclusive.

II

The problem of self-luminosity in the systems of spiritual philosophy

Next, one comes across the quasi-spiritual philosophies of Jainism and Sāṅkhya wherein, with the acceptance of consciousness as the primary meaning of knowledge, the problem of self-luminosity is raised on an altogether different plane. These systems are called quasi-spiritual only with reference to the spiritual Absolutism of Śāṅkara Vedānta with which they share a broad community of sympathies. They all subscribe to the supposition of consciousness, as an abiding principal of experience underlying the transitory phenomenon of cognitions. As a unitive principle, the consciousness is identical with self; it is indubitable in the sense that its denial cannot be conceived and hence it must be accepted as the first necessary presupposition of any meaningful account of experience. It alone represents the primary sense of the term 'knowledge', whereas the cognitions are called so only in a secondary or

derivative sense. The common assumptions as to the nature of consciousness, bring the two systems perilously close to Advaita Vedānta. The assumption of the Self as identical with consciousness being common, it is the notion of plurality of selves which constitutes the differentia of the Jain and Sāṅkhya concepts of Self from the Vedānta view of it. However, as Dr. Radhakrishnan has shown, mere numerical difference between the principles of consciousness without any essential basis for the distinction, is untenable.*

A close scrutiny of the basic concepts of these systems paves the way for Vedānta Absolutism. In fact the dualism of Sāṅkhya and Jain systems may be viewed as an intermediary stage in the transition from Nyāya Mīmāṃsā pluralism to the Absolute and unqualified monism of Śāṅkara Vedānta.

The concept of self-luminosity in Jainism

Of the two classes of reality, according to Jainism the living (*jīva*) and the non-living (*ajīva*), the living consists of an infinite number of souls (*ātman*).

The *ātman* is of medium size with consciousness as its essence. An obvious corollary of this identification of self and knowledge is the replacement of the three-term account of knowledge by a two-term account. Knowledge reveals the object as well as itself by the revelatory character peculiar to it and the instrumentality of the mediating factors-senses etc. is either wholly unnecessary or simply an aid to limited knowledge, which becomes redundant as the soul rises higher through austerity and purification and progresses towards realisation of its all knowing excellence (*sarvajñatā*). Of the two types

* It is not possible for us to support the doctrine of the plurality of souls when we have no means of finding out whether in the ultimate condition there is any basis of distinction. Salvation is inconsistent with a separate personality that is throughout hampered by what is external and contingent and is bound up with bodily organism and nature itself. The particularity of Self opens the way to error and sin, and salvation means the abolition of this particularity. It is only by stopping short at a half-way house that Jainism is able to set forth a pluralistic realism (Indian Philosophy Vol. I p. 338 and 340).

There does not seem any basis for the attribution of distinction to Purusas. If each Purusa has the same features of consciousness, all pervadingness, if there is not the slightest difference between one Purusa and another, since they are free from all variety, then there is nothing to lead us to assume a plurality of Purusas. Multiplicity Without distinction is impossible..... plurality would involve limitations, and Absolute immortal eternal and unconditioned Purusa cannot be more than one.

(Indian Philosophy vol. II p. 322).

of perception (*pratyakṣa*), sensuous and nonsensuous, the latter alone represents the direct knowledge in the right sense of the term. The sensuous perception, which accepts the mediation of senses, etc., can be called immediate only derivatively or by proxy. Here too, it may be recalled that the senses do not contribute towards the revelatory character of knowledge. Thus the two-term account of experience finds a complete and flawless expression in Jainism because of its peculiar conception of reality as that which persists inspite of production and destruction. The transient cognition is simply a mode of the abiding principle of consciousness and not an ideal form of intermediary existence between the featureless consciousness and the object, as maintained by the Vedāntins. It cannot be said that in order to explain the occasionality of cognition, some sort of contact has to be admitted between the consciousness and the object, because it is the very nature of consciousness to illumine itself and the other, i.e. the world of objects.

Knowledge is svaparābhāsaka Knowledge thus comes to be defined in Jainism as that which illumines the self and the other (*svaparābhāsaka*). Since consciousness (*jñāna*) itself is affirmed as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) the problem of self-luminosity forms part of the discussions on the nature of *pramāṇa*. Samantabhadra was probably the earliest Jain thinker (Circa 580 to 680 A.D.) who defined valid knowledge as self and other illumining (*svaparābhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhuvi buddhi lakṣaṇam*)⁵¹. Acarya Siddhasena, his contemporary, calls the self and other illumining, uncontradicted experience as valid. (*pramāṇam svaparābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam*)⁵². Akalaṅka later on adds the qualification determinate (*vyavasāyātmakam*) to the definition and restates it as 'the determinate experience which apprehends the self and the other (*vyavasāyātmakam jñānam ātmiārthagrāhakam matam*)⁵³. Acārya Māṇikyanandī holds that the determinate knowledge of the self and the unapprehended object is valid (*svapūrvārtha-vyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam*).⁵⁴

This definition restricts the usage of the term knowledge to concrete experience i.e. to the experience with a definite or determinate content. All hypothetical concepts of knowledge—the 'svalakṣaṇa' of the Buddhists, the the indeterminate perception of the Nyāya realists and the pure featureless consciousness of the Vedāntins are excluded from the Jain concept of knowledge. Significantly, it affords us an insight into the fact that self-luminosity of knowledge does not necessarily entail denial of the revelation of the other by it. A lamp is seen to reveal itself as well as the objects which fall in its range, without entailing any inner contradiction. True to its metaphysics of manifoldness of concrete reality, Jainism consistently

upholds the self and other illumining (*svaparāvabhāsaka*) character of knowledge. The twelfth verse of *Anyayogavyavaccheda Dvātrimsikā* says: "knowledge is capable of revealing itself and the object. Otherwise even the talk of objects would be impossible. And yet afraid of their critics, other schools maintain that knowledge (*jñānam*) is not self-bound (*anātmaniṣṭha*)"⁵⁵.

The commentator, the author of *Syadvādamañjarī* points out that in the aforesaid verse the term '*prakāśate*' being made predicate of '*bodha*', the latter is suggested to the mind as a kind of light. As all lights are luminous of self and object, the same is true of knowledge also⁵⁶. If knowledge is not regarded as self-luminous, it would require to be revealed by another knowledge, and that by a third knowledge and so on ad infinitum. Thus knowledge being unsure of itself, the object itself insentient and non-luminous and expecting to be revealed, will ever remain unrevealed. Even the talk of object would become impossible⁵⁷.

The commentator takes up for consideration the stock objection of *kartṛ-karma-virodha* against the hypothesis of self-luminosity. It may be recalled, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold knowledge to be an act, and emphasise that no act can have itself for its object any more than 'a gymnast howsoever well trained he is, can ride upon his own shoulders or a sword howsoever sharp can cut itself'. Keeping the distinction between the act of knowing and knowledge (*jñapti*) in view, the commentator asks: Does it mean that the act of knowing cannot be directed towards itself, or that the resultant knowledge cannot know itself. As to the first alternative, the author points out that the Jāinas do not identify knowledge with the 'act of knowing'. But as for the resultant knowledge, (*jñapti*) it can be directed towards itself; when the knowledge arises, it is already invested with that particular character just as the light of a lamp (*pradīpālōka*) springs into existence as (*prakāśa*) or illuminated. This light cannot remain unilluminated while it illuminates others, nor can it be illuminated from another light and so on. The first supposition is contrary to experience, the latter involves regressus (*anavasthā*). The author concedes the point of the objector that the light does not illumine itself; on the contrary, it springs into existence as illumination and it is exactly in this sense that it is called 'self-illuminating'. When it is said that knowledge is self-illuminating, it does not mean that knowledge appears before itself as an object. The sentence 'knowledge knows itself, (*jñānam svam jñānāti*) is analogous to the sentence the lamp shines (*pradīpaḥ prakāśayati*)"⁵⁸

The view that knowledge is manifest without becoming an object is a significant advance as it suggests the vedānta distinction (*lakṣaṇa*) of self-

luminosity as 'non-objectified immediacy'. But it is too much of a categorical position to sustain for a system, which prefers to reconcile contradictions in a conception of total reality, rather than resolving them through finer analysis. One notices sudden relapse from the position 'knowledge reveals itself without becoming an object', as the author seems to concede the incongruity of '*kartr̥ karma virodha*' in self-luminosity and defends it by saying that 'the incongruity when it is in the nature of things and is proved by experience, cannot be set aside by logical considerations. (*anubhavasiddherthe virodhā-siddheḥ*).⁵⁹

For all the systems which subscribe to the theory of self-luminosity, the question naturally poses itself as to the exact mode of it. Three possible answers are suggested: (1) Knowledge becomes an object unto itself (2) it is manifest through the relation of identity with itself (3) knowledge is manifest without becoming an object to itself or to another knowledge.

Jainism does not seem to be very particular about the mode of self manifestation and the aforesaid explanations may be traced all and sundry in the Jain texts, without inconvenient and exclusive elaborations. Besides the third-explanation which brings Jainism perilously close to the Vedānta approach, the first two explanations, reminiscent respectively of the Buddhist and the Prabhakarite views also find place in a typically Jain approach to the problem. At one place it is suggested—

just as the knower (*jñātr̥*) is known as knower (*jñātr̥*), even so the experience (*anubhūti*) is known as experience (*anubhūti*) (and not as experienced)⁶⁰. This position is quite close to Prabhakara's, who upholds three basal non-reducible relationships with regard to the revelation of cogniser (*jñātr̥*) cognition (*jñāna*) and cognised (*jñeya*). Another answer suggested in similar context is: Experience (*anubhūti*) is experience (*anubhūti*) in relation to the object but it is experienced or *anubhāvya* (object of experience) in relation to itself⁶¹. Here self-luminosity is understood as self-objectification or self-apprehension, a view traditionally ascribed to the Buddhists.

It must be admitted that while Jainism is not prepared to commit itself as to the exact mode of self luminosity for fear of becoming categorical, it shows a clear grasp of the basic issues at hand. It is only as a principle of luminosity, as in the case of light, that knowledge can be described as self-luminous. It is the behaviour of the well known luminaries that gives the term 'self-luminous', its distinct significance. The author of *Syādvādamāñjari* knows with no less certainty than Kumārila (the most prominent adversary of the hypothesis) that the central argument for self-luminosity revolves

around the concept of knowledge as 'light' and stands and falls by the legitimacy of the description of knowledge as 'light'. Hence his argument for self-luminosity runs as follows: "Knowledge illuminates the objects while illuminating itself, because it is an illuminator like a lamp. The objection that the knowledge, if it is illumined, cannot become an illuminator does not stand to reason, because the two things refer to two different dimensions of knowledge (luminosity); while self-revelation signifies the manifestation of the identity of revelation, it is called illuminator with reference to objects by removing the veil of ignorance"⁶². Another argument for self-luminosity of knowledge is put forth as follows: "cognition (*saṃvit*) is self-luminous because it is manifestive of the object (*artha*); that which is not self-luminous is not manifestive of *artha*" (as a jar)"⁶³.

Significance of the Jain view

The Jain case for self-luminosity suffers from an obvious limitation. The very concept of knowledge as '*sva-parāvabhāsaka*' flows from the analogy of the material luminaries lamp etc. and when put forth as the unique distinction of knowledge, it unduly extends to the lamp etc. which are insentient (*jaḍa*). Śaṅkara and his followers struggled hard to evolve a definition of self-luminosity, which could serve as a unique distinction of knowledge to the exclusion of the phenomenal luminaries. But curiously enough, the Jain texts do not evince even the awareness of the problem. However, on the positive side, the following points of the Jain account of self-luminosity may be noted in brief. Disposing off Kumārila's contention that the illuminators such as eye etc. are not known to illumine themselves, it is pointed out that the eye etc. are illuminators not as physical organs but as sensuous consciousness (*bhāvendriyās*), and the sensuous consciousness is self-luminous. It is a significant supposition explaining how the concept of consciousness may be reconciled to specific cognitions, and seems to have suggested the Vedānta theory of '*vṛttijñānā*.' The application of self-luminosity is not restricted to cognition alone; on the contrary, corresponding to the Jain connotation of the term 'knowledge' (*jñānam*), it applies to consciousness as well as to its modes, the cognitions. Prabhākara makes the concept of self-luminosity as part of the realistic epistemology, whereas in Jainism it is part of spiritual realism. While in Prabhākara's system 'self luminosity' is one of the three invariable but distinct relationship of the manifestation to the cognition, cogniser and cognised, in Jainism it seems to represent the unique distinction of the self which is identical with consciousness. In Prabhākara's system, the revelation of the cognition (the self or identity of revelation) has no better status than the revelation of the cogniser and the cognised, just as one side of a triangle is neither more nor less significant than others. On the

other hand, it may be remarked, in a two-term account of experience. by an affirmation of identity, the knower is assimilated to knowledge, and a simple relation obtains between the source of effulgence and the phenomenon, illumined—the 'obligor' and 'obliged', the 'giver' and the 'recipient' of luminosity; and which of itself bestows a somewhat superior status to experience. In Jain system, unlike Prabhākara's, the emphasis is not so much on the relation of identity as on the identity of revelation itself. Notable is also the fact that while emphasising the basic unity of the principle of manifestation, it is the identity-in-difference and not the undifferented unity that Jainism seeks to emphasise. The 'a priori unity' is too much of a hypothetical or isolated concept to be of any relevance in Jain wisdom. By defining revelation itself as '*svaparāvabhāsaka*', all possibilities of the bare identity of revelation, as postulated in Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems, have been discounted. However, the very recognition of the revelation (consciousness) as a unitive principle is a notable advance. Besides, the identity of self and experience, the two-term account of experience, the acceptance of consciousness as a principle of revelation, are some basic assumptions which distinguish Jainism from the realistic systems considered so far, and bring it close to the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta philosophies of experience.

Sāṅkhya-yoga view In Sāṅkhya Yoga system, the polarity of the dual referents of experience (i.e. the principle of revelation and the phenomenon revealed is clearly established. According to these systems the selves (*puruṣa*) and the matter (*prakṛti*) are the two absolutely distinct orders of reality. They are variously referred to as the sight (*dṛk*) and seeing (*darsana*)⁶⁴, the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and the seen (*dṛśya*)⁶⁵, the witness (*sākṣī*)⁶⁶ and the cognised (*viśaya*)⁶⁷, the light (*prakāśa*)⁶⁸ and the illumined or the recipient of light (*prakāśa kriyā sthitiśīlam*)⁶⁹.

Consciousness is not an attribute but the very essence of the *puruṣa*. The seer is the sight itself⁷⁰, the witness, a neutral isolated on-looker and not an agent in activity⁷¹. On the other hand the matter (*prakṛti*) is constituted of the three attributes (*guṇa*) is non-intelligent, indiscriminate, productive and of the nature of objects⁷². It is the recipient of light (*prakāśa-kriyā-sthitiśīlam*)⁷³. From the absolute exclusiveness of the principle of revelation and the phenomenon revealed, there results the definability of the 'revelation in terms of the denial of 'revealedness' or 'objectness', which itself is hypostatized as its unique distinction i.e. its self-luminosity. That is how the light of consciousness is distinguished from the inert phenomenon of 'lustre', which belongs to the *sattva* constituent of the matter (*prakṛti*). The *sattva* is luminous but not self-luminous. "It can reflect the light and

its bright nature is only to this extent. When there is illumination of sentience in the form of the self, that illumination is reflected on the *Sattva* element in threefold matter. The reflected light appears to be the light of the matter itself, just as the light of the Sun reflected from the moon and the planets appears to be the light of these bodies."⁷⁴

Distinct from the *puruṣa*, the bare given of consciousness, the reflection of consciousness in pure *sattva* form constitutes the intellect, the first order of phenomenal experience, which is at the base of further diversified, phenomenal forms of experience and carries the light of consciousness to them. Thus the distinction between the consciousness and cognition which was only vaguely felt in some systems emerges sufficiently distinct for a clear-cut formulation. While consciousness serves as the revelatory basis for the entire complex of phenomenal experience, the intellect, the senses and their specific cognisings, are like other material objects, evolutes of the matter (*prakṛti*), and derive their revelatory character from the self, the principle of revelation par excellence. Thus the very identity (self) of consciousness, distinct from its reflections in matter (*prakṛti*) constituting the varying orders of phenomenal experience, comes to be distinguished as self-luminous.

The problems of Sāṅkhya philosophy are the problems of all dualistic systems. If the principle of revelation (consciousness) and the phenomenon revealed are extremely distinct, no relationship, not even the illusion of relationship can be possible between them. The evolution of the phenomenon becomes inexplicable, in a absence of any conceivable meeting point between the self (*puruṣa*) and the matter (*prakṛti*). Sāṅkara agrees with Sāṅkhya that the self is identical with pure awareness. He, however, rejects the Sāṅkhya conception of plurality of selves on the ground that the individuality of self is itself a trace of phenomenality, a false ascription to the bare principle of awareness, absolute and unsurpassable. The belief in an absolute spiritual reality—the Brahman, which is not only a principle of knowledge but also of being and bliss and which shines as the lone transcendental base of all that is sentient and insentient, constitutes the hard core of Sāṅkara Vedānta. In Sāṅkhya and Jainism, the objects have a principle of existence independently of the self, the principle of awareness. But Sāṅkara appears to agree with the Buddhist contention that unless there is some common spiritual bond between the manifesting and the manifest, the former cannot illumine the latter. Unrelated to experience, the objects cannot, even be so much as conceived or imagined to exist, because all conceiving or imagining is an exercise in ideation, and the object is projected as related to experience by the very exercise which seeks to demonstrate to the contrary.

It is emphasised in Sāṅkhya Sūtra that since luminosity or manifestive character cannot belong to the unintelligent, it must belong to the *puruṣa* (*jaḍaprakāśāyogātparakāśaḥ* I. 145). Commenting on the sūtra, Vijñānabhikṣu observes: "It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light, (it is not self-manifesting). If soul, also, were unintelligent (as the Naiyāyikas hold it to be a substance; knowledge being by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities), then there would need to be another light for it, and as the simple theory, let soul itself consist, essentially of light."⁷⁵ The Yoga-Sūtra 4.13, '*na tat svabhāsam dṛsyatvāt*' explains why the '*citta*' as different from '*citi*' (consciousness) is not self-luminous. The reason given in the '*yoga-vārtika*' gloss on the same sūtra observes that the self-luminosity of the *puruṣa* consists in the independence of its manifestation and not in its being the object of experience.⁷⁶ Thus, in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga literature non-objectifiability is repeatedly emphasised as the unique distinction of the light of consciousness, the very meaning of its self-luminosity, though the term itself has been used very sparingly.

III

The Vedānta View : According to Advaita Vedānta, the self (which is identical with the absolute reality) is not only the principle of revelation (*cit*) but also of being (*sat*) and bliss (*ānanda*). It is the substratum of all that shines and exists. All that is limited and transient, all that has its being in the world of appearances, subsists in the basal transcendental principle of reality. From it they derive their definitive character and unrelated to it, they remain inconceivable and dwindle into nothingness.

(i) Multi-layered treatment :-

The principle of pure awareness thus permeates an infinite variety of phenomenal existence, the manifestation or appearances of which are characterised by a certain amount of immediacy determined by the degree of its transparence (receptivity) or participation in the ground effulgence. It will be useful in this context to distinguish respectively between the ground effulgence and the phenomenal luminaries which derive their effulgent character from the former, and the world of objects which they seek to illumine. The self (*Brahman*) is the principle of revelation *par excellence*. Consciousness is the very essence and not an attribute of it. *Brahman* alone is direct and immediate. On the other hand, the character of immediacy in phenomenal instances such as sense perception etc. is derivative and not primary. It is due to the light of self that the phenomenal luminaries, the

material as well as mental are effulgent. However, compared to the world of object, they belong to a higher order of spiritual existence. Thus, the phenomenal luminaries enjoy an intermediary existence between the ground effulgence, and the bare hypothetical object, the nothing. From the absolute stand point, they, together with the objects they illumine, belong to the recipient phenomena, the order of 'revealed', distinct from the principle of revelation. From the relative standpoint however, they do constitute an order of effulgent existence, which distinctly serves to illumine the world of objects. The problem of self-luminosity in Advaita Vedānta viewed from these different standpoints necessitates supposition of different measures of self-luminosity and a temptation for a simplified version of Vedānta view has frequently misled the adversaries as well as the devoted exponents of the system.

The problem is made all the more intricate by the admission of the degrees of immediacy among the varying orders of phenomenal luminaries themselves. The light of cognition in the form of sense perception is more immediate than the light of the lamp which itself must need be perceived for manifestation. But the pure ideas, as obtain in dream state are the luminaries of higher order than the cognitions which are object-bound and depend on so many accessories. But it is the witness self, the detached seer of all the 'seeings', all the psychic events, which signifies, at the phenomenal level manifestive principle of the highest order. But highest of all is the Brahman, the pure, formless, eternal, immutable continuum of effulgence.

(ii) *Degrees of self-luminosity :-*

The notion of degrees of 'manifestiveness' is thus basic to the Vedānta philosophy of experience, although its significance has not been adequately appreciated. Accordingly, it becomes necessary for the vedāntin to accept different notions of self-luminosity, not only from the absolute and relative standpoints, but also for the different levels of the relative, the dependent, the phenomenal order of luminaries. Hence, the Vedānta theory of self-luminosity, thanks to its comprehensive approach to the problem of experience, is, of all accounts, most complete and thoroughgoing. It does not exclude other views on the problem, but simply accommodates them to varying orders of phenomenality. Over and above, the Vedānta discussions of the self-luminosity of the Brahman (self) pose the problem with reference to such dimensions of experience which others never dared to explore, nay even to recognise.

(iii) *Self-luminosity as unknowable immediacy :-*

Brahman (identical with self) is the Absolute principle of being and manifestation (*satyam jñānāmanantam brahma*). The world of phenomenal

existence, of duality and distinctions, is sustained and revealed by it. Herein lies the quintessence of its freedom, the meaning of its self-luminosity. It is exactly in terms of denying the phenomenality or its distinctive limitations that the seers of upaniṣads, and the Vedānta scholarship following them, sought to grasp the meaning of self-luminosity. In brāhadāraṇyakopaniṣad King Janaka poses the question to sage Yājñavalkya : What serves as light for man? and through a process of successive elimination of mediate cognitions and their accessories, the sage leads the disciple round, to grasp the significance of the free unconditional ground effulgence, the light of pure experience which is identical with the self, itself is its light (*ātmaivāsyajyotirbhavati*)⁷⁷. Similarly Muṇḍakopaniṣad observes: "No sun sheds its light on it, no moon, no stars, the lightening and the fire lose their shining character before it. It is through the light of this great illuminator that every thing else derives its light (*tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*)"⁷⁸. Śaṅkara and his followers found that presentability, objecthood, form or limitation is the distinctive feature of phenomenality and sought to define the ground immediacy (effulgence) as that which is not presentable. (*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam*)⁷⁹. That is how the lone ground effulgence comes to be distinguished in Advaita Vedānta from the multiplicity of the derivative phenomenon of luminaries.

(iv) *Two-term account of experience with a difference :-*

One cannot help noticing that the emphasis on the lone indivisible oneness of the principle of revelation, distinguishes the Vedānta concept from all other revelatory concepts of knowledge. It may be recalled that the Jain thinkers conceived revelation as that which is self and other illumining (*svaparāvabhāśaka*). It means that the manifestation of the 'other' is as necessary a part of the meaning of revelation, as the manifestation of its identity (self). The Vedāntin will, however, never subscribe to the view that like the manifestation of its identity (self), the manifestation of the 'other' should also be admitted as the part of the meaning of revelation. Of course, like all other schools which subscribe to the revelatory theory of knowledge the Vedāntin also accepts a two-term account of knowledge, with the self (identity) and the 'other' as the two dimensions of the fact of revelation that is knowledge. However, according to Vedānta, the manifestation (appearance) of the 'other' is a false projection of the self, which, from the ultimate standpoint, abides only as self-luminous and not self and other illumining, simply because there is no other to be illumined (*yatra sarvam ātmaivābhūt tatra kena kaḥ paśyet*). The sun illumines itself as well as other things but its luminous character cannot be made dependent on the illumination (manifesta-

tion) of others. The sun will shine even when there is nothing else to shed its light on.

In the context of Vedānta philosophy the principle of revelation and the phenomena revealed are not of the same ontological status. The latter depend on the former not only for 'manifestation' but also for their limited being. The relation between the 'revelation' and the 'revealed' is unique. It is so conceived that it binds the 'revealed' to the principle of revelation, but leaves the latter absolutely free. It is primarily this freedom of the principle of revelation, which the Vedāntin seeks to ensure and visualise through the concept of self-luminosity. This is the final, the unconditional stand of the Vedāntin.

(v) *The comprehensive character of the Vedānta approach :-*

The system, however, as has been noted above concedes a measure of effulgence to the phenomenal luminaries as well, from the relative standpoint. Each case of experience enjoys a specific measure of freedom corresponding to the degree of its effulgence and immediacy and may be called self-luminous to that extent.

It may be noted here that the varying concepts of revelation and self-luminosity offered by the different schools of thought, are clearly assignable to these varying levels of phenomenality in the Vedānta system. Thus the Jain concept of 'revelation' as self and other illumining (*sva-parāvabhāsaka*) applies to all the connotations of 'effulgence' except the highest self, the transcendental principle of effulgence. The Buddhist notion of self-luminosity as 'self-apprehending idea' may be assigned to the dream state of the Vedāntin. Similarly the Prabhākara concept of self-luminosity (as a relation of identity), nay even the *anuvyavasāya* of the Naiyāyikas may be accepted in the Vedānta system with regard to certain specific levels of experience.

It may be recalled that the Sāṅkhya system also subscribes to the theory of degrees of experience and seems to have influenced the course of Vedānta thinking in this respect. In sāṅkhya system, however, there remains an unbridgeable gap between the self and the evolved phenomena. On the other hand, the Vedānta system upholds that the entire phenomenon with its bewildering multiplicity, all the conceivable forms of phenomenalisation are rooted in a single unitive base, whereby they derive their definitive significance, their limited being and effulgence (appearance). It is this transcendental unity of apperception, which imparts comprehensiveness, depth and unity to the Vedānta philosophy of experience and distinguishes it from all other systems of thought.

It is against this theoretical background that the present dissertation, besides offering a faithful exposition of the Vedānta view, puts forth in the first place, the thesis of degrees of self-luminosity, and secondly seeks to examine the possibility of accommodating differing concepts of self-luminosity in a comprehensive account of the Vedānta philosophy of experience. These conclusions, though implicit in all Vedānta thinking, have nowhere been explicitly stated. It is true that the notion of states of experience (waking, dream and dreamless sleep) postulated in the system, provides a sure base for a theory of degrees of experience, but it was scarcely developed in that direction. What is more, nowhere in Vedānta texts do we come across the notion of degrees of self-luminosity. Some very obvious anomalies follow if the notion of 'degrees of self-luminosity' commensurate with the notion of degrees of experience is not accepted in the system. In the first place, when the Vedāntin maintains that the term 'knowledge' is applicable to the mental modifications by proxy (*upacāra*)⁸⁰. It is quite natural to expect a derivative or conditional sense of self-luminosity, corresponding to this conditional sense of knowledge. Secondly, if Brahman alone were self-luminous and not the cognitions etc., the concept will be of no epistemological worth and the Vedāntin can have no controversy with the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsa realists, who seek to refute simply the self-luminosity of the cognition and are hardly concerned about the self-luminosity of Brahman. The fact that the Vedāntin does have such controversies serves to show that even the cognition is upheld as self-luminous, though in some relative or conditional sense and quite distinct from the sense in which the Brahman (the highest self) is called self-luminous.

(vi) *The Self-luminosity of the Absolute as indefinable :-*

There is yet another notable feature of the Vedānta exposition of self-luminosity. The psychic facts carry a sort of necessity, an undeniability, which is not given to other facts. The necessity is primarily a 'feel of identity' and is not to be confused with its logical equivalent, the conception of identity in terms of the denial of the 'other'. While the concept of self-luminosity seeks to analyse the meaning of 'luminosity', the sense, in which the identity of effulgence is distinguished, simply denotes the unanalysable, the unreflective, the felt identity of the psychic being. The two levels of the treatment of the problem, the demonstrative and the analytic are clearly discernible in the Vedānta expositions of the problem. While the elements of 'indubitability', 'necessity' and 'belief' directly evidence the self-manifestive dimensions in varying orders of experience, the definitions of self-luminosity, the inferential proofs based on them offer the analysis of the concept with respective denotations of the term in mind. It further serves to highlight the sense in

which self-luminosity of the highest self, is distinguished from the relative dependent or derivative meanings of the term in which it is applicable to the phenomenal luminaries.

The self-luminosity of the highest self survives only as a 'bare feel' of identity. But its simple meaning content is not analysable, not definable. It is so because the highest self is the principle of lone effulgence; there is no other, not even the negation of the 'other', in terms of the exclusion of which, the felt (identity) of effulgence may be defined or reflected upon. The self-luminosity of the highest self is indefinable, simply because defining is a relational affair and can never be operative with regard to a bare identity. Even the accidental distinction (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*) of the Vedāntin does not take us very far. It is upheld in this dissertation that none of the eleven connotations of self-luminosity offered by Citsukhācārya, the eminent vedānta dialectician, applies to the highest self. However, they do apply to the varying levels of this phenomenal existence with the witness self at the highest. Beyond them is the continuum of indefinable indubitability, the bare feel of identity.

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CHAPTER III

The Concept of Knowledge as a Principle of Revelation

The concept of knowledge as a principle of Revelation eternal and immutable, is a key concept in Vedānta philosophy of experience. It is also a necessary supposition of the Vedānta concept of self-luminosity, and as such its elucidation rightly constitutes the starting point for the study of self-luminosity in the system.

The elucidation of the revelatory concept of knowledge in Vedānta consists in bringing out successively: (1) the essential identity of self (knower) and experience (knowledge), as an eternal principle, (2) reconciling the upaniṣadic account of experience to the commonplace notion of knowledge as a product or a transitory occurrence by showing that latter is a derivative phenomenon of the former (3) elucidating the sense in which the eternal principle of knowledge as marked out in (1) may be conceived as a principle of revelation, by offering a corroborating analysis of relevant Śrūti and (4) an exemplification of the experience as a principle of revelation in deep sleep and empirical verification of the aforesaid analysis. The implications of this distinctly Vedānta concept of revelation for the concept of 'self-luminosity' may also be appropriately marked out.

Identity of self and Experience

As the distinction between the knowledge and the knower introduces a fundamental schism within experience itself, the first step towards establishing experience as a principle, must commence by showing the essential identity of the unitive experience by demolishing the distinction of the 'knowledge' and the 'knower' (at the pre-epistemological level of experience). The identity of self and experience has been a recurring theme of the upaniṣads. The self has been described as 'pure mass of intelligence' (*Br. Up. IV 5. 13*), who 'embraced by knowledge knows nothing within, nothing without' (*Br. Up. IV. 3. 21*), 'devoid of distinctions of inner or outer is the effulgent *puruṣa*, the transcendental immutable' (*Mund. Up. II. 1. 2*). The self is not

just the knower, but the transcendental principle, the 'seer of sight', the 'hearer of hearing' (*Br. Up. III. 4.2.*). 'He is the unfailing seer.' (*Br. Up. IV. 3. 23.*). Similarly the knowledge is not to be confused with cognition, since scriptures describe it as eternal and immutable. 'The sight of the seer never diminishes because it is eternal'. (*Br. Up. IV. 3. 20.*). The mainstay of Śaṅkara's reasoning throughout has been that the notions of self and knowledge, when pruned of their phenomenal traits, have a common content to denote—the bare continuum of experience, admitting of no inner or outer distinction. The notions of agency, instrumentality, and accusative, which account for the distinctions of knowledge, knower and known, are alien to the ontology of experience. His reasoning to bring about the identity of self and experience hence consists of a process of reduction, aimed at bringing out the essential or primary meaning of the two terms, so that their identity may be a foregone conclusion, as the individuating traits are rejected as alien or non-essential.

The notion of agency in self a matter of grammatical convenience

The difference between 'knower' and 'knowledge' is quite obvious in common parlance, Self is known not as knowledge but as the agent of the act of knowledge; even scriptures frequently resort to such usage. "The seer, hearer, feeler, smeller, taster, meditator, knower and doer is the being of the nature of consciousness. (In deep sleep); he is properly settled in the transcendental immutable Atman" (*Prasna up. IX. 9.*). The question is : How to reconcile the Śrutis which lay down knowership of *ātman* as its essential character with those which uphold identity of self and experience. Śaṅkara has carefully dealt with the problem.

In his gloss on the aforesaid lines of *Prasnopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara points out that the intellect which reveals the self as the agent of sight, touch, audition, smell, taste, meditation and doing, is itself known by the self as an instrument or means, effecting such knowledge. The idea is that the 'form' whereby the self is revealed as agent is itself not the subject in the strict sense of the term, since this itself is presentable as an object. Hence, Śaṅkara concludes, that the consciousness put in nominative case is self (*ātman*), which has knowership as its essential nature.¹ The phrase '*kartā kāraṇa rūpa vijñāna*' is significant, as it unmistakably emphasises the point that while knowership is the *esse* of subjectivity, this itself is no more than 'experience' put in the nominative case. It amounts to saying that the notion of agency which distinguishes the knower from knowledge is simply a matter of grammatical convenience, a matter of idiom rather than of fact.

Knowership as the esse of self, not compatible with the notion of agency

The emphasis in the Upaniṣads on knowership (*jñātṛatva*) as the *esse* of self is not an innocent verbosity of stock phraseology as may appear at first sight. The description of knowership as 'esse' of subjectivity, by itself tends to exclude the notion of 'agency' in our understanding of the self. The 'agency' as entailed to a subject by an act, can never be affirmed as its *esse*; it is so because an act even when it continues, entails simply a continuity of conjunctions and disjunctions and as such, cannot be its *esse* i. e. an abiding character of its being. The agency of goership or playership belongs to self only when it is engaged in these activities. But it cannot constitute the *esse* of self because it is a transient phenomenon depending on the occurrence of a corresponding act. Similarly, *ātman*, the Knower par excellence, may still be put in the nominative case, but knowership itself 'fixed and frozen' an immutable, indivisible *esse* of self, is inconceivable except as the very identity of thought continuum, whereon the appearance of agency is superimposed as a discursive necessity, a matter of linguistic convenience rather than of ontology.

Knowledge affirmed as the esse of subjectivity is an eternal principle and not a product of cognitive mechanism

The Nyāya realist points out that all knowledge is transitory and as such knowership is a non-essential or accidental quality of the self. The same man may be said to possess the attributes of goership when he moves and the contradictory attribute of non-goership when he is stationary. Hence the characteristics of knowledge emphasised by the followers of Kaṇāda are '*samyojakatva*' or production by virtue of contact and '*ayauga-padyatva*' or non-simultaneity.² The first condition denies possibility of knowledge as an eternal fact, whereas the second condition excludes the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of contradictory attributes e. g. goership and non-goership, thinkability and non-thinkability.

Knowledge, eternal, and transient

It is at this stage that Śaṅkara is obliged to make a distinction between eternal and transient knowledge. It has been an unfortunate aspect of Indian philosophy that the term '*jñānam*' has been used rather indiscriminately in the dual senses of cognition and consciousness and the ambiguity is at least as old as the scriptures themselves. Respect for tradition comes in the way even when one seems to be aware of the necessity of drawing a clear cut distinction between consciousness and cognition. Śaṅkara circumvents the difficulty by making them represent two varieties of knowledge. Step by step we are led to realise the distinction between two types of knowledge—basal

and derivative, the eternal and transient, without actually using separate terms for cognition and consciousness. He does not refute the realistic view of knowledge as cognition, but simply shows its insufficiency and points out that it falls short of the upaniṣadic view of knowledge which declares the knowership of self as eternal and undiminishing. The sight of the seer never diminishes because it is eternal. The audition of the hearer never diminishes because it is eternal. (*Br. U. IV. 3. 23*).

Śaṅkara therefore distinguishes between two types of sight, the sight of eye etc. which is perishable and the sight of self which is eternal.³ The sight characterised by conjunctions and disjunctions is non-eternal because it is an attribute of the concrete transient substrates as eye etc. which are capable of conjunction and disjunction. But the self, eternal, immutable and abstract, is incapable of conjunction and disjunction. Therefore, the transient characteristics generated by conjunction etc. cannot be ascribed to it. Hence it is said, 'the sight of the seer never diminishes because it is eternal.'⁴

Śaṅkara points out that the distinction between the eternal and non-eternal sights may be borne out in common experience. A man who has lost his eye sight can be heard saying 'today in dream I saw my brother. Were the sight of self a product of self 'object' contact, it would have perished at the loss of visual organ. In that case the blind would never see blue and yellow colours in dreams.'⁵ But the fact that he does see 'colours' proves beyond doubt the existence of two types of sight (*dr̥ṣṭi*) eternal and non-eternal.

Śaṅkara's reasoning demonstrates identity of knowledge and knower

It is only in the light of distinction of eternal and transient knowledge, that the descriptions of self as 'the seer of sight', the hearer of hearing (audition) can be meaningful. Knowledge can be said to be the *esse* of subjectivity only when it is upheld as an eternal, immutable principle of consciousness.

Śaṅkara's reasoning to bring about the identity of knowledge and knower is plain enough. He shows that their individuating contents are extraneous to them and emptied of these contents we are left with a common homogeneous idea-base. Thus while the notion of agency is shown extraneous to the concept of self, the eternal knowledge is at the same time shown independent of the characteristics of coalescence (*samyojakatva*) and non-simultaneity (*ayaugapadyatva*) which belong only to the transient knowledge. The reduction of self and experience to the bare identity of principle

of awareness has thus been worked out both ways, although to show that the agency does not belong to the self would of itself prove that knowledge is not an act or effect thereof and vice-versa, because the notions of agency, instrumentality and effectness are interrelated and if agency is denied to a cognitive situation, other notions analytically related to it also stand denied.

Knowledge identical with self is a meta-principle

The opponent, taking knowledge in the sense of cognition, continues to emphasise the point that the self has been referred to in the Upaniṣads as the seer, hearer, thinker and knower. These characteristics cannot be part of the nature of the knower, just as the act of going cannot be part of the nature of the 'goer' nor the act of cutting part of the nature of the agent, the cutter. (*na hi gamireva gantaḥ svarūpam chidivā chettuḥ*).⁶

It may be alright so far as it goes, says Śaṅkara. But has not the self at places in the Upaniṣads been also described as the 'seer of seeing', 'hearer of hearing' 'thinker of thinking' and 'knower of knowing'. Can this refined version of the self salvage it from the taint of phenomenality which accrues to it in the guise of agency etc. and resolve the unhappy self-contradiction of scriptures which describe the self on the one hand as knower, seer etc. and on the other hand affirm its identity with 'knowledge'? The opponent points out that it is no better than the earlier one as it accrues no distinction to the *ātman*. The seer, whether the seer of pot or the seer of sight remains just the seer. The refined version of self as 'the seer of sight' accrues distinction to the object of seeing rather than to the seer.⁷

Having anticipated these objections, Śaṅkara proceeds to show that the distinction between the 'seer of sight' and the 'seer of pot' is fundamental and that the meta-experience or the transcendental experience is not merely another variety or just a negative counter of the phenomenal experience.

To begin with, one point of difference that accrues to the 'seer' of the 'sight' is quite obvious. In the case of 'seer of seeing', if it exists at all, it must be an eternal principle. It never happens that the seer fails 'to see' the 'seeings' (*na hi draṣṭurdr̥ṣṭeḥ viparilopo vidyate 'vināśitvāt Br. Up. IV, 3. 23*). If the sight of the seer were non-eternal, the 'seeing' i. e. the seeable sight might sometimes not be apprehended at all, just as the objects jar etc. are at times not apprehended by the non-eternal sight of the eye etc. However, it never happens that the 'seeable sight', while manifesting the object itself remains eternal, imperishable and ever manifest, in contrast to the transient sight which is perishable and object-bound.⁸

Knowledge as a principle of non-objectifiable immediacy

Having shown that knowledge or knowership can be the 'esse' of 'subjectivity' only as an 'eternal principle' Śaṅkara proceeds to show that this principle is immutable and indivisible i.e., it cannot suspend itself to turn back and reflect how it 'looks'. Here the main plank of Śaṅkara's reasoning are the dual-assumption regarding the self-experience-principle. In the first place the very notion of subjectivity is exclusive of thinghood or objectness, and as such no character, no form can be logically ascribable to the principle of knowledge, which is identical with subjectivity. Secondly, the principle of *subjectivity* is also the principle of *reality*, which is exclusive of the notion of '*appearance*', and as such, whatever is apprehended or put forth as the content of 'self-knowledge-continuum', will yield only the '*appearance*' and not the '*reality*' of the self. The idea is that the self-knowledge identity is non-objectifiable, non-presentable.

Śaṅkara's analysis of the Issues is very illuminating. In his preface to the second chapter of *Aitareya upaniṣad*, he shows that the pure self, the 'unthinkable thinker', the unknowable knower 'cannot be thought of as the agent of the acts of knowing. Thinking etc. The cognitive acts such as hearing etc., can be directed only towards the object and not to their own 'substratum'. The act of thinking on the part of the thinker cannot operate in a place other than the thinkable object. (*na hi mantavyā-danyatra manturmanan kriyā sambhavati*).⁹ Thus proceeding on the assumption that the notions of 'knower' and 'knowable' are contradictory or exclusive, it is upheld that the *ātman*, which is the thinker of all this, will ever remain the thinker and will never become the object of thinking (*sarvasya yo-yam. mantā sa mantaiveti na sa mantavyaḥ syāt*).¹⁰ There can be no other thinker of that thinker. If the thinker is considered as knowable to its own self, then the *ātman* will split into two parts : the *ātman* which thinks and the *ātman* which is thought of; or like the parts of a split bamboo, one and the same self will have to be accepted as divided into two parts, one the knower, the other the known. Whatever alternative is chosen, it remains untenable. Just as the two lamps, owing to the common nature they share, cannot illumine each other, similarly here too, there cannot be illuminator-illuminated relation between parts of the self.¹¹

Śaṅkara makes it plain that once we try to apprehend the self discursively, i. e. as an object signified by the agency of knowership etc. the split is inevitable. With surpassing insight, he points out that there is no moment when the thinker can be engaged into self thinking, since in the very moment

he is apprehended as an object through a sign, there ensues a split in the self in the former manner i. e. the self as knower, and the self as known¹². And curiously, what is apprehended again is not the knower. Language deals in the world of duality or appearances and that which is apprehended through a sign is the *appearance* and not the *reality* of the *Self*. Any further signification in this respect will yield only further appearances or appearances of appearances without ever arriving at the Reality. The categories of language are hopelessly inadequate to measure up the mystic experience. In language, which reminds one of Nāgārjuna and Bradley, Saṅkara seeks to conjure a poetic vision of the indescribable transcendence.

It is the state in which affirmations and negations and all other distinctions of mind and speech unite, and the person, who wants to visualise the pure unqualified experience, transcending all verbal appearances as 'is' 'is not', one many, qualified non-qualified, knowing not knowing, active inert, fruitful fruitless, originative non-originative, blissful sad, middle non-middle Śūnya, non-Śūnya, transcendental ego or something 'else', wants as if to bundle the sky in a leather case or to climb to it through a ladder. He, as it were, wants to discover the footprints of fish and birds in the water and the sky. ¹³

This seems rather an abrupt conclusion of the systematic exposition aimed at elucidating the Vedānta concept of knowledge as 'unknowable'. Here first of all knowledge has been shown as different from its conception as an occurrence and as an abiding principle identical with self. This principle is then shown as immutable and its immutability analysed in terms of its non-objectifiability or non-phenomenality. Needless to say that this exposition has been consistently dealing in categories of language and logic. The concluding observation, however, rejects the very relevance of linguistic or logical categories with regard to the absolute. Does it mean that the aforesaid analysis falls short of the Absolute Spiritual Reality, the Brahman? Notably, it is this very analysis of the upaniṣadic concept of knowledge as a non-objectifiable principle that has been put forth as the meaning of its 'self-luminosity'. Hence to say that this analysis does not belong to Brahman, may mean that the Absolute is not self-luminous, or is self-luminous only in some altogether different unanalysable sense. The suggestion is significant as it underlines the necessity of a careful and multi-layered treatment of the problem of self-luminosity in the Vedānta system.

II

Elucidation of the Revelatory Concept of Knowledge

The Revelatory concept as a pivotal myth, determining the Vedānta philosophy of experience from within

The realistic epistemology seems to be inadequate in the context of the aforesaid account of experience. The reason has been fairly explained by the Buddhists. They point out that the realistic epistemology arbitrarily requires the experience to conform to the categories of language and as such cannot but produce false and distorted notions, when brought

to bear on ontological issues. Hence, 'to know', being a transitive verb, gives rise to expectancy regarding the agent, the instrument and the object of the act of knowing, and the epistemology seeks to explain knowledge in terms of the knower, the known and the means (of knowledge). It needs little discernment to see that if the upaniṣadic account of experience analysed in the preceding pages is to be consistently upheld, a new and more liberal idiom, which may reconcile the commonplace to the transcendental, must replace the fundamental or epistemological account which is hopelessly restricted to a very small fraction of 'experience'.

As has been noted, the upaniṣads often replace the transitive 'know' by the intransitive 'to shine' and 'knowledge' by the term 'illumination'. Knowledge, thus conceived as a principle of revelation, happily illustrates the distinctive points of Vedānta idealism. (1) It helps us to understand how knowledge can be conceived as an abiding fact, an ontological principle, different from and independent of the world of objects. (ii) In a luminous body, the 'illumination and 'illuminator' are non-distinguishable. As Śaṅkara very ably points out, in a flame (the illuminator) is nothing but a mass of illumination.* Hence, knowledge conceived as a principle of illumination, significantly illustrates how knowledge and the knower may be identical. (iii) Between the lamp and the object (recipient of light), say a jar, no instrumentality intervenes (at least it seems so) to effect the manifestation of jar, and the lamp seems to oblige the recipient simply as a matter of grace. The two term account of experience can be better appreciated when conceived in terms of the principle of revelation and the phenomenon revealed. (iv) It demonstrates 'conceivability' of knowledge, even when there is no object to reveal. The vedāntin is never tired of reminding us that the lamp shines, even when there is no object to shed its light on (v) It further serves to show how experience, inspite of its being an illuminator of the world of diversified objects, can retain its absolutely free, distinct and non-relational

* "Sankara declares that quality cannot extend beyond substance. The flame of a lamp and its light are not related as substance and quality. Both are fiery substances only in the flame the parts are drawn closer together while in the light they are more widely separated" -Indian Philosophy, vol. II p. 599.

character (vi) The term 'illumination' better conveys the idea of meta-experience which distinct from the world of objects and object-experience, which are recipients of its light, is a self-distinguishing self-shining principle.

In fact, the revelatory concept of experience, conveys much more than what the bare analysis without it could have conveyed. Far from being merely an illustrative metaphor, the concept of revelation is a pivotal myth which determines the Vedānta thinking from within. It may be noted that while in a systematic philosophical exposition, the analysis precedes substantiation or instantiation, in actual psychological occurrence, it is the concrete image which precedes abstraction and determines the course of reflexion from within.

Some basic issues involved in a revelatory concept of knowledge — the Vedānt approach towards them

Apparently the usage of the term light is limited to the physical phenomenon, which seems as an accessory to the visual organ, and is applied to knowledge only in a metaphorical sense. While sun, moon, etc are insentient (*jaḍa*), knowledge is a conscious principle (*ajāḍa*) and the two do not seem to have anything common in reality.

However, if it is said that 'manifestation' is the common character shared both by physical and spiritual luminaries, and on this ground if an ideal or basal principle of revelation underlying all luminaries is admitted, then the problem of distinguishing 'knowledge' from physical luminaries, becomes significant. The distinction between knowledge and physical phenomenon of light is more obvious to common sense than the principle of manifestation, wherein the two are rooted. The description of knowledge as light, the realist may point out, tends to abolish this significant distinction between sentient (*jaḍa*) insentient and (*ajāḍa*) and confuses the metaphorical with the actual or direct significance.

1. The Vedāntin boldly accepts the idealistic implications of his revelatory concept of experience. In reply to the aforesaid objection, he emphasises that the experience is luminous not in the derivative or metaphorical sense, but in the real or denotative sense.

According to the prevalent usage the term, 'light' or 'lustre' primarily denotes the physical phenomenon, which is accessory to the visual organ, and only in its secondary or metaphorical sense suggests knowledge'. In the context of Vedānta philosophy, which upholds a sort of Platonism between the Ideal Revelation (the principle of pure awareness) and its

phenomenal approximations, this usage is reversed. Here, the term 'luminous' or 'lustrous' primarily denotes the basal spiritual principle of revelation, the *Idea* of it, and is applied only secondarily or derivatively to the variegated phenomenon of luminaries. It is owing to an attempt to distinguish the 'revelation' in its primary sense from the derivative or metaphorical applications of it, that the term 'self-luminosity' gains its specific significance.

2. It may be further noted that once the fundamental principle of manifestation, underlying the luminaries of varying levels of physical, psychological and ideal existence is conceded, the distinction permissible in this frame work, can be only between the basal principle of revelation and the derivative phenomenon thereof. It coincides with the distinction between the 'eternal sight' (*nityā dr̥ṣṭi*) and the 'transient sight' (*anityā dr̥ṣṭi*), already made in this chapter. The distinction between the experience and the physical phenomenon of luminosity e. g. the light of lamp, though quite obvious, is not philosophically fundamental. The cognitions and ideas, though finer than the physical luminaries, belong to the realm of the phenomenal or derivative; are presentable to the self as things and as such are *jaḍa*, and are, in the final analysis, on par with other phenomenal luminaries as sun and moon etc. All the phenomenal luminaries sentient (*jaḍa*) as well as insentient (*ajaḍa*) derive their limited being and effulgence from the absolute principle of knowledge, being and bliss. This is the typically Vedānta attitude towards the revelatory concept of experience. The problems involved therein, may be traced in some detail in the following pages.

The author of *Brahma Sūtra* recognises the twin basic postulates of the upaniṣadic concept of revelation in two of his aphorisms i. e. '*jyotiścaraṇā-bhidhānāt*' (I. 1. 24), and *anukṛtestasya ca* (I. 3. 22) and thus sets forth the guidelines for all Vedānta thinking on the problem. The first of them underlines the fact that in the upaniṣads, the usage of the term lustre (*jyoti*) or its synonyms is not restricted to the physical luminaries sun, moon etc. but extends to the luminaries of spiritual and ideal levels of existence as well. The second aphorism '*anukṛtestasya ca*' goes to emphasise that the *Self* alone, is truly revelatory, and all other, luminaries simply imitate or follow it. The term '*anukṛti*' a sanskrit term for 'imitation', employed by Bādarāyaṇa himself, serves to throw into relief, the specific nature of Vedānta idealism, which seems closer to plato than to the subjective and the nihilistic schools of idealism in East and West.

In Śaṅkara's subgroupings of the aphorisms, the aforesaid two aphorisms are recognised as nuclei of '*jyotiścaraṇādhikaraṇam*' and '*anukṛtyadhikaraṇam*' respectively.

Śaṅkara's gloss on
jyotiścaraṇābhidhā-
nāt

In his comment on the aphorism, Śaṅkara attempts to show that the primary sense of the term 'lustre' is not restricted to the physical luminaries alone, but extends to other levels of being as well, nay to the Brahman itself, the highest principle of being and experience. The scripture under consideration is the third chapter of Chāndogya Upaniṣad, which having instructed the disciple in the worship of the lotus of heart (*hr̥dayacchidra*) in connection with Gāyatri lore, it is added; "Now after what has gone before, the lustre (*jyoti*) that continues to shine above the heaven, on the top of the world, on the top of everything in the best of all worlds therein, of which no other world is better (viz. Satyaloka), is the same as the lustre that is within this Puruṣa." (Chand. 3. 13. 7.).*

Here, Śaṅkara raises the question whether the light shining beyond heaven is some accessory (*anugrāhaka*) light of eye i.e. the physical light connected with the sense of vision, the light of the nature of effect, or is it the spiritual light-the brahman itself.¹⁴

Śaṅkara anticipates the case for the opponent and enlists the following objections to spiritual connotation of the term 'lustre'.

- (i) The term lustre must be taken to denote only the sun etc., because they are well known and established (luminaries). The scriptures use the word 'shine' in its well known connection with sun etc. and hence in its primary sense, they cannot ascribe the term to the formless Brahman.¹⁵
- (ii) The word Brahman does not occur in the passage, and the scripture "this is that very light which is inside the Puruṣa," shows that the light as preached here is the light of the nature of effect and non-distinct from the gastric fire etc.
- (iii) It is so because the scriptures also mention the heaven as the boundary beyond which that 'lustre' is said to shine; Brahman, which is the self of all and the source of all, cannot be said to

* Trans.—V.M. Apte.

have a boundary such as heaven. But lustre which is the modification or the effect can quite properly be said to have such a boundary."¹⁶

- (iv) "And also, the scriptural passage, 'He who knows this, in this manner, becomes handsome, well known' (Chand. 3. 13. 8), could not indicate Brahman, because of a minor fruit."¹⁷

Countering this line of interpretation, Śaṅkara upholds that by the term lustre, the Brahman should be understood, because of the context which refers to the dimensions of Brahman. He draws attention to the fact that the sentence preceding the given scripture, refers to the quadrupedal Brahman as indicated by the following Mantra: "Only that much is the greatness of this, greater than this is the Puruṣa, one foot of which represents all these beings and the remaining three immortal feet are in heaven" (Chand. 3. 12. 6)

It is the triple footed ethereal Brahman which is the subject of discussion in this scripture. It is obvious from the reference to heaven. Hence the lustre mentioned as shining above heaven, must be the lustre of Brahman. If one rejects that and accepts some natural light (prākṛta jyoti). then there ensues the defect of abandoning the given and presuming what is not given.

"Therefore", "by lustre, we should understand Brahman. It cannot be said that the words 'lustre shines' used in the case of lustre, the effect, when from the chapter the 'Brahman' is understood to be indicated. The words 'lustre shines' have not the effect of indicating any ordinary light to the exclusion of Brahman, and it is possible to use the expression for Brahman, which is suggested by an effect having 'shining lustre'¹⁹.

Having shown on the basis of context that the expression 'lustre shines' stands for Brahman, Śaṅkara points out that the meaning of 'lustre' is not confined to the physical luminaries alone. That the usage of the term 'jyoti' is not confined only to 'lustre' which helps the function of the eye—is obvious from the use of the term in other contexts as follows:²⁰ " 'Kindled by whose Teja, the Sun shines' (Tait. Bra. 3. 12. 9. 7.), 'where the sun has set. sound serves as light' (Br. up. 4. 3. 5), 'The mind of the partaker of Ghee is lustre' (Tait. Bra. 1. 6. 3. 3)."

Thus Śaṅkara shows that in the upaniṣads the term 'lustre' is meant to cover a wider range of meaning, than what is indicated by the physical luminaries. Elucidating the liberal connotation of the term he points out:

"Therefore, whatever is the cause, which makes different things manifest, is said to be the lustre. That being so, the term 'lustre' is appropriate in the case of Brahman, which is of the nature of Intelligence, because of Brahman, which makes the whole world manifest."²¹

Saṅkara's gloss on 'anukṛtyadhikaraṇam' Having offered a comprehensive definition of lustre, Saṅkara addresses himself to the task of distinguishing the real or basal principle of revelation from its phenomenal exemplifications. The sūtra 'anukṛtestasya ca' (B. S. I. 3. 22) proposes to consider the following śruti of Muṇḍakopaniṣad:

*"There the Sun does not shine, nor do the moon and the stars nor lightening, much less fire. All this shines in the wake of its shining. by its lustre all this shines. (Mund. II. 2. 10)."*²²

Here the question arises: Is the light referred to here, some lustrous : matter like the Sun etc or the self of the nature of experience ? The opponent's view is that the luminous being spoken of in the foregoing śruti refers to the same phenomenon of light, which the Sun, Moon, Stars and fires embody in varying degrees of intensity and volume. It however, surpasses them all by being most luminous as it has been described as defeating the light of Sun etc. It is a common experience that in the presence of higher light, the lower lights dwindle into insignificance. The Moon and the Stars, which have the nature of lustre do not manifest themselves when the Sun, whose nature also is lustre, shines during day time. Similarly the lustrous being in the presence of which the moons, the stars along with the Sun, do not shine, must be a luminary of the same order with them and not some transcendental principle of manifestation, like Brahman.²³ Its distinction from the known luminaries as Sun, Moon and Stars etc. consists simply in its being more luminous than all of them by virtue of which it defeats them and renders them ineffective. The point of the opponent is that the distinction of the luminous being, referred to in the Śruti, from Sun, Moon etc. is simply of degree and not of kind.

Taking up the second line of the Śruti, "in the wake of shining of which, all this shines," the opponent points out that the "shining in the wake of (something), is reasonably sustainable in the case of things, which have lustre as their nature, because we see that things which have similar natures imitate each other. For instance, it is only when there is already a man that is walking that another is said to follow him." Therefore, the opponent concludes, what is meant in the above Śruti must be something possessing lustre in the well known sense of the term, (and not some spiritual principle).²⁴

Against this Śaṅkara maintains that the term light stands in the upaniṣads for the self, the highest principle of revelation. "Why? Because of imitation (i.e. shining in the wake of). The word *anukṛti* means doing likewise."²⁵

Elaborating his point Śaṅkara observes: "To be lustrous is common to such things as the Sun etc. and they do not require anything of a similar nature, in whose wake they must needs shine. One lamp does not shine in the wake of another (i. e. one lamp does not help the other to shine)"²⁶ In the case of physical phenomenon of luminosity, there is no shining in the wake of another. The point Śaṅkara wants to drive at is that the second line cannot yield any sense if the luminosity is taken in the popular sense. Hence it must be so construed as to signify the self which as the highest principle of revelation is essentially distinct from the phenomenal luminaries.

In this context Śaṅkara pointedly observes: "It is not known and is contrary to experience to say that the Sun etc. shine by help of any other body of light, because one light (far from illumining) neutralises another."²⁷ Besides, "the shining in the wake of that" as its cause mentioned in the Śloka is not of Sun etc. only because the scriptures which mention of 'all this' without exception, show that the manifestation of names and forms and actions, agents and fruits is due to the existence of the light of Brahman, just as the manifestation of all forms etc. is due to the existence of the light of Sun."²⁸

Refuting the contention of the opponent that imitating is possible only among things of similar nature, Śaṅkara points out that there is no such rule that *anukṛti* (imitation) can be possible only among things which have similar nature, "because we find that there is such imitation even when the two things are dissimilar. For instance, a red hot iron ball, imitating fire, burns like fire, or a blowing wind sucks dust in its wake. This imitation is meant to suggest 'becoming manifest afterwards'. "The shining of Sun etc. which the scriptures mention as caused by it, makes us understand that the highest self is meant. The scriptures speak of the highest self as follows: The Gods meditate devoutly on it, as the light, of lights as immortal life (*Br. Up. IV. 4. 16*)."²⁹

Hence Śaṅkara concludes: "whatever becomes manifest becomes so manifest because of the lustre called Brahman, and the Brahman is not made manifest by any of the light, because it has the nature of being self

luminant, and the Sun etc. cannot make Brahman manifest. So say the scriptural passage 'Brahman alone makes other things manifest. He sits in the light of his own, Highest Self (Brh. IV. 36) and 'It is unperceivable and is not perceived.'"³⁰

The Transcendence and Immanence of the Principle of Revelation reaffirmed in sacred recollections (Smṛti)

The two lines of the aforesaid scriptures, the first one negating the light of Sun and Moon etc. in the highest principle of revelation, and the second one declaring them all as its imitations or exemplifications, jointly bring out the twin distinctions of the principle of revelation i.e. its transcendence and immanence with reference to the phenomenal

luminaries. The sūtra '*apīca smaryate*' (B. S. I. 3. 23) contends that not only *śruti* but also *smṛti* literature supports the vedānta concept of revelation. Śaṅkara's gloss noted two utterances of the Gītā, each one corresponding respectively, to the two lines of the aforesaid scripture, and thus emphasising the transcendence and immanence of the principle of revelation. These are as follows:

"The Sun cannot make it manifest nor the moon, nor fire. My highest abode is there from where a man does not return to the transmigratory existence."³¹

"You should know that the light in the Sun which makes the whole world manifest and which also is in the Moon and the Fire, is the lustre (teja) inherent in me."³²

A critical estimate of Śaṅkara's elucidative

Śaṅkara maintains that the term 'revelation' itself has to be redefined, in order to be significant in a philosophy of experience. His gloss on '*jyotiḥ śabdenābhidhānat*' and '*anukṛtyadhikaraṇam*' seeks to assign

a wider as well as deeper significance to the term 'lustre' than the commonly prevalent usage permits. His definition of lustre, 'that which is manifestive somethings' (*yadyatkaścidavabhāśakam jyotiḥ śabdenābhidhīyate*) goes far beyond the elemental luminaries and extends to cognitions, ideas and thoughts which serve to manifest some content. Looked more closely, the definition of lustre extends to the entire paraphernalia of the aids of understanding i.e. the feelings, the senses, the external conditions, the generalisations, postulates, suppositions, hypothesis and theories—in fact to the entire series of accessories, which may carry the light of knowledge to the furthest and most obscure regions of the 'Knowable.' However, it is the

depth of significance rather than the width of it, that makes 'revelation' a distinctly Vedāntic concept. The term 'depth' is meant to signify the Absolute principle of manifestation, the Idea of luminosity, which underlies all actual and possible luminaries, sanctifies them by its grace, as well as rejects them as insufficient by its Absolute reference.

Degrees of experience

Another notable implication of the aforesaid line of interpretation is the notion of degrees of experience.

One and the same fire, as Śaṅkara has observed, is exemplified in water and coal, and in fact in a host of media; but what he has not cared to emphasise is that they embody 'fire' in varying degrees. It is, however, plain from the scripture itself; the Sun, the Moon, the Stars and the fire, which are said to shine owing to the highest principle of Revelation, are unmistakably the luminaries of varying degrees. This will be all the more obvious if the cognitions, ideas and the varying planes of consciousness are also added to the list of luminaries. That the notion of degrees of experience is a cumulative import of scriptures, may be further borne out, when the question is taken up in some more detail when the states of experience i. e. the wakeful, dream and dreamless states are taken up for study.

Vedānta Platonism and the notion of immanence

All other luminaries as the sun and the moon and the stars etc. are said to imitate the Absolute principle of revelation. The strikingly similar use of the hypothesis of imitation (*anukṛti*)

to explain the relationship between the principal of revelation and its phenomenal exemplifications, serves to show the close affinity of approach between Plato and Vedānta. In fact Śaṅkara's elucidation of the concept of 'immanence' of the principle of revelation, closely reveals fairly comprehensive scheme of Vedānta Platonism. To put in Plato's terminology, one may say that Brahman is the Absolute *idea* of knowledge (Revelation), being and bliss. Whatever is manifest, is invariably an imperfect and limited exemplification of this ultimate *idea* (Absolute principle) of manifestation (knowledge), being and bliss. Just as the idea of the blue is imitated in all the infinite shades of blue, just as the space pervades all its limited manifestations in jar and monastery, even so the Brahman—the *idea* of Revelation shines in all the luminaries, elemental and ideal. As Śaṅkara puts it: "The sun illumines other non-luminous objects owing to the light of Brahman, he himself has no such power. Similarly, neither moon nor these stars shine there, nor lightening, then how can this commonplace fire known to us. What more to say, all this universe which is manifest, that itself being of

the nature of light, shines in the wake of the light of the Lord, who is self-luminous. Just as water and coal etc. burn things owing to the fire and on account of fire, and in themselves are incapable of burning (things). Similarly, the sun etc. and this entire universe shines by the light of the highest Lord .

The transcendence of the Principle of Revelation

Elaborating the notion of transcendence Śaṅkara observes: "The sun does not shine in *brahman*, which is the innermost self of it i.e. he does not illumine Brahman. Being the highest principle of revelation, he is not a recipient of light. In fact this is a measure of his independence as the absolute self-subsistent principle and as such, serves as the basis of the distinction of basal and derivative, real and the phenomenal, the ideal and the exemplification, the original and the counterfeited, of the free ontological principle of revelation and the phenomenon dependent on it. The non-illuminability by the lower order of illumination, which is obvious even in the case of commonplace luminaries, emerges as the unique distinction of the highest principle of revelation with regard to which the entire order of lower or phenomenal luminaries becomes irrelevant. In the context of experience, this non-illuminability comes to be referred to as unknowability, when the experience comes to be conceived of as a principle of revelation.

The transcendence and the immanence of the principle of revelation constitute the meaning of its self-luminosity.

The distinctions of transcendence and immanence refer as they do, to one and the same ontological principle, are conceived not as distinct but mutually implicative. In fact this analytically related or mutually interdefinable character of the two notions of 'immanence' and transcendence, is concretised as a real distinction. It is the 'manifestation' of the identity of the revelation as a transcendental and immanent principle, which has been technically termed as its 'self-luminosity'. Thus while one is analysing the notions of transcendence and immanence of the principle of revelation, one is already discussing its self-luminosity, without naming it, and that too cannot be deferred for long. It will be worthwhile to note, how from the analysis of these intrinsically related notions in the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara feels his way to 'self-luminosity.' He takes up the following utterance of Muṇḍakoṇiṣad for consideration,

"Hiraṇmaye pare Koṣe virajam Brahma niṣkalam,
Tacchubhram Jyotiṣām Joyotistadyadātmavido viduḥ.

(Mund 2. 2. 9).

In his gloss Śaṅkara explains the term '*virajam*' as that which is free from contamination (*virajamavidyādyāśeṣadoṣa rajomalavarjitam brahma*). The term *niṣkala* has been explained as that which is emptied of variations or degrees and hence devoid of parts (*niṣkalam nirgataḥ kalāyasmāttanniṣkalam niravayavam ityārthaḥ*). Śaṅkara further observes that since brahman is free from contamination, and devoid, of parts, he is *subhra* i.e. pure; he is 'light' i.e. illuminator of fire etc. and all luminaries. The idea is that the luminosity of fire etc. is also due to the light of consciousness which is the very identity of Brahman and self, which underlies them all. The light of self, which is not illumined by any other light is the supreme light, which those who are gifted with discrimination know as *ātman* i.e. the witness of all ideas and cognitions.³⁴

Śaṅkara's comments on Mund II. 2. 13 which has been the subject of discussion of the aphorism '*anukṛtestasya ca*,' further brings out that the twin distinctions of the principle of revelation i.e. its transcendence and immanence, which constitute the hard core of the Vedānta concept of self-luminosity. It is emphasised that the same brahman shines and illumines. The luminous character of Brahman stands self-proved on account of the variegated effect lights. It is so because that which is not self-luminous, cannot illumine others, just as the jar etc. are not seen illumining other objects whereas the sun etc. which are of the nature of light, have been seen illumining other things.³⁵

The passage is noteworthy as an earliest attempt at an argument for self-luminosity in Vedānta. It may be recalled that the Buddhists also tried to offer proof for self-luminosity of knowledge on the analogy of the self-illumining nature of physical luminaries. The distinction of the Vedānta view lies in its peculiar concept of *Revelation* and the adaptation of already available arguments to prove the self-luminosity to it. The fact of revelation, has been conceived in vedānta as an abiding principle, which is identical with brahman or the self. It is distinguished from all phenomenal luminaries on account of its being transcendental light (*param jyotiḥ*). pure (*subhra*), free from eternal contamination (*virajam*) and devoid of parts (*niṣkalam*). It has been described in the Upaniṣads as light of lights. It indicates what 'self luminosity' cannot mean in the Vedānta system. With regard to a principle of revelation as specified, the meaning of self-revelation, as the act of self-reflection, or self-apprehension, or self-intuition, is absolutely out of place. It is so because self-reflection presupposes duality, limited being and effulgence. The self, which is an eternal and immutable principle can never be presented as an object for apprehension or reflection. 'Just as fire does not burn itself,

in the same way this *self* as the principle of manifestation, cannot become an object of manifestation. It is self-manifest and is not 'known' as the objects are 'known'.³⁶

III

A corroborative analysis of the wakeful dreaming and dreamless states of experience

Significance of the analysis

It has been repeatedly emphasised in the course of this chapter that the concept of self-luminosity of knowledge stems, primarily from the concept of knowledges as a principle of revelation. The revelatory principle is, distinguished from the entire range of phenomenal luminaries, material as well as mental, by its self-shining character, which consists in its being transcendental as well as a basal principle. Self-luminous is thus the '*ideal*' luminary. Self-revelation, in the context of Sāṅkara Vedānta tends to acquire the sense of '*real revelation*' distinct from 'revelation' by proxy. No doubt, the phenomenal luminaries may be said to be self-luminous in a restricted sense, since they do not require the light of the 'same class' to illumine them. However, it is only the light of self, which alone is self-luminous in the absolute sense of the term, since this alone shines unaided and denial of the aid of all luminaries forms part of its meaning and flows from the analysis of its meaning as a transcendental principle. Thus, the description of knowledge as light far from being a metaphor, as most of the people tend to believe, is an affirmation of a 'deeper significance' of light which, though exemplified by the phenomenal luminaries in a limited sense, transcends and underlies them. Here the question arises: Is there a 'fact' pertaining to the 'deeper significance' or is it simply a figment of philosopher's imagination. The Realist points out that knowledge has at times been metaphorically described as 'light', but to call it self-luminous amounts to taking a metaphor too literally. Udayana, in his '*ātma-tattvaviveka*' significantly points out that luminosity of knowledge is based on verbal similarity and as such any inference regarding self-luminosity of knowledge stems, as it does from this verbal quibble, cannot be valid.

Elaborating Udayana's point, the commentator Nārāyaṇa points out that the inference put forth to prove self-luminosity of knowledge takes the following form : knowledge is self-luminous, because it is luminous like a lamp (*jñānam svaprakāśam, prakāśtvāt, pradīpavat, iti*). Here it is pointed out that knowledge is devoid of 'lustre' (*prakāśa*), and as such when the

reason 'luminosity' (*prakāśatva*) is predicated of *knowledge* (*jñānam*), it metaphorically means nothing but knowledge, and *prakāśatva* stands for knowledgeness (*jñānatva*). Now this character i.e. *prakāśatva* in the sense of knowledgeness is absent in the example, the lamp. Hence the reason is uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*). It is not enough that the term *prakāśatva* is common to both, the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*); it should also preserve a common denotation, i.e. should not mean differently. If inferences based on verbal similarity (*śabdāsāmya*) are permitted, one may as well infer the existence of 'horns' in speech, which is also denoted by the Sanskrit word '*go*', besides its better known denotation, the horned quadruped'³⁸.

The objection of Udayana would have been perfectly valid, had the Upaniṣads and their illustrious commentator relied entirely on conceptual analysis. What goes to the credit of vedānta as a system, different from allied systems in east and west, is that when the absolute spiritual principle is put forth as the very identity of pure experience, the fact of 'pure experience' is itself evidenced or instantiated through a corroborating analysis of 'deep sleep'. The usage of the term 'light' for the principle of manifestation cannot be dismissed as a quibble if the new significance of the term—i.e. the 'Ideal' manifestation as arrived at through conceptual analysis is established through direct evidence. And that is exactly what the scriptures seek to establish through the discussions of the states of consciousness, as revealed in wakeful, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. Śaṅkara is well aware of it when he points out : During the waking state, it is not altogether easy to single out and demonstrate the ground consciousness, the light of self, as one may hold out a straw from a broom³⁹. K.C. Bhattacharya rightly observes : The psychology of waking, dream and dreamless sleep constitutes the pivot of the Vedāntic system and certain other systems as Yoga which may be regarded as ancillary to it . Its importance is not a whit exaggerated if it is claimed that it recognises a new dimension of existence altogether''*.

The pure experience evidenced in 'deep sleep'

The three states of sleep have been distinguished in terms of operations of senses and mind and the respective quietening or denials of them in the ascent to higher levels of experience. In waking state all the senses along with mind are operative. In dream state the senses are quietened but the mind alone is operative; and identifying itself with the self, it freely and playfully creates a world of the material furnished by Vāsanas⁴⁰.

* *Studies in Vedantism* p. 1

In deep sleep, even the mind is quietened and the self withdrawing its effulgence from the senses and mind, rests in equanimity like the setting sun which withdraws all its rays from all derivatives and sinks, or is like the birds which flock to the tree in the evening to rest⁴¹. "When that Lord (God) is overwhelmed with effulgence at that time he sees no visions"⁴².

In his gloss, Śaṅkara takes care to show that with the successive quietening of senses and mind, only the specified cognitions and ideas of the waking and dream states are eliminated, but not the knowledge as such which persists and shines as a formless homogeneous principle of manifestation in deep sleep.

He observes : Since there is no change of consciousness pertaining to the things which are by nature changeable, whatever thing is known in whatsoever specific way, those specific cognisings of those specific objects prove the presence of an invariable consciousness among the knowables⁴³." Śaṅkara's reasoning here, significantly reminds one of G. E. Moore, who deduces 'consciousness' as a common principle, underlying all specific cognisings.*

Referring to the view held by the agnostic that 'there is, of course, something real, but it is not 'known', Śaṅkara points out that it is as inconsistent as to say that the form is visible but there are no eyes. There may be absence of the knowledge of particular objects, but knowledge never fails the universe of knowables, and even when there is absence of some specific object, knowledge of 'other' objects persists there. Śaṅkara's point is unmistakable : There may be knowledge without objects as evidenced in deep sleep, but the objects unrelated to knowledge dwindle into nothingness⁴⁴.

Having clearly stated this possibility of pure experience (i.e. knowledge devoid of objective content, Śaṅkara proceeds to show it in deep sleep. He takes up for consideration the oft repeated view of the opponents that in 'deep sleep' there is absence not only of objects but also of knowledge. The point of the opponent is that the 'deep sleep' is a state of trance or inertia, devoid of all experience.

Disposing of the view, Śaṅkara points out that knowledge like light, is the cause of the revelation of the 'known' and hence, just as the absence of the illumined 'objects' does not necessarily entail absence of the 'light', so in deep sleep (*suṣupti*), it will not be proper to conclude the absence of

* *Philosophical studies* (†The essay entitled 'Refutation of Idealism').

the 'knowledge of things'. Even the buddhist (vaināsika) cannot imagine (conclude) the absence of eyes, because in darkness there has been no apprehension of form (*rūpa*)⁴⁵.

Here the mediator reminds that the Vaināsika does imagine the absence of knowledge in absence of the knowable. It may be so. But then the vaināsika must explain, how the absence of such knowledge whereby the 'absence of the knowable' is ascertained, itself is arrived at; since the absence of such knowledge, being itself of the nature of 'knowable', cannot be established without knowledge⁴⁶.

The mediator suggests that if knowledge is held non-different from the knowable (*jñeya*), there follows automatically the absence of knowledge from the absence of the 'Knowable'.

It is not so, says Śaṅkara, because negation (*abhāva*) has also been admitted as of the nature of 'knowable'. The vaināsika also admits that absence (*abhāva*) is 'knowable' and 'eternal'. If knowledge is non-different from that (*abhāva* as knowable and eternal, then it is implicitly admitted as eternal; and since the negation of knowledge is itself of the nature of knowledge, it is negation (*abhāva*) only in name. Strictly speaking the negation and non-eternality of knowledge is not proved.

If it is contended that the negation though knowable, is different from knowledge, then in that case says Śaṅkara, the negation of knowable will not lead to the negation of knowledge⁴⁸. The disputant cannot say that from the absence of knowable (object) the negation of knowledge is also obvious, because the existence of bare knowledge (*jñapti*) devoid of knowable content, is evidenced in deep sleep⁴⁹.

Śaṅkara is obliged to elucidate the Vedānta view of self-luminosity as the mediator continuing the discussion, contends that in the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*) too, the knowledge is upheld as knowable unto itself. This is the Buddhist view of self-luminosity. In support of it, one may say that if knowledge is not knowable unto itself, then it will have to be posited as knowable unto some other knowledge. But the latter view (espoused by the Nyāya realists) is untenable since it involves infinite regressus.

Śaṅkara demonstrates insufficiency of the two views by emphasising the absolute and exclusive character of the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'known'. All that is there can be classified either as 'knowledge' or as

'known', the distinction being absolute and exclusive. When all the things are 'knowable to someone' then that which is different from them must be their illuminator. Knowledge remains just the knowledge and never becomes 'knowable'. No third category (exclusive of 'knowledge' and 'knowable') has been admitted. Hence, the possibility of infinite regressus, which can arise only in the case of knowledge becoming a 'knowable', is ruled out⁵⁰. 'Unknowable immediacy' is the sole meaning of self-luminosity that is ascribable to knowledge as the highest principle of revelation.

The principle of revelation as distinct and non-modifiable The unique distinction of the 'light of self', as a transcendental as well as a meta-principle, is brought about afresh in the consideration of the states of experience in waking dream and dreamless sleep, and its further implications are worked out in detail. In a bid to isolate the light which is the *esse* of self and shines as such even in deep sleep, when all other luminaries are quenched, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad poses the question '*Kim Jyotirayam Puruṣaḥ*', (of what light is this Puruṣa?). Śaṅkara takes it as a query pertaining to the character or *variety* of the light which belongs to the '*puruṣa*' and distinguishes his behaviour. Hence the query takes the shape 'whether the principle of manifestation whereby the *Puruṣa* conducts himself, is different or non-different from his organism' (*svāvayava samghāta*)⁵¹. Śaṅkara points out that once it is ascertained (whether the organic behaviour is caused by the light which is different or non-different from it), one can make necessary inference regarding the nature of the light, which itself is not directly observable, but of which only the effects or functions in the form of organic behaviour, can be seen. If it is not definite whether the light, which determines the behaviour of the person of (*puruṣa vyavahāra*) is different or non-different from his organic personality, there will remain uncertainty regarding the specific nature of light; therefore Yājñavalkya asks "of what light this Puruṣa is?"⁵².

Having stated the problem, Śaṅkara proceeds to consider the text. It is pointed out that during the wakeful state, when the senses such as eye etc. obliged by the luminaries as Sun etc. operate extrovertly, the conduct of the person is more distinct than ever. Thus having clearly seen that during the wakeful state, the manifestations are brought about by some light which is different from the organic conglomeration we uphold—that when all external lights are quenched in dream and dreamless sleep states, the effects of luminosity i.e. the manifestations, will still be ascribable to some light different from the organism. In the dream state, the manifestation takes form of experiences of union with and separation from our brethren, and the

journeys to the foreign lands. Similarly, during deep sleep, the experience takes the form 'I slept blissfully and did not experience anything'. It serves to show that there must be some absolutely distinct principle of manifestation⁵³.

In fact the extreme distinctness of the light of consciousness from the entire range of illumined or knowables, is the sole distinction ascribable to it. The phenomenal lights such as the Sun and the Moon, are, like the objects they illumine, themselves illuminable or knowable, and as such cannot be 'illuminous' in the absolute sense of the term. Hence the query "When the speech is quiet . . ." shows that the light of self is different not only from the body, but also from the entire body-sense-mind complex which it illumines. It is different from all external lights Sun etc. in not being the object of any other light. The unique distinction of the light of *self* as a non-modifiable, non-objectifiable principle has been ably brought out by Śaṅkara as follows :-

The self is different from the causal conglomeration, being the illuminator of the effects and their instruments which bring them about like other external lights, such as Sun etc. It manifests itself without being illumined by any other luminary, and hence, is an inner principle⁵⁴.

Against this, the opponent may say that the light of consciousness is seen invariably concomitant with body senses conglomeration and as such, it should be a property of the conglomeration⁵⁵. Inference cannot set aside the testimony of perception. It is the conglomeration which sees, hears, meditates and knows. Hence even if the light as obligor is different from the conglomeration, it must be a co-class principle with it like the sun etc. and not the self (*ātman*)⁵⁶.

Against this, Śaṅkara contends that the light of consciousness (knowledge), cannot be a property of conglomeration because a dead body, though intact or undeformed, is not seen to possess it⁵⁷. Besides, in dream and remembrance the old experience is reproduced. If the act of seeing belongs to the body alone, its reproduction in dream would have become impossible. Similarly, a blind man dreams of the objects he saw before the loss of his sight. It shows that the experience belongs not to the body or senses but to the *seer* who maintains his identity during the states of waking and sleep⁵⁸.

In his reply, the opponent points out that even if it is conceded that the light as a principle of illumination is an obligor and as such is different from the objects, 'the world of luminaries and illumined' it cannot be

absolutely distinct from them. The relation of obligor and obliged (*upakārya upakāraka bhāva*), which obtains between a principle of revelation, and the objects revealed, is seen to obtain not between ontologically distinct principles but only between the two co-class facts (*samānajatīyenaivopakara darsanāt*). It is seen that body-senses-conglomeration, which is of material (*bhautika*) constitution, is obliged by the material (Physical) lustre of Sun etc.⁵⁹.

Hence, the opponent concludes, even if it is conceded that effulgence is distinct from the illumined, it cannot mean consciousness, which is not a co-class principle with the objects, which are *jaḍa* (insentient). The obliging light must be insentient (*jaḍa*), on par with sun, moon, fire etc.⁶⁰

Against this. Śaṅkara contends that there is no rule that the relation of obligor and obliged (*upakārya upakāraka bhāva*) should obtain only between the members of the same class (*upakāryopakāraka-bhāvasyāniyamādarśanāt*)⁶¹. Sometimes, fuel, which is of the nature of earth, obliges the act of burning in the co-class things as straw and grass. But at other times, water, belonging to a different class, is seen to oblige the fire in the form of lightning⁶².

These illustrations of *upakārya-upakāraka bhāva* further flatten the already tenuous relationship signified by the terms. In fact Śaṅkara has done everything to show that *upakārya-upakāraka-bhāva* is not a relation at all or a relation in a very unique sense of the term. A relation binds the two terms. The *upakārya-upakāraka-bhāvā*, if it must be a relation, binds the one term and ensures complete independence of the other. The concept is yet another notable contribution of Śaṅkara towards a systematic exposition of the Vedānta theory of experience and it will be worthwhile to have a close look at it.

III

Some basic concepts of the Vedānta philosophy of experience

The significance of Upakārya-Upakāraka-Bhāva, as a relation between the Revelation and the Revealed

The realistic epistemology generally favours the view that knowledge 'causes' the manifestation of the object. Here manifestation is a caused event brought about by a number of clearly ascertainable factors. Against this, the exponents of the revelatory concept of knowledge point out that the elements of immediacy and self-assurance invariably present in all experience, cannot be adequately accounted for, if manifestation is

treated as a causal affair. It is the very meaning of the term 'direct knowledge' or 'immediate experience' that nothing mediates between the experience and the object (experienced). Just as a lamp by its very nature is manifestive of the things in its proximity, and no other condition except absence of 'obstruction' is needed to ensure it, even so the light of knowledge manifests its objects directly and no causal factor mediating between them can be admissible. The recipient of light—the object is simply 'obliged'. Hence the relation between the 'principle of manifestation' and the 'object manifest' is not causal, but as Śaṅkara terms it, it is one of the obligor and obliged. (*upakārya-upakāraka-bhāva*).

In the Vedānta system, knowledge has been conceived as a principle of revelation different from its recipient phenomenon, 'the illumined'. The question regarding the nature of relationship between them acquires significance, since theoretically, the Vedāntin denies the possibility of any real relationship between the two.

The *upakārya-upakāraka-bhāva* itself is a relation only in appearance in as much as it refers simply to the ontological status of the terms, i.e. the dependent character of the 'illumined' and the independence of effulgence. The term '*upakāra*' actually means 'grace'. The principle of revelation obliges or illumines the objects as 'free grace', which means that it does not enter into any relationship with them. The 'individuated revelations' do not constitute any restriction on the freedom of the principle of revelation, nor do they vitiate its non-modifiable character or entail any relationship to it. The illumined is obliged by the '*Revelation*' and as such depends on it, whereas the *Revelation* remains ever independent of the phenomenon it obliges or illumines. The *appearance* is bound to the *reality* but not vice-versa.

This one term relationship, embodied in '*upakārya-upakāraka-bhāva*', has been emphasised in Advaita Vedānta in a number of ways. The superimposed form (snake) and the substratum (rope) in the well known cases of illusion illustrate the same in so far as the substratum of illusion; the rope remains unchanged by the false form of snake superimposed on it, or the conch is not at all effected by the fact that it was mistaken for silver. While the substratum remains independent of the forms falsely imposed on it, the illusory forms owe their limited being to the substratum. Like the illusion myth, the '*upakārya upakāraka bhāva*' seeks to emphasise the one cardinal tenet of Advaita Vedānta—the absolute, uncompromised integrity of the spiritual reality and the dependent or derivative character of the phenomenon superimposed on it.

The term 'upakārya' covers both the 'Pramāṇa' and the 'Phala' caitanya of the post-Śaṅkara Vedānta epistemology

While ontologically there are only two terms of experience i.e. the principle of revelation (*upakāraka*) and the phenomenon revealed (*upakārya*), the 'revealed' itself may be divided into the media and the object according to the differing modes of reception of the basal light. The medium (or the mediating factors), placed as it is between the principle of revelation and the object, is the first recipient of the light of (witness) self, and itself rendered luminous by it, transfers the same to the recipient locus (the object), wherein it fructifies in the manifestation of the object. The medium not only receives but also imitates the light of self, and in turn obliges the object. The object, on the other hand, zealously guards its character as recipient and has no pretention of imitating the 'light'. The light of self reflected in the medium is called '*pramāṇa caitanya*', and the resultant manifestation is called *phala caitanya*'.

Pramāṇa Caitanya According to the conventional vedānta view, the mental modification (*vṛtti*) is the fundamental mediating factor in all direct experience. The internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is a subtle lustrous matter, with preponderance of *sattva*, and as such suited to be a direct recipient of the light of self. It flows to the object through the senses and reaching there covers it and assumes its shape. There is non-difference between the consciousness riding the mind and the consciousness limited by the object, which gives rise to the direct cognition in the form 'This is jar'. "Just as the water of tank, coming out of a hole and entering the field, assumes the quadrangular or whatsoever shape it has; in the same way the mind, which is lustrous by nature, flows through the eyes and reaching the space covered by the object jar etc. assumes the form of object (jar etc.) This modification (of the mind) is called *vṛtti*"⁶³. Hence, in the case of direct cognition 'this is jar', the mental modification in the form of jar, being in contact with the jar, the consciousness having the jar as its limiting adjunct being non-different from the consciousness, delimited by its mental modification, there is directness or immediacy in the knowledge of jar"⁶⁴.

The limitations of the Vedānta theory of perception

This hypostatised explanation of direct experience (*pratyakṣa*) by the Vedāntin, seems rather curious from the very outset. It has been found objectionable not only on the ground of being cumbersome with unconvincing suppositions (of internal organ, its flow to the object, and assumption of its form etc.) but also rigid in unnecessary

details and incorrect in several respects. In the first place, the role of senses in perception is positive and cannot be likened to that of a hole in the tank for conveying water to the field. One sense organ would have been as good as another, if the senses were simply to serve as passive means for the flow of mental mode, just as in the case of water flowing into the field, the choice of the passage does not make any qualitative difference to the resultant form. However, as is well known, for the perception of colour, the mental mode must necessarily flow through the visual organ and its passage through other 'holes' (ear etc.) will not yield the desired result. This definitive role of the senses cannot be explained within the framework of the orthodox vedānta theory of perception.

There are more serious objections to the vedānta theory of perception. The mental mode can be neither necessary nor exhaustive in its operation. The intellect (*buddhi*) has been accepted in the upaniṣads as a distinct and superior principle than the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). It transcends and is independent of the mental modifications, owing to the superior position it enjoys in the spiritual hierarchy. The intellect (or its laws) is closer to the light of self than the mind or its modifications and as such carry greater necessity, is more fundamental as a mediating factor than the mind which presupposes them. The psychic world of joys etc. represents the highest limit of the phenomenon, explainable in terms of mental modification (*vṛtti*). Beyond that, there is the realm of the laws of intellect, immediate necessary and indubitable, which even the vedāntin does not attempt to explain in terms of mental modifications. The mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is thus neither the necessary nor sole mediating factor for all cases of immediate knowledge (perception). There are so many extra mental co-ordinates intervening between the mind and the object, as proximity and necessary distance from the eye, the light of sun etc. the relevance of microscope and telescope in the case of very small and distant objects,—and a host of such aids the scientists may employ in exploring the regions of the unknown. These conditions cannot be covered by the terms 'mental mode' (*vṛtti*). These intermediary accessories (*upakāra*) to perception have not been adequately taken into account in the vedānta theory of perception.

The Function of Vṛtti :

The *vṛtti* hypothesis was offered with a view to ensure a theory of perception in consonance with the tenets of vedānta idealism. Though it failed due to oversimplification, it felt its way in the right direction. A restatement of the vedānta theory of perception must take into consideration not only the limitation of the *vṛtti* hypothesis, but also what its authors aimed

to achieve through it. The function of *Vṛtti* has been varyingly explained in the vedānta texts as *ciduparāga* or relation with consciousness, '*abhedavyakti*' or realisation of non-difference and '*āvaraṇābhibhava*' or removal of the obstruction⁶⁸.

Ciduparāga What is meant by *ciduparāga* or relation with consciousness? It means the subject-object relationship and it is maintained that this relationship is brought about with the help of mental modification (*vṛtti*). Just as due to the contact of wave and tree, there is contact between the tree and the river, there is subject (*jīva*) and object (*viśaya*) contact due to *vṛtti*⁶⁹. Some point out that if the function of the *vṛtti* is restricted to the contact in the form of subject-object relationship, then the object-ward flow of the *vṛtti* as accepted in the system, will become superfluous. Hence they restate *ciduparāga* or the relation brought about by the *vṛtti* as one of 'identity with *vṛtti* in contact with object (*viśayasamyuktavṛttitādātmya*)'⁷⁰.

Abhedavyakti The relation with consciousness (*ciduparāga*) thus specified as the relation of identity with *vṛtti* in contact with 'object', comes close to '*abhedavyakti*' or realisation of non-difference.

What is *abhedavyakti*? Some maintain that just as the water of tank is channelised into the field and becomes one with that; in the same way the unity of consciousness delimited by the object with the consciousness delimited by internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) realised through mental modification (*vṛtti*) is called '*abhedavyakti*'⁷¹.

In Vedānta system, it may be recalled, imitation (*anuāṛti*) or identification is upheld as the fundamental relationship, which obtains between the *reality* and its *Appearances*,—the principle of revelation and phenomenal manifestations, the continuum of pure experience (consciousness) and the fleeting cognitions. The Sun and the Moon, the speech, the cognitions and ideas are called luminous, because they imitate the basic principle of Revelation. The phenomenal experience, the cognitions etc. are called 'knowledge', because they imitate the fundamental principle of experience. Hence, a phenomenal knowledge whether in the form of a 'mediating factor' or 'resultant manifestation', can serve the object only if it identifies itself with the principle of manifestation. *Abhedavyakti* (realisation of non-difference) and *viśayasamyuktavṛttitādātmya* (identity with *vṛtti* in contact with object) emphasises this important function of *vṛtti* in differing terminology.

Āvaraṇābhībhava

Some Vedāntins maintain that the removal of veil (*āvaraṇābhāṅga*) is the function of *vr̥tti*. What is this removal of obstruction? If it is of the nature of destruction of ignorance, then the mere cognition of jar will be able to sublimate the entire phenomenal complex, rooted in ignorance⁷². Hence it is said: Just as fireflies make tiny luminous holes in the all pervading darkness, or the mat covers only part of the floor, or just as some panicky troops run away, such is the removal of ignorance⁷³.

A re-statement of the *Vr̥tti* hypothesis:

The mental modification (*vr̥tti*) coming as it does between the the principle of manifestation and the object, participates in both. It imitates the manifestive character of the revelatory principle and has a tendency towards the object. Viewed closely, the *vr̥tti* hypothesis exemplifies a complex process, the components of which though fairly discernible, have been only imperfectly recognised in the traditional expositions. The mental mode is the primary recipient of the light of self. Constituted of a very fine stuff (*sattva*) it is fit to be a direct recipient of the light of witness self and is rendered luminous by it. Hence the first identification of the mental mode is with the 'light' it receives from the self and from which it becomes non-distinct. The aforesaid discussion of the problem in *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* does not enumerate it but takes it for granted as 'consciousness delimited by the mental mode (*vr̥ttyavacchinna caitanya*). The light of self riding the *vr̥tti*, flows towards the object. It is followed by the removal of obstruction in the form of ignorance, which paves way for the identification of consciousness delimited by the object. This identification gives rise to the resultant manifestation of the object. Thus it is obvious that the three functions, i.e. *cīdūparāga*, *abhedavyaki* and '*āvaraṇābhībhava*', are not exclusive. They rather belong to a complex process and are operative respectively at the different stages of it. It is necessary to further elucidate the terms in this process and bring out their mutual relationship.

It has been said that the mental mode (*antaḥkāraṇa*), rendered luminous by the light of self, flows to the object through the eye etc. just as the water of tank runs into the field through a hole or channel. What is this 'flow' (*vr̥tti*) of the mental mode? Is it real or simply a hypostatised presentation? Even in the corroborating example, it may be noted that the water of the tank takes help of a number of mediating factors such as 'hole' 'channel' etc. while being conducted to the field. In the case of experience, similarly, the mental mode, the primary mediating factor is aided by a number of subsidiary mediating factors, the senses mechanical aids to senses

(spectacles etc.), the sense-object-contact, the accessory light and so on. The internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) receives the light of self, and notably what is transmitted to the object through these subsidiary mediating factors, is the light of consciousness (self) reflected in the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and not the internal organ itself conveyed to the object in some fluid form. Just as the internal organ is the direct recipient of the light of self, and does not require a fluid substance to bring it down upon it, even so the light of self reflected in the internal organ will be directly received by the mediating factor placed next to it. It is through a series of mediating factors that the light of consciousness reflected in internal organ is conveyed and adapted to the object. What the vedāntin seeks to explain with the help of *vṛtti* hypothesis is the objectward movement and adaption of the light reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This can be best ensured by conceding a meaningful role to other mediating factors such as eye etc. as well. The vedānta supposition of a mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇa*) running to the object with light, is, however, not only cumbrous and unnecessary but also inconsistent with the observed phenomenon of experience. The hypothesis looks more plausible if the usage of the term *vṛtti* is not restricted to the activity of *antaḥkaraṇa* but extended to the self-accommodating activity of the entire series of mediating factors beginning with *antaḥkaraṇa* whereby the light of self is transmitted to the object.

In this modified version of the vedānta theory of perception, the *antaḥkaraṇa* (mind) remains the primary recipient of the light of witness self, but it is certainly not the only recipient medium between the light and the object. It is rather the first term of the series of mediating factors which terminates with the apprehension of the object. In this version, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is not required to run to to the object, with the light of self riding it. Rather it transmits the light to the nearest subsidiary medium, while remaining stationary, just as the witness self transmits its light to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, without itself moving or taking help of any mobile medium for the purpose. Everywhere it is seen that the light is directly transmitted to what is fit to receive it. The aid of medium is inconsistent with the notion of manifestation, which vouchsafes direct relationship between the light and the object. However, one may consistently maintain that one recipient of light, which is subtle and transparent, may transmit the light to the comparatively less subtle medium, and so on till the light reaches and strikes the impenetrable, that is 'object'. In this process, the light, as it passes through successive terms, is itself modified or 'tailored' to suit the object.

CHAPTER IV

Revelation and Self-Revelation

(The Problem of Self-Luminosity with Reference to the witness
Self and the Absolute)

Once knowledge is conceived of as 'revelation', the term self-revelation comes to denote the self-manifestive dimension of the fact of revelation (knowledge) in distinction to the 'other' manifestative dimension of it, which covers the manifestation of subject and object. It is pointed out that the object stands in need of knowledge for its manifestation whereas knowledge, conceived as a fact of revelation, does not stand in need of another knowledge for its manifestation, just as a lamp which serves to reveal the object does not require another lamp for its revelation. It is self-luminous. This is the commonplace reasoning put forth by all the adherents of the concept.

It may be noted here that the concept of self-luminosity seeks to distinguish the luminous fact in terms of the exclusion of the aid of the 'other'. In the vedānta system, the problem may be posed with reference to the self or the experience, and since the two are identical, the referent of self-luminosity remains the same despite the differing terminology in which the problem may be stated. It may be either the manifestation of the self (identity) of experience (luminosity) stated in terms of negation of the aid of other luminaries, or the manifestation (experience) of self articulated in terms of the denial of not the self, i.e. the world of things and objects. In any case the manifestation, whether it is in the form of experience of the self, or of the self (identity) of experience, is the notion of experience, distinguished and analysed in terms of the denial of the aid of the 'other'.

The witness self, the primary articulation of the 'unitive feel'

In advaita vedānta the witness self represents ontologically the highest level of articulate experience, where the identity of pure experience, the 'unitive feel' emerges defined or conceivable by reflecting on the 'nothing' it posits before itself. It marks the limit of language concerning apperception or unitive experience. The highest self realised as the ground of negation of the world of plurality and distinctions, or the continuum of pure awareness identical with it, is reaffirmed as ground of all the transient knowledge (cognition). It is the region of free experience

which does not depend on the operations of cognitive mechanism for its manifestation, but sanctifies their products with its positive effulgence and shines as the immutable background of their production, sustenance and dissolution. It is the eternal witness of the transient experience. The witness self hence, marks the limit of language concerning the apperception i.e. the unity or 'identity' of experience which is the same as the manifestation of the identity—the self luminosity of experience. As the following excerpts serve to show, the concept of witness-self signifies the conceived or conceivable unitive, distinct from the Self (*Brahman*), which persists as bare 'unitive feel'. The concept of witness-self hence reflects the articulation given in the vision itself, and its analysis is the final meaning of self-luminosity.

Summarising different vedānta views on witness self, Prof. T.M.P. Mahadevan points out that "The witness self has been variously identified in the texts as 'form of Lord which permits *jīva* to be active, and to refrain from activity, but which is itself indifferent and non-active', 'the *jīva* conditioned by nescience', *Jīva* conditioned by the internal organ as an adjunct: 'the unique distinction of Brahman which is really of the constitution of Brahman, appears to be of the constitution of *jīva*'. In *Kūṭastha*, Deep, Bhārtīrīth defines the witness as the *kūṭastha*, the immutable unchanging eternal, flawless intelligence. The preceptors of old have defined the *kūṭastha* as the witness of the mind and the modifications. Scriptures declare the immutable to be existence, knowledge and bliss. In states other than sleep, swoon and *saṁādhi*, knowledge of object is acquired through the functions of psychosis. The psychoses of the internal organ manifest the two bodies at intervals. But from the absence of psychoses at other times we cannot infer the non-existence of intelligence. The immutable witness is the silent spectator of all the changing moods and the fleeting moments. It is the foundational intelligence which reveals the existence as well as the non-existence of psychoses"*.

"The Vedas and the Puranas declare that the self is the witness which illumines both the presence and the prior non-existence of psychoses"*.

It is the principle of revelation par excellence since it illumines all derivative lights (*Pramāṇas* and their accessories) as well as their absence and shines independently of them.

Sākṣi as a self and other illumining principle

The witness self is directly demonstrated in deep sleep, wherein it is realised as the abiding illuminator, rather a detached spectator of the absence of specific cognitions. It takes the shape of recollection 'I did not know anything during this period', soon after one gets up from

* *The philosophy of Advaita* p. 186.

* *Ibid.*

deep sleep. The witness self, i.e. the identity of manifestation distinguished through the denial of psychoses, thus furnishes us with the fact as well as the meaning of self-luminosity, its ideal content as well as the analysis of that idea.

Besides the self manifestation, the other illumining character is another noteworthy aspect of the witness-effulgence. In fact the manifestation of the self and the other, forms part of the meaning of the witness experience and are, as such interdefinable. Hence the manifestation of the self (identity) of witness experience is conceived in terms of independence of aid of 'others' (the 'other' denotes the phenomenal luminaries), whereas the 'other' itself a derivative phenomenon, depends on and looks to the self (basal effulgence) for its limited significance and sanction.

It is noteworthy that the self and other illumining character of the witness experience is not analogous to the '*svaparāvabhāśakatva*' of Jainism. According to Jainism, the consciousness or the light of self directly manifests the world objects as well as its own identity. The Vedāntin on the other hand maintains that barring the psychic entities (which are directly presentable to the witness), the witness-self does not illumine the things directly; it rather sanctions some fundamental categories of thought, the basic postulates of *pramāṇasāstra*. These categories are further exemplifications or reflections of the conceived unitive (i.e. the witness-self) and impart the unitive form or intelligibility to sensations, the individuating contents of empirical experience.

The followers of Śaṅkara take pains to show that the witness-self as described above must be a necessary assumption in any consistent account of experience. They point out that the ignorance belonging to the object is removed by the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and for this very reason cannot be established by them (*pramāṇas*) because that which is a sublator of something cannot serve to establish that. Hence the supposition of witness self, a higher order of experience than cognitions etc. becomes necessary to account for the knowledge of ignorance etc. ¹.

The witness self as the fundamental assumption of all epistemology

The witness self is shown as the fundamental assumption of epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*). Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika and the Vārtikasāra following it, bring out the limitations of epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), which necessitates postulation of the witness self. The gist of the argument is: Since Known-ness (*jñātatva*) and unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) cannot be established through the means of

cognition (*pramāṇa*), it becomes necessary to assume some higher order of experience such as witness self to establish them. It is pointed out that the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) helps apprehension of the form of the object, but known-ness and unknown-ness cannot be made known by the *pramāṇa*, because they cannot become objects of it. Just as taste and smell do not constitute object of eyes even so *jñātatva* and *ajñātatva* are not ascertainable through *Pramāṇa*. *Sākṣi* alone is their manifestor ².

The Pramāṇa cannot establish unknown-ness (ajñātatva)

Some believe that the means of knowledge apprehend only that which is unknown. The point is how the unknown as 'unknown' is established? Is it by *pramāṇa* or by experience (*anubhūti*)³.

It cannot be established by the means of knowledge because the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in order to be operative, itself stands in need of an unknown object. Never does a *pramāṇa* operate, but aiming at some unknown object⁴. If it is said that the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) operates towards what is already established by them (*pramāṇas*), as unknown, then there will ensue the defects of self dependence (*ātmāsraya*) and fruitless-ness (*naiṣṭhalya*), to cognition ⁵. The defect of self dependence follows as the operation of *pramāṇa* depends upon its own result, i.e. the cognition of the object as unknown. Besides, if the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) has already effected the knowledge of the object (as unknown) even before its operation, then the operation of the means of knowledge itself will be superfluous and futile.

Some other inconsistencies will follow if the ignorance of the object is held to be known or established by the *pramāṇa*. It may be noted that before cognition (*pramāṇajñāna*) the object jar etc. is called unknown. The knowledge of jar etc. is hence preceded by the 'knowledge of ignorance of jar etc.'. The manifestive (knowledge) element being common to both, the result or fruit (*phalam*) of cognition (*pramāṇajanya jñāna*) consists precisely in the sublation of ignorance. Now if ignorance is treated as knowable through cognition (*pramāṇajanya jñāna*) then like jar etc. even ignorance will not be sublated, because that which is revealed by something is not sublated by that. It is the very nature of the means (*mānam*) to sublimate the ignorance. It is by sublating the ignorance that the means (*mānam*) fulfils itself or realises its nature as a means. If that ignorance itself is established through the means, the cognition (*mitiḥ*) produced by the means (*pramāṇa-jñāna*) will be fruitless⁶. The ignorance belonging to the object is removed by the means (*mana*). Hence it is certain that unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) is not established through the means, because that which is sublator of something

cannot help its ascertainment⁷. Just as taste and smell do not constitute object of eyes, even so *jñātatva* and *ajñātatva* are not ascertainable through *pramāṇa*. Hence it is necessary to admit a *sākṣī* (a principle of revelation manifestive of known-ness and unknown-ness), which is prior to and presupposed by the means of cognition.

Known-ness too cannot be established by the Pramāṇa

Known-ness (*jñātatva*) too cannot be established by the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). A thing is said to be known, when the cognition (*mitiḥ*) effected by the means, removes the veil of ignorance.

Notably, the means of knowledge exhausts with the removal of ignorance and does not survive to witness the manifestation of the object as 'known'. Hence the manifestation of the object as 'unknown', which precedes the operations of the means (*pramāṇa*) as well as its manifestation as 'known' which obtains when the operations of the means (*pramāṇa*) terminate after giving rise to their fruit, cannot be brought about by the means of knowledge. Their knowledge necessitates admission of a *sākṣī* (an abiding principle of revelation manifestive of known-ness and unknown-ness) which is prior to and presupposed by the means of cognition. It is the basal unitive principle which not only validates the opposing poles of experience but also serves to show the relative or contingent nature of all contrasts or polarities and the unity of all experience from the higher standpoint.

Some categories of known-ness

Known-ness (*jñātatva*) and unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) are the basic categories directly manifest by the witness self. However, unlike 'unknown-ness',

'known-ness' itself consists of a number of categories of varying range or capacity for manifestation. The vedānta texts do not attempt a systematic account of these categories but mention has been made of the cognition cogniser and cognised (the invariable points of cognitive situation) time and space, the means of cognising (*vṛtti etc.*), which as aids to 'knowing' are taken as self-evident⁸. These 'forms of thought' themselves postulate an abiding principle, the witness self which imparts its unitive touch to them and is exemplified by them. The absence of *sākṣī* is never vouchsafed. There is no other being to see or vouchsafe it. If there is absence of *sākṣī* it is not *sākṣī* at all, and if it is *sākṣī* its absence is not possible. A given cognition cannot be a witness to its own production and destruction. This abiding principle which validates fundamental postulates of epistemology is itself self-luminous. The problem of self-luminosity here comes under the pervuew of *pramāṇasastra*. Given that the cognition (the means and fruit

thereof), the cogniser and the cognised are evident in every case of 'knowledge', how are we to account for their self-evidence? They in themselves have no such capacity. A means of knowledge may serve to bring about valid knowledge of the object, but this itself being an insentient operation, it cannot validate its own content. The same may be said of the cognition and the cogniser. Like objects they are knowable and have a limited being; they are hence insentient (*jaḍa*) and incapable of establishing the self (their own identity). Their self-evident character therefore must be a derivation,—reflections of a basic unity, further phenomenal co-ordinates of the self-luminosity of the witness experience. The self-evidence noticeable in them is due to their direct proximity to the principle of revelation, the witness self, which alone is self-luminous in the strict usage of the term. The knower, knowledge, and the known are witnessed by the *sākṣi*. It is self-luminous, i.e. it is part of its meaning that it is not accessible to any of the *Pramāṇas*, which it validates⁹.

The cognition or the sight in the form of mental modification (*vr̥tti*) is insentient (*jaḍa*). It cannot be illuminator. Thanks to its contact with the reflection of consciousness belonging to self (*ātmacaitanya-chāyā-yukta*), it may be denoted by the term 'sight' (*draṣṭi*)¹⁰. In a manner reminiscent of Kant, the author of '*Vārtikasāra*' observes: The transient knowledge which is of the nature of act is born pervaded by the eternal sight, just as a jar is born pervaded with space¹¹. The pervaded sight is transient because it is a product. The pervading consciousness identical with self is on the other hand eternal because it is immutable witness and is free from birth etc.¹². Without *Sākṣi* even non-existence cannot be proved, what to say of existence¹³. The witness self does not stand in need of time and space to establish it, because the space etc. are dependent on *Sākṣi* which is self-established¹⁴. Because it is witness to birth and decay, This witness experience (sight) is eternal whereas the rest (of experience) is product of ignorance¹⁵.

The self-luminous witness as the key concept of vedānta Idealism.

The jar shines either as 'known' as 'unknown', and in both these cases we have the jar revealed by the *sākṣi* as 'known' or 'unknown'. In the first case, it gives knowledge of the 'variety of known-ness' having jar as its object (*jñātatva-prakāra-ghaṭa-viśeṣyaka-bodha*) and in the second case it gives knowledge of the kind of unknown-ness, having jar as its object (*ajñātatva-prakāra-ghaṭa-viśeṣyaka-bodha*). The vedāntin maintains that for the revelation of a jar as

'known', we need means (*pramāṇa*) and for its revelation as 'unknown' we need ignorance (*ajñāna*). But one may ask how the bare jar itself is revealed? The author of 'Bṛhadāraṇyaka-sūtra' is explicit on this point. He observes that there is no moment in the existence of jar, which may be devoid of both the means (*māna*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). The thing in itself, independently of known-ness (*jñātatva*) and unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) the twin-co-ordinates of all phenomenal experience, does not shine at all. The entire ground between the known-ness (*jñātatva*) and unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) is infected with experience on all sides. Therein the objects such as jar etc. are established and dissolve again¹⁶. The author of 'vivekaśūtra' pithily observes: "All the things, either as known or as unknown are objects of the witnessing consciousness". (*sarvaṃ vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣī caitanyasya viśaya eva*)¹⁷. This is the quintessence of vedānta idealism.

A critique of Kant from vedānta viewpoint

The vedānta analysis has close affinity of approach with Kant who, following similar lines, aims at the conclusion that the knowledge of the thing in itself 'independently of the mental categories is not possible. According to Kant, the sense impressions of a thing as they are received in the 'mould' of the mind, give rise to the knowledge of that thing.

"There are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding...through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought"¹⁸. Through sensibility we are presented with all our factual material and it is through sensibility that we establish truths about what there is. The understanding, on the other hand, enables us to organise intellectually our raw material by classifying, discriminating, judging, comparing". "Sensibility alone yields us intuitions...from the understanding arise concepts"¹⁹. It is pointed out that the sensory intake and intellectual control are necessarily intertwined in our knowledge of the thing. The mechanism of intellectual control, technically referred to as categories of understanding, is manifestive of the object as well as its own identity. All conceivable forms of experience may be assigned to one (or more) of the following categories of understanding. They are classified as categories of quantity (Axioms of Intuition) of quality (Anticipations of perception) and those of relations (Analogies of experience) and morality (Postulates of Empirical thoughts). The unity of apperception (vedāntin calls it self-luminosity) underlies them all, and they signify simply different modes of it.

The vedāntin maintains that a complete account of categories of understanding must cover the basic determinants of known-ness (*jñātatva*) as well

as unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*). These two are the most basic of all the categories, inasmuch as all conceivable categories of thought are ascribable to one or other. What Kant calls categories of understanding are simply rational determinants of Known-ness (*jñātatva*). But his account is incomplete in the sense that it ignores the category of unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*) which is an equally important and irreducible category of thought. In support of his contention the vedāntin may point out that at least we know this much of the 'thing in itself' that it exists and that it is not only unknown but also unknowable. To put it in vedānta terminology there is manifestation of the thing in itself of the variety of known-ness (*jñātatva prakāra kevalavastu viśeṣyaka bodha*) in the form 'there is a thing in itself' and also of the variety of unknown-ness (*ajñātatva prakāra kevalavastu viśeṣyaka bodha*) in the form 'the thing in itself' is not known. How can the knowledge of the thing in itself, in these two forms be accounted for? The possibility of the apprehension of Reality (thing in itself) through cognitive mechanism stands already ruled out in Kantian philosophy.

Besides, the cognitive mechanism cannot certify to its own absence or its own limitations. It cannot go out to affirm that it is incapable of knowing the thing in itself. The point of the vedāntin is that knowledge of the thing in itself as 'unknowable', as well as the knowledge of the limitations of the cognitive mechanism cannot be accounted within the framework of Kantian philosophy, and hence, it necessitates supposition of a higher principle of Revelation, which will testify the 'unknowable', validate the cognitive mechanism (including categories of understanding), and will be a witness to the limitations thereof. It has been the unique insight of the Vedānta system to have seen that the categories of understanding are essentially of the nature of intellectual control (the vedāntin will not call them mental); they belong to the level of intellect which itself presupposes and is sustained by some spiritual principle. This principle is not to be confused with the highest featureless consciousness as it the substratum of the denials (limitation' to be more accurate) and validations of the categories of understanding. It is sufficiently individuated to serve as the basis of personality and is termed as 'witness self'.

Vedānta categories of thought

A systematic account of vedānta categories of thought has not been seriously attempted by the vedānta scholarship. One may, however, roughly state them as follows : the self-luminous witness self is the fundamental principle of thought. It is manifest in all conceivable forms of thought

directly or through proxy. It is the ground of what Kant calls 'unity of apperception'. The immediate modes of this unity i.e. the direct recipients of the light of witness, are the three basic categories i.e. the self or the ego and the categories of known-ness (*jñātava*) and unknown-ness (*ajñātatva*). Barring the witness self, which is self-manifest by definition, whatever is manifest, is manifest either as known or as unknown, and is manifest to some knower. Hence, next to the witness-self which they presuppose, cognisership, known-ness, and unknown-ness emerge as the basic categories. Owing to the immediate proximity of ignorance with (witness) consciousness, there arises the appearance of consciousness, the self-consciousness or *ahaṅkāra*. Hence it has been said : self consciousness is the first order of superimposition (*ahamiti tāvatprathamodhyāsaḥ* ; co-existent with it are the categories of known-ness and unknown-ness²⁰. As has been noted, ignorance (*ajñāna*) and the cognitive mechanism (*pramāṇa*) constitute the individuating contents of these basic forms of manifestation. The term *pramāṇa* stands here for the entire mechanism of valid cognition, which consists of the cogniser (*pramātr*) cognised (*viṣaya*) and the means of cognising (*māna*). Hence 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*) as the content of unknown-ness, and the cogniser (*pramātr*) cognised (*viṣaya*) and the means of cognising (*māna*) as the content of 'Known-ness', constitute the primary categories of thought in vedānta system. The entire phenomenon of mediating factors between the cogniser and the object consisting of the intellect (*buddhi*) mind (*mānas*), and the senses, their operation and the accessory conditions belong to the category of the means of cognising (*māna*) in the restricted sense of the term. It may be noted that the Kantian categories of understanding essentially belong to the level of intellect in vedānta categoriology.

Antaḥkaraṇa as The western philosophy is not particular about
intellect-mind- sense distinguishing, the mind from the intellect, but one
complex expects that the vedānta philosophy, following the
 upaniṣads, is certain to uphold the distinction. The
 Upaniṣads tell us that the mind is higher than the senses, and higher than
 the mind is the intellect. But it is curious that the vedānta texts do away with
 this legitimate distinction, and refer to the mind-intellect-complex by the
 common term '*antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ). The following analysis of the
 functions of internal organ, may serve to show that the denotative range of
 the term '*antaḥkaraṇa*' covers the faculties of the mind the the intellect and
 in part, the senses.

According to the vedānta theory of perception, the internal organ flows
 to the external object through the sensory apertures and assumes its shape

so as to bear the light of consciousness upon it. Hence the two aspects of the internal organ, that which is subject to modification due to the object and that which remaining independent of modification—imparts unitive character, to it, are clearly discernible. The *antaḥkaraṇa* as it flows to the object and is modified accordingly, covers the object-bound operations of the intellect-mind-senses complex and the sensations constitute that part of *antaḥkaraṇa* which is modified in accordance with the object. Besides there is an abiding aspect of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, its formal or unitive character which it imparts to the sensory intake. The sensations are received or unified in the forms of certain basic categories of thought, which belong to the faculty of intellect and are not subject to modification. Besides these functions, ascribable respectively to the faculties of senses and intellect, the *antaḥkaraṇa* accomplishes the task of applying the 'categories of understanding' to the sensations as well as to the psychic entities as joy etc. Obviously, this synthesising function belongs to the mind (*mānas*), which is different from the intellect. It is the mind which is the instrument as well as the ground of the application of the intellectual forms (categories of thoughts). The categories themselves have no capacity for organising sensations into intelligible forms (precepts). Thus it may be shown that the presentative, the conceptual and synthesising functions which are ascribable to the distinct faculties of senses, intellect and the mind, have been dovetailed in the vedānta concept of *antaḥkaraṇa*. The vedāntin may, of course say that since the entire intellect-mind-senses complex intervening between the cogniser and the object, constitutes the faculty of presentation, there is no harm in denoting it by a single term '*antaḥkaraṇa*'. It will be economical to postulate an internal organ with senses serving as openings for its flow, instead of postulating three faculties of Mind, Intellect and senses. But this explanation of the vedāntin can hardly serve as a justification for doing away with the valid distinctions between the faculties of the mind the senses and the intellect, which have the sanction of the scriptures and are useful for a consistent exposition of the philosophy of experience based thereon.

A close look at the vedānta concept of *antaḥkaraṇa* reveals its vague arbitrary and hypothetical character. Although it is called internal organ *antaḥkaraṇa* in contrast to the external organs (eye etc.), it appropriates to itself, the functions of external organs (eye etc.) as it is supposed to flow to the object and assume its shape, leaving sense organ to do nothing except serving as a passive apertures for the objectward flow of the internal organ. When altogether distinct and exclusive functions are tied down to one faculty, the economy thus arbitrarily effected can only lead to

vagueness and hypothetical thinking. It is necessary therefore that these distinctions are restored to or at least clearly discerned, as above, in the operations of internal organ. The functional analysis of the vedānta concept of *antaḥkaraṇa* serves to evidence that the term covers in its denotative range not only the senses (*indriyas*) or the faculty of presentation, and the intellect (*Buddhi*) or the Faculty of intellectual control, but also the mind (*manas*), which serves as the meeting ground for them and ensures application of the intellectual forms to the sensations.

The vedāntin will emphasise that these faculties along with their contacts at various levels represent different orders of experience or spirituality. The lower order of experience is infected with the higher one whereas the latter remains independent. Hence the senses are infected with the mind, the mind with the intellect and the intellect with the witness, but not vice-versa. This is the most important postulate of vedānta philosophy of experience, that every mediating factor through which the light of self travels to the object, must itself be manifest before it may bring the light of self to bear upon the object. The identity of the medium must be manifest or affirmed before it may help the manifestation of the object. The unity of apperception is thus successively realised at the levels of the subject, the medium, and the object, and technically referred to as '*sākṣi caitanya*' '*pramāṇa caitanya*' and '*viśaya caitanya*'. Every case of 'manifestation' has a necessity to manifest itself, which may mean realisation of its belongings to the deeper springs 'manifestation' i.e. realisation of its own identity as the ground of affirmation of the unity of apperception. The vedāntin maintains that the self-affirming necessity of the pure consciousness, the highest principle of manifestation is the fundamental necessity, which is reflected in varying measures in the phenomenal experiences. An appropriate analysis of the phenomenal manifestations of necessity cannot fail to reveal its deeper springs in the self (*ātman*).

The concept of necessity Kant distinguishes between the a priori and a posteriori judgements on the basis of whether they may be falsified or not by experience. The a posteriori judgements are based on the acquired experience and are vulnerable to future experience. The a priori judgements are, on the other hand, true independently of our experience, true a priori. Equating the term 'experience' with sensory intake, Kant points out that the general truths which at the same time bear the character of inward necessity must be independent of experience, clear and certain in themselves"²¹. If then a judgement is thought with strict universality, that is, in such a manner that no exception

is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely *a priori*²². 'Necessity and strict universality are sure criteria of *a priori* Knowledge'²³. 'How far we can advance independently of all experience in an *a priori* knowledge, is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics'²⁴.

A modern student of vedānta is certain to appreciate the manner in which Kant brings out the region of such knowledge as independent of sensory aids. His *a priori* truth in this respect represents a measure of self-luminosity. The example of mathematics demonstrates more convincingly, in certain respects than the analysis of deep sleep, the self-shining self-established character of knowledge. The vedāntin will, however, object to equating experience with sensory intake, and will point out that to be independent of the aid of senses is not necessarily to be independent of all experience. The categories of understanding whereby the *a priori* truths derive their sanction, are not unsanctioned operations. They are rooted in and in fact argue for the finer regions of experience, which have not been adequately explored by Kant.

The treatment of the problem of necessity in Kantian philosophy shows lack of rapport between the structure and its theoretical base. If the *a priori* truths, as Kant maintains, derive their necessary character from the inherent structure of the mind, then the necessity reflected in the *a priori* truths belonged primarily to the mind and is certainly prior to its logical or linguistic equivalents. The distinction between the necessity of the *a priori* and its linguistic equivalents is implicit in Kant's system. However, it does not find any place in the system, and the problem of necessity is posed simply as a problem of necessary or invariable connection. What Kant investigates is not the distinction of *a priori* as such, but how certain judgements may be so distinguished. The *a priori* judgement may be synthetic or analytic according to whether the predicate adds to the meaning of the subject or not. In any case, an *a priori* sentence exhibits regularity of connection between the subject and the predicate and distinct from a posteriori sentences, their regular behaviour is established neither on the basis of acquired experience nor can it be falsified by future experience. Here one may be tempted to ask : What is there in the *a priori* sentence itself which shows the necessity content therein ? The usual reply is that the denial of the *a priori* sentences is inconceivable or self-contradictory. Inconceivability of the denial is, however an effect, a different sentence caused by the necessity content of the *a priori* sentence and not the *a priori* sentence itself regarding which the query is made.

In fact Kant's treatment of the *a priori* reduces it to mechanical equations between the meaning contents of the subject and predicate concepts. The categories of understanding thus failing to guarantee an identity to the '*a priori*' distinct from its linguistic equivalent, the concept of '*a priori*' soon fell victim to the onslaughts of the logical positivists. With the *a priori* emptied of the ideal content, the positivists now had the opportunity to show successively that there are no synthetic *a priori*, all forms of necessity are analytic and that all analytic propositions are tautological based on arbitrarily fixed linguistic usage. Curiously Kant's own treatment of the problem paved way for it. The *a priori* necessity once equated with necessary relation or its exemplification, the linguistic usage emerges self-sufficient and the supposition of the categories of understanding shown to impart the unitive character to the *a priori*, becomes redundant.

The vedānta view The missing link in Kant's treatment is the unitive character of the *a priori* as imparted to it through the categories and is directly identifiable prior to its analysis as a necessary proposition. It is demonstrated by the 'felt necessity' or 'indubitability' which distinguishes the *a priori* in and by itself before all analysis and is in fact the controlling base of all further analysis of necessity.

The vedānta scholarship realised, though somewhat vaguely, that necessity is primarily a feeling which is the unique distinction of all experience and not merely of the necessary connections identified as *a priori* by Kant. 'It is the unique distinction of psychic facts that they cannot be denied²⁹'. Since the earliest days, the philosophers have shown awareness of this fact that experience, whether in the form of 'knower' or 'knowledge' cannot be denied without involving self-contradiction; and this superiority of experience over things and objects, its unquestioned authority as a self-affirming fact, has been an article of faith for the idealistic systems of all shades. The quest for certainty takes Descartes to the concept of self, which unlike other things, cannot be doubted, because the very act of doubt posits a self who doubts. This unique distinction of the self which he terms as its indubitability is expressed in the maxim, 'I think therefore I exist' (cogito ergo sum). Even the apparently self-negating thought 'I do not exist', itself being a case of thought, presupposes the self as a thinker. Centuries ago, Śaṅkara anticipated it. He observed: "Everyone experiences the existence of the self and does not experience that he is not. If the well know existence of the self were not to be so in fact, every one would experience that the does not exist³⁰'. Elucidating the point, the author of Bhāmatī observes: 'The ascertainment of the absence of knowledge only seems to strengthen the knowledge'. The denial of knowledge in the form 'I do not

know' itself is a case of knowledge. No thought can deny the thinking being or the thought itself, as the very fact of self-denying thought carries an affirmation of the existence of the thought. This analysis of indubitability in terms of inconceivability of the denial is, perfectly valid. But it must be emphasised that indubitability is not merely an order of logical connection, it is a feeling which persists as a simple psychological character of experience. It may be understood in a number of ways; as a reflection of prior necessity given in a unitive base or as a basis of posterior analysis, as the bare being or identity of experience, emerging defined or distinguished by the denial of its negation.

The Vedāntin upholds that all experience is an expression of a fundamental necessity i.e. the necessity implicit in all experience to manifest or express itself. That which is not expressive or manifestive of its own identity is not experience at all. Hence the ideal or the experiential fact *p* carries with itself the necessity to manifest its identity as 'this is *p*'. It is this self-manifestive necessity of the ideal fact that is technically referred to as its self luminosity. It may also be noted that this self-manifestive necessity is not identical with self-affirming usage, 'this is *p*', which is caused by it. Hence the two aspects of necessity discernible are : the necessity identified as a 'unitive feel' and the logical and the linguistic usage caused by it. In all experience there is a self-affirming feeling and a necessary proposition corresponding to it. The elements of indubitability, self-evidence and belief exemplify the self-affirming feeling, in varying degrees for the varying orders of experience. Indubitability demonstrates the highest limit of the 'unitive feel' or self-affirming distinction of the experience, which is at the same time capable of giving rise to a corresponding linguistic usage of necessity. 'Self-evidence' shows this feeling in a somewhat differentiated form, as it is sharpened with reference to the deductions it validates. 'Belief' is the lowest common denominator of the 'felt content' of experience, vouchsafing certainty or self-assurance to any experience. These terms denote the orders of self-assurance, varying according to the degrees of vivacity and distinctness and are, at the basis of discursive (linguistic) expressions of necessity. Put together, they represent the 'synthetic' and 'analytic' aspects of 'self-manifestation'.

What is the relation between these two forms of self-manifestation. The Vedānta stand will be that the *unitive* or the felt continuum of necessity is the very being of experience and as such, prior to and presupposed by the discursive reflections of it. As has been emphasised in the preceding chapters, it is a singular feature of the Vedānta philosophy that the ex-

perience of higher order is imitated or manifest in the lower orders of experience, but these imitations or expressions at lower order can never exhaust the content of the underlying unity, can never be equivalent of it. They only exemplify it imperfectly. On the controversy the Vedānta view will be that the analysis can never be independent of the experience it seeks to analyse or reflect in the mould of intellect. In fact the synthetic is partially but invariably reflected in the analytic and that constitutes the individuating content of the analytic proposition, which seeks to grasp it, through the faculty of intellect. Without that there will be no necessity for further elucidation or analysis of the component concepts of an analytic proposition and as such there will be no system of thought. The a priori or necessary proposition may be free from the sensory content, as Kant and other prominent western philosophers maintain, it cannot be free from the ideal or consciousness content, which imparts a unitive character to it, which is directly demonstrated in the feeling of indubitability etc. in a necessary proposition. The analysis is in the first place a reflection of the synthetic feel, which as the given or exhibited content of analysis, cannot be an object into it i.e. remains unanalysed by it; and secondly, this felt necessity as exhibited in the analysis is in the first place a reflection of the synthetic feel, which as the given or exhibited content of analysis, cannot be an object unto it i.e. remains unanalysed by it, and secondly, this felt necessity as exhibited in the analysis is a partial or derivative reflection of the synthetic feel, which the mechanism of intellect sought to analyse.

All Manifestations of necessity, synthetic or analytic are imitations of the self-luminosity of pure consciousness

All the manifestations of necessity, the a priori—synthetic or analytic, the self-evident postulates of the deductive systems, the laws of logic and epistemology—they all are the case of imitation or partial exemplification of the fundamental necessity embodied in self (*ātman*) as the pure principle of consciousness. The necessity to manifest itself is a distinction, though in differing measures, of all experience, and is the absolute and unqualified distinction of the absolute principle of experience. In the case of phenomenal exemplifications, it may be identified in the feeling of indubitability, self-evidence and the element of belief which are demonstrative of self-affirmation in varying degrees and are reflected in so many logical and discursive equivalents of them. That is the reason why sometimes even the vedānta texts take self-luminosity in the sense of indubitability or self-evidence. The author of *Pramāṇamāla* (whose arguments for self-luminosity will be considered in the following chapter) points

out that in every system of thought the basic postulates of the system whereby all its conclusions are deduced, have to be accepted as self-evident. Similarly, experience which is the basic postulate in all reasoned account of knowledge, must be accepted self-established or self-evident. There is no harm in taking self-luminosity in the sense of self-evident, provided one is clear in his mind that it gives only a derivative and not an exhaustive sense of the term.

Hence another cardinal point of vedānta philosophy of experience is that the fundamental necessity i.e. the necessity in the Absolute to manifest itself, is transmitted to the appearances in varying degrees and no experience form can be so blind as to be devoid of the unitive touch. Kant refers to this unifying touch. Kant refers to this unifying touch of consciousness as 'unity of apperception', which means that knowledge at every level is unified to the ideal base or consciousness. And yet it is curious that Kant should talk of blind sensations and 'empty concepts'. In fact the so called 'blind sensations' and 'empty concepts' are already unified or reconciled to the underlying principle of awareness, before they may be significant to us. Before they can yield any meaning they are evident to us as meaningful. They are self-luminous in this limited sense.

The difficulties of ascribing self-luminosity to the Absolute in definable or analysable sense

(i) It goes to the credit of the vedāntin to have seen that the manifestation of a thing consists in the linguistic usage of immediacy, occasioned by the knowledge of that thing. The knowledge of jar gives rise to the propositional usage 'this is jar'. The object, itself being insentient, has no such

capacity and depends on knowledge for the linguistic usage concerning it? But knowledge, in distinction to the object, gives rise to the usage regarding the object as well as its own identity. Hence, while the proposition 'this is jar' affirms the identity of jar, the proposition such as 'I know the jar' or 'the jar is known' affirms the identity of knowledge having the jar as its object. Knowledge thus gives rise to the dual usage affirming respectively the identity of the object as well as the identity of its own. (What relation obtains between the knowledge and the two propositions succeeding it. Certainly they cannot be identical because there is a sequence between them). It will not be difficult to uphold the contention, as far as the phenomenal knowledge is concerned that knowledge causes the manifestation or linguistic usage concerning itself. But the problem arises regarding the pure consciousness, which as the state of emancipation, is the very

identity of the Absolute. According to the tenets of the system, it can give rise to no linguistic usage. Must the Absolute spiritual principle be then given up as non-self-luminous for this reason, or in deference to the scriptures it should be treated as self-luminous in some altogether different sense. Curiously the vedānta analysis of self-luminosity and the definitions formulated on the basis of it, apply to all the cases of knowledge except to the Absolute principle of knowledge, to which he is most eager to ensure it.

(ii) The vedāntin maintains that the distinction of self-luminosity consists in the capacity of knowledge to give rise to its own usage. Now this appearance or manifestation in the form of linguistic usage must be distinct from the knowledge as such, if the causal relation is to obtain between the reality of knowledge and its verbal appearance. What may possibly be the nature of knowledge before causing the 'manifestation'? Can there be an unmanifest state of experience before it causes the manifestation? The concession is certain to strike at the very root of the theory of self-luminosity. The adherents of the theory point out that manifestation is the quintessence of experience. The very fact that there is an idea means that it is manifest. It never happens that we are happy or sad without our knowing it. Hence the being of experience must be co-extensive with its manifestation. The crucial question before the vedāntin is: Are they identical or distinct. If identical, there can be no causal relation between the identity (self) of experience and its manifestation, and the concept of self-luminosity itself becomes redundant. If on the other hand they are treated distinct as cause and effect, then the causal experience prior to effecting the manifestation, will remain non-manifest and the concession will strike at the very root of the theory which upholds that all experience is self-manifest. The vedāntin is thus on the horns of a dilemma which the post-Śaṅkara scholarship struggles to resolve.

(iii) All idealistic systems commonly hold that 'knowledge' and 'being' are not two distinct principles. Experience alone is the principle of Reality as well as of manifestation, and the vedāntin may add that the highest principle of ontology must be the principle of manifestation par excellence. As the scriptures affirm, the highest spiritual principle is the indivisible identity of knowledge, being and bliss. The absolute is the bare identity devoid of all internal and external difference. Since at this level the terms, Self (being) and manifestation (knowledge) can have no distinctive meanings, the concept of self-luminosity arrived at through their relational understanding can have no relevance with regard to the Absolute.

(iv) A fundamental question that may be asked of all the advocates of self-luminosity is : Is there actually a self-manifestive dimension in a luminary, which over and above its luminosity persists as a distinction of it, and which, different from it, may be termed as its self-luminosity? The luminosity of the lamp is a fact of experience, the same is not true of its self-luminosity. We owe our knowledge of it to the analysis of the meaning of luminosity. One may define a luminary as that which revealing an object does not require the aid of another luminary (of the same class) to reveal itself. The self-luminosity of a luminary, such as a lamp, consists in its capacity to manifest itself without the aid of another luminary. However, it is part of the very meaning of its luminosity and does not warrant the postulation of a new mode or distinction to revelation or luminosity.

Against this, the adherents of the concept point out that self-luminosity is ascertainable from the behaviour of the luminous fact. The luminous fact manifests itself as well as the object before it. However, the modes of manifestation for them are radically different, owing to the different relationships they bear to the luminary. The object is revealed as the 'other' of the luminary whereas the luminary itself is revealed as the very identity of manifestation. One may ask here : should we presume different modes of luminosity according to different recipients of light? Will it not open way for presumption of an infinite number of modes of self-luminosity according to infinite number of recipients of light? Not so, the adherents of the concept point out. The fact of manifestation is not a recipient of light at all. It is the very 'given' of luminosity. True, self (identity) and the object of a luminary are not to be confused as two different objects or recipients of light. The object of light, different from the self (identity) of it, is dependent on light for its manifestation. On the other hand, the self (identity) of light is manifest by the very fact of existence and is independent of the aid of the 'other'. This radical distinction between the two dimensions of 'manifest' necessitates and justifies assumption of two different modes of manifestation, i. e. the manifestation of the 'self' and the manifestation of the 'other'. The former is technically referred to as its self-luminosity.

It is all right as far as it goes. But the objector may say that all these explanations simply avoid the basic issue raised at the very outset i. e. Is self-luminosity identical with the luminous fact or distinct from it? If identical, the concept of self-luminosity becomes redundant, if distinct, then one has to concede that self-luminosity is an acquisition and not an innate or essential distinction of the luminary. If self-luminosity of knowledge consists in giving rise to the appearance in the form of linguistic

usage concerning the self (identity) of that knowledge, then the knowledge *per se* will have to be distinguished from its appearance in the form of linguistic usage as well as from the self-luminosity entailed to it by its relationship to that appearance. Self-luminosity is hence, not the very identity of experience but a mode or 'appearance' of that identity, which arises in the experience as it reflects upon itself to the exclusion of the 'other', or defines the self-effulgence in terms of the exclusion of aid of other 'luminaries'. The self of experience manifest in the aforesaid manner is not the bare identity of experience, but the identity as manifest through difference. This conclusion is of paramount importance for the vedāntin, who upholds that the Brahman as the highest spiritual principle, is devoid of all internal and external differences, and persists as bare feel of identity. It may also be noted that self-luminosity is a distinction and as such can have no pretention to belong to the absolute which is devoid of all distinctions. Hence, a distinction has to be made between the bare identity of the absolute and the 'form' of this identity manifest as self-luminous.

(v) The law of identity is incontestably the fundamental law of all reasoning and the vedāntin will point out that it is so because all thinking seeks to unfold a deeper unity i. e. the identity of basal principle of experience. Its denial is inconceivable, simply because conceiving itself is a discovery in identity. It is true, as the vedāntin points out, that the fact of knowledge gives rise to the linguistic usages pertaining respectively to itself and to the object. But there is a subtle distinction between the two forms of usages not noticed in the traditional analysis. The linguistic usage pertaining to a psychic fact is an instance of the basal unitive, an exemplification of the law of identity, whereas the usage pertaining to the object is an application of this law to the object. Hence, the linguistic usages for the experiential fact *P* and the object, *p*, will take the respective forms, '*P* is *P*' and '*this is p*'. This distinction is necessary in order to account for the necessary character of the ideal or experiential fact. There is a marked necessity in the ideal facts towards manifestation, which distinguishes them from the objects *jar* etc. Now this self-manifestive necessity itself may be accounted for in the vedānta system as an unfolding of a basal unitive and exemplification of a prior identity. The self-luminosity of the idea *P* thus consists in giving rise to the usage '*P* is *P*', which itself may be articulated in other forms e.g. (*P.P*) and (*p ⊃ p*). Hence the given idea

$$P = P \text{ (} P_1 \text{ is } P_1 \text{)} = P_1 \text{ (} P_2 \supset P^2 \text{)} = P_2 [\neg (P_3, \neg P_3)]$$

Here the articulate forms following P are the manifestations of it; they represent the linguistic usages occasioned by the given identity of P. The sign' = signifies the immediacy which binds the manifestation of the idea to its existence, the appearance to the being, the felt identity to an articulate form. This immediacy together with the linguistic usage occasioned by it, constitutes the meaning of self-luminosity predicated to P. Hence in the equation $P = P(P_1 \text{ is } P_1)$, the predicated ($P_1 \text{ is } P_1$) signifies the meaning of self-luminosity for P. Here the question arises: can the idea P be ever independent of this predication or is there an ideal fact some transcendental P, which may be so. The vedāntin emphatically says that the brahman, the absolute idea (if such descriptions are permitted) is independent of all predications; it gives rise to no linguistic usage or appearance, and hence the self-luminosity i. e. the causal capacity for such usage too cannot be ascribed to it. brahman is the absolute identity of knowledge, being and bliss and the difference between being and manifestation, discernible in phenomenal knowledge, cannot hold good with reference to the absolute principle of knowledge, since it gives rise to no differentiated manifestation and hence, any definition of self-luminosity based on the said split will not be applicable to the absolute.

It means that the self-luminosity in its sole communicable (conceivable) sense is simply not applicable to the brahman. How are we to reconcile this conclusion to the scriptures which unequivocally assert the self-luminosity of brahman or of the self identical with it? The question arises before Citsukhācārya, who takes it upon himself to evolve a definition of self-luminosity, which may be flawlessly applicable to the absolute. As will be shown in a subsequent chapter, he does not face the problem squarely and his consummate definition of self-luminosity is as vulnerable as other definitions, examined and rejected by him.

To ascertain the extent of the concept is a prerequisite to clarity of thinking and the discussions of the problem in vedānta texts serve to show that they have not been quite particular about it. The problem of the vedāntin is that in view of the teachings of scriptures, he feels obliged to formulate such a definition of self-luminosity, which may be applicable to the Absolute, the brahman. This exercise, however, soon lends him into a self-contradictory position. It is because, in the first place, self-luminosity is an attribute and hence not ascribable to the absolute, which is devoid of all qualifications or distinctions. Even if it is conceived that the absolute (the Brahman in the State of *mokṣa*) is self-luminous, how can the definition

offering an analysis of the concept in terms of the linguistic usage caused by it, may be true to it. The stock solution that self-luminosity belongs to Brahman, only as an accidental and not as its essential distinction, is unconvincing in the extreme. It amounts to saying that if an attribute does not belong to a substratum truly, then it must at least belong to it falsely.

The dilemma of the vedāntin is : He cannot offer an account of the self-luminosity which belongs to the absolute as its *esse*, nor can he say that the brahman is not essentially self-luminous, because the concession will strike at the very spiritual base of the vedānta system. The only way open before him is to distinguish between the two senses of self luminosity : the unanalysable, non-predicable sense in which it may be the quintessence of the absolute; and the analysable or definable sense (or senses) in which it may be a unique distinction of the phenomenal experiences from the witness self onward. The self-luminosity in its definable sense can rightly belong to the absolute as its accidental distinction, but it can never take the place of the sense in which the absolute is self-luminous.

In fact, such a distinction between the two notions of self-manifestation, has been clearly made by the Buddhists and is implicit in the teachings of the upaniṣads. According to the vijñānavādin's, the idea apprehends not the object but its own form split as self and the 'other'. Hence the self-luminosity of an idea consists in the manifestation of the self-form by the underlying idea being, which is momentary. It is further emphasised that the forms of the knowledge (manifestation), the Knower (self) and the known (object) are superimpositions on the basal, formless, momentary 'given' of the idea. The content of self-luminosity is only the 'self form', the appearance of identity, which is distinct from the basal identity, the formless 'given' of the idea. From the highest standpoint, no distinction, not even that of self-luminosity, can belong to the idea, because they are false appearances entailed to the idea owing to the reflections of the intellect. The bare 'given' of the idea is manifest qua given, which may be called a distinction unto itself ; but one has to keep in mind, that here manifestation is neither a mode of manifestation nor a distinction in the predictive sense.

It means that the noumenal identity of the idea, is prior to and independent of all differences involved in the phenomenal manifestation of this identity. The manifestation of the noumenal identity, may still be called its self-luminosity, but there is a vital difference between the noumenal and phenomenal manifestations of identity, which must need be appreciated. Self-luminosity refers to an articulate experience, which has a definite form,

which is conceivable, in fact it stands conceived as 'luminous' when self-luminosity is reflexively ascribed to it. On the other hand, the manifestation as the identity of the idea, is neither articulation of the ideal identity, nor a reflection upon it. The identity of the idea is manifest solely by virtue of its being an idea, and the manifestation identical with it is inconceivable or unanalysable simply because the noumenal idea is so.

In advaita vedānta, the single term *svaprakāśa* has been used to denote both, the manifestation of the absolute, unqualified identity of brahman, and the qualified or conceivable identity of the witness self and the entire range of phenomenal experience. In fact, much of the confused dialectics and embarrassing controversies in the vedānta texts on the problem, are obviously due to the lack of distinction between the transcendental and phenomenal orders of self-luminosity.

It may be noted that the distinction between the noumenal identity of the absolute and its phenomenal forms, has been clearly hinted in the upaniṣads and is adequately provided in the system itself. It is shown in the distinction of the self and the witness self, and is illustrated by the example of blissful state (*turīya*) and deep sleep (*suṣupti*). But curiously, the vedānta scholarship fails to appreciate the bearings of this distinction on the problem of self-luminosity, when it attempts to formulate a definition of self-luminosity, which may be applicable to the absolute. If the absolute is referred to as self-luminous, it can be so only in some unanalysable, indefinable sense.

The meanings of self-luminosity for the Absolute and the witness self The absolute (*ātman*) is the highest spiritual reality. It is the bare feel of identity devoid of all duality and distinction, and what is more significant, this absence of duality is not a part of the meaning of its identity. It has no propensities, gives rise to no usage, and entails no relationships. This simple feel of identity, is not only an exclusive but also a necessary prerogative of the absolute, since without it, the blissful character of the absolute will not be explicable. But the noticeable point here is, that since there is no differentiation in the immutable absolute and it gives rise to no linguistic usage, the manifestation of its identity can be taken only in the sense of unspeakable, inconceivable 'feel'. This pure self, as the bare feel of identity, is at the base of the definitive expression of identity in the form of the witness-self.

All conceivable forms of necessity, reflect in varying measures the unity of the witness-self, or one may say, it is the witness-self which ensures unity

of apperception. Here the identity of the spiritual principle is reflected upon and comes to be conceived as the substratum of all phenomenal affirmations and negations and as such, may be defined in terms of exclusion of phenomenality. Here the difference or exclusion of phenomenality is part of the meaning of the identity of the witness-experience, and is exactly the measure by which it falls short of the fullness of the absolute, which does not require the counter of difference for self-manifestation and stands manifest sans difference. As has been noted earlier, the exclusion (denial) of phenomenality is itself a reflex of phenomenality, and as such what is sought to be defined in terms of it, is not the highest reality but simply the closest conceivable proximate of it. The witness-self is hence the hypothetical limit of all the conceivable accounts of self-luminosity, which seeks to define the self-manifestive dimension of experience or measures its freedom in terms of exclusion or independence of the aid of the 'other.

What does the conceivability of the witness unitive consists in, is amply evidenced by the analysis of deep sleep experience, when all means of knowledge and the conditions for their operations are quietened. The identity of deep sleep experience is conceivable in terms of the denial of the phenomenal aids, which in their totality may be referred to as conditions of 'knowability'. The witness-experience is the witness to the negation of cognisings and as such, the denial of knowability is part of the meaning of the identity of the witness-experience. It is exactly in this sense that the witness-self is referred to as self-luminous. The notable point here is that all the definitions of self-luminosity, offered in terms of unknowable immediacy, formulated as they are, on the basis of the analysis of deep sleep experience, stop at the witness self. The possibility of any definition being applicable to the absolute (brahman) is ruled out since the witness-self is the 'limit definable' of the spiritual principle.

That no analysable sense of self-luminosity applies to brahman, need not, however, be construed to mean that brahman is non-self-luminous or *jaḍa*. Such a conclusion goes against the preachings of scriptures which uphold that knowledge, being, and bliss constitute the very esse of brahman. In fact the state of bliss (*turiya*) demonstrates the bare identity of the brahman-experience, distinct from the articulate or conceivable identity of the witness-experience evidenced in deep sleep. In the witness state, the consciousness or the revelatory aspect of the spiritual principle emerges emphasised or reflected, and as such, its self-luminosity is a reflex of it. But the unqualified brahman-experience is a state of perfect homogeneity having no points of emphasis and no reflexes in it, and it is owing to this homogeneity

that it is referred to as a state of bliss. The bliss or homogeneity is hence the content of the absolute identity (the Brahman), but its unity or oneness is not a reflex entailed to it by the exclusion of others, because there are no 'others' (or their negation) available to reflect upon, nay even for denial. It is the bare identity free from 'difference' and hence not conceivable. Its inconceivability again is not a reflex of the mechanism of conceiving. It is simply the primeval unity.

The paradox of preaching the indescribable Thus in the context of the vedānta philosophy, a distinction can be made and consistently upheld between the phenomenal experience from the witness-self downward, which gives rise to linguistic usage, and the pure consciousness i. e. the bare identity of the Absolute in the state of emancipation—which gives rise to no linguistic usage and has no necessity for it. It means that all phenomenal experience including the witness experience is reflected in the language or the corresponding linguistic appearance in the form of propositions, simply because both the experience and its 'linguistic appearance' belong to the world of phenomenal existence. But the transcendental principle of awareness represents an altogether different plane of ontology. It is not connected with appearances and has no necessity for them and hence, there is no 'appearance', linguistic or otherwise pertaining to it. It is a self-sufficient, self-sustained principle which shuns even the aid of 'appearances' for self-manifestation. The manifestation, realised in its absolute identity with self is lifted, as it were, to the fullness of the being, ceases to be an 'appearance' which may be reflected in language. Here is domain of experience which is completely alien to language. But one may ask: 'is not at least the statement, that the absolute is alien to language, truly applicable to the absolute reality? When one says that the brahman is indescribable, is he not resorting to a negative description, or when brahman is preached as a transcendental trans-linguistic reality, is it not being affirmed so only through language. A much debated problem of the advaita vedānta has been the status of such sentences which somewhat paradoxically describe brahman as 'indescribable' and affirm it as a transcendental trans-linguistic reality. The basic issue is whether such sentences faithfully mirror the brahman experience or not. If they do so, the transcendental reality can in no way be said to be 'indescribable'. But if the scriptural sentences do not mirror the brahman experience, they cannot impart valid knowledge of brahman, because it is the correspondence of the sentence with the experience content that lends validity to the sentence. A number of solutions have been offered in the traditional texts toward resolving the

paradox. Any correct solution, however, must be preceded by a clear understanding of the manner in which the experiences describable and indescribable are distinguished. The term 'description' may be assigned a specific sense in the context of vedānta philosophy. It seems to be a common supposition of the vedānta dialecticians that a sentence concerning an experience is brought about or occasioned by that experience. However, this occasioning relation itself can be ensured only by an additional supposition that the experience which occasions a sentence, is itself mirrored or reflected in that sentence and hence true to it. It holds good, with regard to all experience, which possesses 'form', because only that which has a 'form' can be reflected or mirrored into language. But as one comes across to discuss the problem of 'pure experience', which is devoid of forms and relationships, the above generalisation can no longer hold good. The pure experience has neither an urge that may give rise to a sentence nor a form that may be available for reflection in a sentence. It is in this sense that the absolute is said to be 'indescribable'. The sentences which call the absolute as indescribable are not reflecting or mirroring the content of the absolute; they are simply mirroring a reflex of language, an echo of its own hollowness in the face of the reality and are true in this very sense. They demonstrate the language turned sober and becoming conscious of its own limitations and are as such useful in setting the stage for the advent of pure experience. They are true not as language pictures corresponding to the absolute reality, but in the sense that they mirror the limitations of language with reference to the absolute. They conjure from a distance, as it were, the notion of the absolute experience for the purpose of meditation, which it self, being tainted with phenomenality, finally dissolves as the identity of self with the pure experience is realised.

These dual aspects of the relevant scriptural utterances, the descriptive and the pragmatic or useful must be clearly distinguished. They are descriptive of the limitations of language (not of the brahman), and are 'useful' to brahman realisation, which is set forth as the goal of all upaniṣadic teachings. Now with this clarification in mind, we may take up another important issue : What is the need of scripture, if the brahman, the absolute spiritual principle is self-luminous or self-manifesting. As has been made plain, the self-luminosity in its analysable or conceivable sense cannot be ascribed to the experience of which it is said, 'whence, unapprehending, the speech turns back along with the Mind. (*Yatra vāco nivar-tante aprāpya manasāsaha*. Tait. up. II. 4.). It belongs to such levels of experience which may be 'mirrored' in language. In fact the concept has been analysed as the capacity of experience to give rise to the linguistic

usage pertaining to itself, without depending on the aid of 'others' Now, significantly the exclusion of the aid of the other as part of the meaning of self-luminosity does not go so far as to exclude the usage of language. In fact, the 'identity' and linguistic manifestations' (expression) are held together in the conceivable sense of self-luminosity and in this sense the supposition of self-luminosity far from ensuing superfluity to scriptures, is a necessary assumption which correlates the scriptures to spiritual experience.

The highest experience is, however, trans-linguistic. Its manifestation is absolutely free and unfettered. The freedom of experience, which is in fact the independence of its manifestation of the aid of 'others' and is intuited as such (with reference to the self of manifestation) here asserts itself to a point when it shows independence even of the aid of language, the last, the most elusive and subtle refuse of phenomenality—withstraws itself and settles down to shine by its solitary effulgence. But the realisation of this state leaves the experience speechless. The absolute freedom, devoid of references to shakles, loses all communicable significance. It may still be 'significant, experience, but it remains essentially incommunicable and even scriptures cannot translate it. It is in this sense that one may say that the freedom of the absolute i.e. the self-luminosity in its absolute sense is unanalysable and incommunicable. With regard to this sense of self-luminosity one may say that the scriptures cannot translate it, and hence the charge of scriptures becoming 'repetitive' with regard to it, is simply out of question. There is, however, no harm in conceding that the scriptures become unnecessary, once the highest experience is realised in the state of emancipation.

So long as the state of emancipation does not dawn, the scriptures serve the useful purpose of diverting our attention to it; by reflecting upon the limitations of language with reference to the absolute. they suggest a 'form' for 'meditation', which in relative and apparent proximity to the absolute, may serve as a stepping stone for the dawn of the mystic vision, resulting in dissolution of all bondages, including the steps which seemed to have helped in the apparent ascent to the ever present principle of spirituality. Thus from direct description to negative suggestion, and through them to injunction for meditation, leading finally to the emancipation of self, one may easily notice the successive stages towards emancipation of experience from dependence of language. Here we have the successively finer shades of 'self-luminosity' striving to conform to their absolute significance. The state of emancipation is hence the state of complete emancipation of

experience from dependence on language, and may as such signify the absolute sense of self-luminosity. In this state all urges leading to a discursive expression are quenched as the bare self-experience-identity shines in solitary effulgence. We may still refer to it as self-luminous, but the very attempt to give it any analysable or communicable sense will debase it, and will confuse it with the innumerable, qualified, and less equivocal connotations of the term.

CHAPTER - V

Self-Luminosity of Cognition

According to Sāṅkara vedānta, brahman, the pure principle of knowledge alone is self-luminous. It is so because the manifestation of the Identity of brahman alone is absolutely free and independent of the aid nay, even of the reference to the 'other'. However, just as the term 'knowledge' applies derivatively to all possible shades of experience, even so varying shades of experience may be described 'self-luminous' in different senses of the term, measuring the degrees of their relative independence. Instances are very few where the vedānta texts have discussed the problem of self-luminosity with reference to cognition (the experience with definite objective content and brought about by pramāṇas), but they are significant since they expose the untenability of the attempts to restrict self-luminosity to brahman alone, and emphasise the need of a graded account of self-luminosity in the system.

It was noted in the preceding chapter, how the self-luminosity of brahman differs from that of the witness self, and again, how the witness self is self-luminous in a superior sense than the ideas. To carry the issue further, the cognition is more independent in comparison to the object it manifests. The manifestation of cognition does not depend on another cognition in the manner in which the object depends on cognition for its manifestation. However, this independence of cognition is only relative, as its own manifestation, though independent of the aid of other cognition, is itself rooted in the deeper levels of experience. Thus corresponding to different levels of experience, from phenomenal point of view, we can have different versions of self-luminosity reflecting the relative degrees of their independence. No wonder that Citsukhācārya puts forth eleven possible connotation of self-luminosity for examination. He chooses however, to defend only one of these connotations, which he thinks flawlessly applies to brahman, and surrenders the rest of them to the criticisms of the opponents. This ambivalence is somewhat puzzling. As a matter of fact, all possible connotations of self-luminosity can be accommodated to a comprehensive vedānta account of experience, owing to its

theory of degrees of experience. The vedantin can, of course, condemn other accounts of self-luminosity e. g. those put forth by the buddhist, prabhakarites and jainas as insufficient or partial but he cannot reject them as false or inconsistent, since they are true to 'certain' levels of experience accepted by the vendāntin.

Belief evidences self-luminosity of cognition: Analysis of the views of Khadana and citsukhī.

Just as the bare identity of the highest self is manifest in the blissful state of (*turīya*,) and in the identities of the 'witness self' and the 'idea' respectively in deep sleep and dream states, even so in the waking state the identity of experience, its self-luminosity is evidenced in the element of 'belief' which invariably accompanies all experiences of the waking state. It goes to the credit of Śrīharṣa, (the author of '*khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*') that he stated this most important argument for self-luminosity for the vednā-tin. In the opening chapter of the text, the vijñānavādin is shown refuting the view the Sūnyavādins that everything, including the ideas (*vijñāna*) is unreal. He points out that knowledge is self-validating and hence cannot be unreal. This self-validity itself cannot be explained except in terms of the self-luminosity of knowledge. The reasoning, though placed in the mouth of the vijñānavādin, stands approved by the vedantins, is shown by the later adaptations of it in the vedānta texts. It may be reproduced as follows :

'Knowledge (*vijñāna*) is self-luminous i. e. is of the self-established nature; it is so because once knowledge being there, even the inquirer does not have any doubt 'whether I know or not'. Besides, there can be neither any illusion, 'This is not knowledge, this is desire' nor a knowledge of its negation in the forms 'I do not know'. Hence regarding knowledge under inquiry, the combined absence of doubt, illusion and knowledge of negation reflects the valid knowledge of the knowledge under inquiry, which is its pervader (*vyāpaka*). If there were no valid knowledge of *vijñāna*, then the pervaders of the absence of *vijñāna*—those having the absence of knowledge (*vijñāna*) under inquiry for their object, i.e. doubts etc. must have been there. But they are not there, hence for all persons, the nature of knowledge stands self-established by their own direct experience'¹ .

The point this reasoning seeks to emphasise is that the absence of doubt, illusion etc. in a knowledge evidences valid manifestation of knowledge (*pramāṇaprakāśitva*), since there is no other knowledge, corresponding to this valid manifestation of knowledge, it becomes necessary to suppose

the knowledge as self-luminous. The apponent may say that there are not doubt etc. in knowledge because knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is apprehended by the subsequent knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). Against this, the author of '*Khaṇḍana*' points out that (if the series of continuous apprehensions of one knowledge by another is not to be infinite) doubt etc. are bound to ensue to the last term of the series, which remains unapprehended. This doubt concerning the very identity of the last knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*), will unavoidably infect its object, the *vyavasāya jñāna*, and so on upto the first cognition. It is so because the doubt regarding apprehension (knowledge) may render also the apprehended (object) doubtful. These defects will equally ensue to the views which uphold that the series of apprehensions does not go beyond three or four cognitions.² What is significant about this reasoning is that it seeks to prove the self-luminosity of ideas and cognitions, and not of the absolute (the brahman) to which most of the vedāntins professedly seek to restrict the usage of the term.

In '*Tattvaprdīpikā*', Citsukhācārya adapts the same reasoning to prove self-luminosity of cognition. What is notable is that he does not put it at the door of any other system but as a vedāntin accepts full responsibility for it. Thus restating *Khaṇḍana's* argument, Citsukh brings out its significance as an evidence for self-luminosity of knowledge. He observes :

'If, at the time of manifestation of the object, experience is not manifest, then, after the manifestation of the object the inquirer must have doubt (*sandeha*), uncertainty (*viparyaya*) and opposite determination (*viparītaniscaya*). But when asked, 'have you seen this thing or not, the spectator expresses neither doubt nor uncertainty nor opposite determination. on the other hand, he determinedly affirms his belief, 'I have seen this thing. Hence we will have to admit that experience while revealing itself, gives rise to the usage regarding the object.'³

This reasoning unmistakably emphasises the value of belief as demonstrative of the identity of cognition, and puts it forth as an evidence for its self-luminosity. The validity of this reasoning depends in the first place on the truth of its assumption that 'belief' necessarily accompanies all cognitions, and secondly that the element of belief signifies the self-manifestive dimension of cognition. It will be accepted by all that the fact of cognition itself is never doubted. Whenever there is doubt 'Is it a man or a lamp post', it concerns the object and not the cognition itself. When a cognition is called 'doubtful', what is questioned is its truth value, its validity and not its occurrence as a fact of experience. To make the point clear, the validity of

a cognition certifies that the cognition faithfully corresponds to a given object; and whenever we call a cognition doubtful, we simply mean that it is not certain of its object, not that it is not certain of its own self. Even when 'doubting', a cognition is certain of itself as a 'doubting fact'. It is this self certifying, self affirming character of a cognition that is called its self-luminosity.

It is notable that the aforesaid reasoning of Citsukhācārya seeks to prove the self-luminosity of cognition (not of brahman). He is at the same time busy in involving a definition of a self-luminosity which, distinct from other definitions (put forth by buddhists and others) applies only to the brahman. His study of the problem thus serves to highlight the partial and ambivalent attitude of the vedāntins in general. As a matter of fact, the vedāntin can have no meaningful controversy with the nyāya realists, if the former means simply to uphold the self-luminosity of brahman. The nyāya view that the cognition is not self-luminous, far from being contradictory, can only supplement the orthodox vedānta thesis that barring the brahman, all else is non-self-luminous or other-illuminated. However, as has been seen, the vedāntin not only refutes the nyāya theory of anuvyavasāya, but is also drawn into proving the self-luminosity of cognition (against his professed conviction). Curiously the vedānta scholarship, traditional and modern alike, for from attempting an explanation of it, does not bother even to take note of this inconsistency.

As has been noted earlier the vedānta texts take the term knowledge (*jñāna*) in a rather loose and comprehensive sense—its usage extending from the pure formless experience to all possible forms of experience i.e. the witness self the ideas, the feelings, the cognitions and so on. Consistently true to this loose usage of the term, a variety of arguments designed to prove self-luminosity of knowledge have been put forth, without ever specifying the range of experience to which they may be separately or jointly true. In the absence of any specific concept of knowledge or rather with a very flexible connotation of the term in mind, it becomes possible for the vedāntins to accommodate in their texts various arguments offered in support of self-luminosity in other systems; although on close scrutiny it soon becomes obvious that they apply only to certain levels and fall short of the vedānta concept of knowledge in the strict sense of the term.

Prakāśātmāyati on
self-luminosity :

As has been the case with all other exponents of self-luminosity, *Prakāśātmāyati* employs the example of the 'light of lamp' to prove 'self-luminosity' of knowledge. Against this the opponent may point out that in distinction

to knowledge, the 'light of lamp', which serves as an example in the reasoning for 'self-luminosity of knowledge', is itself non-self-luminous. Hence the argument is vitiated due to failure of the example (*draṣṭāntāsiddhi*), and as such, fails to establish the self-luminosity of knowledge. On the other hand, if the light of lamp were the correct example of self-luminosity, knowledge may as well belong to the category of lamp etc. and may be treated as an insentient luminary. (*jaḍaparakāśa*). Prakāśātmāyati anticipates these possibilities and introduces a distinction between the light of consciousness and the light of lamp etc. It is pointed out that the light of lamp etc. reveals the objective world by dispelling the material veil, whereas the light of consciousness dispels the veil of ignorance and is generator of knowledge⁴.

Prakāśātmāyati further points out that consciousness is self-luminous as it is independent of any other conscious principle of the same nature with it, and hence like the light of lamp, makes revelation of the objective world possible directly and without any intervening moment. "This syllogistics approach towards the problem of self-luminosity of consciousness has been made here by Prakāśātmāyati by taking the example of the light of lamp. In fact, Prakāśātmāyati has all along been discussing self-luminosity of consciousness from the view point of the light of the lamp, that is to say, from the viewpoint of independence of similar *prakāśa* or revelation. Thus the third alternative in Citsukha's analysis of the concept of *svaparakāśatava* seems to have been suggested by Prakāśātmāyati. Hence this syllogistic conclusion, arrived at by Prakāśātmāyati to establish self-luminosity of consciousness, seems to include both material and intellectual illuminations as being on the logical plane, at least, though not in the ultimate metaphysical plane, similar concepts, with regard to revelation independent of similar revelation' (*sajātīyaparakāśāprakāśyatvam*)"*.

The discussion of the problem in Nyāya Makaranda The author of Nyāyamakaranda (Anandabodha 1200 A.D.—1250), similarly examines the problem of self-luminosity of knowledge, with such connotations of the term in mind which are less remote than the 'pure consciousness' of the system. It is the self-luminosity of 'vijñāna' that he proposes to defend. Those who say that the knowledge (*vijñānam*) is not self-luminous, but illuminated by the not-self, should be asked : Is the illumination by the other, manifest or non-manifest⁵. While posing this query, the author has the mīmāṃsā (bhāṭṭa) and the nyaya schools in mind, is obvious from his further elaboration. In the school of mīmāṃsa, knowledge is supposed to give rise to the usage of *jñātātā* in the

* A critique on Vivarana School, p 176.

form 'the jar is known' (*jñāto ghataḥ*) whereas in the nyāya school, knowledge gives rise to the usage in the form of illumination 'the jar shines' (*prakāśate ghataḥiti*). The author asks : Does knowledge, while itself remaining unmanifest, gives rise to the manifestive usage of the nature of *jñātaṭā* in the object, or functions only by manifesting itself'. It cannot be non-luminous, because in that case there will be possibility for doubt in the form 'the pot is known to me or not', 'have you seen or not'. But, in fact, there never follows doubt 'I have seen or not' but the affirmation 'I have certainly seen it'. Hence the author concludes—

Knowledge shines simultaneously with the illumination of the object, because after the manifestation of the object superimposed thereon, the fact of knowledge itself becomes incapable of doubt even as the object itself.⁶

Commenting of these lines, Citsukha clarifies that the term '*arthopādhau*' stands for that which has object for its qualifier, and since whatever be the object it will never be a qualifier unto itself, and as such; the example under consideration will be pointless; hence the the *arthopādhau* should be taken in the sense of the knowledge of jar, which simultaneously with the usage of the jar, is subject of the usage 'the jar is known' (*jñāto ghaṭaḥ*). The point is just as the jar is the subject of the cognitive usage pertaining to itself, i.e. 'this is jar', even so the knowledge of jar is the subject of the cognitive usage 'The jar is known'. The significance of this analysis as an argument for self-luminosity lies in its emphasis that one and the same 'fact of manifestation simultaneously gives rise to the dual usage, pertaining respectively to itself and to the object. Hence, just as a matter of course, we do not 'doubt' the object after manifestation, even so there is no scope for doubting the fact of knowledge itself. If the fact of knowledge is doubted after manifestation, there shall never be certainty about the object itself. This is the argument preventive of any contrary hypothesis (*vipakṣabādhaka tarka*).⁷

*Discussion of the
problem in
Pramāṇamālā :*

In another text (*pramāṇamālā*) Anandabodha offers another ingenious argument for self-luminosity of knowledge. He points out that manifestation of the qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) always depends on the manifestation of dualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). For example, the manifestation of the man with a stick, presupposes the manifestation of the stick. Similarly, the knowledge such as 'this is favourable and 'this unfavourable' are cases of qualified manifestations on which depend our activities of inclination and aversion.

However, the qualified manifestation in the form of knowledge 'this is favourable to me' itself depends on the manifestation of 'self' which is the qualifier; the position of self as qualifier is quite obvious, because whenever there is the query 'favourable to whom' it is that self which appears as the 'pervader' (*avaccedaka*) or qualifier. This 'self' being the pervader cannot pervade its own base, because it is a fact like the edge of a sword which as such, cannot be cut by itself. It cannot be said (by the Prabhākārites) that by the 'knowledge of the object, its substratum, the 'Self' will also be established. The experiencer is not revealed by any experience other than itself, because like experience it is immediate without becoming 'object' of experience. Hence self-luminosity is proved as an inevitable conclusion.⁸ In vedānta, it is pointed out, this self has been affirmed as identical with experience e.g. 'This brahman is of the nature of experience and bliss', 'This self is brahman experienced by all. If experience is self-luminous, how can the self, which is identical with it be illumined by not self. Thus the author of *Pramāṇamālā* exposes the inconsistency of the Prabhākārite view, which upholds that knowledge alone is self-luminous, whereas the self is not self-luminous but is revealed by the knowledge as its substrate. It will be preposterous to affirm the self-luminosity of knowledge, while denying the same to the more fundamental principle 'the self'.

This very line of reasoning is then adapted to prove the self-luminosity of cognition—

The cognition under dispute, though devoid of any co-subsisting, simultaneous and self-apprehending cognition, is not at all devoid of the usage pertaining to itself, because it is cognition (*samvit*), like any undisputed cognition".⁹

Elaborating the point of the reasoning, the author points out that if '*samvit*' were not self-luminous (distinct from self-apprehension), then soon after the manifestation of jar, there would not have followed the determination in the form 'this is known to me'. Notably in this determination the knowledge is the qualifier of the object (jar) and the determination of the qualified, the jar, is known as impossible, while the qualifier (the knowledge) itself remains unmanifest."¹⁰

This rather ingenious piece of reasoning for self-luminosity of knowledge, significantly points out that the very ascertainment of the object of knowledge in the form 'jar is known' becomes impossible, unless prior manifestation of the knowledge, which is the 'qualifier' is conceded. It means that the knowledge already stands revealed while revealing the object. "The

manifestation of the 'qualified' is not possible while the qualifier remains unmanifest. The qualified experience such as 'this is the man with a stick' is not seen without manifestation of the stick.¹¹

The qualified manifestation (*viśiṣṭavedanam*) such as 'the jar is known', remains inexplicable, in the absence of the manifestation of knowledge which serves as the qualifier in the aforesaid case (of qualified manifestation). Hence it becomes necessary to postulate the self-luminosity of knowledge as a mode of the manifestation with objective content. The central point of this reasoning is, that in the manifestation of the object by knowledge, the manifestation of knowledge is implicit i.e., from the analysis of the manifestation of object, invariably flows the manifestation of the knowledge which seeks to manifest the object and qualifies it in the cognition 'the jar is known'.

Against this the opponent may uphold that the hypothesis of 'self-luminosity' is not at all necessary to explain the 'manifestation of manifestation', since it can be better explained by conceding that a cognition, is capable of being apprehended by the subsequent cognition. He lays down the rule: "whatever is, is pervaded only with the cognition distinct from itself."¹² It means that the revelation (revelator) and the revealed must be different. This supposition is fundamental to all refutations of self-luminosity.

Examining it, the vedāntin points out that the aforesaid rule itself furnishes an instance to the contrary, inasmuch as pervading all the objects, it pervades its own self as well; i. e. the rule that 'all that is, is revealed by some cognition which is different from it', besides pervading (or being applicable) to all instances, applies (pervades) to its own self as well.¹³

Elucidating its significance, the author further observes: "not only that, all generalisations as, 'All experience is non-self-experiencing' 'all effects have their causes'. 'all that is, has a being' are uniformly applicable to the specific instances as well as to their own self, and as such, may be said to be manifestive both of the self as well as of the others. They furnish a type of exceptions to the rule 'whatever is, is manifest by the other'. If it is said that *while apprehending the others they apprehend their own selves*, then the 'experience of jar', while manifesting the jar may also *manifest its own self as well*, and there is nothing extraordinary about it.¹⁴

The commentary 'Nibandha' points out that the knowledge of the aforesaid necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the *naiyāyikas* 'all cognition is non-self-luminous', proves non-self-luminosity of itself as well as of all

other cognitions, the term knowledge being commonly applicable to both (the law and the instances)". Similarly the vyāpti 'Everything is manifest by the knowledge distinct from it', itself being a fact of knowledge must apply to itself while being applicable to all other cases of knowledge.¹⁵ The point is: In order to be a complete and universal law, (vyāpti), it must be applicable to all the cases of knowledge including itself. But application of knowledge to itself leads to the supposition of the self-luminosity of knowledge.

A close scrutiny of the aforesaid analysis will show that herein, the term self-luminosity has imperceptibly taken on the meaning of self-validity. All the laws, including that which lays down non-self-luminosity of knowledge, must be self-validating in order to be the validator of the instances. Since all laws are cases of knowledge, self-luminosity in the form of self-validity can be evidenced in those very generalisations which seek to deny it.

Discussion of the Problem in Nyāya Ratnad. pāvalī : Anadānubhava (circa 1200 A.D.), the author of 'nyāratnadīpāvalī' observes—a cognition cannot be an object of another cognition (*saṃvit*) because of similarity. The subject-object relation is not seen among the similars, as in the case of two lamps. Hence, non-cognised by (another) cognition, the cognition shines by itself¹⁶.

The syllogism offered to prove self-luminosity of knowledge is as follows : The disputed term (explained by the commentator as the cognition of jar) is the light which is the cause of the usage of self (identity), because it is cognition (*saṃvitatvāt*) ; whatever is not so is not like that, like a jar¹⁷. Countering the possible objections against the syllogism, the author points out that it does not suffer from the unfoundedness of the prediction (*aprasiddha viśeṣaṇatā*). The light causing the cognitive usage is well-established (even the opponent accepts it in the form of *anuvyavasāya*). Then, one may contend, there is fallacy of proving what is already proved, in so far the manifestation of cognition is concerned (since it is already established through *anuvyavasāya*). Not so, *anuvyavasāya* is not acceptable to the vedāntin. Only the fact of the light of cognition is not disputable and that is enough to salvage the syllogism from the defect of unproved prediction (*aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā*)¹⁸.

Thus the unique distinction of the light of cognition, i.e. its self-luminosity consists in its non-cognisability (*avedyatva*). What is the harm in accepting cognition as cognisable (*vedya*) ? It will be no more a cognition,

we say. But then self-luminosity may be proved everywhere in the aforesaid manner. (one may as well say that the jar is the causal light for the usage of jar cognition, because it is a jar, like any other jar). No, even when they (jar etc.) are present, they are not manifest (in absence of cognition) and hence cannot be called self-luminous.¹⁹ Then, the opponent points out that the knowledge manifestive of jar etc. being (eternal) ever present, the apprehension of them will be possible even when they are absent. The vedāntin counters the objection by emphasising that all cognisability (*vedyatva*) is on account of *māyā*, and it is from this axiom, that the non-experiential character of the cognised (object) becomes ascertainable²⁰. It cannot be said that even without the pervasion of *māyā*, there may be cognisedness (*samvedyatva*) in a cognition due to relation with (some other) cognition, because no conceivable form of relationship, contact etc. is possible between them.

The author then proceeds to consider the argument of Śivāditya Miśra against the vedānta concept of self-luminosity. If experience (*anubhūti*) is not experienced (*ananubhāvya*) then like hare's horn, there may follow negation (non-existence) of experience (*ananubhūtiva prasaṅga*). The invariable concomittance in this argument as stated by the commentator is : 'Wherever there is non-cognisedness, there is non-cognitionness (*yatra ananubhāvyatvam tatrānanubhūtitvam*).

Does this vyāpti hold good from your (opponent's) view-point or from ours, asks the vedāntin. In the former case, the hare's horn, the said vyāpti of the conceited pandit may be possible, when one of its terms remains unproven or non-existent. From our standpoint, though the hare's horn is established as a sport of *māyā*, the *vyāpti* disintegrates at the very roots since *māyā* represent the principle of objectification (*anubhāvya*) to the exclusion of experience (*anubhūti*).²¹

Discussions in Pañcadaśī

Stating the vedānta view of self-luminosity, the author of 'Pañcadaśī' says that the self, because of its being of the nature of experience, is manifest by itself. He emphasises that its unknowability (*ajñeyatā*) is on account of the absence of difference between the knower and knowledge and not on account of its non-existence²². The notion of this unique distinction of experience is brought home through an example. There are certain things juggery etc. which are sweet by nature. Their capacity to impart flavour is innate and not imparted to them by something else. Similarly, even devoid

of some other bestower, the self is manifest by its very nature. Experience is the essence of it.²³ The scriptures such as "Here this self is light unto itself" (Br. IV. 3. 9). "All luminaries follow (imitate) as it shines, by its light all this shines" (Mund. 2. 2. 10; Sveta. 6. 14; Katha, 5. 14) preach the self-luminosity of ātman²⁴. That this self-luminosity consists in the unknowability or 'non-presentability' is also vouchsafed in the scriptures. 'Whereby all this is known by what else can that be known. How the knower is to know by the means of cognising as they are all directed to the objects and not to the self'²⁵. Elucidating the contention, the commentator says that by what seeable means of cognising (*drasyabhūtena*) can the knower of all this 'seeable' (*drāśyajātasya jñātāram*) be known? By none is the import. One cannot say that the self is known by the mind, because the capacity of the instruments of cognising is objectbound and can never be directed to the self. The scriptures say 'not by the speech, not by the mind' (Katha 6 12). In fact, the incongruity owing to the exclusiveness of agency and accusative (*Kartr-Karma-Virodha*) arises only if cognisability or presentability is ascribed to the self' and not when it is conceived as 'non-objectifiable' 'immediacy' or self-luminous in the vedānta sense of the term.²⁶

The self is the knower of all that is knowable (*vedya*); of that there is no other is knower. Distinct from the categories of the known (*vidita*) and the unknown (*avidita*), he is just of the nature of experience.²⁷ Obviously, here the term 'known' stands for the object of knowledge (*viditam jñānena viśayīkṛtam*) and 'unknown' stands for that which is covered with ignorance (*aviditamajñānenāvṛtam*)—whereas the self-as the bare identity of experience (*bodhasvarūpa*) is distinct from both.

Deriding those who do not subscribe to self-luminosity of experience, the author observes: 'The slow-witted man, to whom even the experience in the form of manifestation of jar etc. is not obvious, how the knowledge of śāstras be imparted to such a human image in stone.'²⁸ To say 'I have a tongue or not' simply causes embarrassment to the person who utters it. Similarly, it is self-contradictory to say that the 'experience is not manifest to me but other things are, since usage pertaining to it will remain inexplicable.'²⁹ It is hinted that the law of identity is the basis of all disputation. When the very identity of experience is doubtful, no meaningful disputation about experience is possible and nobody can be a disputant.³⁰ The contention is that the self-luminosity of experience must be a necessary presupposition of any meaningful dialogue on experience.

If it is asked—what may be the nature of this immediacy as devoid of thisness (we say), the non-thisness is ascertained as the very esse of it.³¹

It is pointed out that the objects of eye (i.e. the objects of immediate experience) are called 'this' (*īdrk*), whereas the objects which are not immediate are referred to as 'that' (*tādrk*). The self is in a way distinct from both. It is the knower and hence not the object of eyes, and yet it is immediate as the very self of immediacy.³² Hence it is concluded: that which is immediate, without becoming the object of knowledge, is self-luminous.³³ The commentator makes the idea explicit through the following syllogism: The ātman is self-luminous because of its being immediate without becoming object of cognition like any other cognition. One cannot say that the qualification in the reason (*hetu*) is unproven; because if ātman becomes the object of cognition, there will ensue incongruity owing to the exclusiveness of the agency and accusative (*kartṛ-karm-virodha*). Nor can it be said that the example is inconclusive, since if (in support of it) a cognition is supposed to be apprehended by another, infinite regressus is bound to follow.³⁴

This view which puts forward the example of the self-luminosity of cognition, as illustrative of the self-luminosity of the ātman, is itself remarkable. It again serves to emphasise the importance of the question. In what sense the cognition itself can be called self-luminous, or to what extent does it exemplify the self-luminosity of the highest?

The summary of the main findings:

The relevant content of some of the vedānta texts analysed in this chapter amply evidence that the subsequent vedānta manuals, particularly those

which are not of the nature of commentaries, clearly uphold the self-luminosity of the phenomenal experience—ideas (*vijñāna*) and cognitions etc. It is significantly emphasised that the psychological element of belief and reassurance, which invariably accompanies all cognitions is indicative of the self-affirming dimension of it. This insight of the vedānta protagonists of self-luminosity is of special significance particularly in the context of the modern analytic philosophers who maintain that the psychological element in a cognition indicates only a state of mind and not a fact. The vedāntin upholds that all facts of experience, ranging from the witness-self to the lowest cognitive responses, invariably have the self (identity) and the other (object) as two dimensions of manifestation. The fact affirming dimension is unitive whereas the other is affirmed discursively. The fact of experience is reflected in the 'unitive feel' while the object-fact is mirrored in the propositional form. As has been noticed in the preceding chapter, at the levels of witness-self and the intellect, this 'unitive feel' is identifiable, respectively in the forms of 'indubitability and 'logical necessity'.

Similarly in a cognition, it is exemplified in the feelings of 'belief' and 'self-assurance'. In fact, there may be innumerable shades of the 'unitive feel' for varying orders of experience, but they all invariably refer to the self, the identity of experience. Hence the psychological element (e.g. belief) in a cognition cannot be dismissed as a useless subjective appendage; it refers to the fact of cognition just as the proposition form, 'this is jar' refers to the object.

Corresponding to the object affirming proposition 'this is jar' the unitive feel' in a cognition, may give rise to the propositional forms 'I know the jar' or 'the jar is known to me'. The vedāntin analyses these propositions to show that they do refer to the self-affirming dimension of cognition. It is pointed out that the qualified experience such as 'this is a man with a stick', is not possible without the experience of the stick which is the qualifier. Similarly, in a proposition 'the jar is known to me', the ascertainment of the object jar is impossible while the qualifier, the knowledge remains manifest.

The vedānta philosophy upholds the absolute identity of the self (ātman) and experience, and the separate sets of reasonings offered in the vedānta texts to prove the self-luminosity of the self (ātman) and the knowledge seem rather puzzling at first sight. A close look at the texts will show that most of them discuss the problem of self-luminosity with the nyāya and the prabhākara schools of realism in mind. Prabhākara upholds that the cognition is self-luminous, whereas the self (ātman), prior to a discussion of the self-luminosity of knowledge. However, Prabhākara and the vedāntin have different meanings of 'self' (ātman) and 'knowledge' in mind. The knowledge which Prabhākara calls self-luminous, in contrast to its unconscious substrate, the ātman, is in fact a cognition (samvit), a momentary product of the cognitive mechanism and not the principle of pure awareness identical with self, as upheld by the vedāntin. The vedānta polemics designed to bring out the inconsistency of the view, which upholds self-luminous cognition and unconscious self (ātman) can only end in a thesis which reconciles the self-luminosity of cognition to that of ātman; wherein the partial significance of the self-luminosity of cognition is realised as derivative of the highest sense of the term which may be applicable only to the highest self. Little wonder that the vedānta texts (mentioned in this chapter) do not feel shy of upholding the self-luminosity of ideas and cognitions. As will be seen in the following chapter Citsukhācārya explores the highest regions of the freedom of experience, the absolute sense of self-luminosity, while discussing in detail other connotations of the term as well. Although in his work there is no attempt at a synthesis or reconciliation of the varying connotations in a comprehensive philosophy of experience, the very completeness of the statement ensures a clear and compelling possibility of it.

CHAPTER VI

Refutation of the Divergent Views

Viewed historically the vedānta concept of self-luminosity may be said to have evolved out of controversies with rival schools which either did not subscribe to the hypothesis of self luminosity or upheld it in a sense which was found inadequate from the vedānta standpoint. The first part of the controversy was devoted mostly to the refutations of the nyāya and mīmāṃsā explanations of 'knowledge of knowledge' and the defence of self-luminosity against the onslaughts of these systems; whereas the other part sought to show the inadequacy of buddhist and the prabhākārite concepts of self-luminosity. It may be remarked that even before the advent of Śaṅkara there had been thoroughgoing discussions between the buddhists, the earliest systematic exponents of self-luminosity and the bhaṭṭās who give us perhaps the oldest critique of the concept. The vedānta refutations which were obliged to reply to the bhāṭṭa criticism of self-luminosity as well to expose the buddhist version of it, drew heavily upon these earlier and more genuine controversies. This indebtedness is however, restricted to a set of rather well-known and stock arguments of general nature, the vedānta text do attempt at places a fresh and illuminating critique of the rival accounts. Śaṅkara's criticism of the vijñānavādin view of self-luminosity, examination of the vijñānavādin and śūnyavādin versions of the concept by Śrī harṣa and the brilliant criticism of the concept of anuvyavasāya by the author of nyāya Makaranda may be enumerated as some of the positive contributions of vedānta to the traditional controversy. It may be emphasised here that in the context of vedānta philosophy, the concept of self-luminosity itself acquires (or yields) its deepest significance and as a key concept of the system, reveals dimensions of meaning which none of the preceding controversies ever touched. The refutations offered mostly with provisional meanings of self-luminosity in mind, seem to be a sort of concession to the tradition and as will be seen, not infrequently landed the vedāntins into embarrassing inconsistencies.

In most of the cases these criticisms hang loosely and have not been reconciled to the basic tenets of the system in a comprehensive account. Besides, the vedānta criticism of the rival schools suffers from faulty metho-

dology. Instead of presenting a direct criticism of rival schools from vedānta standpoint, we see that one school is presented criticising another and that one, in its turn criticised and refuted by the vedāntin. This sort of treatment does not oblige the vedāntin to make his stand clear on specific issues vis a vis the rival systems and is responsible for a volume of superficial and loose sort criticism in the texts. Whatever be the limitations these criticisms form part of the intellectual background against which the vedānta scholarship felt its way towards formulating a distinctly upaniṣadic concept of self-luminosity.

It may be further pointed out that if the sole concern of the vedānta thinking on the concept is to bring out the self-luminosity of the brahman, (the identity of pure consciousness) then he can have no meaningful controversy on self luminosity with the buddhists, bhaṭṭās, naiyāyikas and the prabhākarites, who discuss the problem only with reference to cognitions and ideas and discount the very possibility of a fact of 'pure awareness'. If the brahman (pure experience) alone is self-luminous, the vedāntin can contradict neither the realists, the bhaṭṭās and the naiyāyikas who treat knowledge (cognition) as non-self-luminous, since by his own definition they are condemned to be so; nor object to the buddhists and prabhākarite concepts of self-luminosity which do not contradict the specifically vedantic concept of self-luminosity as a unique distinction of brahman, but rather humbly seek to explain such levels of experience which are not claimed by the vedāntin for luminosity at all. The vedānta polemic does offer unqualified refutation of them all and gives rise to a situation which is puzzling in the extreme. The distinctly vedānta concept of self-luminosity cannot be available to the phenomenal experience, cognitions etc. and the explanations offered by the bhaṭṭās, naiyāyikas, buddhists and prabhākarites which are explicitly concerned with them stand refuted all and sundry. How does the vedāntin then explain the manifestations of cognition etc. It is well nigh impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion on the basis of the texts.

The reasons for this ambivalent attitude are not far to seek. One may easily see where the vedānta scholarship overdid itself and deviated from the path of its illustrious exponent. Strictly speaking, the vedānta philosophy does not sanction refutations of the less ambitious explanations of the phenomenal occurrences, so long as they move within prescribed limits and do not set themselves up as final or absolute principles. Hence all that the vedāntin is entitled to do in the course of controversy is to expose the limitations of those explanations, to question their bonafides as the final

points of explanations in the philosophy of experience and demonstrate that they themselves argue for the supposition of a higher principle of experience. Śaṅkara's critique of vijñānavāda is probably the best example of this cautious criticism. It seeks to expose the limitations of the buddhist (vijñānavādin) concept of self-luminosity as the final explanation and shows that it presupposes a self-luminous witness. It assimilates rather than rejects the buddhist concept. It lays down the guidelines for all future vedāntic criticisms of rival views. It warrants not so much the refutation of the less ambitious connotations of self-luminosity (i.e. the buddhist and the prabhākarite views of it) as their accommodation or assignment to relevant levels of phenomenal experience.

In fact the vedānta theory of graded experience, consistently emphasised in this dissertation, suggests that besides one absolute idea of self-luminosity applicable to brahman alone, several derivative concepts of self-luminosity are necessary to explain the modes of manifestation of the identity of experience at various levels. The unqualified rejection of other versions of self-luminosity was a mistake of the vedānta scholarship which seemed to have lost its bearing in the heat of controversy.

*Refutations of the
nyāya and buddhist
views by Śaṅkara*

As has been noticed earlier, Śaṅkara repudiates the anuvyavasāya theory of nyāya school as well as the buddhist concept of self-luminosity by denying 'knowability' to pure experience. The buddha and the nyāya systems broadly agree in upholding that knowledge is 'known' or 'apprehended'; the difference is regarding how the 'knowledge' is known. While the naiyāyika maintains that it is apprehended by the subsequent knowledge, the buddhist (vijñānavādin) maintains that it is apprehended by itself. Since denial of knowability or objective presentability of knowledge strikes at the root of both of these explanations, single assumption of unknowability of knowledge, serves to refute the buddhist view of self-luminosity as well as the nyāya theory of anuvyavasāya. With this assumption in mind, Śaṅkara proceeds to show the insufficiency of the two views. He points out that 'knowledge of knowledge' (in the manner of naiyāyika) is not possible. The subsequent knowledge apprehending the preceding knowledge will itself require a third knowledge for its manifestation and so on ad infinitum. The infinite regress is inevitable if the knowledge is accepted as knowable (*anavasthā doṣasca jñānasya jñeyātvābhyupagamāt* P.U.S.B. 4. 2). It cannot apply to the vedāntin who denies knowability of experience.

Śaṅkara then proceeds to show the insufficiency of the buddhist view of experience and self-luminosity. If the idea itself is not knowable, it cannot be self-luminous. But if it is known, how can it know itself. It can be apprehended only by some other idea but that is bound to lead to infinite references. (*avasyam ca vaināsikānām jñānam jñeyam. svātmnā cāvijñeyatvenānavasthānivāryā* P.U.S.B. 4.2)

Śaṅkara emphasises that a similar objection cannot be levelled against vedānta. It is so because here knowledge is accepted as one uniform indivisible homogeneous principle. One and the same 'knowledge' shines variously like the reflections of sun in varying temporal spatial receptacles.'

The Relevant extract from Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkara Bhāṣya reproduced and elaborated

Śaṅkara's comment on brahmsūtra (II. II. 28) seeks to bring about the distinction of the vedānta concept of self-luminosity from that of the vijñānavādin on more or less similar lines. Relevant extracts from Apte's translation of Śaṅkara bhāṣya may be quoted as follows :—

"Buddhist:—Since cognition is a luminous thing, it stands self-revealed like a lamp, but an external object is not like that.

Vedāntin¹ :— Then like assuming that fire burns itself, you assume that something can act on itself by itself, which is absolutely opposed to reason, yet you do not admit the well-known fact, bearing no contradiction, that an external object is known through a cognition which is different from the object. What a great display of erudition you make. It cannot be asserted that consciousness is known to itself as something apart from objects for the simple reason that there can be no action on oneself.²

Buddhist :— If a cognition has to be known by some entity other than itself, that second one will have to be known by another, and that one again by another. This will lead to an infinite regressus. Moreover, since cognition is an illuminator like a lamp, if you should imagine a second cognition (to know it), then since both the cognitions are similar, there will be no revelation of the one by the other, so that this whole assumption will fall to the ground.

Vedāntin :— Both these arguments are wrong. for once an awareness of the cognition occurs, no further desire to apprehend the witness of cognition can arise, and so there is no possibility of infinite regressus. And

since the witness and cognition are different by nature, there can be no relationship of the perceiver and the perceived among them. Besides, the self-evident witness cannot be denied. (to substantiate the difference among your momentary cognitions, you have to admit the witness which stands aloof to see this difference). There is another consideration. When you assert that cognition shines by itself like a lamp without requiring some other cognition, you virtually say that a cognition is not apprehended by any other means of knowledge or by any thing else, which would be like saying that a thousand lamps shine. (unknown) within a massive boulder.³

Buddhist :— Exactly so, for cognition being of the nature of awareness (suggested by you), you have only approved the view that we hold.

Vedāntin :— No, for it is seen that some other perceiver having the eye etc. as his instrument, perceives a lamp etc. so it is understood that since cognition has equally to be revealed by some one else it can be perceived by a lamp only when a distinct perceiver is present.

Buddhist :— By upholding the theory that the perceiving witness is self-effulgent, you only accept under a different garb of words my own view that cognition has origin, destruction, multiplicity and so on. And hence it is that we establish the apprehension of that cognition by some entity outside it, as in the case of a lamp."

It may be noted here that Śaṅkara's refutation of buddhist formulation of self-luminosity forms part of his refutation of buddhist idealism as such. The idealist maintains that what is illumined or manifest in a cognition is not the external object but the form of the 'idea' itself. Hence the term self-luminous comes to denote the self-apprehending facts as well as the act of self-apprehension. In this view there is no possibility of the apprehension of the 'other', 'the object'; all cognitions are cases of self-projections on the part of the idea. And that is exactly what the term 'self-luminosity' means. Against this, Śaṅkara seeks to maintain self-luminosity of the witness-self. Refuting the idealistic stand that it is the 'form' of the idea that is revealed in a cognition, he shows that the external object has to be admitted in order to explain the differences of cognitions.

Śaṅkara shows the untenability of the concept of self-luminosity taken in the sense of self-apprehension. How can one and the same cognition be simultaneously the subject as well as the object of apprehension. He very

He very significantly observes that even the example of lamp does not support the buddhist concept of self-luminosity. The lamp no doubt, illumines the objects as well as its own self, but this revelation of identity is not at all a case of self-apprehension.

The buddhist view is not only illogical but also insufficient. Even if it is allowed that the cognition apprehends itself, it cannot be a witness to its own origin, destruction, multiplicity etc. According to the buddhist, the cognition is momentary and as such, it is non-existent in the moment of origination and does not persist to 'see' its own destruction. Even the 'self-luminous' cognition of buddhist cannot apprehend these characteristics of cognition. The buddhist formulation of self-luminosity is therefore insufficient and necessitates supposition of an abiding background of pure experience, which may vouchsafe or witness the origin and destruction of the momentary cognitions.

The witness-self does not apprehend the cognition the way a cognition apprehends an object. Apprehension being an act, presupposes operations of means of knowledge and the agent. It is creative by nature and is a result of direct involvement on the part of the agent, the cogniser.

On the other hand, the witness self, as the term itself signifies, is neither an agent, nor has it any involvement in the creative activity which brings forth cognition. It detachedly obliges the cognition and ideas in their moments of existence as well as in moment of production and destruction. It is witness not only to the the existence, but also to production and destruction of cognitions, and persists as the uniform background behind all forms of cognitive occurrence. The self-luminosity of 'cognition' is insufficient as it can explain only the knowledge of the existence of cognition, but cannot cover the knowledge of its own production and destruction. And there too, every cognition has to be separately affirmed as self-luminous, which is a cumbersome assumption. Instead of admitting a self-luminosity for every cognition it will be parsimonious to accept a 'self-luminous' witness self, which sustains and manifests the limited being as well as the production and destruction of them, and is necessarily presupposed by all cognitive occurrences. Notably, the witness self-cannot be self-luminous in the sense in which the vijñānavādins have conceived it, i.e. it cannot be a self-apprehending act, since being a witness to all occurrences, it transcends them and is presupposed by them. It is self-luminous only as a free eternal and immutable principle of effulgence, which sustains the

dependent phenomenon of experience, its infinite forms and acts including the self-apprehension' of the buddhists and the anuvyavasāya of the naiyāyika, and shines independently of all aids to experience.

*An assessment of
Śaṅkara's criticism*

The two postulates of vedānta philosophy of experience viz. the indivisible oneness of pure consciousness and its absolute distinctness from the world of things, the knowables—as hinted at by Śaṅkara, necessitates the formulation of the concept of self-luminosity, the way it has been conceived in vedānta and accounts for its distinction from other formulations. when Śaṅkara says that his concept of experience is free from the objections levelled against the buddhist view, he has these two characteristics in mind : non-objectifiability of experience, and its indivisible homogeneity. But then, in what sense it is self-luminous has nowhere been specified. Non-objectifiability is a distinction of the principle of revelation and if the same is put forth as a unique distinction of its self-luminosity, then the question may as well, be asked : What is the difference between luminosity and self-luminosity or what is the difference between the principle of revelation and 'self revelation'?. If the two are non-distinct then the concept of 'self-luminosity' is superfluous.

Śaṅkara's criticism of the buddhist and the nyāya views stems from the inconsistencies arising out of knowability or objectifiability of experience. Experience cannot be self-apprehending because one and the same thing at the same time cannot be the knower and the known. Nor can it be objectively presented to and apprehended by a subsequent cognition, as the second cognition necessitates postulation of a third cognition for its apprehension and so on ad infinitum. However, there is a clearly discernible distinction between the two types of experience-knowables the buddhists and the nyāyikas have in mind; and Śaṅkara's criticism which seeks to refute both these views as possible alternatives of a single stand (objecthood of experience), is vitiated by oversimplification of the issue. His view (again taken from bhāṭṭas) that knowledge cannot be self-apprehending, because it is the nature of knowledge to apprehend the object and not itself, is only partially true. It is only the valid knowledge (pramā) which is object-bound, but there are forms of experience, such as the ideas revealed in dreams, which arise independently of external objects and are not effected by the cognitive mechanism. It is such ideas (vijñāna) which the vijñānavādin has in mind in his formulation of self luminosity.

*Examination of the
divergent view by
Padmapāda and
Prakāśātmāyati*

The vedānta theory of self-luminosity stems from the identity of the self (*ātman*) and consciousness as a principle of revelation. Prakāśātmāyati shows that the consciousness, once divorced from the self (*ātman*), cannot be brought into any conceivable relationship with it. Separate from the *ātman* the cognition (consciousness) may be either a quality (*guṇa*) or a substance (*dravya*) or an act (*karma*).⁴ Elucidating the contention, Akhaṇḍānanda points out that the prabhākarites and the naiyāyikas regard knowledge as a quality (*guṇa*), the sāṅkhyas as a substance (*dravya*) and the bhāṭṭas as an act (*kriyā*). All these views are successively examined and shown as untenable.

(i) *Refutation of the bhāṭṭa theory of knowledge :—*

Prakāśātmāyati points out that if consciousness is supposed to be an act (as upheld by the bhāṭṭas), its character as revelation (*prakāśatva*) and an effect of the means of cognition, becomes inexplicable (*karmatva prakāśatva phalatvayoranupattiḥ*)⁶ The implications of the remark as worked out in the commentaries have been lucidly summarised by Dr. B. K. Sen-gupta as follows :

"What Prakāśātmāyati means is that bhāṭṭa recognises revelation (*prakāśatva*) as the characteristic of consciousness, but this characteristic being inferred from the quality of known-ness or *jñātata* (as he does recognise consciousness as self-revealed) there is the possibility of revelation of consciousness as an inferred effect. Hence Prakāśātmāyati's suggestion brings out these aspects of the bhāṭṭa contention of consciousness as an effect inferred from the self-luminous know-ness (*jñātata*). It has been said above that this self-luminous quality makes knowledge (*jñāna*) to be inferred in the self and therefore knowledge as a product adhering to the self is sought to be established by the bhāṭṭas by the inferential proof. If consciousness is thus reduced to an effect by regarding it as a produced act, then it cannot be said to be revealed, for an act is not the resultant revelation. This aspect is clearly brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda when he says that an act does not make for the revelation of itself as the resultant of the act (*Kriyātvā gamyādivat samvedanasya prakāśakam na bhavati*). To save this unwarranted conclusion the bhāṭṭa may seek to establish that revelation of the act is possible because of the fact that he recognises consciousness (the act) as the resultant product (*pramāṇaphalatvāt*—Tattvadīpana, p. 314), still his position is untenable. The act is what is the process and the resultant is

what is the effect and the two can never be equated. The resultant is the end of the process by itself. Akhaṇḍānanda brings out this position clearly when he says: *na ca —pramāṇaphalatvāt prakāśatvamityapivācyam, karmatv ephalatvasyānupapatterityartham (Tattvādīpana, p. 314)*. If knowledge is regarded strictly as an act, it must be regarded as the act that originates some result (phala) in the object; otherwise the subject and the object cannot be related in knowledge. Hence the bhāṭṭa starts this hypothesis that *jñātatā* or knowness of the object being the resultant of the knowledge situation makes the act of knowledge an inferred product or strictly the process which adheres to the self, and the resultant of knowledge is revelation that is the quality of self-luminous knowness adhering to the object. Thus it is clear that the bhāṭṭa theory trying as it does to make knowledge adhering to the self as an act cannot by any stretch of the imagination make it revealed. This is the substance of the position maintained by Padmapāda, Prakāśātmāyati and Akhaṇḍānanda against the bhāṭṭa position of knowledge as an act (*kriyā*).⁶*

(ii) *Refutation of the Sāṅkhya view :—*

Next Prakāśātmāyati proceeds to examine the sāṅkhya view of knowledge as a substance (*dravya*). According to sāṅkhya, the reflection of *puruṣa*, the principle of consciousness on the unconscious intellect (*buddhi*) gives rise to the empirical knowledge through the *vṛtti* or psychosis generated by *buddhi*. This empirical knowledge is of the nature of matter and is of the same ontological status as the world of objects. Refuting the view, Prakāśātmāyati points out that if knowledge is regarded as a substance (*dravya*), its dimension must be either minute (*aṇu*) or middling (*madhyam*) or infinite (*mahat*). But none of these views can be consistently upheld. If knowledge is infinitesimal, it will reveal only a part of the object and not the whole of it, if it is of middling dimension, it will be composed of parts, like a jar composed of the halves. But knowledge is partless and reveals the whole of the object. If, on the other hand, knowledge is infinite, then it would reveal everywhere its substratum viz. the *ātman*, but it does not. Hence the sāṅkhya view of knowledge as a substance cannot be upheld.⁷

One cannot help feeling that the foregoing criticism of the sāṅkhya view of knowledge is rather superficial, in as much as *vṛtti jñāna* of the vedāntin—itself a borrowing from the sāṅkhya system, is not free from similar blemishes. As will be shown in the following pages, certain points of divergence of more fundamental character could have been fruitfully examined, to throw light on the distinctive contents of the vedānta concept of consciousness and self-luminosity.

* A critique on the Vivarana School, p 181-182.

(iii) *Refutation of the prabhākarite view :—*

The quality theory of knowledge, ascribed to the nyāya and the prabhākara schools, has been refuted on the grounds that it invariably leads to the vedānta position of the identity of the self (*ātman*) and the consciousness. This conclusion is, however, preceded by a detailed refutation of prabhākara's theory of tridal knowledge (*tripuṭī jñāna*), which for its close relevance to the problems of this dissertation, deserves special attention. Padmapāda anticipates the pūrvapakṣa as follows: "Hence the cognition (*anubhava*) as the resultant knowledge of blue etc. being self-luminous, reveals the object (the cognised) as the 'this' and the subject (the cogniser) as the 'not this' and leads to the inference of *pramāṇa* (*grahaṇa*).⁸

Examining it, padmapāda poses three possible alternatives to prabhākara : (i) "of the two, *ātman* and *anubhava*, the former manifests itself being of the nature of insentience or (ii) whether that also (i.e. *anubhava* together with *ātman*) manifests itself being of the nature of insentience. The first alternative is untenable for if it (experience i.e. *jñāna* resulting from *pramāṇa*) were insentient, it would result in the world remaining totally unrevealed."⁹

Pūrvapakṣin : "It is not so. The *pramātā* (the cogniser, *ātman*) being of the nature of consciousness manifests, with its aid (i.e. *anubhava*), the object as the 'this' and itself (*ātmānam*) as the 'not this', like light (which illumines objects as well as its own self), so that there occurs no non-revelation of the world.

Siddhāntin : that cannot be. It does not appear to be reasonable to hold that *ātman* being itself of the nature of consciousness, illumines (others and its own self) through the benevolent instrumentality of 'anubhava' (*viśayānubhava*-the experience of the object) which is inert (*jaḍa*). Moreover, if the *ātman* is said to manifest like light, both the object and its own self with the help of *Pramāṇaphala* (i.e. *anubhava*), then the act of manifestation (*cetanakriyā*) will be interminable".¹⁰ Elucidating the point, Prakāśātmāyati observes that the act of manifestation (*catāyati kriyā*) itself being an inert product of the inert *anubhava* (as supposed in the first alternative) will require a fresh activity for its revelation and so on, ad infinitum.¹¹

As regards the second alternative, *ātman* also, like cognition (*anubhava*), would of its own accord manifest itself, and why should it need the aid of the object-experience ? If it be urged that inspite of its partaking of the

nature of consciousness, *ātman* is not self-revelaling, a reason must be adduced for this discrimination. It is not intelligible that *ātman*, being of the nature of intelligenc, is in itself mediately perceptible and immediately perceptible with the aid of another. Again, since there is parity between them like two lights, the one need not require the help of the other.¹²

It is, however, the third alternative viz. *ātman* is *jaḍa* and *anubhava* is consciousness (*citiprakāśa*) that is upheld by prabhākara. Against this Padmapāda points out that inspite of one's will, this view leads to the inevitable conclusion that *ātman* alone is luminous consciousness.¹³ "Since the cognition is self-luminous (in Prabhākara's view), its substratum, viz. *ātman* must also be self-luminous like light i.e. not depending on any extraneous aid for its self-luminosity. Being its very quality, the *jñāna* cannot be said to originate in its substratum. Hence if *ātman* possesses the property of luminosity, it amounts to *ātman* itself being self-luminous"¹⁴

Elaboration and assessment

The entire controversy, it may be noted, centres around the issue whether the consciousness or the manifestive character in cognition is a product of the inert operations of the means of cogniting (*pramāṇa*) and whether the mediation of the *pramāṇas* is necessary for the manifestation of consciousness as of the object, even when the consciousness is an *a priori* principle (identical with *ātman*) and not a product. Prabhākara's view is that such a mediation is indispensable, whereas the vedāntin upholds that the consciousness is a self-luminous principle and not the result of the unconscious activity of the *pramāṇas*. Notably, both Prabhākara and the vedāntin discuss the problem with the common example of the visual experience in mind, and elaborate their respective contentions by emphasising different aspects of it. Prakāśātmāyati treats vision as a case of light or manifestation. Consciousness is a self-luminous principle which directly manifests the objects without depending on any agency, just as a lamp manifests the things as well as itself. Prabhākara on the other hand, emphasises the role of the *pramāṇa* (i.e. visual organ) and maintains that the perception or the visual consciousness is the result of the unconscious activity of the visual organ, which, distinct from the light of resultant consciousness, is referred to as unconscious light. The question is: 'Does the self as a principle of consciousness, stand in need of the aid of the unconscious light (operations of the *pramāṇas*) for self-manifestation', as visualised in the first alternative. Prakāśātmāyati begins his refutation of the possibility by questioning the very usage of the term 'light' for the senses and their activities. Even on the material plane, there is a clear cut distinction between the 'light' (of

lamp etc.) and the sense organ (e.g the eye), and the two cannot be commonly grouped as 'insentient' light'. It cannot be said, he observes, that the eye is insentient light (light distinct from consciousness), because of its being productive of the manifestation of the object. The cognition is self-luminous i.e. its manifestation not caused by some other light. Hence distinct from the eye etc. the cognition like the light of lamp, directly illumines the object. Not that the lamp's manifestiveness of object, like that of the eye etc. consists in its being productive of cognition. The ground is different. While knowledge is luminous in the sense of its being dispeller of ignorance, the luminosity of lamp consists in its being dispeller of darkness. The eye does none of these things (and as such cannot be assigned to the class of luminous facts).¹⁵

The meaning of luminosity thus specified, Prakāśātmāyati proceeds to show that it is the self-luminous character which distinguishes all the exemplifications of luminosity, mental as well as material, from the sense organs (eye etc.). The concept of self-luminosity stated formerly as absence of the negation of light in the existence (*sva-sattāyām prakāśavyatirekād-arśana*)¹⁶ is now analysed from a different angle. It is contended that the cognition, being manifest independently of the aid of co-class light, gives rise to the manifestive usage of the object, just as the unobstructed light of lamp etc. causes the manifestive usage in the object.¹⁷ One (the opponent) cannot say that the self-luminosity of the lamp as '*sajātīya prakāśāntaranirapekṣa*' breaks down, since the light of lamp is itself apprehended (illuminated) by the eye, which being of the nature of lustre, is a co-class light with it. 'It is the cognition, the light of a different class, and not of the same class, that manifests the lamp'.¹⁸

Thus in his refutation of the first alternative viz, the insentient light of *anubhava* helps manifestation of the *ātman* which is of the nature of consciousness, Prakāśātmāyati shows that the meaning of the term 'insentient light' as exemplified in the lamp etc. does not cover the *pramāṇas* (the sense organs etc.). Against this Prabhākara may point out that sense organ (eyes), the light and a host of other accessories are aids to perception, and it is quibbling to introduce any radical distinction between them. The term, 'insentient light' denotes the entire series of factors mediating between the self (*ātman*) and the object, and it hardly matters if we call some of these factors luminous and others non-luminous. The central issue which the vedāntin does not directly grapple, remains: Is the mediation of such accessories necessary for the manifestation of the object and of the self, identical with consciousness? The vedāntin cannot brush

aside the issue by saying that the self-luminous consciousness need not depend on the insentient luminaries for manifestation, when the opponent is disputing the very nature of self-luminosity as an *a priori* distinction. Against the vedānta concept of self-luminosity, the opponent maintains that self-luminosity in consciousness is a product, a derivative distinction, a reflex in consciousness owing to the act of apprehension (of the object). It is due to the act of apprehension that there is self-consciousness in consciousness. The challenge to the vedāntin may be pointedly stated: What can be the nature of self-luminosity, if it is not a reflexion in the form of self-consciousness? If this self-consciousness is distinct from consciousness, it must be a product, a reflex entailed to consciousness by the act of apprehension (of things); if non-distinct, it becomes redundant and hence there will be no ground to distinguish 'pure consciousness' from 'pure unconsciousness'.

Against this, the vedāntin may point out that the reflexive concept of self-luminosity itself stems from the concept of knowledge as a quality, an act or product thereof. These relational accounts presuppose some distinction between the self (*ātman*) and consciousness (knowledge). In the vedānta system, however, owing to the absolute identity of the self (*ātman*) and consciousness (knowledge), such relational accounts of knowledge and the possibility of the reflexive concept of self-luminosity entailed thereby, is completely ruled out. Hence, in their rejoinder Padmapāda and Prakāśātīkā rightily emphasise the identity of self and consciousness as an eternal, immutable, indivisible principle, underlying the fleeting phenomenon of cognitions. The different moments of consciousness (cognitions), the varying forms apparent in the principle of consciousness, are due to the objective forms. Padmapāda pithily hints that if consciousness is subjected to internal differentiation, it will pave the way to idealism by rendering the world of objects superfluous, and will be a cumbrous assumption, necessitating the supposition of a class concept of consciousness, besides the particular moments of it. 'If it is said that the distinct cognition is established by *'pramāṇa'*, then by the differentia (*savगतena viśeṣeṇa*) inhering in cognition, it would reveal each object distinct from the other (and not by the fact of there being distinct objects) and it would reveal in addition the, *anubhavatva* (the universal concept), the common characteristic of all *anubhava* particulars like *gotva* (i.e. the cowhood common to all cows). But the particularity (*viśeṣa*) inherent in itself (*anubhavatva*) is not seen to manifest itself as blue experience and yellow experience, to the exclusion of any reference to the particularity existing in the object.¹⁹

Padmapāda further points out that the opponent's contention that the distinctions in knowledge (*jñāna*) can be established on the ground of

destruction and non-destruction, is question begging and involves the defect of mutual dependence. The idea is that the destruction and non-destruction of knowledge presuppose its origination (*janyatva*), whereas its origination itself cannot be established unless the destruction and non-destruction are already established. Hence owing to such mutual dependence neither will become established.²⁰ As the distinction apparent in cognitions (*anubhava*) cannot be shown to belong to consciousness (*jñāna*) it will be reasonable to uphold that they are just reflections or appearances of the distinctions obtaining in the world of objects. Emptied of these extraneous contents, the pure consciousness (*jñāna*) is identical with self (*ātman*). "Hence *ātman* being of the nature of consciousness only, gets the appellation of *anubhava*, when conditioned by the differing objects of knowledge; but when the limiting adjuncts are out of purview it is described by the terms *ātman* etc. Just as the trees lose the appellation of forest when the fact of their standing together in one spot, is ignored and are described as trees etc. that analogy should be admitted (here also)."²¹

The aforesaid analysis of the vedānta concept of consciousness by Padmapāda serves to show where the vedānta concept of self-luminosity differs from the analogous concepts in other systems. It is conclusively shown that the indivisible immutable identity of the self (*ātman*) and consciousness rules out the possibility of a "reflexive concept of self-luminosity in vedānta system. But then what is the positive meaning content of the vedānta concept? Can there be a statement of it, which is not simply a statement of its difference from other concepts? The issue may be dwelt upon at some length, at the end of the chapter.

Refutation of anuvyavasāya in Nyāya Makaranda

The author of Nyāya Makaranda takes up the issue of self-luminosity with the traditional adversaries of the concept, the naiyāyikas and the bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas. He observes : Those who say that experience is not self-luminous but is illumined by the non-self-luminous, should be asked : Is the illumination by the other luminous or non-luminous? ²²

The first alternative of the query refers to the bhāṭṭa and the nyāya views is clear from the commentary of Citsukhācārya. It is pointed out that while according to the bhāṭṭas, knowledge gives rise to the usage of knownness (*jñātatā*) in the form 'the jar is known' (*jñāto ghaṭah*), according to nyāya it brings about the manifestive usage of the object in the form 'the jar is manifest' (*prakāśate ghaṭah*). Notwithstanding this difference, both the schools commonly hold that while giving rise to the cognitive usage, the fact of knowledge itself remains unmanifest or non-luminous. The view is

shown untenable. Knowledge cannot be non-luminous because in that case there will be possibility for doubt in the form 'the pot is known to me or not', 'have you seen it or not'. These cognitions are never followed by doubt. On the other hand there is always affirmation in the form 'I have certainly seen it.'²⁴ Hence, it must be admitted that knowledge shines in the moment of the illumination of the object, because after that, like the object, this too is not followed by doubt.²⁵ 'Even if direct revelation of knowledge is admitted, but the same is made dependent on subsequent knowledge, then for its revelation too, a subsequent knowledge will be necessary, thus leading to infinite regressus.'²⁶

Besides repeating this oft-levelled charge of infinite regressus the nyāya theory of *anuvyavasāya* is subjected to further scrutiny. The peculiarity of the nyāya view, it may be recalled, lies in the fact that it concedes the direct manifestation of knowledge; but instead of explaining it in terms of the supposition of self-luminosity, it is explained as a case of direct apprehension in the subsequent moment of cognition. All that is needed, is the supposition of mind as an instrument of introspection and the necessary contact to bring about the introspection.

The author of *nyāya makarada* demonstrates the inconsistency of this view. He asks: Does the same self-mind contact, which creates the knowledge of object, has that knowledge also for its object or some new contact is required? The first alternative is not possible because (1) the instrument of cognition is incapable of giving rise to simultaneous cognitions, since their occurrence is due to difference in non-inherent causal factors. Besides, in the absence of such necessary difference of non-inherent causes, there will also ensue the difficulty of simultaneity of memory and cognition; because in the absence of temporal 'order' in causal factors, the order (of prior and posterior) in the occurrences cannot be accounted for. The external objects cannot determine the order of cognition. The senses subsisting in the mind, which is in contact with the self, may be simultaneously in contact with a number of objects such as jar and clothe etc. But there is only one cognitive occurrence at a time. That is why the one contact, that is, the self-mind-contact has been accepted as the determinant of a cognition.²⁷

The second alternative that knowledge is cognised by a second contact, is also not possible, because according to nyāya an act survives for 'three seconds. First there is mental act simultaneous with the production of the knowledge of jar followed respectively by 'differentiation'

(*vibhāga*), destruction of previous contact (*pūrvasamyogavināsa*), occurrence of the new contact (*uttarasamyogotpatti*), and only then the next knowledge comes into being. Hence between the first knowledge and the subsequent knowledge which has it for an object, there is time gap due to a number of occurrences. Then how can the first knowledge be available for apprehension by the following cognition? Riddled with such insurmountable difficulties, the theory of *anuvyavasāya* must, therefore, be given up as untenable. The jar etc. are insentient and as such cannot be self luminous, nor can they illumine one another; and if even knowledge is to be insentient, what can we say of that. ²⁸

'But why don't you accept that the cognition, though insentient, can reveal the object by its very presence (existence) just as the eye, itself insentient reveals the 'object'. This position, says the vedāntin, cannot stand to reason.²⁹ It may be asked: Is the revelation of the 'object' which is held to be distinct from experience, of the nature of the (given) object or of some other 'object'? It cannot be of the nature of the given object because like liquid and solid, sentient and non-sentient cannot be of the same nature. Besides, the light (of cognition) which is momentary, cannot be identical with the object of illumination, which is of abiding character. Nor can the 'other' revealing manifestation be predicate (quality) of the given object. (revealed). It is, therefore, proper to hold that the revelation of the object is rooted in knowledge (*vijñāna*) because that is not related to the destroyed or unborn (object of revelation), which also is revealed as a matter of fact.³⁰

If, however, you (the opponent) say that the presentable phenomenon of revelation (object) is an inner object (not an outer object), then you introduce *vijñāna* simply under a new name. If that is insentient that will simply not shine. Nor the light, being of the nature of not self, will illumine the object, thus eventually engulfing the whole world into darkness.³¹ Hence it is concluded that knowledge alone is of the nature of self and other illumining.³²

The opponent may say that the *vijñāna* is not self-luminous, because the same thing cannot be the subject and object of revelation. The author disposes of the objection by elaborating his view of self-luminosity. He points out that just as a pot requires the aid of light by way of repelling the darkness or facilitating contact with eyes for its revelation, the fact of light itself does not stand in need of any other light in like manner. The author very significantly emphasises that 'independence of some other light' does not connote some 'other' tendency or some fresh activity.³³ Elaborating the

point, the commentator (Citsukhācārya) observes that the term 'self' in 'self-luminous', as in the case of such an expression as 'the hermits themselves are the attendants' simply denies the 'aid of the other', and does not connote any self-apprehending activity.³⁴ Self-luminosity is not self-apprehension, and hence the objection stemming from the inconsistency of the self becoming an object unto itself (*svātmani vṛtti-virodha*), is simply out of place.

Notably, the view that *vijñāna* is self-apprehending represents a rather primitive notion of self-luminosity, which is popularly ascribed to the *vijñānavādins*. The inadequacy of the view has been thoroughly brought out by Śaṅkara. Curiously, when the author of '*nyāyamakaranda*' purports to establish the self-luminosity of *vijñāna* against the *nyāya* view, it may signify either a non-committal stand or an instance of the indiscriminate usage of the technical terms in the systems.

The vedānta concept of self-luminosity distinguished from the sāṅkhya view of it

The sāṅkhya system like vedānta, upholds the identity of self and consciousness as an immutable undifferented principle of formless effulgence. The area of agreement, however, ends here. Against the vedānta view of identity or oneness of the transcendental self (*ātman*), the sāṅkhya system upholds the plurality of selves. The *puruṣas* are many; they are neither blissful nor represent the ultimate principle of being. These vital points of difference regarding the ultimate ontological status of 'consciousness' (which is commonly held identical with self), impart distinctive meaning contents to the notion of self-luminosity in the two systems.

The selves (*puruṣas*) of the sāṅkhya system are the distinct principles of pure consciousness and the distinctness from 'others' is part of the being of every self (*puruṣa*). If it is not so, there will be nothing to distinguish them from one another and to prevent them from relapsing into one principle of consciousness. They must carry with them the ground of their distinction from other similar principles. The content of self-luminosity predicable to the *puruṣa* of sāṅkhya, therefore, must consist in the manifestation of the identity as well as of its difference from other similar principles. Such a concept of self-luminosity is essential because in the absence of it, there will be no other factor to account for the distinctness of the *puruṣas* from one another. In the vedānta system, on the other hand, although self-luminosity of the highest self (*ātman*) has been defined in terms of the denial of phenomenality (knowability), it argues neither any difference in the self nor in the principle of revelation. Self-luminosity is

simply a sort of reaffirmation of the undifferentiated identity of the being and consciousness in the transcendental unity that is *ātman*. The very attempt to define tends to debase it, since defining introduces a split in the 'unity' and projects the identity as an attribute. The manifestation, non-distinct from the highest being can admit of no internal or external difference; and hence the self-luminosity predicable to it, remains indefinable. It signifies felt identity, the bare unity of pure consciousness, which survives the dissolution of all bonds, relationships and attributes.

What is more, the felt identity of consciousness is blissful. In contrast to the sāṅkhya view of isolated neutral and unfeeling selves, the vedāntin upholds that the felt identity persisting as the highest self, is essentially a feeling of unison, of harmony and bliss. It must be there, in the absence of any division, discord or limitation in pure consciousness. The brahman, the highest self, has been identified in the upniṣads as a principle of being (*sat*) and bliss (*ānanda*). They constitute the 'self' of the self-luminous. Hence the self-luminosity of knowledge in the vedānta system consists in the manifestation of knowledge or consciousness as an ultimate principle of being and bliss.

Śaṅkara's comment on the scripture '*vijñānamānandam brahma*' (Br.up. III. 9.7.), brings out how blissfulness, like being, is the invariable content of the self-luminous experience. The opponent contends that the term '*ānanda*' is used in the sense of the 'knowable' or presentable experience of joy. Hence the 'bliss' of brahman experience should also be 'knowable', and only then it can be significant with reference to brahman.³⁵ Against this Śaṅkara points out that such a stand is inconsistent with the śrūti which emphasise the 'unknowable' character of the brahman experience, e. g. 'When everything becomes self, what can it see and by what' (Br.up IV.5.15), 'when it does not see the other, does not hear the other, does not know the other that is *bhūmā*' (Chand. up. VII. 24. 1), 'Embraced with experience, it knows nothing else' (Br. up. IV. 3. 21.).³⁶

The opponent on the other hand draws attention to another set of śrūti. He points out that the śrūti such as 'consuming, playing and sporting' (Chand.up. 8.2.1.), 'who is all knowing and omniscient' (Mund.up. 1.1.9); 'he who obtains all the desirables' (Tait. 2.5.1.) give the impression that in the state of *mokṣa*, there is a knowable or presentable experience of bliss.³⁷ Besides, the self (*ātman*) of the nature of bliss, is directly known in the experience 'I am happy'. Hence, it may be concluded that the brahman knows himself as blissful through the instrumentality of the idea (*vijñāna*), and not that blissfulness is manifest as the content of the 'self-luminous' experience.

Disposing of this view Saṅkara observes that even scriptures cannot go against reason and direct experience to prove that fire is cold and water is fiery. In the absence of body and senses there can be no production of distinct cognitions (*vijñāna*). Hence, in the state of *mokṣa* or emancipation, there shall be no *vijñāna* due to the absence of body and senses. Besides, the production of *vijñāna* is inconsistent with the unitive and indivisible character of brahman (*ekatva vīrodhācca*).³⁸ It will not be correct to say that the brahman being eternally of the nature of blissful experience (idea) the transcendental brahman eternally 'knows' his blissful nature, because after emancipation even the phenomenal self achieves the nature of brahman, and like a handful of water thrown into the tank, does not retain a separate existence for the *vijñāna* (idea) of the blissful nature of brahman.³⁹ Saṅkara's contention is that in the state of emancipation, there is neither the cogniser (the individual self) nor the instrument of cognising which may bring about a distinct cognition of the blissfulness of brahman. Hence, the supposition of the self-luminosity of blissful experience, becomes unavoidable. It cannot be maintained that the emancipated *ātman* experiences the blissful brahman, (I am of the nature of bliss), by remaining different from brahman, because this stand is inconsistent with the fulness or unitive character (of the brahman) and as such is opposed to all the *śrutis*.⁴⁰

One thing more. If there is admitted in brahman continuous cognisings (*vijñāna*) of the bliss, then the very supposition of its *vijñāna* or *avijñāna* becomes redundant. If there is continuity of blissfulness in brahman, it must be understood as the very nature of the brahman, and hence it cannot be imagined that he knows it. Such an assumption can be significant only in the case of the possibility of absence of *vijñāna*. For example, it is a valid usage to say 'he knows himself and the other'. However, it does not hold good in the case of intense absorption. With reference to a man whose attention is fixed on the arrow, the assumption of knowledge or ignorance of 'arrow' cannot be significant.⁴¹

If he knows the blissful self as distinct from himself, then in the moment of gap (disjunction) or discontinuity i.e. when the knowledge of blissful does not exist, there will be the possibility of the *vijñāna* of something else and as such it will prove the self as non-eternal (*anitya*) and modificatory. Hence, Saṅkara concludes that the scripture '*vijñānamānadam brahma*' affirms blissfulness as the very esse of brahman and does not indicate the state of knowability of blissfulness.⁴²

One must carefully guard self from the impression that the aforesaid analysis purports to establish the self-luminosity of bliss as different from the self-luminosity of experience. It is the very being of experience as blissful and not something different from it that the vedāntin seeks to establish as self-luminous. If self-luminosity denotes the mode of the manifestation of self, the identity of consciousness as a principle of revelation, then the being and bliss, as the other ontological meanings of this identity cannot remain unmanifest; because if they remain unmanifest, there will be only a case of partial and not of complete self-luminosity. Surprisingly, the ontological dimensions of the vedānta concept of self-luminosity remain mostly unexplored even in the texts reputed for their highly sophisticated analysis of the concept.

The fact remains, however, that the concept of self-luminosity generally assigned to epistemology or philosophy of experience, tends to become predominantly a concept of ontology in the idealistic and spiritual systems, where the idea comes to be equated with reality. Just as the controversy with sāṅkhya brings out that bliss (*ānanda*) is the invariable content of the self-luminous experience, the controversy with the sūnyavadins shows that it is the reality or being of consciousness, which shines as self-luminous.

Vedānta and Sūnyavāda on self-luminosity:—

Śrīharṣa states and examines the sūnyavādin view of self-luminosity. The question that poses itself is: 'What is the ontological status of manifestation or illumination?' The vedāntin holds that barring the brahman, everything else (the means of knowledge as well as their objects) has only apparent existence. Sūnyavādin on the other hand, holds that everything has only apparent existence. There is no reality beyond the appearance. Besides, the vedāntin holds the 'apparent existence' as real, the sūnyavādins hold even the apparent existence as unreal. They point out that just as existence (being) of jar etc. is the 'knowledge or manifestation in the form of jar' the existence of 'knowledge in the form of jar' is itself another knowledge of the form 'jar is known'. Hence we are led from appearance to appearance, without ever arriving at the reality (of knowledge).

The point is very significant for the problem of self-luminosity from the vedānta standpoint. The vedāntin maintains that what is revealed by the self-luminous knowledge, is the self or 'being' of knowledge, and that is exactly why the manifestation of knowledge is called 'self-illumination'. Illumination' touches the 'Reality' base which underlies every appearance,

every 'illumination'. The *sūnyavādin*, on the other hand, upholds that an 'appearance' or manifestation can have no reference beyond itself, much less to a 'reality' which is exclusive of it, and as such its self-luminosity is the manifestation of the void, or the essencelessness that is; so much so that when there is curiosity as to the ontological status of the 'self' content of its 'self-luminosity', we have in fact another 'appearance' which seeks to apprehend the 'former' appearance but which is just another appearance. The *sūnyavādin* points out that it should not be said that in order to know that an 'apparent existence', we shall have to admit its being or reality, since when there is curiosity as to the being (existence) of knowledge, our only resort is knowledge of this knowledge. Against this it may be said that the existence of object requires knowledge, and if the existence of that knowledge is made dependent on another knowledge, it will entail the defect of infinite regressus. In reply to it, the *sūnyavādin* points out that in the first place, it is not necessary that there should be knowledge of every knowledge. The series of such apprehensions does not go beyond two or three knowledges. There is knowledge in the form 'this is jar', which can itself be apprehended in the judgement form 'the jar is known'. We are not aware of any series beyond this.⁴³

The *sūnyavādin* further points out that if we do not admit that the series of knowings does not 'terminate' in the restricted scope of three or four 'knowledges', then even the acceptance of the reality of knowledge will not help us out of the infinite regressus.⁴⁴

The reality or unreality of knowledge does not make any difference to it. Just as in the *vedānta* system, both the object (jar, etc.) and the knowledge are held real and yet it is the knowledge and not the jar, which is supposed to be the cause of the cognitive usage, in the same way in the case of *sūnyavādin*, though there is no difference between the jar and its knowledge (*vijñāna*), in so far as their unreality is concerned, yet it is the unreal knowledge (*vijñāna*) which is the cause of the usage of its objects and not the jar etc. The jar etc., are causes of their usage only when they have apparent existence.⁴⁵

The point of the *sūnyavādin* is that the objection of regressus cannot be got rid of by upholding the reality of knowledge—by maintaining that what self-luminosity seeks to manifest is not only the 'self' of knowledge, but reality that the self is, the being-base of it. Against this the point of the *sūnyavādin* is that this is an undue extension of the concept of self-luminosity, and that the 'reality' or unreality of knowledge is altogether irrelevant in so far as its self-luminosity is concerned. All that this concept

stands for is that the 'self (identity) of experience is manifestive of itself. However, its ontological status is not a part of the meaning of self-luminosity and as such it does not flow from the analysis of the concept of 'self-luminosity', that the 'knowledge' which is manifested in this manner is 'real'.

The reasoning of the *sūnyavādin* to bring about the 'unreality' of knowledge is plain enough. He first begins by pointing out that it is admitted by all that knowledge is the cause of its own cognitive usage or propositional form. Then it is proved that all causes are unreal and hence, knowledge, which is the cause of its own usage is also unreal.

As self-luminosity of knowledge itself has been defined in terms of causality to the usage of self, (knowledge) the ontological status of the 'self' (identity) of knowledge that is manifested, and is the content of the self-luminous, invariably emerges outas the point of controversy between the *vedāntin* and *sūnyavādin*. The issue, however does not figure prominently in the *vedānta* texts, and the aforesaid discussion is only a cautious adaptation of the relevant section of the '*Khaṇḍana*'. It seems to bring out the two radically exclusive views on the ontology of 'manifestation'. Notably, manifestation is generally held as an 'apperance' of some 'reality' underlying it. The *vedāntin* tends to assimilate and identify the 'manifestation' with the absolute principle of reality, and maintains that the manifestation of the absolute is not an appearance, but the very *esse* of it. The *vedāntin* cannot uphold the dichotomy of the appearance (manifestation) and reality at the transcendental level, because that militates against the unqualified monism of the system. Hence the manifestation is identified with the reality. The *sūnyavādin*, on the other hand, identifies manifestation with the 'appearance' and rules out the possibility of an underlying or sustaining reality beyond the 'appearance'. It is noteworthy in this context, that the term 'self-luminous' can be significant, only if the two terms the self (being) and manifestation (appearance) are held as separately significant. That the assimilation of the one term to the other, renders the notion of self-luminosity indefinable and redundant, may be shown with reference to the *śūnyavāda* as well as the *vedānta* system. If the manifestation is devoid of essence (as held by the *śūnyavādin*), if it has no self, no being or identity separate from 'appearance', then the 'self' in the compound 'self-luminous', becomes redundant for him, and the term 'self-luminous' becomes synonymn of 'luminous' 'apparent' or 'manifest'. Similarly in the case of the *vedānta* system, as the fact of manifestation is identified with the self (*ātman*), the eternal unchanging, immutable, principle of being, the term

'luminous' becomes redundant, and no analysable meaning of the compound 'self-luminous' can be applicable to the unqualified identity of the absolute. The concept of self-luminosity can be significant only if there is some differentiation between the 'self' and 'luminosity', and hence in no conceivable sense, can the term be applied to the immortal absolute. This discussion thus serves to reemphasise the contention which has been consistently upheld in this dissertation i.e. the indefinable nature of the self-luminosity of the absolute.

An assessment of the vedānta critique of the divergent views

A study of the vedānta criticism of the divergent views is significant in two respects. In the first place it brings out the unique distinction of the vedānta concept of self-luminosity by differentiating its meaning from that of other analogous concepts. Secondly, the shortcomings of the vedānta critique properly assessed help reconstruction of the vedānta exposition on a comprehensive basis.

As has been noted the vedānta criticism of the buddhist as well as the nyāya views stems from the inconsistency arising out of 'knowability' of experience. Granting that the vedānta concept of self-luminosity as non-objectifiable is correct with regard to brahman, the pure principle of revelation (consciousness), what may be the vedānta stand regarding the transient experience e.g. the ideas, feelings, emotions, cognitions etc. ? Are they self-luminous or not ? If yes, then the question may arise, are they self-luminous in the sense in which the brahman is self-luminous or in some other sense ? We repeatedly, return to the vedānta texts to find an answer to these questions, but, it is curious that in the vedānta texts right from the pioneer works of Saṅkara to the subtle dialectical works of Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana, there is an utter lack of awareness of these problems and their possible solutions in the context of the vedānta system.

Here it is noteworthy that the modifier or experience (*vṛtti jñāna*) cannot be held as self-luminous in the sense of non-objectifiable immediacy, since barring the brahman (the identity of pure experience) all conceivable forms of experience are presentable and possess an objective form. Nor can the vedāntin reject them as altogether non-self-luminous, because that will eliminate the vital distinction between the cognition (manifestator) and the object (manifest). If the vedāntin sincerely sticks to the position that the brahman alone is self-luminous, without conceding any relative measure of self-luminosity to the phenomenal experience, then his entire criticism of the nyāya buddhist and prabhākarite views becomes irrelevant,

because they discuss the problem with reference to the cognition and ideas and not with reference to brahman. The fact that the vedāntin not only refutes these views but also in the course of controversy offers arguments designed to prove the self-luminosity of cognition (*vyṭti jñāna*), necessitates the supposition of the relative measures of self-luminosity in the system. Without it, how can the vedāntin explain the scriptural passages which emphasise the self-luminous character of the transient experience, dream ideas etc.

Here the question is : How does the vedāntin define the relative orders of self-luminosity. His own definition of self-luminosity as 'unknowable immediacy, being non-available to the phenomenal forms of experience, he can have no option but to accept the buddhist and the prabhākarite views on self-luminosity, respectively for the ideas and the cognition. Similarly, it may be that the nyāya account of *anuvyavasāya* is riddled with inconsistency, but the act of introspection or inward looking which is at the base of the theory of *anuvyavasāya*, is a fact of common experience. According to vedānta the phenomenal experience enjoys a dual character; as experience it is effulgent and self-revealing, but as a presentable phenomenon i.e. as a mental object, it is capable of being presented to or apprehended by some other light. Hence the phenomenal experience is self-luminous as well as capable of being revealed by the other. In fact, once knowability of the phenomenal experience is conceded by the vedāntin not only the buddhist and the prabhākarite versions of self-luminosity but also a guarded version of *anuvyavasāya* is admissible within the framework of the vedānta philosophy of experience.

The conclusion is inescapable that the vedānta criticisms of the divergent views are not so much refutation as demonstration of their insufficiency from the vedānta standpoint and their inapplicability to the absolute as preached in upaniṣads. But the vedāntin cannot justifiably maintain that these views do not apply even to the phenomenal orders of experience, for which they are meant. Notably, it is the meaning of self-luminosity as 'unknowable immediacy' that the vedāntin denies to the ideas (*vijñāna*) and cognitions (*samvit*) and curiously even the opponent does not claim them as self-luminous in this sense. What is more, the vedāntin cannot justifiably deny the less ambitious connotations of self-luminosity which are ascribable to the specific orders of phenomenal experience in his own system. Properly understood, the divergent accounts supplement rather than contradict the vedānta system. The vedāntin can question them only when they are put forth as final solutions.

CHAPTER VII

Exposition of the concept of Self-luminosity in Tattvapradīpikā (Chitsukhī)

Defining of self-luminosity

Since the earliest days, when knowledge was conceived as a fact of revelation, efforts were made to distinguish it from the material or insentient (jaḍa) luminaries. Self-luminosity was put forth as the distinguishing feature of experience. The distinction, however, itself an ascription of the behaviour of material luminaries to experience, could never properly serve as a basis for distinction between the two types of luminaries, the material and the intellectual. The problem was further complicated in the vedānta system owing to its peculiar concept of knowledge as an eternal indivisible principle of consciousness. Hence the concept of self-luminosity had to be so defined in the vedānta system that it might distinguish the highest principle of revelation (pure consciousness) not only from the material or insentient luminaries, but also from the varying orders of phenomenal experience i.e. cognitions, ideas, feelings etc. The present chapter proposes to survey, at some length, the vedānta attempts to arrive at a clear formulation of the concept through defining and analysing.

The stage of defining self-luminosity came much later and presupposed a lot of discursive activity towards clarity and elucidation of the concept in the systems. Such activity may be traced back right to the upaniṣads which conceive the self, identical with knowledge as the highest principle of luminosity, and seek to distinguish it from the material and transient luminaries. Later on, the various modes or distinctions, which in the course of subsequent elucidations emerged ascribable to the highest principle of revelation, came to be commonly viewed as part of the meaning of its self-luminosity, as the single, unique, and indivisible distinction of the highest self. Later on these distinctions or the combinations of their meaning contents on a selective basis, contributed toward the formulations of definition (or definitions) of self-luminosity.

The main distinctions of the principle of revelation, already brought out in the course of preceding chapter, may be recapitulated here. (1) The

principle of revelation (awareness) is identical with self (*ātman*) and for this very reason remains non-objectifiable. (2) As a principle of reality, it is unchanging and immutable and is exclusive of all that is phenomenal, apparent, formal, changing and divisible. (3) As light obliges or helps the purposive activities of organism, even so knowledge obliges the conduct of man (*puruṣa*) in the world. Even when all other lights are quenched, the light of self persists there to help him. Hence it is the principle of revelation par excellence. (4) It sustains the entire phenomenon of luminaries without ever becoming an object or recipient of these lights. It is a meta-principle of revelation. (5) While as principle of reality, it is exclusive of the notion of appearance and as such cannot be projected as a 'form' for apprehension, as a principle of revelation par excellence, it cannot remain unmanifest. This is the meaning of self-luminosity given in the vedānta analysis of the concept and sought to be embodied in the definition thereof.

The attempts at defining self-luminosity before Citsukhācārya

In '*tattvapradīpikā*' of Citsukhācārya, we come across a complete and exhaustive treatment of the problem from the vedānta standpoint. He opens his book by offering to examine some eleven possible definitions of self-luminosity and works out a final definition of the concept from the vedānta standpoint. He is, however, not the first to formulate a definition of self-luminosity.¹ As a matter of fact most of his definitions can be traced to the earlier formulations of the concept in the vedānta and other systems and the rest of them are just new combinations of the preceding formulations.

Prakāśātma'yati's formulations of self-luminosity (noted in the preceding chapter) as '*sajātīya prakāśāntara nirapekṣa*' and '*svasattāyām prakāśavyatireka virahitatvam*', may be rated among the earliest vedānta attempts at a definition. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his commentary (Nibandha) on *pramāṇamāla* of Anandabodha poses the problem of self-luminosity in a manner which bears striking resemblance to that of '*Tattvapradīpika*' and it is not unlikely that that the scheme of treatment followed in the eminent dialectical feat, was suggested by this comparatively obscure work in the form of a commentary. It poses the question, as Citsukhācārya does later on in '*Tattvapradīpikā*', 'what is the meaning of self-luminosity?' and like him, he examines a number of possible definitions before arriving at his final formulation of the concept. Is by the term self-luminous meant 'the knowledge itself manifestive of its own identity' (*svayameva svasya prakāśo jñānam*), or 'the knowledge which is manifestive of the self as an object'

1. *Vivaraṇa* p. 247.

(*svayameva svātmānam prakāśayati*) or 'the manifestation itself as the bare identity of knowledge' (*svayamevaprakāśojñānamātram*).²

Examining the respective definitions, the opponent points out that the first one cannot be acceptable because the object and the means of knowledge are pervaded by mutual differences i.e. knowledge cannot be both the object and the means of knowledge at the same time. The difference between the knowledge and its means is necessary, since in the absence of it, the knowledge itself will be non-distinguishable from the state of unconsciousness due to intoxication. (*madamūrchādidaśāsvaviśeṣaprasaṅgācca*). The second alternative is untenable because the production of knowledge in the absence of valid means is not possible (*pramāṇamantareṇa kevalasya prameyasya pramājanakatvānupalabdheḥ*). The third alternative cannot be upheld because in that case the means of knowledge being impossible, it will remain unproved (*pramāṇāsambhavenāsiddhi prasāṅgāt*). If it is assumed proven even in the absence of the '*pramāṇa*', in that case even the 'sky flower' may be taken as proved.³

In view of these objections, the author of Nibandha restates the definition of self-luminosity as "that which reveals itself independently of cognition (*saṁvitti*) is called self-luminous (*svayam saṁvittinirapekṣaḥ prakāśo-yasya iti svaprakāśaḥ*).⁴ This itself constitutes the fourth and final definition of self-luminosity. Without such a notion of self-luminosity, the deep sleep experience recollected after waking 'during this period I had a blissful sleep' cannot be explained. The contention that the self-luminous knowledge without means of knowledge will remain non-established is not correct because apprehension through valid means of knowledge is not the sole determinant of reality. If it were so, there would ensue the fallacy of mutual dependence i. e. the operations of the *pramāṇa* presuppose a non-apprehended object whereas the reality of the object itself cannot be proved without the operations of the *pramāṇa*. Hence, the absence of valid means does not of itself prove unreality (*asattā*) of something, because existence is the very essence of a thing (*svabhāvatvāt sattāyāḥ*).⁵

Definition of self-luminosity in Tattva pradīpikā

Closely following this scheme of investigation, the '*Tattvapradīpikā*' of Citsukhācārya undertakes for the first time in the vedānta system, a comprehensive and thoroughgoing study of the problem of

self-luminosity. The text opens with the familiar query 'Then what is the

2. Nibandha p. 77.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

meaning of the term self-luminous'? (*atha Ko-yam svaprakāśa śabdārthaḥ*), and after successively examining ten possible meaning of the term, offers 'That being unknowable, is capable of the usage of immediacy' (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatvam*) as his final consummate formulation of what the term must mean. The query unmistakably concerns with the analysis of the meaning of the term and the commentator's construction that it concerns with the differentia of self-luminosity (*ko-yamiti kim lakṣaṇaka ityarthaḥ*) is misleading. The differentia (*lakṣaṇa*) belong to the order of things and not to the meanings and concepts.

The following possible connotations of self-luminosity have been put forth for examination in *Tattvapradīpikā*.

*Svaścāsauprakāśaśca svaprakāśaḥ*⁶ :— 'That which possesses self (being) as well as manifestation is self-luminous'. The commentator restates it as 'that which being self, is luminous' (*svatva sati prakāśatvam*)⁷. The formulation emphasises co-extensiveness or co-presence of self (being) and luminosity, so much so that they signify a simple indivisible unity, notwithstanding the different meanings of the two terms. The karmadhāraya in '*svaścāsauprakāśaśca svaprakāśaḥ*' may further be specified as '*svatva-viśiṣṭa-prakāśatā*' (luminosity as qualified by self-hood. It seeks to affirm that the experience has a being, a self, a unity which is the invariable content of its manifestation. The reading significantly distinguishes the vedānta view from that of the śūnyavādin, who upholds that experience is an appearance devoid of being, and manifestation is just the manifestation of its essencelessness.

It is pointed out that the aforesaid definition cannot be upheld, because it unduly extends to the knowable (*vedya*) or non-luminous phenomenon of knowledge. *vedyasyāpi jñānasya svaprakāśatvābhyupagamāt*⁸. The term 'knowable knowledge' signifies the entire range of the phenomenal experience (covering cognitions, ideas, feelings etc.), which is technically referred to as *vṛtti jñāna*. The point of criticism serves to emphasise that Citsukhācārya upholds the orthodox vedānta view that self-luminosity is the privileged distinction of knowledge as the highest principle of consciousness and being, and as such, cannot be ascribed to the limited phenomenal forms of it. The epistemological order of knowledge brought out by the operations of the means of cognising (*pramāṇa*) is clearly excluded from the denotative range of self-luminosity.

6. *Tattva Pradīpikā*, p. 4

7. *Nayana Prasadini Vyakhya*, p. 4

8. *T.P.* p. 5

In view of the aforesaid criticism, the definition is restated as '*svasya svayamevaprakāśa iti*⁹ i.e. the light which is manifest by itself. The commentator construes it as 'the manifestation which is an object unto itself '*svaviśayatve sati prakāśatvam*'.¹⁰ The definition lays down that the self-luminous is self-directed (*svasya svasmin prakāśatva-vidhānam*)) and excludes the relevance of other light for the manifestation of its own identity.

The definition represents the view popularly ascribed to the buddhists. It is criticised on the ground that it defies the universal maxim of exclusiveness of agency and accusative (*kartṛ-karma virodha*). One and the same thing cannot be the agent as well the object of the same act. How can then knowledge turn upon itself to apprehend itself as an object. The definition is hence impossible.¹¹

This necessitates the third definition of self-luminosity as that which is not illumined by another co-class light (*sajātyāṁ prakāśāprakāśyatvam*)¹². Against this definition, it is pointed out that the lamp etc. are also not illumined by the co-class light, though they are not self-luminous, hence the definition unduly extends to the insentient luminaries. Not only that there is undue extension even to such objects as jar etc. Since they too are not illumined by the light of the same class. If 'existence' is adduced as the common class abiding in both, then the adjective *sajātīya* becomes redundant, because the existence (*sattā*) being the highest class, there can be no *vijātīya* for it. What does the adjective '*vijātīya*' then distinguish it from.

This brings us to the fourth definition of self-luminosity: 'in the existence of which, there is negation of the absence of light (*svasattāyām prakāśavyatireka-virahitvatvam*).¹³ The contention is that the self-luminous fact never fails to shine so long as it exists (*yāvadasya sattā tāvatprakāśe nāvīyogaḥ*. n. p. 1.5). The definition, it is pointed out, suffers from undue extension to happiness etc. since they too are ascertained as luminous in their existence. It can never be that one is happy and is not aware of his happiness.¹⁴

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4-5

10. *N.P.* p. 5

11. *T.P.* p. 6

12. *T.P.* p. 5

13. *T.P.* p. 5

14. *T.P.* p. 1

The next (fifth) definition seeks to define self-luminosity as that which serves as the causal light for its own usage (*svayvavahārahetuprakāśatvam*).¹⁵ Notably, the term '*vyavahāra*' in the definition stands for the linguistic usage. The definition in a sense constitutes a departure from all preceding definitions inasmuch as it applies only to the 'experiential light' and excludes the material or insentient luminaries from its range. Knowledge of a thing is the universally accepted cause of the linguistic usage of that thing. The propositional usage 'this is jar' is caused by the knowledge of the jar. Notably, this very 'knowledge of jar' is also the cause of the linguistic usage of knowledge in the form 'I know the jar'. Hence knowledge simultaneously causes the linguistic usages concerning the object as well as its own identity. The objects cannot give rise to their own linguistic usage; they depend on the light of knowledge for it. On the other hand, knowledge gives rise to its own linguistic usage without depending on the aid of any other knowledge, and herein consist its self-luminosity.

This definition is criticised on the following grounds :-

(i) The definition, it is pointed out, unduly extends to the light of lamp etc.; since they too are the cause of their own usage and hence will have to be accepted as self-luminous. If it is said that the term '*vyavahārahetutva*' in the definition stands for the cognitive usage (*jñāna-rūpa-vyavahāra-hetutva*), then there shall be undue extension of the definition to *anuvyavasāya*, which is the cause of the usage of knowledge in the form of *vyavasāyajñāna*.¹⁶

(ii) Is the causality of usage (*vyavahāra-hetutva*) an essential or eccidential qualification in the definition? It cannot be an essential qualification because in the state of emancipation (*mokṣa*) and dissolution (*pralaya*) knowledge is devoid of all usage (*vyavahāra*) and hence owing to the absence of the qualification, '*vyavahārahetutva* in these states of experience, the definition suffers from the defect of non-extension (*avyāptidoṣa*).¹⁷

(iii) If it is said that *vyavahārahetutva* is an accidental (*upalakṣaṇa*) and not an essential qualification, then regarding the qualification accidentalness (*upalakṣaṇatva*) the same question will arise i.e. is it an essential or an accidental qualification? If *upalakṣaṇatva* is an essential qualification

15. T.P. p. 5

16. T.P. p. 7

17. T.P. p. 7

the former defect of non-extension (*avyāpti*) to the states of emancipation and dissolution persists. But if *upalakṣaṇatva* is itself an *upalakṣaṇa*, the possibility of regressus becomes unavoidable. If it is said that *upalakṣitatva*, far from being an essential or accidental qualification, is the very identity of the signified (*prakāśa*), then the qualification *vyavahārahetutva* will become redundant. Consequently the definition remains only this much, '*jñānam prakāśaḥ*' which is not a definition at all, because in it the differentium (*lakṣaṇa*) is non-distinct from the object defined. How can the jar be the differentium of the jar. This being so, the definition remains unproven.¹⁸

Hence the sixth definition 'that which is not the object of knowledge' (*jñānāviśayatvam*)¹⁹ is put forth. The definition marks a definite improvement on the preceding formulations. Notably, the first four definitions are applicable to all cases of light without distinction. The fifth definition is applicable only to the experiential or sentient luminaries and excludes the material luminaries (lamp etc.), from its range. The present definition becomes further restricted and excludes all phenomenal luminaries, the experiential (ideas, cognition etc.) as well as the material (lamp etc.), since they all are revealed as objects of knowledge. The new formulation, thus marks a definitive attempt to restrict the distinction of self-luminosity to the highest self (*ātman*), the very identity of pure consciousness.

The definition, however, suffers from some obvious defects. It unduly extends to such non-existent things as 'hare's horn', since they too are not objects of knowledge. Besides, what is meant by the qualification 'not object of knowledge'? Does it deny the knowability (*vedyatva*) of a thing or its objectness to knowledge'. In the first case, that which is not knowable cannot even be denied; nor is the second alternative possible because the very scriptural and inferential evidence put forth as proofs for the self-luminous principle is an object of knowledge. If the brahman is not an object of a valid means of knowledge, all discussions regarding it will be meaningless.²⁰

Hence, in the seventh definition it is modified as follows: 'That which is directly intuited without becoming an object of knowledge' (*jñānāviśayatve satyaparokṣatvam* ²¹). The commentator construes it as 'the immediacy qualified by the non-objectness to knowledge' (*jñānāviśayatā-viśiṣṭa-aparokṣatā*).

18. *Ibid.* p. 8

19. *Ibid.* p. 5

20. *T.P.* p. 8

21. *T.P.* p. 5

Here the fundamental question, as the commentator puts it, is : What is meant by immediacy (aparokṣatva) ? Does it consist in something being the object of direct knowledge (aparokṣa jñānaviśayatvam) or in the directness of the knowledge as such (aparokṣa jñānatvam). The opponent points out that the first alternative is not possible because objectness and non-objectness are contradictory.²² The second too is not possible because all knowledge being self-luminous, the adjective given here will be redundant owing to the absence of mediate knowledge.²³

The eighth formulation of the definition of self-luminosity is : Which being the object of usage, is not the object of knowledge' (*vyavahāra-viśayatve sati jñānaviśayatvam vā*).²⁴ According to the commentator it signifies unknowability qualified by the amenability to linguistic usage (*vyavahāra-viśayatā-viśiṣṭajñānaviśayatā*). The following points of objection against this definition are notable :

(a) Since there is no usage (vyavahāra) in the states of emancipation (mokṣa) and dissolution (pralaya), the old objection of non-extention to these states of experience holds good against this definition too.

(b) The definition does not apply even to the ordinary (phenomenal) experience, because that is not altogether of the nature of non-object (jñānaviśaya). Obviously, the definition applies neither to the pure consciousness nor to the phenomenal experience.

(c) What is more, this definition unduly extends to the nacre silver contact as understood in the case of illusion by prabhākarites. According to Prabhākara, knowledge cannot have anything false or non-existent for its object, lest falsehood should accrue to knowledge itself. The '*śukti-rajata-saṁsarga*' being false, cannot be an object of knowledge, though it causes activity in the person labouring under illusion. The definition '*vyavahāra-viśayatve-jñānaviśayatvam*' thus clearly applies to such cases of illusory contact.²⁵

The ninth definition of self-lumionosity, therefore, freshly defines it as that 'which does not require the (aid) of the other of the same class for the self bound usage' (*svapratibaddha-vyavahāre sajātīya-parānapekṣatvam*).²⁶

22. N. P. p. 5

23. Ibid. p. 5

24. Ibid. p. 5

25. T. P. p. 5

26. T. P. p. 8

This definition is a restatement of the third definition (*sajātīyaprakāśāp-rakāśyatvam*) with the difference that here the specific expression 'linguistic usage' (*vyavahāra*) replaces the term 'manifestation' (*prakāśa*) of the earlier formulation. It is, however, not free from the defects of the earlier definition and is found too wide to specify the unique distinction of self-luminosity. It is pointed out that even the lamp and the jar etc. do not depend on the (aid of) 'the other' of the same class, for the self-bound usages. If it is said that the lamp etc. require (the aid of) 'knowledge etc.' for the self-bound usage, which are co-class with them, because 'existence' (*sattā*) is the common class abiding in both, the definition will become impossible. It is so because the 'unseen' (*adr̥ṣṭa*) etc. being instrumental in all that is 'produced', the production of 'usage' in the self-luminous soul will also depend on the aid of the *adr̥ṣṭa* and which, because of the *sattājāti* abiding in both, will be of the same class with the soul. The self-luminous soul, thus shown depending on a co-class-other, the *adr̥ṣṭa* for its self-bound usage, the aforesaid definition of self-luminary becomes impossible.²⁷

The next formulation runs as follows: Without being knowable (*vedya*), which is object of the usage of immediacy (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-viśayatvam*).²⁸ It is rendered by the commentator as 'amenability to the usage of immediacy, as qualified by unknowability (*avedyatā-viśiṣṭa-aparokṣa-vyavahāra-viśayatā*).

The definition is criticised on the following grounds:—

(i) The self-luminous being 'unknowable', no discussion regarding it is possible.

(ii) The expression 'object of the usage of immediacy' (*aparokṣavyavahāra-viśayatā*) makes it plain that the self-revelatory soul is the object of direct apprehension. Now, to call it 'unknowable (*avedya*) is as self-contradictory as to say 'my mother is barren'.

(iii) The definition suffers from the defect of non-extension (*avyāptidoṣa*) to the self-experience continuum in states of deep sleep, dissolution and emancipation, since the experience pertaining to these states is not subject to any usage at all.²⁹

27. T.P. p. 5

28. T.P. p. 9

29. T.P. p. 5

The consummate definition of self-luminosity stated and examined

In view of the criticism, the aforesaid definition is slightly modified by inserting the term '*yogyatvam*' in place '*viśayatvam*'. It yields the eleventh and the final definition of self-luminosity as follows :

That which being unknowable, is capable of the usage of immediacy (*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatvam*).³⁰ The commentator renders it as 'the capacity for the usage of immediacy qualified by unknowability (*avedyatā-viśiṣṭa-āparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā*)'. This is the final, the consummate definition of self-luminosity, which Citsukhācārya selects to defend with all his skill and logical acumen. The following points of criticism are anticipated against the definition.

Anticipating the pūrvapakṣa, it is pointed out that this definition too is not satisfactory. It may be asked whether the aforesaid capacity for the usage of immediacy is an attribute (dharma) or the very identity of the self-luminous *ātman*. If an attribute, there will be the defect of non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) in the state of emancipation, because according to vedānta, that state is devoid of all attributes. In fact the acceptance of an attribute in that state goes against the accepted tenets of the system. On the other hand, if that capacity (*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā*) is admitted as the very identity of the self-luminous—the self, which is of the nature of knowledge, will be subject to linguistic determination, (*vyavahāra-nirūpita*) and there will ensue relativity to the self, which is absolute. Hence logical determination of self-luminosity is not possible.

That the last definition in the list is intended also to be the final, the consummate definition, is obvious from the opening sentence of the defence (uttarapakṣa). 'The definition of self-luminosity', it observes, is not impossible. '*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra yogyatvam*', is the definition of it'.³¹ One need not doubt that the qualification '*aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*' is not ascribable to the state of *mokṣa* because to be capable (*yogya*) means 'to be non-substratum of the absolute negation' (*yogyatvā-tyantābhāvānadhikaraṇatvasya tatvāt*). It is exactly in the manner of predication of quality to the substance in the nyāya system that the self (*ātman*) of the vedānta system may be ascertained as the non-substratum of the absolute negation of the usage of immediacy.³²

This exercise in argumentum ad hominem may, of course, be sufficient to silence the nyāya disputant, but it does not make the vedānta position

30. T.P. p. 5

31. T.P. p. 16

32. T.P. p. 16

any less vulnerable. The charge of the opponent that '*aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*' is absent in the self in the state of emancipation stands, and the elaboration of the meaning of *yogyatā* restates rather than refutes it.

The admissibility of '*yogyatva*' as an authentic concept of logic, is open to question. It may be shown that besides the clearly ascertainable attributes, all possible or conceivable accidents, which occur to a thing in specific moments of its existence, may be shown to belong to it by virtue of the '*yogyatā*' it has for them. The concept of '*yogyatā*' thus, instead of serving as a basis for discernment, seeks to abolish a valid distinction between an 'accident' which belongs to a temporal phase of a thing and the 'qualification' which is co-extensive with its existence, by suggesting that in the moments when an accident actually does not belong to a thing, it is there in the form of potency (*yogyatā*) for it. The consequence of such an approach is disastrous, since the defect of non-extension (*avyāpti doṣa*) of any definition may now be easily got over by saying that the '*lakṣya*' possesses *yogyatā* for the *lakṣaṇa* in regions where it is actually not pervaded by the *lakṣaṇa*. Any definition suffering from *avyāpti doṣa* may now be salvaged by resorting to the concept of *yogyatā*. Notably, one single corroborating instance suffices to ensure *yogyatva* in the *lakṣaṇa*, which may be upheld as expecting all observable regions of non-extension in the '*lakṣya*'.

The notion of *yogyatā* hence, far from being conducive to clarity is an instrument of vagueness. The ascription of *yogyatā* for the usage of immediacy to the self (in the state of emancipation) simply serves to concede to the opponent's view that there are regions of experience to which the usage of immediacy actually does not belong.

Justifying the definition, the author points out that the qualification 'non-objectifiable' has been inserted in the definition with a view to ward off its undue extension to jar etc. which too are capable of the usage of immediacy³³. Nor can the mere qualification 'non-objectifiable' be the sole distinction (*lakṣaṇa*) because it will ensure undue extension to the past and future objects and also to the eternally inferrable (*nityānumeya*) entities as merit (*dharma*) etc. It is pointed out that the non-presentability (*avedyatva*) consists in non-pervasion with resultantness (*phalāvyāpyatva*) and hence if mere *avedyatā* is offered as the *lakṣaṇa* of *svprakāśa*, it will extend to merit etc. which are devoid of *vedyatva* in the sense specified. Hence the qualification *aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā* is necessary³⁴.

33. T. P. p. 17

34. T.P. p. 19

The meaning of *vedyatva* thus specified as '*phalavyāpyatva*' the entire definition, the opponent may point out, extends to ignorance, internal organ and its attributes desires etc. and to the illusory phenomenon of nacre-silver, because they too are *avedya* in the sense specified, and are capable of the usage of immediacy in the form 'I am ignorant' etc. According to the vedānta theory of perception, it is only when the light of the witness-self (*sākṣī-caitanya*) is carried to the object through the mediation of *vr̥tti* and senses that there is manifestation of the object in the form of result (*phala*). *Phala* has been defined as the expression or articulation of the consciousness limited by the object (*viṣayāvachinnaṁ caitanyaṁ abhivyaktaṁ phalaṁ it vedānta-vādināṁ matam*).³⁵ The term '*abhivyaktam*' (expression) has been defined as the resultant mode of the mind, which follows the apprehension of the object through senses (*abhivyaktiścendriya-dvārā arthasannikṛṣṭa-manah-pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ*).³⁶ Thus mediation of the mental mode is essential to ensure *vedyatva* in the form of '*phalavyāpyatā*' and is part of the meaning of *vedyatva*. In view of it, now all the experimental facts belonging to the higher-orders of phenomenality, in fact all such higher activities of mind and intellect which are manifest as direct recipients of the light of witness consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*) and do not depend for it on the mediation of *vr̥tti*, belong to the category of *avedya*; they also possess '*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā*' which is obvious from the usages of immediacy assignable to them. Hence the definition '*avedyatve satī aparokṣa-vyavāhara yogyatvam*' intended for an exclusive application to brahman, unduly extends to the manifestation of the above mentioned entities.

Against this Citsukhācārya's contention is that ignorance (*ajñāna*), internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) etc. are *avedya*, but not capable of the usage of immediacy (since brahman alone is direct and immediate) and there is appearance of immediacy in them on account of their being superimposed on brahman³⁷. This can hardly be a satisfactory reply. It rather evades a reply by shifting the ground. As the opponent points out, if '*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā*' is restricted to brahman alone, then the qualification '*avedyatva*' meant to exclude the objects jar etc. and their perception, becomes redundant, because the restrictive usage of *aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvā* suffices to ensure the desired exclusion of jar etc. Citsukhācārya meets the objection by saying that in the pragmatic state of things (*vyavahāra-daśā*) the capacity for the usage of immediacy is conceded also to the

35. N.P. p. 18

36. N.P. p. 18

37. T.P. p. 19

objects of the means of direct knowledge³⁸. No discerning reader of the text can fail to note that in order to prevent undue extension to ignorance, internal organ etc. the author is first obliged to say that brahman alone is direct and immediate and hence '*aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*' belongs to brahman alone; but now, in order to save the qualification '*avedyatva*' from superfluity, the author again shifts the ground and concedes that in the practical state of existence, (*vyavahāra-daśā*), the objects of the means of perception also possess '*aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*'. Of course, the qualification 'means of perception' has been cleverly inserted here, still it prevents the application of '*aparokṣa-vyavahāra yogyatā*' to ignorance, internal organ etc. which are not objects of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). But nobody will believe, not even the vedāntin, that, while brahman on the one hand, and the objects of sense perception such as jar etc. on the other hand, possess *aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*, our intimate moments of intuitions into our ignorance, our desires and aversions, are not immediate and are devoid of the usage of immediacy.

Thus it may be conclusively shown that the final definition of Citsukh-ācārya fails no better than others, and fails in the task of ensuring a restricted application of the concept to the brahman alone. Feeling that it is just a failure of expression, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī offers further logical refinement on this definition. Thus Citsukha's consummate definition of self-luminosity as '*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatvam*' is now slightly modified and re-stated as '*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahārayogyatvāntābhāvānādhikaraṇa-tvam*'.³⁹ The addition of '*atyantābhāvānādhikaraṇatva*' to the definition is justified on the ground that it guards the definition from the defect of non-extension to experience in the states of emancipation etc. It may be recalled that the opponents held against citsukha's definition that '*aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatā*' is a positive qualification which does not obtain in experience in the states of emancipation and dissolution etc. Madhusūdana feels that the difficulty may be got over by stating the qualification in negative terms and hence the expression '*aparokṣavyavahārayogyatva*' of Citsukha's definition is replaced by '*aparokṣa-vyavahāra yogyatvāntābhāvānādhikaraṇatva*'. Elucidating the significance of the change, Madhusūdana points out that '*anādhikaraṇatva*' is not a positive ascription or qualification; it is the very identity of the substratum and not

38. T. P. p. 19

39. A. S. p. 768

a new addition to it. Hence the question of non-extension of '*anādhikaraṇatva*' to the states of emancipation etc. does not arise ⁴⁰. In fact the definition, as applied to the state of emancipation, refers to the very identity of this state of experience and not to any qualification of it. This clever device, however, does not prove of much avail in the face of sound theoretical objections. The opponent may point out that to say that the definition of self-luminosity refers only to the substratum (experience in the state of *mokṣa*) and not to any qualification therein, amounts to conceding that the 'qualification' of self-luminosity as specified in the definition is not applicable to the state of *mokṣa* and is as such false with reference to it. The limitations of the vedānta definition of self-luminosity have been lucidly summed up in Nyāyāmṛta. It is pointed out that there is no linguistic usage in deep sleep etc. and hence the differentium *avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra-viṣayatva* does not extend to (the experience in this state) it. The replacement of the terms '*viṣayatva*' by '*yogyatva*' will also not help, since the capacity (*yogyatva*) itself being a qualification does not obtain in the brahman in the state of emancipation. Similarly, the further modification in the definition as '*tadyogyatvātyantā-bhāvānādhikaraṇatvam*' will also not help because that too being an attribute, is absent in the state of emancipation. The identity of brahman is indeterminable and hence '*anādhikaraṇatva*' cannot now be its determinant. The capacity (*yogyatva*) itself being false, how can the non-substratumness of its absolute negation obtain in brahman ⁴¹. Madhusūdana's refinement does not go very far to meet the challenge. In fact one cannot help feeling that the subsequent generations of vedāntins, instead of attempting a reconstruction of Citsukha's views in the light of criticisms, were content to offer simply verbal solutions to genuine theoretical issues.

Proof for self-luminosity

As will be shown in the following pages, 'self-luminosity' in any definable sense remains only a conceptual and not a factual distinction and hence its definition can be only analytic and not synthetic. In a synthetic definition the two facts i. e. the differentiation and the definition are held together by a necessary connection (*lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhāva*). The classic definition of cow as that which has 'dew laps' (*sāsnādivatvām*) is an instance of a synthetic definition which affirms a necessary connection between the fact 'cow' and the fact 'dew laps'. But an analytic definition, simply elucidates or analyses the meaning of a term. In fact, 'being bound

40. A. S. p. 768

41. A. S. p. 855

by three sides' is a part of the meaning of a 'triangle' and not a predicate of it. It seems to be a cardinal limitation of Indian logic that it treats all definitions as synthetic. An Indian logician will uphold that in the aforesaid definition of a triangle 'being bound by three sides' is the *lakṣaṇa* of a triangle. But this is not correct; the predicate 'that which is bound by three sides' elucidates simply the meaning of the subject (triangle) and does not indicate any factual distinction in it. There cannot be *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-bhāva* in the said definition of the triangle, since it obtains only between two facts and not between a concept and its meaning.

This digression becomes necessary because the several differential (*lakṣaṇa*) of self-luminosity offered by Citsukhācārya, if closely scrutinised, are simply cases of the analysis of the concept. Notably, Citsukhācārya himself poses it to be an inquiry into the meanings of self-luminosity, but in the absence of the distinction between the 'analytic' and the 'synthetic' propositions in Indian logic, it soon becomes an inquiry into the *lakṣaṇa* of self-luminosity.

The quest of meaning, thus distorted into a quest of differentium (*lakṣaṇa*), leads to an embarrassing situation. 'Self-luminosity' is itself a differentium (*lakṣaṇa*) of the luminous, ascertained on the basis of the behaviour of the luminous towards non-luminous. Now, the quest of the differentium (*lakṣaṇa*) of self-luminosity actually amounts to a quest of the 'differentia of differentia' which is untenable, since the exercise is bound to be either circular or tautological. In fact, whether the learned dialectician is offering a '*lakṣaṇa*' of self-luminosity or an inferential proof for the '*lakṣaṇa*', what is being actually offered is an analysis of the concept or a restatement of what is already assumed or implicit therein. Closely viewed, all definitions (erroneously called *lakṣaṇa*) of self-luminosity or their further analysis in the form of inferential proofs—purport to say only this much that the knowledge or the *ātman* identical with it is absolutely distinct from the object (the presentable). As to the query 'how it differs', it is upheld as self-luminous in contrast to the object. But when it is asked what is the meaning of self-luminosity, the reply that it consists in non-objectifiability or non-presentability (*avedyatva*) is simply a restatement of the first assumption that knowledge is different from the known or the self is different from the object. It serves to emphasise that the definition (the so called *lakṣaṇa*) of self-luminosity, is just an analysis, a restatement of the notions already implicit in the concept.

Just as the definition of self-luminosity offers an analysis of the concept (not a lakṣaṇa of it), in the same way the purely negative inferential evidence (kevalavyatirekī anumāna), designed to prove the *lakṣaṇa*, ends by offering a further analysis or restatement of what is already given in the definition.

Inferential proof for self-luminosity There follows in Citsukhī, a highly sophisticated discussion on the validity of the inferential evidence for self-luminosity. The following syllogism has been offered by Citsukhācārya to prove self-luminosity of experience.

Experience, is self-luminous, because of its being of the nature of experience, whatever is not of this nature, is not characterisable as self luminous e. g. a pot ⁴².

Pūrva Pakṣa :- Here, the naiyāyika, the main adversary in the disputation, may say that the aforesaid reasoning is fallacious. It involves, in the first place, the defect of *siddhasādhana*, because the minor term (anubhūti) being an instance of the middle term involves it, and hence what the affirmation of the middle term seeks to prove stands already presumed in the statement of the problem (pratijñā vākya). Besides, the syllogism also involves the fallacy of *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇatā* (sāddhyā-prasiddhi), since the self-luminosity as defined by the vedāntin (*avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatvam*) is not a fact of experience. One may further ask whether in the minor term the word *anubhūti* has been used in the denotative sense (vacyārtha) or the suggestive (lakṣyārtha) sense. In its denotative sense, the term *anubhūti* stands for the consciousness qualified by the mode of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-viśiṣṭa-caitanya*). It goes against the basic tenets of the system to call it self-luminous because it is only 'pure consciousness' (and not any qualified form of it) that is upheld as self-luminous in the vedānta. Nor can the 'pure consciousness', which is the implied sense of '*anubhūti*' be upheld as self-luminous because the pure consciousness is not an established fact for the opponents.⁴³ One may go a little further and say that even the vedāntin cannot uphold the self-luminosity of 'consciousness' without contradicting himself. It is so because in the vedānta system, 'pure consciousness' is devoid of all qualifications and hence it will be inconsistent to ascribe the qualifications such as experienteness (anubhūtitvā) and self-luminosity.

42 T. P. p. 21

43. T.P. p. 15

It may also be asked whether there is any proof for self-luminosity or not. If there is a proof, then this being an object of the *pramāṇa*, will no longer be a case of self-luminosity, which has been defined as unknowable immediacy. If to avoid it, the vedāntin says that there is no proof for self-luminosity, then how can it be proved without a proof. The vedāntin is thus on the horns of a dilemma.⁴⁴

DEFENCE OF THE SYLLOGISM BY CITSUKHACARYA

Citsukhācārya maintains that the following syllogism for self-luminosity of knowledge may be consistently upheld : Experience (anubhūti) is self-luminous, because it has the distinction of experienteness; that which is not so distinguished (by experienteness) is not so (self-luminous), just as a jar.⁴⁵

With a view to show that the aforesaid syllogism is flawless, Citsukha undertakes a pointwise examination of the charges levelled in the syllogism by the opponent.

The syllogism is free from the defect of Sadhyāprasidhi

Citsukha upholds that self-luminosity, which is the major term (sādhya) in the syllogism, is not an imaginary entity (aprasiddha). It may be recalled that self-luminosity has been defined as 'that which being unknowable, has the capacity for the usage of immediacy'. It is accepted by all that knowledge is capable of the usage of immediacy. It is the 'unknowability' (avedyatva) part of the definition that is disputed by the opponents. Citsukha offers the following three arguments to show that 'unknowability' (avedyatva) is a fact of experience.

(i) The fact of unknowability may be established through the following inference based on general properties (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*): Knowability is the counterpositive of some negation abiding in some substratum (dharmī) because it is an attribute like whiteness.⁴⁶ The substratum, which is the counterpositive of the negation of knowability, must be qualified by the absence of knowability i. e. must be unknowable. We may not be able to specify it directly, but it is established in a general way.

(ii) The author of '*Nyaya Lilavati*' formulated a maxim to ascertain whether a supposition is a fact or not. It runs as follows: The denial of which leads to such undesirable conclusions as regressus etc. is certainly amenable to some means of knowledge (*yadviparyaye asamāhita prasaktih*

44. T.P. p. 15

45. Ibid. p. 21

46. T.P. p. 24

tatkvacinmāna योग्यam)⁴⁷. Applied to the present case, if unknowability of experience is denied, i. e. if it is conceded that one experience is the object of another experience, the undesirable conclusion in the form of infinite regressus is bound to follow. Therefore unknowability (*avedyatva*) must be accepted as a fact.

(iii) The following *mahāvidyā* form of inference also serves to prove the fact of unknowability (*avedyatva*): This jar is other than the substratum of knowability abiding in things others than it (jar), because it is a thing as a cloth.⁴⁸ Knowability (*vedyatva*) qualified by the otherness of this jar must be in things other than this jar i.e. in clothes etc. Hence the substratum of the qualified knowability is in cloth etc. and the non-substratum is 'this jar'. The difference of that non-substratum is already in the corroborative example, the cloth. Notably the *sādhya* i. e. non-substratum of knowability (unknowability) becomes established in the corroborative example because of 'the otherness than this jar' in it. This is the speciality of *mahāvidyā-numāna*.

'Unknowability (*avedyatva*) thus proved, the defect of *aprasiddha-viśeṣanātā* cannot be alleged in the syllogism. Nor can it be said that the *sādhya* thus already established, the syllogism simply aims to prove what is already proved and hence suffers from the defect of *siddha-sāadhanātā*, because the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* reasoning only proves the fact of self-luminosity in a general way, whereas the syllogism seeks to establish it in its distinctive character. There is no *siddhasāadhanātā* if the specific character of something known in a general way is proved through inference.⁴⁹

The syllogism is free from the defects of asiddhi There are three types of *asiddhi*—*svārūpāsiddhi*, *āśrayāsiddhi* and *vyāpyatvasiddhi*. The *naïyāyika* may point out that the said syllogism involves the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi*. This type of fallacy has been

defined as a reason "(hetu) the subject of which is devoid of the distinctive character of the supposed *pakṣa*" (*pakṣatāvacchedakābhāvavatpakṣaḥ*—Tark Saṁgraha).⁵⁰

The *naïyāyika* may point out that pure consciousness, the subject in the disputed syllogism, is devoid of all attributes and hence, the distinction *lakṣadharmatā* i. e. the assurance of the presence of reason in the subject cannot be ascribed to it. Hence the defect of *āśrayāsiddhi* in the syllogism. There is also the defect of *svārūpāsiddhi* in the syllogism, which consists in the absence of reason (*hetu*) in the minor term (*pakṣa*).

47 T. P. p. 22

48 T. P. p. 24

49 N. P. p. 22

50 T. S. p. 306

It is pointed out that consciousness (*anubhūti*), the subject (*pakṣa*) in the syllogism, is a single unitive principle. The vedāntin categorically repudiates the suggestion that consciousness can ever be a class character. The reason (*hetu*) '*anubhūtitva*' being a class character, is therefore non-existent in consciousness', the subject (*pakṣa*) of the syllogism. The defect of *svarūpāsiddhi* is thus obvious.

The Naiyāyika may further point out that the syllogism, is vitiated by the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, because the concomitance between the *hetu* (*anubhūtitva*) and the *sādhya* (*svaprakāśatva*) does not present itself as inevitable and invariable. He points out that such contrary inference as 'experience (*anubhūti*) is knowable, because it is a thing, like a jar' are also possible.⁵¹

Refuting the criticism, Citsukhācārya points out that '*anubhūti*' the subject in the syllogism is a well known fact (*prasiddha*) and hence the defect of *āśrayāsiddhi* is not there.⁵² *Svarūpāsiddhi* is also not there because like the class 'moonhood' abiding in many imaginary moon individuals, the acceptance of the class *anubhūtitva* does not lead to any inconsistency in the vedānta system.⁵³ Though from the ultimate stand point *anubhūti* is a single unitive principle and hence the class *anubhūtitva* is not admissible, yet from the relative stand point one may concede the class *anubhūtitva* with reference to the 'experience individuals' apparent due to the limiting adjuncts. The imaginary reason (*hetu*) in the form of *anubhūtitva* serves to prove the *sādhya* just as the imaginary reflection proves the object reflected.⁵⁴ The charge of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* too cannot be upheld, because it is possible only with regard to a conditioned reason (*sopādhika hetu*). But in the present case, the reference being of purely negative form, there can be no possibility of a condition (*upādhi*) in the *hetu*.⁵⁵ If the condition (*upādhi*) is alleged in the *pakṣa* itself, then owing to the very fact that the *hetu* is also present there, it will become connected with *hetu* and hence it will no longer be a condition. Citsukha, therefore, maintains that his syllogism, being of purely negative form, the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* cannot be alleged against it.

The reason (hetu) in the syllogism is not discrepant (viruddha)

Next, Citsukha proceeds to demonstrate that his syllogism is free from the fallacies arising out of discrepant reason. The reason (*hetu*) *anubhūtitva* is not contradictory (*viruddha*), because it is not

51. T P p. 13
52. Ibid. p. 24
53. Ibid p. 25
54. T.P. p. 25
55. T P, p. 26

present in the contrary instances.⁵⁶ The jar etc. which are non-self-luminous, furnish the contrary instances and the reason (hetu) *anubhūtitva* is invariably absent in them. Since the reason (hetu) does not obtain in the contrary instances, the fallacy of *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*, which consists in the commonness of *hetu* to *sādhyā* as well as to the contrary instances of it, too cannot be alleged against it.⁵⁷ Nor can the reason be said to be vitiated by uncommonness of reason (*asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*), because the *hetu* exists only in the minor (pakṣa) and there is no similar instance (sapakṣa) to prove its aberration.⁵⁸ *Asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* is a reason (hetu) which is absent both in the similar (sapakṣa) and the contrary (vipakṣa) loci. The point of Citsukha is that his syllogism, being of purely negative form, has no similar instance (sapakṣa) wherein the absence of *hetu* may be demonstrated. Hence the charge of uncommonness of reason cannot be upheld.

Citsukha further points out that the charge of indefinite reasoning (*saṁdigdha-anaikāntika*) too cannot be levelled against the syllogism.

As a rule, in case of a doubt, the validity of a reason should be established by demonstrating the absurdity of the contradictory reasoning. This is called *vipakṣa-bādhakatarka*. Citsukha points out that in support of the syllogism there is a '*vipakṣa-bādhaka tarka*' in the form: If experience is knowable (vedya), there shall be infinite regressus which will call into question, the very identity of experience. It sets aside the charge of *sandigdha anaikāntikatā* in the syllogism.⁵⁹

Refutation of the nyāya theory of anuvyavasāya Against the theory of self-luminosity of knowledge, the nyāya realists put forth the theory of *anuvyavasāya*. Showing the untenability of the rival hypothesis, Citsukha points out that if the cognition were not manifest at the time of the manifestation of the object, one may have doubt, illusion or contrary belief regarding his experience (cognition). But when a person is asked, 'have you seen that thing or not', he expresses neither doubt nor contrary determination, but expresses his belief in the experience in a determined manner, shows that the experience while manifesting itself, gives rise to the manifestive usage of the things.⁶⁰ The point of the reasoning is that the element of belief in cognition invariably indicates the self-affirming dimension in experience. As has been noted in the course

56. T.P. p. 28

57. T.P. p. 28

58. T.P. p. 28

59. T.P. p. 28

60. T.P. p. 29-30

of preceding chapters, Dharmakīrti was probably the first to perceive the significance of the analysis of belief as an argument for self-luminosity. His reasoning was subsequently reproduced in the well known vedānta texts as *Khandana*, *Nyāyamakaranda* and *Citsukhī*.

The opponent may say that the element of belief (certainty) may be ensured to a cognition by its subsequent apprehension and does not necessarily argue for the supposition of self-luminosity. The rival explanation, says Citsukha, is untenable because once the first cognition is supposed to be known or apprehended by the subsequent cognition, the second one will also have to be posited as knowable to a third cognition, and thus infinite regressus will be unavoidable.

Citsukha then subjects the nyāya theory of *anuvyavasāya* to a searching scrutiny. His reasoning, however, save a few refinements and stylish postures, seems to have been taken from *nyāyamakaranda*. The basic contention is that in order that one cognition may be apprehended by another, it is necessary that the two cognitions are simultaneously available. Such simultaneous availability of two cognitions is clearly ruled out in the nyāya system. The notion of *anuvyavasāya*, hence, cannot be consistently stated within the framework of nyāya epistemology.

The difficulties of the nyāya view are worked out in detail. It may be asked of the naiyāyika, whether the same mental contact (*manah-samyoga*), which generates the original cognition, also produces the introspection (*anuvyavasāya*) or some new contact is necessary for it. The first alternative is untenable because, if caused by the same mental contact, the two cognitions will arise simultaneously. Such simultaneous origination is not possible because the two cognitions are related as generator (*janaka*) and generated (*janya*). Nor can it be said that one and the same mental contact (*manah-samyoga*) generates the two effects (in the form of *vyavasāya* and *anuvyavasāya*) since it has no such capacity. Besides, the difference of non-inherent causes (*asamavāyī-kāraṇa*) is the determinant of difference in cognitions. If the single non-inherent cause in the form of single mental contact can generate different mental effects, then one may have in the same moment triple experiences—the cognition of jar (*ghatānubhava*), recollection of jar (*ghaṭasmaraṇa*) and the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) having the first experience as its object. But since they do not occur simultaneously but only successively, it is necessary to admit different and successive non-inherent causes for them. From the non-successive causes, there can never proceed the succession of effects. If the succession of effects is

accounted for in terms of the succession of external accessories such as sense object contact etc. then there shall be simultaneous cognition of jar and cloth etc. which are simultaneously in contact with the senses. Hence it becomes necessary for the naiyāyika to accept successive non-inherent causes in the form of different mental contacts to account for the succession of different cognitions.⁶¹

But this second alternative that the *anuvyavasāya* is generated by second mental contact is also not possible. According to nyāya, an act survives just for three moments, and hence it becomes necessary for the naiyāyika to admit an interval of three seconds between the two mental contacts and of four seconds between the two cognitions (*vyavasāya* and *anuvyavasāya*.) The cognition of the object (*vyavasāya*) is followed respectively by moments of activity (*kriyā*), differentiation (*vibhāga*), destruction of previous contact (*purva-saṁyoga-vināśa*) and then the generation of a new mental contact which finally leads to *anuvyavasāya*. Now, owing to the fact that there is a gap of several moments between the two cognitions, the original cognition (*vyavasāya*) will never be available to *anuvyavasāya* for direct apprehension. The cognition is upheld as momentary and cannot wait for several seconds, till the *anuvyavasāya* arises to apprehend it. The naiyāyika may say that just as the eye etc. while remaining unmanifest, generate the knowledge of the object, even so a knowledge, though devoid of manifestive character, may still generate another knowledge. This contention, says Citsukha, cannot be upheld. In the absence of the capacity to cause usage of immediacy in objects, knowledge itself will be non-distinct from the object. Thus, the two cognitions will be like two objects, say a jar and a cloth and the relation of 'manifestor and manifest' will be absent between them. Such reasonings preventive of contrary explanations may be anticipated for the self-luminosity of knowledge⁶²

The reason (hetu) is not bādhitā The opponent may further point out that object-hood (*vedyatva*) of experience is apparent in such observations as "I am possessor of the knowledge of jar', 'the jar is known'. Hence the reason *anubhūti* is *bādhitā* or contrary to the testimony of direct experience. Citsukha says that the charge is not well founded because in the first place, the aforesaid observations can be satisfactorily accounted for with the help of the supposition of self-

61, T.P. pp. 30-31

62, T.P. pp. 31-32

luminosity and the supposition of objecthood of experience is not necessary at all⁶³. Secondly, in the proposition 'the jar is known', *vedyatva* or objecthood is felt not in the experience but in the object (jar etc.), because known-ness (*vedyatva*) is the qualifier of the jar.⁶⁴ Even if it is supposed that there is direct perception of the former experience in *anuvyavasāya*, this very perception is not the perception of the knowability (*vedyatva*) of experience'. Hence, unknowability (*avedyatva*) of experience is not contradicted in perception. If the *anuvyavasāya* is said to apprehend the *vyavasāya*, as well as the knowability (*vedyatva*) residing in *vyavasāya*, then *anuvyavasāya*, apprehending the 'knowability' determined by itself, will be self-apprehending. It amounts to embracing the buddhist connotation of self-luminosity.⁶⁵ The point of the reasoning is that the knowability (*vedyatva*) as apprehended in *anuvyavasāya* is already the knowability qualified or determined by *anuvyavasāya* and hence in the act of apprehending it, the *anuvyavasāya* will be self-apprehending or self-luminous in the buddhist sense of the term.

No satpratipakṣa in the syllogism

The opponent then alleges *satpratipakṣa* in the syllogism. According to the vedāntin, it is the unknowability of experience which constitutes its fundamental distinction i. e. its self-luminosity. The opponent points out that a counterargument may be put forth to prove the 'knowability' of experience. It may take the form : 'knowledge is knowable, because it is a thing like a jar'. (*jñānam vedyam vastutvād, ghatavad*).

Repudiating the charge of *satpratipakṣa*, Citsukha points out that the counter argument cannot be upheld because the universal concomitance (*vypāti*), which seeks to prove 'unknowability' from 'thinghood' is not ascertainable⁶⁶. The said *vyāpti* takes the form : whatever is, is knowable, (*yadvastu, tattadvedyam*). The question is whether the knowledge apprehending this concomitance also shines at the time of the knowledge of the *vyāpti* or not ? In the first alternative, the *vyāpti* may be either self-apprehending and hence self-luminous in the buddhist sense of the term or manifest without being a cause unto its own manifestation, which is the 'vedānta view of self-luminosity'.⁶⁷ If on the other hand, one resorts to the second alternative and upholds that the knowledge apprehending the *vyāpti* does not shine at the time of the knowledge of the *vyāpti*, then the

63 T. P. p. 32

64. T. P. p. 32

65. T. P. p. 32

66 Ibid. p. 33

67. T. P. p. 33

vyāpti itself loses its universal character. Notably the *vyāpti* 'whatever is, is knowable' seeks to affirm 'knowability' in every fact and hence the knowledge which apprehends this *vyāpti* but is not manifest simultaneously with it, constitutes an exception to the *vyāpti*. Here the *vyāpti* itself is a case of knowledge which is not knowable (*vedya*), since it is not manifest. How can the counter argument showing non-self-luminosity of experience be upheld when the very *vyāpti*, on which it is based, is vitiated.⁶⁸

Citsukha repudiates the suggestion that his syllogism for self-luminosity is a pseudo-syllogism like the following one : 'The jar is self-luminous because of its being a jar; what is devoid of this (jarhood) is also devoid of that (self-luminosity) for example a cloth'. He points out that there is an obvious difference between the two. The counter syllogism of the opponent stands contradicted by the testimony of perception. The thing, which is known as jar in the world and possesses visual and tactile qualities, cannot be self-luminous, because that is the object of the senses of vision and touch and is established through them.⁶⁹

Accessibility to means of knowledge is not inconsistent with self-luminosity

The opponent draws attention to a dilemma of the vedāntin who conceives self-luminosity as non-objectifiable immediacy. It may be asked whether there is some proof or means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to prove self-luminosity or not ? If there is, then, being an object to that means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), it will no longer be unknowable (*avedya*) and hence self-luminous in the vedānta sense of the term. But in the absence of '*pramāṇa*', how can self-luminosity be proved at all. The vedāntin is thus on the horns of a dilemma.

In his rejoinder, Citsukha points out that the dilemma does not persist if certain distinctions made in the vedānta term *vedya* signifies only the recipient of the resultant consciousness (*phalavyāpyatā*) and not 'objecthood' or 'presentability' in general. To be an object of means of knowledge does not necessarily mean that such an object must also be recipient of the resultant manifestation (*phalavyāpya*) and hence necessarily '*vedya*' in the technical sense of the term. The things belonging to the past are ascertainable through the means of knowledge but they cannot be said to be recipients of consciousness. In other words they are *vrtti vyāpya* but not *phalavyāpya*. There does not obtain a negative concomitance between *pramāṇikatā* and *phalavyāpyatā* i.e. the negation of *phalavyāpyatā* does not necessarily entail negation of *pramāṇikatā* and hence, there is no inconsistency if self-luminosity is proved through *pramāṇa* and is yet held as *avedya* or *phalavyāpya*.⁶⁹

68 T. P. p. 33

69 T. P. p. 35

70. T.P. p. 35

Critique of Citsukha's study of self-luminosity

The foregoing study of self-luminosity by Citsukha is illuminating and exhaustive. The *pūrvapakṣa* as anticipated in the *tattvapradīpikā* evinces an unflinching grasp of the basic issues which await solution in a vedānta exposition of self-luminosity. In his study Citsukha examines almost all possible connotations of self-luminosity with a view to evolve a concept of self-luminosity in consonance with the basic tenets of the systems. He brings together the scattered and piecemeal thoughts of his predecessors in a purposive study with a comprehensive outlook. He effectively counters the criticisms of nyāya realists directed against the vedānta view of self-luminosity. Of course the quest for finer definitions and fresh proofs continued in the subsequent works, and they faithfully followed the pattern set by Citsukha, and in most of the cases their contribution is no more than certain verbal refinements on Citsukha. The work of Citsukha represents the culmination of the vedānta thinking on the subject.

While it may be safely said that he shows a decidedly better appreciation of the problems than any of his predecessor, it cannot be claimed with equal confidence that he succeeds in finding a convincing solution to those problems in his exposition. Some of the weak points of his exposition may be briefly enumerated.

Citsukha attempts to formulate a definition of self-luminosity which applies only to the absolute and which does not extend to the phenomenal luminaries. The attempt is questionable on two grounds. Self-luminosity is a distinction, an attribute and as such cannot belong to the absolute which is devoid of all attributes. Citsukha's defence that the entire universe of duality and distinctions is superimposed on brahman, and like that self-luminosity may still be upheld as an accidental if not an essential distinction of the absolute, simply amounts to conceding that self-luminosity is a superimposed distinction like whiteness etc. and does not belong to the absolute in the state of emancipation when the superimposed phenomenon is sublated. Besides, when all distinctions of the universe can and must ultimately belong to the absolute as an accident, in what conceivable manner can the final formulation of self-luminosity be claimed better than others. When all distinctions are kept at a safe distance, one definition of a given distinction is as good as the other in so far as its ascribability to the absolute is concerned. The successive modifications of the definitions by Citsukha, so as to ensure a definition flawlessly applicable

to the absolute, cannot be justified, if the distinctions hinted by them can be neither more nor less than accidents to the absolute. The view that self-luminosity is an accident and not the *esse* of the absolute, may call into question the entire project of Citsukha.

(ii) This attempt at defining is notably vulnerable on another ground also, as it seeks to restrict 'self-luminosity' to the absolute alone and excludes phenomenal luminaries from its range. The notion of self-luminosity is rooted in the analogy of the behaviour of the insentient luminaries such as lamp etc. and becomes applicable to the phenomenon of knowledge, as knowledge itself comes to be conceived as light owing to the manifestive character it shares with the lamp etc. Hence it is impossible to formulate a definition of self-luminosity which excludes the phenomenal cases of illumination (*prakāśa*) which form the very basis of the concept. Such exclusion is undesirable also, The vedānta system upholds a sort of platonism between the absolute idea of effulgence (knowledge) and the infinite shades of its phenomenal exemplification. The phenomenal limitations (*anukṛti*) are false simply because they are counterparts and not original and are removed from their own ideal meaning. But they are never false as 'exemplifications' or the counterfeits,—the imperfect meanings of self-luminosity, which much be claimed for the phenomenal luminaries in a consistent exposition of the concept in the vedānta system. Theoretically, Citsukha upholds self-luminosity of the absolute alone and nowhere attempts to correlate the definitions, which fail his absolute standard, to the lesser measures of effulgence. This theoretical commitment, however, proves too, much for him and has led to ambiguities and shifts of stand.

(iii) The shift of stand is obvious as Citsukha takes it upon himself to refute the nyāya theory of *anuvyavasāya* as a rival hypothesis. It is noteworthy that *anuvyavasāya* questions only the self-luminosity of cognition (*vṛtti jñāna*), which even the vedāntin upholds as other-revealed (*para-prakāśa*), non self-luminous and possessed of objecthood. The nyāya view of *anuvyavasāya*, far from contradicting, only serves to supplement the theoretical stand of Citsukha which upholds the self-luminosity of brahman alone and rejects all phenomenal forms of experience as non-self-luminous. Hence refutation of *anuvyavasāya* is not theoretically warranted. But a real inconsistency arises, as in the heat of controversy, he is led to offer the argument which, against his professed conviction that brahman alone is self-luminous, seeks to prove the self-luminosity of cognition as well.

(iv) In fact, throughout the reasoning, a studied vagueness is maintained as to the ontological status of the self-luminous and the general terms such as knowledge (jñāna) and experience (anubhūti) have been used and the terms with specific connotations as consciousness (caitanya) and cognition (saṁvit) have been carefully excluded. When the opponent presses him to elucidate whether the term anubhūti in his reasoning is used in the primary sense or in the secondary sense suggesting pure consciousness, he evades a direct reply by saying that all manifestation is intended to be proved self-luminous.⁷¹

Regarding Citsukha's inferential proof for self-luminosity the following points are noticeable. The syllogism, because of its purely negative character, seeks to offer an analysis of the concept which has already been defined. The question of the validity of the syllogism is invariably related to the issue of validity of the concept (as defined). Hence a major portion of the defence is devoted to the refutation of the charge of *satpratipakṣa*.

One may expect that the syllogism in consonance with his consummate definition, which restricts the application of self-luminosity to brahman alone, will aim to prove the self-luminosity of the brahman or pure consciousness identical with it. But it is noteworthy that the *pratijñā vākya* in the syllogism carefully avoids such terms as 'consciousness', brahman or *ātman* and seeks to prove self-luminosity of experience (anubhūti) in an unspecified sense. The reason is quite obvious. The brahman, as the principle of pure consciousness, is a unique non-relational isolated fact. It does not signify a class nor does it belong to any and hence it cannot be a *pakṣa* nor is the *pakṣatavacchedaka dharma* ascribable to it. Citsukha, therefore, chooses a relatively loose term '*anubhūti*' to serve as the subject in the syllogism and instead of proving self-luminosity in the absolute, he only proves the self-luminosity or experience in an unspecified sense. Does the concession mean that the claim of self-luminosity for brahman alone is being given up by the vedāntin? Not necessarily, but the vagueness is there and it is for the vedāntin to explain it.

Reconstructing Citsukha's exposition

Citsukha poses the problem of self-luminosity in a complete perspective. But he fails to impart requisite flexibility to his reconstruction so that the inconsistent implications may be reconciled and the concept of self-luminosity may properly serve as the first postulate in the vedānta philosophy of experience. The subsequent generations of vedānta scholars as Madhu-

71. T.P. pp. 33-34

sūdana, Brahmānanda and others, who could have done that, unfortunately evinced greater interest in translating Citsukha into up-to-date neo-logical terminology, rather than attempting a genuine evaluation and reconstruction of his work.

As has been noted, Citsukha's critique of self-luminosity suffers from obvious defects. Firstly it seeks to define self-luminosity of the absolute, which is hypothetically indefinable, and secondly it is inclined to deny self-luminosity to the definable exemplifications of it in the phenomenal world. Hence, the task of reconstructing Citsuka's exposition, consists in supplementing it with twin suppositions : indefinability of the self-luminosity of the absolute and the notion of degrees of self-luminosity. The former supposition relieves the vedāntin of the impossible task of defining self-luminosity as a distinction of the absolute against the radical convictions of the system. The latter one imparts the requisite flexibility to the vedānta concept. Self-luminosity as the indefinable inconceivable feel of the bare identity of the absolute is the ultimate irreducible nucleus of all experience. It is reflected in the infinite variety of manifestive principles, which are clearly conceivable as self-luminous in contrast to the phenomenon recipient of their effulgence. Their freedom of self-luminosity may be defined in terms of their independence of the aid of the phenomenal recipients of their light with reference to which they are unknowable. Unknowability is a relative term and hence relative notions of self-luminosity may be consistently upheld with regard to the dependent relative or phenomenal orders of experience.

The notion of degrees of self-luminosity once accepted the numerous connotations of self-luminosity examined by Citsukhācārya may be ascribed to different orders of experience. It is queer that Citsukhācārya, after examining a number of definitions, should choose to defend only his final (eleventh) definition and the first ten formulations are quietly surrendered to the criticism of the opponents. His attitude seems to have irked the commentator, who feels called upon to protest that various definitions are not being given up one after the other, but in succession they seek to introduce the disciple with various aspects of the problem.⁷² One consistently feels that the scheme of study followed by Citsukha itself warrants a co-ordination of different definitions of self-luminosity in a graded account of experience.

72. T.P, p. 5

*Different definitions
of self-luminosity
shown assignable
to different orders
of experience*

The term '*yogyatva*' in the final definition, having been shown superfluous, the last two definitions become synonymous. They may, however, be suitably adapted to define respectively the self-luminosity of the witness-self and of the forms of experience directly superimposed on it. It may be done by distinguishing between the two meanings of '*avedya*' used in these definitions. The term may refer to the 'non-objecthood' or non-presentability in a general sense, as ascribed to the self in the upaniṣads or it may mean *phalāvyāpyatva*, a specific meaning evolved later on in the context of vedānta epistemology. The witness-self is *avedya* in the sense of non-presentability, the widest possible sense of the term. On the other hand, the experience forms (of joy etc.) are '*avedya*' only in the sense of '*phalāvyāpyatva*' because they are effulgent (manifest) by virtue of being superimposed on the witness effulgence and are not recipient of a resultant manifestation owing to the mediation of *vṛtti*. The resultantness in a manifestation (*phala-vyāpyatā*) is a relation and hence it can be affirmed or denied only when there are two distinctly recognisable terms. This meaning of *avedyatva* cannot be significantly applicable to the witness-experience, which is a single indivisible unit of effulgence. Hence the two meanings of *avedyatva*, thus specified as *aviṣayatva*, and *phalāvyāpyatva* the last two definitions of *tattvapradīpikā* may be suitably adapted to define the respective meanings of self-luminosity for the witness-self and the experience forms superimposed thereon.

Other definitions of self-luminosity catalogued in '*tattvapradīpikā*' may be assigned to specific levels of experience. It may suffice here to demonstrate that Citsukha's catalogue of definitions may be grouped under three heads in order of the decreasing range of applicability.

(1) The first four definitions specify the widest conceivable meaning of the term and are as such uniformly applicable to all the possible connotations of luminosity ranging from the insentient phenomenon of lustre to the witness-self. (2) The second group, which consists of the definitions from fifth to ninth, puts forth with varying qualifications, the causality for the usage of immediacy' (*aparokṣavyavahāra-yogyatā*) as a necessary mark of self-luminosity. Since experience alone can give rise to a meaningful (linguistic) usage of immediacy or manifestiveness this group of definitions excludes the insentient phenomenon of luminosity from its range. (3) In the last two definitions *avedyatva* has been put forth as a

mark of self-luminosity. They exclude from their range the insentient lustre as well as 'cognitions', which are explained in the system as cases of 'resultant manifestation'. By distinguishing between the two connotations of the term '*avedyatva*' it may be possible to have two separate definitions of self-luminosity specific to the witness-self and the psychic phenomenon (joy etc.) in direct proximity with it. Beyond the witness-self, the self-luminosity of the absolute, if upheld at all, is not a conceivable or definable term.

CHAPTER - VIII

Critical Resume

Further elucidations and reconstruction

The task of reconstructing Citsukha's exposition consists in supplementing it with twin suppositions: indefinability of the self-luminosity of the absolute, and the notion of the degrees of self-luminosity corresponding to varying orders of phenomenal experience. Both the suppositions, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, may be upheld in the system on grounds of internal consistency. They impart the requisite flexibility to the vedānta theory of self-luminosity, so that besides explaining the mystic experience of transcendental unity, it may be brought to bear also upon the commonplace forms of experience. Further elucidations necessitate considerations of certain basic issues.

The issue whether self-luminosity belongs to the *esse* of experience or is a reflexive (accidental) distinction, figures in the buddhist texts. It gains fresh significance in the context of Citsukha's exposition of the problem. As has already been noted, he evolves a definition of self-luminosity which is supposed to be applicable only to the absolute. But when the definition is subjected to close scrutiny, he gives up the game by conceding that self-luminosity is only an accidental distinction of the absolute which amounts to saying that the absolute is not essentially self-luminous. The question arises : What is meant by the accidental or reflexive character of self-luminosity ? Can the vedānta system accept it without compromising its spiritual absolutism? The following analysis of the commonplace usage of the term may be helpful.

The meaning of self- luminosity as a ref- lex

All the schools of thought which subscribe to the notion of self-luminosity maintain that knowledge is essentially different from the class of 'known' or 'knowable' facts. The question arises, how do we become aware of the fact of knowledge, if it is not 'known' at all ? How do we account for the 'knowledge of knowledge' if the fact of knowledge is as held as 'unknowable' ? The reply offered by the vedāntin is: As a

revelatory fact knowledge manifests itself while manifesting the objects, just as a lamp reveals itself while revealing the objects presented to it. Thus technically a distinction is made between the 'known' and the 'manifest'. All that is 'known' is manifest, but not all that is manifest is necessarily manifest as 'known'. Thus two distinct aspects of manifestation, having respectively the *self* (identity) and the *object* of manifestation as their content, are clearly discernible. The '*known*' is a case of recipient manifestation technically called *phalā caitany'*. But distinct from this, the identity of 'manifestation' is manifest, simply by virtue of its existence. In contrast to the recipient mode of manifestation it is called self-luminosity of the revelatory fact. Thus self-luminosity is a distinction reflexively entailed to the luminous fact as its identity is reflected in contrast to the phenomenon recipient of its effulgence. The well known example of lamp may be illustrative. The luminosity of a lamp is a directly observable fact, but such is not the case with its self-luminosity. Its self-luminosity is not directly ascertainable without reference to its behaviour to the 'other' (object). It is only when the manifestation of lamp is reflected in contrast to the manifestation of jar etc. that the lamp is called self-luminous. But can a luminary be still called self-luminous, when there is no 'other' to reflect upon? Self-luminosity is a hypothetical distinction supposed to explain the 'difference' between the manifestation of the 'luminous' and the 'illuminated', the bestower and the recipient of manifestation. It is this 'difference' which is hypostatised as a 'distinction' and is ascribed to the *luminous* as its self-luminosity.

The question is, can this notion of self-luminosity be consistently upheld with reference to the bare identity of the manifestive fact, which is devoid of all internal difference (i.e. the absolute of the vedāntin)? How can a distinction, conceivable only in terms of 'difference' be ascribable to the bare undifferented identity of the absolute?

These considerations must have discouraged the vedāntins from upholding self-luminosity as '*esse*' of the absolute. Treating self-luminosity as a phenomenal distinction, Śaṅkara at least at one place clearly denies self-luminosity in the absolute. (p.u.s.b.4.4.) Similarly Citsukha upholds that it can be only an accidental distinction of the absolute, which amounts to the same. But these concessions do not represent the spirit of the system. In fact they strike at the very roots of the vedānta idealism and lead it to nihilism or stark materialism. If the vedāntins are forced to make such self-defeating concession, it is simply because they could not see beyond the reflexive view of self-luminosity. They unquestioningly accepted it as

final and failed to uphold, in consonance with their system, the idea of self-luminosity as a 'unitive feel', which persists beyond its own reflexes, meaning projections conceivings and definings.

Limitations of the reflexive view of self-luminosity From the vedānta standpoint, one obvious short-coming of the reflexive view of self-luminosity is that it confuses the issue of *fact* with the issue of *conceivability*. 'To be' is not necessarily to be 'conceivable'. The unity of 'being' and 'manifestation' is a fact, and as an indivisible, simple non-relational identity. it must be prior to all conceivings and definings. As all definitions deal in relations—the bare identity of the absolute i.e. the transcendental manifestation must remain 'indefinable'. It is true that freedom, whether spiritual or political can be significant only with reference to the chains which restrict it and which it seeks to overcome. The absolute freedom i.e. the freedom which has no felters to break down, is inconceivable. But it certainly does not mean that there can be no such freedom, all it means is that if there is such an absolute freedom of manifestation (self-luminosity) in the absolute sense, it is indefinable.

In fact the reflexive notion of self-luminosity is a result of posing the question in a wrong way. The question 'how it is revealed' can be significantly posed only with regard to the object (or phenomenal luminaries) and certainly not with regard to the highest principle of revelation. It is so, because the term 'how' has an expectation of 'mode' or instrumentality which renders a thing 'known' or 'revealed' and cannot be posed with reference to the fact of revelation which is exclusive of the notion of the 'known' or 'revealed'. The self-luminosity of the absolute consists in the independence of its manifestation, not only of the means of cognising, but also of the 'mechanism of 'conceiving'. The restricted connotation of '*phalāvyāpyatva*' given by Citsukha to the term 'unknowable' (avedya) is unjustifiable in view of the fact that the upaniṣads emphasise the unknowability of the self or brahman in an absolute and exhaustive sense. 'Whenever there is duality he sees the others, he smells the other, but when everything is realised as the self, who shall see and by what,' such utterances identify knowability with the very principle of duality and distinction. The scripture '*yatra vaco nivartante aprāpya manasa saha*' affirm not only indescribability but also inconceivability of the absolute. The subtlest of all snares are the snares of intellect and the realisation of the absolute freedom of experience consists in transcending them too. What Citsukha failed to appreciate is that the truly 'unknowable' is also inconceivable and indefinable.

*Absolute freedom as
non-reflexive and
indefinable*

The view of inconceivability of the transcendental manifestation is implicit in the upaniṣads. As shown in the course of this dissertation the scriptures may be classified into those which do and do not yield to philosophising, and conforming to it is the notion of four states of experience i. e. wakeful, dreaming, dreamless and blissful states, of which the first three are clearly conceivable whereas the last one is not 'conceivable'. It bears out the view of inconceivability of the identity of the transcendental experience and indefinability of its manifestation. It is notable that the scriptures unmistakably uphold the self-luminosity of the brahman (or of the ātman identical with it). But while they deny the possibility of any distinction in the absolute, they carefully avoid mentioning self-luminosity as the essence of it, along with truth knowledge and bliss. If self-luminosity is neither an *esse* nor the essential attribute of the absolute, then in what conceivable sense can it be made to belong to the absolute. The vedānta scholarship is tempted to say that it is an accidental differentiation (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*) of the absolute. It hardly carries conviction as it robs 'self-luminosity' of its distinctive significance and compromises the character of vedānta philosophy as a system of absolute idealism. The vedānta absolute is the ultimate indivisible principle of 'knowledge', 'being' and 'bliss'. It has to be understood as an eternal principle of manifestation, eternally manifestive of its own being and blissfulness, because unmanifest consciousness or bliss is a misnomer. If the absolute is not essentially self-luminous, then the eternal character of the transcendental vision will be vitiated. The vedānta metaphysics, in order to be distinguished from nihilism and stark materialism, has to accept the transcendental being (self) and blissfulness as the irreducible content of the eternal manifestation. But this is a peculiar sort of manifestation, independent not only of the mechanism of cognising and conceiving, but also of the expectation as 'to whom' it is manifest, because it shines as the lone unitive principle. The notion of its self-manifestation itself becomes indeterminable as the complete identity of the self (being) and manifestation is realised. It survives as bare 'self-feel' homogeneous and devoid of reference to the other. From the bare non-relational and indivisible identity of the absolute, stems the non-relational character of the feeling of its identity i. e. the indeterminable or unanalysable character of its self-luminosity. It has no discursive or logical counterpart.

*The Self-luminosity
definable and in-
definable*

The self-luminosity of the absolute thus persists as the bare indefinable 'feel' of identity, analogous to the svalakṣaṇa of the buddhists. It has no analysable propositional counterpart but it is 'evidenced'

or reflected in the varying forms of 'self-feeling' such as indubitability, logical necessity, vividness, and 'belief' which invariably accompany the respective orders of all phenomenal experience. The single 'self-feeling' is thus reflected in all conceivable forms of experience, and no form of experience can ever be devoid of it. The traditional vedānta thinging is broadly correct in upholding that this transcendental self-feeling' (*saṃvīt*) is a single formless indivisible unity. It is simple, unanalysable and indefinable. Different from it, are the phenomenal reflections of it, limited and articulate with clearly analysable propositional counterparts.

In view of the aforesaid, the present dissertation poses the problem of self-luminosity separately with reference to the pure principle of experience and the phenomenal orders of it. It upholds the unity of self-feeling, along with the multiple definable measures of 'self-feeling' corresponding to the varying orders of the phenomenal experience.

The felt identity of the absolute and the phenomenal forms of manifestation

The vedānta system upholds a sort of platonism between the primary self-feeling and its phenomenal exemplifications of varying shades. Its corollaries are as follows : (1) The relation between them is not reciprocal. The exemplifications derive their limited significance from the primary self feeling, whereas the latter retains its ever isolated non-relational character. (2) The felt identity of experience is prior to its conception as 'revelation' and the consequent analysis of the concept as self revelation. Hence while the manifest identity of the absolute is only a felt continuum, all the phenomenal levels of self-manifestation are 'felt' as well as 'conceivable', though the former is prior to the latter. The following symbolic presentation may be elucidating :—

1. P (Felt Identity).
2. P (p_1) (articulate feeling).
3. p_1 ($p_2 \cdot p_2$) p_1 represents the feeling of indubitability reflected in the conceived form of P as self and other illumining.
4. p_2 (p_3 is p_3) The Law of Identity wherein the felt necessity p_2 understood as self affirmation.
5. $p_3 \searrow$ ($p_4 \searrow p_4$) Identity p_3 further defined in terms of the independence of the 'other'.

6. $P_4 (p_5 O')$ Here 'O' denotes an empirical proposition regarding an object 'O'. P_4 denotes the Law of Identity operating through the proposition, and p_5 the element of belief which accompanies all empirical knowledge.
7. $p_5 (O'') \rightarrow p_6 \rightarrow p_7 (O'')$ —The progress of the scientific knowledge of the object O.

Barring the P, which is only a felt continuum, the experience at all succeeding levels is not only self and other illumining but also that its self luminosity has dual aspects i. e. the feeling of identity and the measure or definition of the felt identity in terms of the independence of the other. In the foregoing presentation p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 represent the varying orders of self-feeling, whereas the bracketed propositions seek to offer their linguistic equivalents. Referring to the definable universe of experience Mr. Premnath Mukhopadhyaya emphasises two things.

"First in everyone of these structures, the polarity of the logical and alogical, that which is, or can be explained, and that which cannot—unfailingy presents itself; and secondly, the polarising activity appears also to be a grading activity which splits up experience not merely into A's and Not-A's but into untold shade of grade A itself of B's, C's, and so on, and links up the A's, B's, C's.so as to impart to each class something common" * The varying orders of experience in the foregoing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, embody the varying degrees of immediacy $p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4, p_5, p_6 \dots$ in decreasing order, in such a way that every succeeding order of experience invariably depends on the former one, but is independent of the succeeding ones. The range of the dependent orders of experience, and the rejection of its aid is the measure of the freedom of the higher, the sustaining order of experience and constitutes the meaning or the definition of its self-luminosity. But it must be remembered, the measure holds good only with reference to the derivatives and definable universe of experience, denoted by $p_1, p_2, p_3 \dots$ etc. and not with reference to the P, the absolute. The predication of the denial of the aid of the entire range of the definable lustres $p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 \dots$ to P will yield only another definable appearance, and not the meaning of the absolute freedom which is indefinable and immeasurable.

The unity of all knowledge The aforesaid graphic presentation serves to show the drawing out of the unitive experience to the object. The unitive base P is thus reflected in a succession of ontological logical and epistemological categories of varying

* *Introduction to vedanta Philosophy : Chapt. 'Brahman as fact'.*

orders before its unitive touch is imparted to the sensations giving rise to the knowledge of the object in the form 'this is jar'. Thus the process of drawing out or estrangement from the unitive base commences much before the resultant perceptual knowledge of the objects actually takes place. It continues as the scientific knowledge of the things progresses. Sense perception provides the primary data for a scientific inquiry. As the scientific investigation is exercised towards comprehension of the object by extricating itself from the intimate bonds of the first appearance, it lets loose a series of secondary appearances are supplied either by the finer aids to senses (microscope etc.) or are of the nature of hypothetical or explanatory entities (e.g. atom, molecular weight sound waves etc.) As the science progresses the series of mediating appearances and suppositions enlarges and there is an impression of the increasing knowledge of the object. But the object remains a hypothetical entity becoming more and more eluding and mysterious as the science progresses towards it.

The scientific knowledge thus endeavouring to extricate itself from its own springs, soon finds itself in the wilderness of appearances, and if it is not completely lost it is simply because no appearance can be completely divorced from its base. The terms in the series of appearances beginning with the articulate 'self-feeling' superimposed on the bare transcendental 'self-feel' to the latest of the scientific knowledge about things, are arranged in the diminishing order of unitive significance. Thus every succeeding term depends for its specific significance, on the preceding term, which shines independently of the aid of the phenomenon dependent on it. Hence with reference to the succeeding terms, every preceding appearance observed or hypothetical, possesses certain amount of self-validity by virtue of which it validates and sanctifies the succeeding suppositions. That is how the notion of degrees of self-luminosity may be shown to work in an explanation of the scientific or empirical knowledge.

All systematising (systematic exposition) is a structure of interrelated propositions, postulates, theories and assumptions and explanatory hypotheses, which are arranged according to the diminishing degrees of immediacy, self evidence or necessity. A given system of thought stands on certain basic postulates, which are assumed as self evident and unquestionable and whereby the entire structure of thought derives its validity. These basic postulates have to be assumed as self-luminous (self validating) because they cannot be validated within the system which itself depends on them. Any attempt to do so will involve the fallacy of mutual dependence.

These postulates are, however not absolutely free and self-sustained. Just as derivations in a structure of thought ultimately dependent on and are validated by the basic postulates of the system, the dependent character of these 'self-evident' postulates may itself be evidenced in a spiritually higher system of thought. Thus the sense perceptions which constitute the basic irreducible data of the empirical sciences are analysed and accounted for in epistemology (*pramāṇaśāstra*). As the vedāntins show, the *pramāṇa śāstra* is inadequate by itself and necessitates supposition of the witness self, whereby the cognitive mechanism and its operations derive their validity. The basic postulates of epistemology are accommodated in and validated by a comprehensive philosophy of experience, just as the basic postulates of empirical sciences are validated by the system of epistemology or *pramāṇa śāstra*. The witness self, the fundamental assumption of the vedānta philosophy of experience is the articulate 'self-feeling'. The articulation consists in its character as a self and other illumining principle, and for this very reason it cannot be held to be an absolutely self-sustained principle in which all disquietenings all discursive activities are quenched. The limitation of the witness self as an articulate conceivable 'self-feel' argues for the supposition of the inconceivable 'self feel' of the absolute. It is the *brahman*, the transcendental self (*ātman*), which alone is absolutely free and indivisible, so much so that its manifestation has no reference to the other. Its absolute and non-relational character makes it inconceivable. The ontology of experience is prior to the philosophy of experience and alone can rightly claim for the prerogative.

Thus it is the single unanalysable self-feel of the transcendental principle of thought, which, while remainig absolutely independent of the phenomenon of duality and distinction, shines in and imparts unity to all forms of experience, from the commonplace perceptions to the highly complication systems of natural sciences. Properly understood, it is the theory of self-luminosity which provides the vedānta system with a philosophy of experience the most complete and comprehensive of all.

Self-luminosity as a key concept in the lore of brahman realisation

The quest of the object draws out an experience into the endless alley of mediating factors, explanations and suppositions etc. and lead it into the regions farther from its own unitive base. It has been referred to in the scriptures as *aparā vidyā* or the knowledge of the lower order. In contrast to it, the knowledge of the self, which consists in the realisation of the identity of pure consciousness through the inversion of this process of the scientific knowledge. It is called

Parā Vidyā or the knowledge of the higher order. The scientific knowledge of the world of objects and the mystic-realisation of the self-experience are understood in the vedānta system as the extrovert and introvert phases of the same process. The scientific knowledge is the unfolding of the series of appearances towards the object, the lore of self on the other hand consists in the withdrawal of experience to its eternal immutal springs, synchronising with the dissolution of the universe of the mediating factors and the appearances based thereon. An exposition of the vedānta theory of self-luminosity serves to show how the successive dissolution or inoperativeness of orders of mediating mechanism leads to the realisation of the higher orders of experience. It lays down the direction and the specific stages of brahma-realisation as well as a concrete scheme for practical discipline. It is a charter, as it were, of our voyage to self-realisation.

Chapter 1

References

1. एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ।

ऋग्वेद I. 164. 43

2. नान्तः प्रज्ञं न बहिःप्रज्ञं नोभयतः प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्य-
मलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवम-
द्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ।

माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, I. 7

3. न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् ।

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, II. 4. 12

4. स यथा सैन्धवखिल्य उदके प्रास्त उदकमेवानुविलीयेत न हास्योद्ग्रहणायैव
स्यात् । यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं
विज्ञानघन एव ।

बृह० उप० IV. 3.23

5. विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म ।

बृह० उप० III. 9. 28

6. यश्चायमध्यात्म शरीरस्तेनोभयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषोऽयमेव स योऽयमात्मेद-
ममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम् ।

बृह० उप० II. 5. 1

7. योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः ।

बृह० उ० IV. 3. 7

8. स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एवैवं वा अरे
यमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्ये-
वानुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीत्यरे ब्रवीमीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः ।

बृह० उ० IV. 5. 13

9. यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म ।

बृह० उप० III. 4. 1

10. तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमवाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूतित्यनु-
शासनम् ।

बृह० उप०, II. 5. 19

11. See reference 10.

12. तद् यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न वाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तर-
मेवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न वाह्यं किञ्चन वेद
नान्तरं तद् वा अस्यैतदाप्तकाममकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम् ।

बृह० उप० IV. 3. 21

13. दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स वाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।

अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः ॥

मुण्ड० उ०, II. 1. 2

14. यत्त नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमाथ यत्तान्यत्पश्य-
त्यन्यच्छृणोत्यन्यद्विजानाति तदल्पं यो वै भूमा तदमृतमथ यदल्पं
तन्मर्त्यम् ।

छान्दो० उप०, VII. 24. 1

15. यत्त हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति
तदितर इतरं शृणोति तदितर इतरमभिवदति तदितर इतरं मनुते तदितर
इतरं विजानाति यत्त वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्तत्केन कं
शृणुयात्तत्केन कमभिवदेत्तत्केन कंमन्वीत तत्केन कं विजानीयात् । येनेदं
सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयाद्विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति ।

बृह० उप०, II. 4. 14

16. न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा

नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा ।

ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्वस्ततस्तु

तं पश्यते निष्कलं ध्यायमानः ॥

मुण्ड० उप०, III. 1. 8

17. चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति नो मनो न विद्मो न विजानीमो यथैतदनु-
शिष्यादन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि ।

केन० उप०, I. 3

18. न संदृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य
न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनेनम् ।
हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिवृत्तो
य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥

कठ० उप०, II. 3. 9

19. अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथारसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥

कठ० उप०, I. 3. 15

20. तद् वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यं दृष्टं द्रष्टृ श्रुतं श्रोत्रमतं मन्त्रविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ
नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति मन्त्रं नान्यदतो-
ऽस्ति विज्ञात्वेतस्मिन्नु खल्वक्षरे गार्ग्याकाश ओतश्चप्रोतश्चेति ।

बृह० उप०, III. 8. 11

21. न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारं शृणुथा न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न
विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः । एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरोऽतोऽन्यदार्तं ततो
होषस्तश्चाक्रायण उपरराम ।

बृह० उप०, III. 4. 2

22. यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वाग्भ्युद्येते ।
तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

केन० उप०, I. 5

23. तच्छुभ्रं ज्योतिषां ज्योतिस्तद्यदात्मविदो विदुः ।

मुण्ड० उप०, II. 2. 9

24. नित्योऽनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम् ।

कठ० उप०, II. 2. 13

52. यः सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन् सर्वेभ्यो भूतेभ्योऽन्तरो यं
सर्वाणि भूतानि न विदुर्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि
शरीरं यः सर्वाणि भूतान्यन्तरो यमयत्येष
त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत इत्यधिभूतमथाध्यात्मम् ।

बृह० उप०, III. 7. 15

26. न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं
नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं
तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥

कठ० उप०, II 2. 15, मुण्ड० उप०, II. 2 10

27. दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।

मुण्ड० उप०, II. 1. 2

28. See Ref. 23

29. सर्वा दिश उर्ध्वमधश्च तिर्यक् प्रकाशयन् भ्राजते यद्वनड्वान् ।

श्वेत० उप०, V. 4

30. See Ref. 7

31. बृहच्च तद् दिव्यमचिन्त्यरूप सूक्ष्माच्च तत् सूक्ष्मतरं विभाति ।

मुण्ड० उप०, III. 1. 7

32. परं ज्योतिः स उत्तमः पुरुषः ।

छान्दो० उप०, VIII. 12. 2

33. याज्ञवल्क्य किं ज्योतिरयं पुरुष इति । आदित्यज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवा-
चादित्येनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीत्येवमेवैतद्
याज्ञवल्क्य ॥२॥ अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य किं ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष
इति चन्द्रमा एवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति चन्द्रमसैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते
कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीत्येवमेवैतद् याज्ञवल्क्य ॥३॥ अस्तमित आदित्ये
याज्ञवल्क्य चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते किं ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इत्यग्निरेवास्य ज्योति-

भ्रवतीत्यग्निनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीत्येवमेवैतद्
याज्ञवल्क्य ॥४॥ अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते शान्ते-
ऽग्नी किं ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति वागेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति वाचैवायं
ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति तास्माद् वै सम्राडपि यत्र
स्वः पाणिर्न विनिर्ज्ञायतेऽथ यत्र वागुच्चरत्युपैव यत्र न्येतीत्येवमेवैतद्
याज्ञवल्क्य ॥५॥ अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते शान्ते-
ऽग्नी शान्तायां वाचि किं ज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इत्यात्मैवास्य ज्योतिर्भवती-
त्यात्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ॥६॥

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 2-6

34. See reference 26.

35. जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशति मुखः स्थूलभुग्वैश्वानरः
प्रथमः पादः ।

माण्डूक्य उप०, 1. 3

36. पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्रा च तेजश्च तेजोमात्रा च वायुश्च
वायुमात्रा चाकाशश्चाकाशमात्रा च चक्षुश्च द्रष्टव्यं च श्रोत्रं च श्रोतव्यं
च घ्राणं च घ्रातव्यं च रसश्च रसयितव्यं च त्वक्च स्पर्शयितव्यं च वाक्च
वक्तव्यं च हस्तौ चादातव्यं चोपस्थश्चानन्दयितव्यं च पायुश्च विसर्ज-
यितव्यं च पादौ च गन्तव्यं च मनश्च मन्तव्यं च बुद्धिश्च बोद्धव्यं चाह-
ङ्कारश्चाहङ्कर्तव्यं च चित्तं च चेतयितव्यं च तेजश्च विद्योतयितव्यं च
प्राणश्च विधारयितव्यं च ।

प्रश्न० उप० IV. 8

37. तद् यथा महामत्स्य उभेकूले अनुसंचरति पूर्वं चापरं चैवमेवायं पुरुष
एतावुभावन्तावनुसंचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ।

बृह० उप०, IV. 3, 18

38. तद् यथास्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षो
संलयायैव ध्रियत एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र मुक्तं न
कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति ।

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 19

39. स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तः प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो
द्वितीयः पादः ।

माण्डूक्य उप०, 1. 4

40-41. तस्य च एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवत इदं च परलोकस्थानं

च संधयं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं तस्मिन् संधये स्थाने तिष्ठन्नेते उभेस्थाने पश्यतीदं च परलोकस्थानं च । अथ यथाक्रमोऽयं परलोकस्थाने भवति तमाक्रममाक्रम्योभयान् पाप्मन आनन्दाश्च पश्यति, स यत्र प्रस्वपित्यस्य लोकस्य सर्वावतो मात्रामपादाय स्वयं विहृत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपित्यत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति ॥

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 9

42. तत्र मुप्तो न कंचन काम कामयते न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत्सुमुप्तम् । सुमुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानवान् एवाऽऽनन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुवचेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः ॥

माण्डूक्य उप०, 1. 5

43. See reference 14.

44. अत्र पितापिता भवति मातामाता लोकालोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाभ्रूणहा, चाण्डालोऽन्नाण्डालः पौलकसोऽपौलकसः श्रमणोऽश्रमणस्तापसोऽतापसो नन्वागत पुण्येनानन्वागत पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति ॥

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 22

45. यद् वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन् वै तन्न पश्यति न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् । न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद् विभक्तं यत् पश्येत् ॥

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 23

46. सलिल एको द्रष्टाद्वैतो भवत्येष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति

बृह० उप०, IV. 3. 32

47. इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च पर मनः ।

मनस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान्परः ॥

महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।

पुरुषान्न पर किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥

एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोत्मा न प्रकाशते ।

दृश्यते त्वग्रया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥

कठ० उप०, 1. 3. 10-12

48. यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञ तद्यच्छेज्ज्ञान आत्मनि ।

ज्ञानमात्मनि महति नियच्छेतद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि ॥

कठ० उप०, 1. 3. 13

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प्रमाणवार्तिक 249, पृ० 175
2. तस्मात् सुखादयोऽर्थानां स्वसंक्रान्ताभासिताम् ।
वेदकाः स्वात्मनश्चैषामर्थेभ्यो जन्म केवलम् ॥
प्र० वा० 266, पृ० 180
3. द्वैरूप्यसाधनेनापि प्रायः सिद्ध स्ववेदनम् ।
स्वरूपभूताभासस्य तदासवेदनेक्षणात् ॥
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4. धिया तद्रूपया ज्ञाने निरुद्धेऽनुभवः कथम् ।
स्वं च रूपं न सा वेत्तीत्युत्सन्नोऽनुभवोऽखिलम् ॥
प्र० वा पृ० 247, प्र० 224
5. स्वकाले ज्ञानं न वेद्यते, ग्राहककाले ग्राह्यस्यैव अभाव इति कथं
बुद्धिवेदनम् ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति, पृ० 224
6. ज्ञानप्रकाशो ह्यर्थप्रकाशः, स च स्वपरकालयोर्नास्तीति प्रकाशो न
स्यात् सर्वस्य ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति, पृ० 224
7. बहिर्मुखं च तज्ज्ञानं भात्यर्थप्रतिभासवत् ।
बुद्धेश्च ग्राहिका वित्तिर्नित्यमन्तर्मुखात्मनि ॥
प्र० वा० 428, पृ० 224
8. तथा स्ववेदनताऽभावे यो विषयस्याभास आकारो यस्य ज्ञानस्य त स्वाका-
रार्पकं विषयं तदाकारवत् ज्ञानं न वेत्तीति प्राप्तम् । विषयस्वरूपस्यात्मनो
वेदने हि विषयवेदनं तत्परोक्षतया अर्थोऽपि परोक्षः स्यात्, यतोऽर्थस्वरूप-
धीवेदनादन्या का संविदर्थस्यास्ति ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति, पृ० 225
9. यथा नीलादिरूपत्वान्नीलाद्यनुभवो मतः ।
तथानुभवरूपत्वात् तस्याप्यनुभवो भवेत् ॥
प्र० वा० 436, पृ० 227

10. कस्माद् वाऽनुभवे नास्ति सति सत्तानिवन्धने ।
अपि चेदं यदाभाति दृश्यमाने सितादिके ॥
प्र० वा० 438, पृ० 227
11. पुंसः सिताद्यभिव्यक्तिरूपं संवेदनं स्फुटम् ।
तत् किं सिताद्यभिव्यक्तेः पररूपवदात्मनः ॥
प्र० वा० 439, पृ० 227
12. पररूपेऽप्रकाशायां व्यक्तौ व्यक्तं कथं सितम् ।
ज्ञानं व्यक्तित्वं सा व्यक्तेत्यव्यक्तमखिलं जगत् ॥
प्र० वा० 440, पृ० 227
13. व्यक्तेव्यक्त्यन्तरव्यक्तावपि दोषप्रसङ्गतः ।
दृष्ट्या वाज्ञातसम्बन्ध विनिर्णयितुं तथा कथम् ॥
प्र० वा० 441, पृ० 227
14. तस्माद्द्वयोरर्थज्ञानयोः संस्पृष्टयोरेकोपलम्भात् दृष्टौ सत्यां दृष्टमिदमिति
निश्चयः, ततोऽन्योपलब्धिः स्वोपलब्धिरूपैव ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति, पृ० 228
15. सरूपं दर्शनं यस्य दृश्यतेऽन्येन चेतसा ।
दृष्टाख्या तत्र चेत् सिद्धं सारूप्येऽस्य वेदनम् ॥
प्र० वा० 443, पृ० 228
16. न ह्यर्थकारज्ञानवेदनमन्तरेणार्थवेदनम् ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति 444, पृ० 227
17. सारूप्यमात्रेणार्थवित्तिर्भविष्यतीति ।
मनोरथनन्दिवृत्ति 444, पृ० 229
18. दृष्टयोरेव सारूप्यग्रहोऽर्थं न च दृष्टवान् ।
प्राक् कथं दर्शनेनास्य सारूप्यं सोऽध्यवस्यति ॥
प्र० वा० 445, पृ० 226
19. सारूप्यमपि नेच्छेद् यस्तस्य नोभयदर्शनम् ।
तदार्थो ज्ञानमिति च ज्ञाते चेति गता कथा ॥
प्र० वा० 446, पृ० 229
20. अथ स्वरूपम्, सा तर्हि स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ।
यत् तस्यामप्रकाशायामर्थः स्यादप्रकाशितः ॥
प्र० वा० 447, पृ० 229

21. विषयस्य कथं व्यक्तिः ? प्रकाशरूपसंक्रमात् ।
 स च प्रकाशस्तद्रूपः स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ॥
 प्र० वा 479, पृ० 237-8
22. प्रकाशे स्व संविदिते ज्ञाने विषयस्वरूपसंक्रमात् सारूप्यसम्भवात् ज्ञानेनार्थं प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते । स च प्रकाशस्तद्रूपो विषयस्वरूपः स्वयमेवापरोक्ष-प्रकाशात्मनोत्पन्नः प्रकाशते न त्वन्येन प्रकाशते ।
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23. तथाभ्युपगमे बुद्धेर्बुद्धौ बुद्धिः स्ववेदिका ।
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 प्र० वा० 480, पृ० 238
24. धीःसरूपाया बुद्धेः स्वप्रकाशत्वे पूर्वबुद्धिः प्रकाशिता स्यात् । अन्यथा स्व-प्रकाशत्वानभ्युपगमे विषयोऽप्यप्रकाश स्वभावतया धियासह तुल्यधर्मोति सोऽपि बुद्धेर्व्यञ्जकः स्यात् । सरूपयोर्धीविषयोरन्योन्यं व्यञ्जकता भवेत् ।
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25. इति प्रकाशरूपा नः स्वयं धीः सम्प्रकाशते ।
 अन्योऽस्यां रूपसंक्रान्त्या प्रकाशः सन् प्रकाशते ॥
 प्र० वा० 481, पृ० 238
26. यथा प्रदीपयोर्दीपवटयोश्च तदाश्रयः ।
 व्यंग्यव्यञ्जकभेदेन व्यवहारः प्रतन्यते ॥
 प्र० वा० 483, पृ० 239
27. स्मृतेरप्यात्मवित् सिद्धा ज्ञानस्यान्येन वेदने ।
 दीर्घादिग्रहणं न स्याद् बहुमात्रानवस्थितेः ॥
 प्र० वा० 485, पृ० 239
28. सर्वं चित्तचैस्तानामात्मसंवेदनम् ।
 न्या० वि० I. 10.
29. वित्तमर्थमात्रग्राहि । चैनाविशेषावस्थाग्रहिणः सुखादयः ।
 न्या० वि० (तात्पर्यटीका), पृ० 14
30. इह च रूपादी वस्तुनि दृश्यमानेऽन्तरः सुखाद्याकारस्तुल्यकालं संवेद्यते ।
 न च गृह्यमाणाकारो नीलादिः सातादिरूपो वेद्यते इति वक्तुं शक्यम् ।
 यतो नीलादिः सातरूपेणानुभूयत इति न निश्चीयते ।
 धर्मोत्तरी टीका, पृ० 14

31. नास्ति सा काचिच्चित्तावस्था यस्यामात्मनः संवेदनं न प्रत्यक्षं स्यात् । येन
हि रूपेणात्मा वेद्यते तद्रूपमात्मसंवेदनं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

धर्मोत्तरी टीका, पृ० 14

32. प्रकाशकत्वं बाह्येऽर्थे शक्यभावात् न आत्मनि ।

अन्येन बाधुभावेऽसावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥

श्लोकवार्तिक, शून्यवाद, 187

33. स्मृतिभ्रान्तिश्च याऽप्यत्र पश्चाज्ज्ञानेषु जायते ।

तदेवार्थस्मृतेरेषां तज्ज्ञानादिप्रमाणता ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य, 192

34. अग्न्यादयो घटादीनां प्रसिद्धा ये प्रकाशकाः ।

न ते प्रकाश्यरूपा हि प्रकाशस्याऽनपेक्षणात् ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 65

35. ग्राह्यत्वं तु यदा तेषां तदाऽक्षं ग्राहकं मतम् ।

अक्षग्रहणकाले तु ग्राहिका धीर्भविष्यति ॥

तस्यां तु गृह्यमाणायामन्या धीर्ग्राहिकेप्यते ।

नन्वात्मा ग्राहको ग्राह्यो भवताऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 66-67

36. व्यापृतं चार्थसंविद्धौ ज्ञानं चाऽऽत्मनमृच्छति ।

तेन प्रकाशकत्वेऽपि बोधायाऽन्यत्प्रतीयते ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 184

37. ज्ञानस्योत्पद्यमानस्य प्रतिबन्धो न कश्चन ।

न चाऽप्रकाशरूपत्वं येनास्याऽग्रहणं भवेत् ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 24

38. न चाऽपि प्रतिबन्धेन केवलेनाऽग्रहो भवेत् ।

विशिष्टकारणाऽभावेऽप्यर्थो नैवाऽनुभूयते ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 183

39. तेषु तर्केषु विज्ञानमर्थकालेऽवगम्यते ।

तथा सत्यर्थनाशः स्यादित्येतदुपदिश्यते ॥

श्लो० वा०, शून्य०, 223

40. विज्ञानं जडरूपेभ्यो व्यावृत्तमुपजायते ।

इयमेवात्मसंवित्तिरस्य याऽजडरूपता ॥

तत्त्वसंग्रह 1999 (Trans. G. N. Jha)

41. Panjika, 2000. (Tran. G. N. Jha)

42. क्रियाकारकभावेन न स्वसंवित्तिरस्य तु ।
 एकस्यानंशरूपस्य त्रैरूप्यानुपपत्तिः ॥
 तदस्य बोधरूपत्वाद् युक्तं तावत् स्ववेदनम् ।
 परस्य त्वर्थरूपस्य तेन संवेदनं कथम् ॥
 तत्त्वसंग्रह 2000, 2001 (Trans. G. N. Jha)

43. व्यापृतं ह्यर्थवित्तौ च नात्मानं ज्ञानमृच्छति ।
 तेन प्रकाशकत्वेऽपि बोधायान्यत् प्रतीक्षते ॥
 त० सं०, 2012 (, , ,)

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 न्यायसूत्र, I. 10

45. इन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
 तत्त्वसंग्रह, 42

46. इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमात्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मसमवायाच्च
 मुखादिवद्-गृह्यते ।
 न्यायभाष्य, II. 1. 19

47. एवं प्रमेयं सति किञ्चिदर्थजातमुपलब्धिहेतुत्वात् प्रमाण-प्रमेय-व्यवस्था
 लभ्यते ।
 I. 2. 19. न्या० भा० I. 2. 19.

48. न चास्ति व्यवहारानन्तरम् अनवस्था साधनीया ।
 -न्या० भा० I. I. 20

49. उपलम्भस्योपलम्भार्थमुपलम्भकान्तरं नास्तीति । अस्ति चेदुपलभ्येत ।
 किञ्च उपलम्भस्यैवोपलम्भार्थमुपलम्भान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्था स्यात्,
 नन्वेवं तर्हि संविद्विषयसंविदन्तराभावे सविदोऽनुपलब्धिरेवेत्यत्राह.....
 प्रमेयं हि जडत्वात्प्रमाणायात्तां सिद्धिमाशास्ते, तत्रावश्यं किञ्चित्स्वतस्सिद्ध-
 मेष्टव्यम्, अन्यथा जगदान्ध्यमविचिकित्स्यमापद्यते तस्मादनन्याधीनसिद्धि-
 त्वात्स्वयंप्रकाशा संविदिति ।
 न्यायसिद्धि, पृ० 171

50. स्वसम्बद्धव्यवहारे सजातीयज्ञानान्तरापेक्षा नियतिरहितत्वम् ।
 न्या० सि० पृ० 173

51. स्वयम्भूश्लोक, 63

52. न्यायावतार श्लोक, 1

53. लघिस्त्रय कारिका, 60

54. परीक्षामुख सूत्र, I.

55. स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव बोधः प्रकाशते नार्थकथान्यथातु ।

परेपरेभ्यो भयतस्तथापि प्रपेदिरेज्ञानमनात्मनिष्ठम् ॥

अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद द्वाविंशिका, 12

56. क्रिययावबोधस्य प्रकाशरूपत्वसिद्धेः सर्वप्रकाशकत्वेन बोधस्यापि तत्सिद्धिः ।

स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० 73

57. यदि हि ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं नेष्यते तदा तेनात्मज्ञानाय ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षणीयं तेनाप्यपरमित्याद्यनवस्था । ततो ज्ञानं तावत्स्वावबोधव्यग्रतामग्नम् । अर्थस्तु जडतया स्वरूपज्ञापनासमर्थ इति को नामर्थस्य कथामपि कथयेत् ।

स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० 73

58. प्रकाशरूपतयोत्पन्नत्वात्स्वयं प्रकाशत एव इति चेत् चिरं जीव । न हि वयमपि ज्ञानं कर्मतयेव प्रतिभासमानं स्वसंवेद्यं ब्रूमः । ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रतिभासत इत्यादावकर्मकस्य तस्य चकसनात् । यथा तु ज्ञानं स्वं जानामीति कर्मतयापि तद्भाति तथा प्रदीपः स्वप्रकाशयतीत्ययमपि कर्मतया प्रथित एव ।

स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० 74

59. स्या० मं० पृ० 74

60. ज्ञातुर्ज्ञातृत्वेनैवानुभूतेतरानुभूतित्वेनैवानुभवात् ।

स्या० मं०, पृ० 75

61. न चानुभूतेरभाव्यत्वं दोषः । अर्थापेक्षयानुभूतित्वात् स्वापेक्षया चानुभाव्यत्वात् ।

स्या० मं०, पृ० 75

62. अनुमानाच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धिः । तथाहि-ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् । संवेदनस्य प्रकाश्यत्वात्प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धिमिति चेन्न । अज्ञाननिरासादिद्वारेण प्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः ।

स्या० मं०, पृ० 75

63. तथा संवित् स्वप्रकाशा । अर्थप्रतीतित्वात् । यः स्वप्रकाशो न भवति नासावर्थप्रतीतिर्यथा घटः ।

स्या० मं०, पृ० 75

64. दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता ।

योगसूत्र, II. 6

65. द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ।

Ibid. II. 17

66. तस्माच्च विर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ।
सांख्य० का०, 19
67. त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥
सांख्य० का०, 11
68. सांख्यसूत्र, I. 145
69. योगसूत्र, II. 18
70. द्रष्टादृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः । Ibid.
71. सांख्य० का० 19
72. Ibid. II
73. प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गार्थं दृश्यम् ।
योगसूत्र, II. 18
74. Sankhya Aphorism. P. 97
75. जडो न प्रकाशत इति सिद्धं यद्यात्मापि जडः स्थातुस्याप्यनेन प्रकाशेन
भवितव्यं लाघवाच्यात्मैव प्रकाशरूपोऽस्तु । -योगवार्तिक I.45
(Tran.-B)
76. अपराधीनप्रकाशतो ह्यस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशता, नाऽनुभवकर्मतः ।
Ibid. 4, 91

60. Tunc in hunc locum addendum est
etiam in hunc locum addendum est

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61. Tunc in hunc locum addendum est
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66. Tunc in hunc locum addendum est

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Chapter III References

1. एष हि द्रष्टा स्पृष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञाना-
त्मा विज्ञानं विज्ञायतेऽनेनेति करणभूतं बुद्ध्यादीदं तु विजानातीति
विज्ञानं कर्तृकारकरूपं तदात्मा तत्स्वभावो विज्ञातृस्वभाव इत्यर्थः ।

प्रश्नोपनिषद्, शांकरभाष्य, 4.9

2. यदा देवदत्तो गच्छति तदा न स्थाता गन्तेव । यदा तिष्ठति तदा न
गन्ता स्थातेव तदाऽस्य पक्ष एव गन्तृत्वं स्थातृत्वं च न नित्यं गन्तृत्वं
स्थातृत्वं वा तद्वत् । अत्र काणादादयः पश्यन्ति । पक्षप्राप्तेनैव श्रोतृ-
त्वादिनाऽऽत्मोच्यते श्रोता मन्तेत्यादिसंयोगजत्वमयौगपद्यं च ज्ञानस्य
ह्याचक्षते ।

ऐतरेय उपनिषद्, शांकरभाष्य, 2.1

4. अनित्यानां मूर्तानां च चक्षुरादीनां दृष्ट्याद्यनित्यमेव संयोगवियोगधर्मि-
णाम् यथाग्नेर्ज्वलनं तृणादिसंयोगजत्वात्तद्यत् । न तु नित्यस्यामूर्तस्या-
संयोगवियोगधर्मिणः संयोगजदृष्ट्याद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वं संभवति । तथा च
श्रुतिः 'न हि द्रष्टुर्द्रष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते' इत्याद्या ।

ऐत० उप०, शां० भा०, 2.1

5. वदति हि उद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्नेऽद्य मया भ्राता दृष्ट इति । ...यदि चक्षुः
संयोगजेवात्मनो नित्या दृष्टिस्तन्नाशे नश्येत् । तदोद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्ने
नीलपीतादि न पश्येत् ।

ऐत० उप० शां० भा०, 2. 1

7. नन्वत्र को विशेषो द्रष्टरि ? यदि दृष्टेर्द्रष्टा यदि वा घटस्य द्रष्टा, सर्व-
थापि द्रष्टेव । द्रष्टव्य एव तु भवान्विशेषमाह दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेति द्रष्टा तु यदि
दृष्टेः यदि वा घटस्य द्रष्टा दृष्टेव ।

बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्, शांकरभाष्य, I. 4. 10

8. अस्त्यत्र विशेषः -दृष्टेर्द्रष्टा स दृष्टिश्चेद् भवति नित्यमेव पश्यति
दृष्टिम्, न कदाचिदपि दृष्टिर्न दृश्यते द्रष्टा, तत्र द्रष्टुर्दृष्ट्या नित्यया
भवितव्यम्, अनित्या चेद् द्रष्टुर्दृष्टिः, तत्र दृश्या या दृष्टिः सा कदा-
चिन्न दृश्येतापि, यथा नित्यया दृष्ट्या घटादि वस्तु । न च तद्वत् दृष्टे-
र्द्रष्टा कदाचिदपि न पश्यति दृष्टिम् ।

वृ० उप० शां० भा०, I. 4. 10

9. ऐतरेय उपनिषद्, शांकरभाष्य, II. 1.

10. Ibid.

11. न च द्वितीयो मन्तुर्मन्तास्ति । यदा स आत्मनैव मन्तव्यस्तदा येन च मन्तव्यः आत्मा आत्मना यश्च मन्तव्य आत्मा तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयात् । एक एवात्मा द्विधा मन्तृमन्तव्यत्वेन द्विशकलीभवेद्वंशादिवत् उभयथाप्यनुपपत्तिरेव । यथा प्रदीपयोः प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिः समत्वात्तद्वत् ।

ऐत० उप० शां० भा०, 11. 1

12. न च मन्तुर्मन्तव्ये मननव्यापारशून्यः कालोऽस्त्यात्ममननाय । तदापि लिङ्गेनात्मानं मनुते मन्ता तदापि पूर्ववदेव लिङ्गेन मन्तव्य आत्मा यश्च तस्य मन्ता तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयाताम् । एक एव वा द्विधेति पूर्वोक्तदोषः ।

ऐत० उप० शां० भा०, 11. 1

13. तथा च अस्ति नास्तीत्याद्याश्च यावन्तो वाङ्मनसयोर्भेदा यत्रैकं भवन्ति, तद्विषयाया नित्याया दृष्टेर्निविशेषायाः अस्ति नास्ति, एकं नाना गुणवदगुणम् जानाति न जानाति, क्रिवादक्रियम्, फलवदफलम् सवीजं निर्वीजम्, सुखं दुःखम्, मध्यममध्यम्, शून्यमशून्यम् परोऽहमन्य इति वा सर्ववाकप्रत्ययागोचरे स्वरूपे यो विकल्पयितुमिच्छति, सोपानमिव च पद्म्यामारोढुम्, जले खे च मीनानां वयसां च पदं दिदृक्षते ।

ऐत० उप० शां० भा०, 11. 1

14. किमिह ज्योतिः शब्देनादित्यादि ज्योतिरभिधीयते किं वा परमात्मेति ।

—ब्रह्मसूत्रार्णद्धरभाष्य, I 1. 24

15. नहि रूपादिहीनं ब्रह्म 'दीप्यते' इति मुख्या श्रुतिमर्हति ।

Ibid

16. द्युमर्यादत्वश्रुतेश्च । नहि चराचरबीजस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वात्मकस्य द्यौर्मर्यादा युक्ता ।

—Ibid. (Trans. A.)

17. चक्षुष्यः श्रुतो भवति य एवं वेद (छा. ८.१३.८) इति चाल्पफश्रवणादब्रह्मत्वम् —Ibid.

18. ज्योतिरिह ब्रह्म ग्राह्यम् । कुतः । चरणाभिधानात् । पादाभिधानादित्यर्थः । पूर्वस्मिन्हि वाक्ये चतुष्पाद् ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टम्—तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायांश्च पूरुषः । पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि । (छा० ३।१२।६) इत्यनेन मन्त्रेण । तत्र यच्चतुष्पदो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिपादमृतं

द्युसम्बन्धिरूपं निर्दिष्टं तदेवेह द्युसम्बन्धान्निर्दिष्टमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते तत्परित्यज्य प्राकृतं ज्योतिः कल्पयतः प्रकृतहानाप्रकृतप्रक्रिये प्रसज्येयताम् ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा०, I. 1. 24 (Trans. —A.)

19. तस्मादिह ज्योतिरिति ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तव्यम् । यत्तूक्तम्—‘ज्योतिर्दीप्यते’ इति चेतो शब्दो कार्ये ज्योतिषि प्रसिद्धाविति । नायं दोषः । प्रकरणाद्ब्रह्मावगमे सत्यनयोः शब्दयोरविषयकत्वात् । दीप्यमान् कार्यज्योतिरूपलक्षिते ब्रह्मण्यपि प्रयोगसंभवात् ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा०, I. 24

20. यद्वा नायं ज्योतिःशब्दश्चक्षुर्वृत्तेरेवानुग्राहके तेजसि वर्तते अन्यत्रापि प्रयोगदर्शनात् । वाचैवायं ज्योतिषांते (बृह० उप० ४.३.५) ‘मनोज्योतिर्जुषताम्’ (तै० ब्रा० १. ६. ३. ३.) इति च ।

Ibid.

21. इति च, तस्माद्यद्यत्कस्यचिदवभासकं तत्तज्ज्योतिः शब्देनाभिधीयते । तथा सति ब्रह्मणोऽपि चैतन्यरूपस्य समस्तजगदवभासहेतुत्वादुपपन्नो ज्योतिः शब्दः ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा०, I. 1. 24

22. Ibid. (Trans. A. S. B.)

23. तेजैः स्वभावक हि चन्द्रतारकादि तेजस्वभावक एव सूर्ये भासमाने अहनि, न भासत इति प्रसिद्धम् । तथा सहसूर्येण सर्वमिदं चन्द्रतारकादि यस्मिन्नभासते सोऽपि तेजः स्वभाव एव कश्चिदित्यवगम्यते ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा०, I. 3. 22

24. अनुभानमपि तेजःस्वभावक एवोपपद्यते, समानस्वभावकेष्वनुकारदर्शनात्, गच्छन्तमनुगच्छतीतिवत् ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा०, I. 3. 22

25. प्राज्ञ एवात्मा भवितुमर्हति । कस्मात् । अनुकृतेः । अनुकरणमनुकृतिः ।

—ibid. (Trans. A.)

26. न तु तेजो धातुं क्वचित्सूर्यादयोऽनुभान्तीति प्रसिद्धम् । समत्वाच्च तेजोधातूनां सूर्यादीनां न तेजोधातुमन्यं प्रत्यपेक्षास्ति यं भान्तमनुभायुः । नहि प्रदीपः प्रदीपान्तरमनुभाति ।

Ibid.

27. तेजोऽन्तरेण सूर्यादितेजो विभातीत्यप्रसिद्धं विरुद्धं च, तेजोऽन्तरेण तेजोऽन्तरस्य प्रतिधातात् ।

Ibid.

28. अथवा न सूर्यादीनामेव श्लोकपरिपठितानामिदं तद्वेतुकं विभानमुच्यते । किं तर्हि सर्वमिदं इत्यविशेषश्रुतेः सर्वस्येवास्य नामरूप-क्रियाकारक-फलजातस्य याभिव्यक्तिः सा ब्रह्मज्योतिः सत्तानिमित्ता । यथा सूर्यादि-ज्योतिः सत्तानिमित्ता सर्वस्यरूपजातस्याभिव्यक्तिस्तद्वत् ।

ब्र० सू० शां० भा० I 3.22

29. यदप्युक्तं समानस्वभावकेष्वनुकारो दृश्यत इति । नायमेकान्तो नियमः । भिन्नस्वभावकेष्वपि ह्यनुकारो दृश्यते । यथा सुतप्तोऽयःपिण्डोऽग्न्यनु-कृतिरग्निं दहन्तमनुदहति, भीमं वा रजो वायुं वहन्तमनुवहतीति ।

Ibid.

30. यतो यदुपलभ्यते तत्सर्वं ब्रह्मणैव ज्योतिषोपलभ्यते ब्रह्म तु नान्येन ज्योतिषोपलभ्यते स्वयंज्योतिःस्वरूपत्वात् येन सूर्यादयस्तस्मिन्भायुः ब्रह्म ह्यन्यदव्यनक्ति न तु ब्रह्मान्येन व्यज्यते । आत्मनैवायं ज्योति-षास्ते । (वृ० ४.३.२), अगृह्यो नहि गृह्यते (वृ० ४.२.४) इत्यादि श्रुतेभ्यः ।

Ibid.

31. न तद्भासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः ।
यद्गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥

गीता, 15. 6

32. यदादित्यगतं तेजो जगद्भासयतेऽखिलम् ।
यच्चन्द्रमसि यच्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥

गीता, 15. 12

33. किं बहुना यदिदं जगद्भाति तत्तमेव परमेश्वरं स्वतो भारूपत्वाद्भान्तं दीप्यमानमनुभात्यनुदीप्यते । यथा जलोल्मुल्काद्यग्निसयोगादग्निं दहन्त-मनुदहति न स्वतस्तद्वतस्यैव भासा दीप्या सर्वमिदं सूर्यादिजगद्वि-भाति ।

मुण्ड० उप० शां० भा०, II. 2. 10.

34. यस्माद्विरजं निष्कलं चातस्तच्छुभ्रं शुद्धज्योतिषां सर्वप्रकाशात्मनामग्या-दीनामपि तज्ज्योतिरवभासकम् । अग्न्यादीनामपि ज्योतिष्ट्वमन्तर्गत-ब्रह्मात्मचैतन्यज्योतिर्निमित्तमित्यर्थः । तद्धि परं ज्योतिर्यदन्यानव-भास्यम् आत्मज्योतिस्तद्यदात्मविद् आत्मनं स्वं शब्दादिविषयबुद्धि-प्रत्ययसाक्षिणं ये विवेकिनो विदुर्विजानन्ति त आत्मविदस्तद्विदुरात्म-प्रत्ययानुसारिणः ।

मुण्ड० उप० शां० भा०, II. 2. 9

35. यत एवं तदेव ब्रह्म भाति च विभाति च कार्यगतेन विविधेन भासा-
तस्तस्य ब्रह्मणो भारूपत्वं स्वतोऽवगम्यते । न हि स्वतो विद्यमानं
भासनमन्यस्य कर्तुं शक्नोति । घटादीनामन्यावभासकत्वदर्शनाद्भारू-
पाणां चादित्यादीनां तद्दर्शनात् ।

मुण्ड० उप० शां० भा०, II. 2. 10

36. न चाग्नेरिव आत्मा आत्मनो विषयः, न चाविषये ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानमुपपद्यते ।
बृह० उ० शां० भा०, II. 5. 14

38. ज्ञानस्य तेजस्त्वाभावात् प्रकाशशब्देन ज्ञानत्वमेव वक्तव्यम्, तस्य च
दृष्टान्ते भावादसाधारण्यस्यादिति । पक्षद्वष्टान्तयोः प्रकाशशब्दार्थ-
साम्याभावेऽपिशब्दस्तावत्समान इति चेत्, तत्राह शब्दसाम्येति । तथा
चोक्तम्—वाचोऽपि गोशब्दवाच्यत्वाद्विषाणिनी माभूदिति ।

आत्मतत्त्वविवेक, नारायणी टीका, पृ० 306-307

39. तथापि जाग्रद्विषये सर्वकरणागोचरत्वादात्मज्योतिषो बुद्धयादिबाह्या-
भ्यन्तर-कार्यकरणव्यवहारसन्निपात-व्याकुलत्वान्न शक्यते । तज्ज्योति-
रात्माख्यं मुञ्जेशीकावन्निष्कृष्य दर्शयितुमिति..... ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 7

40. प्रश्न० उप० IV. 2., IV. 5.

41. Ibid. IV. 6. 7

42. Ibid. IV. 6

43. स्वरूपव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्यस्याव्यभिचाराद्यथा तथा यो यः
पदार्थो विज्ञायते तथा तथा ज्ञायमानत्वादेव तस्य तस्य चैतन्यस्याव्यभि-
चारित्वम् ।

प्रश्न० उप० शां० भा०, VI. 2

44. वस्तुतत्त्वं भवति किञ्चित्, न ज्ञायत इति चानुपपन्नम् रूपं च दृश्यते
न चास्ति चक्षुरिति यथा । व्यभिचरति तु ज्ञेयम्, न ज्ञानं व्यभिचरति
कदाचिदपि ज्ञेयम्, ज्ञेयाभावेऽपि ज्ञेयान्तरे भावाज्ज्ञानस्य । न हि ज्ञाने
सति ज्ञेयं भवति कस्यचित्, सुषुप्ते दर्शनात् ।

प्रश्न० उप० शां० भा०, VI. 2.

45. न ज्ञेयावभासकस्य ज्ञानस्यालोकवज्ज्ञेयाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्स्वव्यङ्ग्याभाव
आलोकाभावानुपपत्तिवत्सुषुप्ते विज्ञानाभावानुपपत्तेः । न ह्यन्धकारे
चक्षुषा रूपानुपलब्धौ चक्षुषोऽभावः शक्यः कल्पयितुं वैनाशिकेन ।

प्रश्न० उप० शां० भा० VI. 2.

46. येन तदभावं कल्पयेत्तस्याभावः केन कल्प्यत इति वक्तव्यं वैनाशिकेन,
तदभावस्यापि ज्ञेयत्वाज्ज्ञानाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः ।

Ibid.

47. ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वाज्ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञानाभाव इति चेत् । न, अभाव-
स्यापि ज्ञेयत्वाभ्युपगमादभावोऽपि ज्ञेयोऽभ्युपगम्यते वैनाशिकैर्नित्यश्च
तदव्यतिरिक्तं चेज्ज्ञानं नित्यं कल्पितं स्यात्तदभावस्य च ज्ञानात्मकत्वा-
दभावत्वं वाङ्मात्रमेव न परमार्थतो भावत्वमनित्यत्वं च ज्ञानस्य ।

Ibid.

48. अथाभावो ज्ञेयोऽपि सन् ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्त इति चेत् । न तर्हि ज्ञेयाभावे
ज्ञानाभावः ।

Ibid.

49. ज्ञेयाभावे दर्शनादभावो ज्ञानस्येति चेत् ? न, सुषुप्ते ज्ञप्त्यभ्युपगमात् ?
वैनाशिकैरभ्युपगम्यते हि सुषुप्तेऽपि ज्ञानास्तित्वम् ।

Ibid.

50. न, तद्व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानं ज्ञानमेवेति द्वितीयो विभाग एवाभ्युपगम्यते
वैनाशिकैर्न तृतीयस्तद्विषय इत्यनवस्थानुपपत्तिः ।

प्रश्न० उप० शां० भा०, VI. 2

51. किमयं स्वावयवसंघातवाह्येन ज्योतिरन्तरेण व्यवहरति, आहो स्वित्
स्वावयवसंघातमध्यपातिना ज्योतिष्कार्यमय पुरषो निवर्तयति, इत्येव-
भिप्रेत्य पृच्छति ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 2

52. व्यतिरिक्तमव्यतिरिक्तं वा ज्योतिः पुरुषस्य व्यवहारहेतुः, ततोऽनध्य-
वसाय एव ज्योतिर्विषये-इत्येवं मन्वानः पृच्छति जनको याज्ञवल्क्यम्-
किं ज्योतिरयं पुरुष इति ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 2

53. सर्वबाह्यज्योतिः प्रत्यस्तमयेऽपि स्वप्न-सुषुप्तिकाले जागरिते च तादृग्वस्थायाम् स्वावयवसंघातव्यतिरिक्तेनैव ज्योतिषा ज्योतिष्कार्यसिद्धिरस्येति, दृश्यते च स्वप्ने ज्योतिष्कार्यसिद्धिः—बन्धुसंगमनवियोगदर्शनं देशान्तरगमनादि च, सुषुप्ताच्चोत्थानम्—सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति, तस्मादस्ति व्यतिरिक्तं किमपि ज्योतिः ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 6

54. आत्मेति कार्यकरणस्वावयवसंघातव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यकरणावभासकं, आदित्यादिबाह्यज्योतिर्वत् स्वयमन्येनानवभास्यमानमभिधीयते ज्योतिः, अन्तस्थं च तत् पारिशेष्यात्—कार्यकरणव्यतिरिक्तं तदिति तावत् सिद्धम् ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 6

55. कार्यकारणसंघातभावभावित्वाच्च संघातधर्मत्वम् अनुमीयते ज्योतिषः ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 6

56. Ibid.

57. मृते च देहेऽविकलस्यैव च रूपादिदर्शनाभावात्—देहस्यैव च द्रष्टृत्वे मृतेऽपि दर्शनादि क्रियास्यात् ।

Ibid.

58. स्वप्नस्मृत्योर्दृष्टस्यैव दर्शनात् ।

Ibid.

59. बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 6

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. येनोदकेनापि प्रज्वलनोपकारी भिन्नजातीयेन वैद्युतस्याग्नेः जाठरस्य च क्रियमाणो दृश्यते, तस्माद् उपकार्योपकारकभावे समानजातीयासमानजातीयनियमो नास्ति ।

बृह० उप० शां० भा०, IV. 3. 6

63. Vedanta-Paribhasa, p. 15 (Trans. -M.)

64. Ibid.

65. वृत्तेश्चिदुपरागो वा अभेदव्यक्तिरेव वा ।

फलमावृत्तिभङ्गो वा तत्राऽऽद्यं कीदृशं भवेत् ॥

सिद्धान्तशेष संग्रह, 1. 65

69. तरङ्गतस्पर्शान्निदीस्पर्शतराविव ।

विषये वृत्तिसंसर्गाञ्जीवसङ्ग परे विदुः ॥

सिद्धान्तलेशसंग्रह, 1. 66

70. वृत्तिनिर्गमवैयर्थ्यादन्ये तद्द्वारसङ्गमम् ।

Ibid. 1. 66

71. अथ द्वितीये काऽभूदव्यक्तस्तत्रापि केचन ।

कुल्याद्वारेव सा वृत्त्या क्षेत्रकासार वारिणोः ॥

Ibid. 1. 69

72 अथावरणभङ्गोऽपि तृतीये कीदृशो मतः ।

मोहनाशः स चेदिष्टो मोक्षः स्याद् घटवेदनात् ॥

Ibid. 1. 72

73. खद्योतेन तमसश्छिद्रं केचित् प्रचक्षते ।

कटवद्वेष्टनं भीतभटवद्धा पलायनम् ॥

Ibid. 1. 73

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1. निः साक्षिके न वेद्मीति न कथञ्चित्प्रसिद्धयति ।
तथा कूटस्थ संवित्के नितरां नैतदिष्यते ॥
बृहदारण्यकवार्तिक, IV. 3. 3. 53
2. प्रवृत्तं विषये मानं बोधयेद्विषयाकृतिम् ।
ज्ञातताज्ञातते भातो न तेनाविषयत्वतः ॥
रूपार्थं सम्प्रवृत्तेन नेत्रेणरसगन्धयोः ।
अगृहीतिर्यथा तद्वज्ज्ञाताज्ञाततयोर्भवेत् ॥
बृहदारण्यक वार्तिकसार, अध्याय I,
प्रमेयपरीक्षा 14—15.
3. अविज्ञातः प्रमाणानां विषयोवादिनामन्तः ।
सोऽज्ञातोऽर्थः प्रमाणात् किं सिद्ध्येद्यद्वाऽनुभूतिः ।
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4. न तावन्मानतः सिद्धिमनिन तदपेक्षणात् ।
न ह्यज्ञातमनुद्दिश्य क्वचिन्मानं प्रवर्तते ॥
वृ० वा० सा० I, प्र० प० 3.
5. मानसिद्धं समुद्दिश्य यदि मानं प्रवर्तते ।
आत्माश्रयादिदोषः स्यान्नैष्फल्यं च मितेस्तथा ॥
वृ० वा० सा० I, प्र० प० 4.
6. अज्ञातत्वं क्षतिं कुर्वन्मानं मानत्वमश्नुते ।
सा चेदज्ञातता मानान्न कथं निष्फला मितिः ॥
वृ० वा० सा० I, प्र० प० 5.
7. अज्ञातत्वं मेयगतं मानेनाऽतो निवर्त्यते ।
नाऽज्ञातत्वमतो मानातिसिद्ध्यतीति विनिश्चयः ॥
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8. बोधादेव प्रसिद्धयन्ति कालावस्थादयोऽखिलाः ।
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9. द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां स्वप्रभस्यतत् ।
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वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 54

10. वृत्तिजंडाऽप्यसावात्मचैतन्यच्छायया युता ।
चैतन्यवद्भासकत्वाद् दृष्टिशब्दार्थतां व्रजेत् ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III. 4. 61
11. क्रियाकारकरूपा धीरक्रियाकारकात्मना ।
व्याप्त्येव जायते कुम्भ आकाशेन यथा तथा ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 66
12. व्याप्या दृष्टिर्जन्मत्वादन्तया व्यापिका त्वियम् ।
कूटस्थत्वेन साक्षित्वान्नित्या जन्मादिवर्जनात् ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 67
13. व्यावृत्तत्वेन मामादेः सिद्धसाक्षी सुषुप्तगः ।
नाऽवेदिषं सुषुप्तोऽहमिति धीर्नाऽन्यथा भवेत् ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 70
14. न देशकालावस्थादेरपेक्षा साक्षिसिद्धये ।
देशादेः साक्ष्यपेक्षत्वात् स्वतः सिद्धयति साक्ष्यतः ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 74
15. जन्मनाशादिसाक्षित्वाज्जन्मनाशादिवर्जिता ।
साक्षिदृष्टिरियं नित्या मोहजन्या तथेतरा ॥
वृ० वा० सा० III, 4. 75
16. अभितोऽनुभवाक्रान्ता ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वभूमिषु ।
घटादयोऽर्थाः सिद्ध्यन्ति लीयन्तेऽनुभवे पुनः ॥
वृ० वा० सा० 1, प्र० प० 40
17. Vivarana.
18. Critique of pure reason (A-19, B-29)
19. Kanta's Analytic, p. 53. 20
20. स्वकारणाभिसम्बन्धाच्चैतन्याभासताधियः ।
जायतेऽतोऽभिमानोऽस्यां जायते महतामपि ॥
वृद्धदारण्यकवर्तिक IV. 3. 357
21. Critique of pure reason, p. 1
22. Ibid. p. 4
23. Ibid. p. 4
24. Ibid. p. 4
29. Studies in Vedantism. p I
30. सर्वोद्धात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति नाहमस्मीति । यदि नात्मास्तित्वं प्रसिद्धः
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31. प्रतीतिमेवाप्रतीति निराकरणेन दृडयति । शा० भा० भामती० 1. 1. 1.

Chapter V References

1. विज्ञानं तावत् स्वप्रकाशं स्वत एव सिद्धस्वरूपम् । न खलु विज्ञाने सति जिज्ञासोरपि कस्यचित् जानामि न वेति संशयः, न जानामीति वा विपर्ययः व्यतिरेकप्रमा वा । तेन जिज्ञासितस्य असत्त्वज्ञानव्यतिरेक-प्रमाणानामभावसमुदायः स्वव्यापकं जिज्ञासितस्य प्रमितत्वमानयति । अन्यथा हि जिज्ञासितप्रमितत्वव्यतिरेकव्यापकं जिज्ञासितव्यतिरेको-ल्लेखि ज्ञानमविध्नतजिज्ञासस्य स्यात् । अतः सर्वजनस्वात्मसंवेदनसिद्ध-मेवास्य बोधस्य स्वरूपम् ।

खण्डनखण्डखाद्य, पृ० 28-29

2. व्यवसायस्य अनुव्यवसायनियमान्न तत्र संशयादिरिति चेन्न । यत्रैवा-नुव्यवसाये ज्ञेयता नोपेया, तत्र जिज्ञासायामात्मधर्मिकं तत्संशयमारभ्य व्यवसायविषयपर्यन्तं संशयाक्रान्तेर्दुष्परिहरत्वात् । विषयिसद्भाव-संशये तद्विषयेऽपि संशयस्य सम्भवात् । एवं त्रिचतुरसंवेदनकक्षाज्ञान-ध्रौव्यनियमाभ्युपगमेऽपीति ।

खण्डनखण्डखाद्य, पृ० 29

3. किञ्चानुभूतिरर्थप्रकाशमसमये यदि न प्रकाशेत तथा सत्यनन्तरक्षणे जिज्ञासोस्तत्र सन्देहो विपर्ययो वा विपरीतप्रमा बोधियात् । न च कश्चिदमुद्राक्षीन्तो वा भवानिति पृष्ठोऽनन्तरक्षणे संदिग्धे विपर्यस्यति संविदभावं वा प्रमिणोति, किन्तु निश्चिनोत्येव इदमहमद्राक्षम् इति तेन प्रकाशमानैवानुभूतिरर्थे व्यवहारं जनयतीति युक्तम् ।

स्वत्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 29-30

4. Vivarana
5. किमप्रतिभासमानमेवान्यत्रार्थे ज्ञाततालक्षणं प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा मतभेदेन करोति किं वा प्रतिभासमानमेव स्वकार्यं करोतीति विकल्पार्थः ।

न्यायमकरन्द, पृ० 137

6. विज्ञानमर्थं प्रकाशसमये प्रकाशते तदुपाधावनन्तरं सन्देहायोग्यत्वात् अर्थवद् इति ।

न्यायमकरन्द, पृ० 138

7. तदुपाधो अर्थोपाधवार्थलक्षणेऽवच्छेदक इति यावत् इदमपि चिरन्तन-रीत्यावगंतव्यम्, अर्थोपाधावित्यर्थं विशेषितस्य विवक्षितत्वेऽर्थस्यार्थ-विशेषितत्वाभावेनदृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वात् तस्माद् घटज्ञानं घटव्य-

वहारसमये व्यवहियमाणं ज्ञातो घट इति व्यवहारविषयत्वाद्वटवदिति प्रयोगानुसंधेयः, कथंचिदनन्तरसंदेहयोग्यत्वम् तु विपक्षे बाधकस्तर्क उन्नेयः ।

न्यायमकरंद (चित्सुखी टीका) पृ० 138

8. किञ्च अस्ति तावत् ममेदमनुकूलं इदं प्रतिकूलमिति च ज्ञान, यद्वशादनुकूले प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिकूलाच्च निवृत्तिः । तच्चेदमवच्छेदकप्रकाशाधीनं अवच्छिन्नप्रकाशत्वात् दण्डप्रकाशवत् । अवच्छेदकश्चायमात्मानं स्वाश्रयव्याप्यो भवितुमुत्सहते वस्तुत्वादसिधारावत् । न हि असिधारयेवासिधारा छिद्यते । विषयसंवेदनादेव तदाश्रयः सोऽपि सिध्यत्विति चेन्मैवम् । संवेदिताहि न स्वातिरेकि-संविदधीन-प्रकाशः संवित्कर्मतामन्तरेणापरोक्षत्वात्, संवेदनवत् । अतः पारिशेष्यात् स्वप्रकाशता सिद्धिः ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 78

9. विमता धीः समाधारकालस्वज्ञान-हानितः । न हीनाव्यवहारेण धीत्वादविमता यथा ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 80

10. अस्वसंवेदनत्वे तु सवेद्यमान घटप्रकाशसमन्तरमेव ममेदं विदितमिति विकल्पो न भवेत् । न ह्यविदिते विशेषणे विशिष्ट-विकल्पः सम्भवति ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 81

11. न चास्फुरति विशेषणे विशिष्टावभासः सम्भवति । न ह्यप्रकाशमाने दण्डे दण्डीति विशिष्ट-प्रत्ययो दृष्टः । अतो विशिष्टावभासानुपपत्त्या संवेदनानां स्वसंवेदनमेव वक्तव्यमिति भावः ।

निबन्धः, पृ० 82

12. यद्वस्तु तत् स्वातिरिक्तं नैव वेदनेन व्याप्यमिति व्याप्तेर्भेदः कल्पनीयः ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ०, 84

13. यद्वस्तु तत् स्वातिरिक्तं नैव वेदनेन व्याप्यमिति व्याप्तेर्भेदः कल्पनीयः इति चेन्न । अनेनैव व्याप्तिसंवेदनेन व्यभिचारात् । इदं हि वस्तुमात्रं व्याप्नुवत् आत्मानमपि व्याप्नुयात् ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 84

14. किञ्च सर्वं संवेदनं अस्वसंवेदनं सर्वं कार्यं सकारणकं, सर्वं वस्तुसात्मके इत्यादि संवेदनानि स्वपरसाधारणप्रयोजकवशात् स्वात्मगोचराण्यपि बहुलमुपलभ्यन्त इति कथं न व्यभिचारपरंपरा ? परं गोचरयत्येव स्वात्मानमपि गोचरयतीति न विशेषः कश्चित् । स्वपरसाधारण-प्रवृत्ति-

निमित्तगोचरतयैव स्वगोचरत्वं तत्र दृष्टमिति चेन्न । अस्य वैधर्म्यमात्र-
त्वात् । सर्वथा च साम्यसम्पादनीयत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 84

15. सर्वं संवेदनमस्वसंवेदनमिति नैयायिकानां व्याप्तिसंवेदनं सर्वस्य संवेदन-
स्यास्वसंवेदनत्वं साधयत् स्वस्यापि अस्वसंवेदनत्वं साधयति । संवेदन-
त्वस्य प्रयोजकस्य स्वस्मिन् परत्र च साधारणत्वात् । न तु तस्य स्वाति-
रिक्तेनास्वसंवेदनत्वं सिध्यति । तथा सर्वं कार्यं सकारणकमिति विज्ञानं
सर्वस्य कार्यस्य सकारणत्वं साधयत् स्वस्यापि कार्यत्वाविशेषात् स्व-
कारणं स्वयमेव साधयति । तथा सर्वं वस्तु सात्मकमिति व्याप्तिसंवेदनं
सर्वस्य स्वात्मकत्वं बोधयत् स्वस्यापि स्वात्मकत्वं साधयति न तु तस्य
स्वात्मकत्वं व्याप्तिवेदनानान्तरेण सिध्यति इति कथं यद्वस्तु तत्स्वातिरि-
क्तेति व्याप्तिबलेन सिध्यतीति त्वदीयव्याप्तेर्न व्यभिचारपरपराऽपितु
भवत्येवेत्यर्थः ।

प्रमाणमाला, पृ० 85

16. संविच्च न संविदो विषयः समत्वात् । समयोहि न विषयविषयिभावो
दृश्यते, युज्यते वा दीपयोरिव ।...तस्मात्संविदगोचर एव सवित् स्वतः
प्रकाशते ।

न्यायरत्नदीपावली, पृ० 118-119

17. विवादपदं स्वव्यवहारहेतुप्रकाशः, संवित्वात् कुम्भवदिति व्यतिरेकी । न
तावदप्रसिद्धविशेषणता । संविद्व्यवहारहेतुप्रकाशो हि प्रसिद्धः । अत-
स्तत्स्वरूपत्वं साध्यं नाऽप्रसिद्धम् । संवित्प्रकाशभागे सिद्धसाधनमिति
चेन्न । तस्याघमिभागत्वात् ।

न्यायरत्नदीपावली, पृ० 119

18. Ibid. पृ० 119-120

19. ननु संविदो वेद्यते को दोषः स्यात् । असंवित्वप्रसङ्ग इति ब्रूमः । ननु
सर्वत्रैव स्वप्रकाशत्वं साधयितुं शक्यम् । न । कुम्भादिभावेऽपि ते
तत्प्रकाशाभावात् ।

न्यायरत्नदीपावली, पृ० 123

20. ननु ते प्रकाशो नित्यः, सत्यम्, तथापि प्रकाशे सति कुम्भादेरभावनं
तदात्मनोपलम्भसम्भवः । मायामयस्यैव च वेद्यत्वाद्देद्यत्वे संवित्
नियतमापद्येत ।

न्यायरत्नदीपावली, पृ० 154

21. यदप्यत्र मित्रेण प्रलपितम्, अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे शशविषाणवदननुभूति-

त्वप्रसङ्गः इति तत्र व्याप्त्यभावात् प्रशिक्षितमूलता । न हि पण्डितम्म-
न्यस्य शशविषाणे सिद्धे व्यप्तिः सिद्धयेत् । अननुभाव्यत्वं चाप्रसिद्धम् ।

न्यायरत्नदीपावली (वेदान्तविवेकाख्यव्याख्या), पृ० 124

22. स्वयमेवानुभूतित्वाद्विद्यते नानुभाव्यता ।

ज्ञातृज्ञानान्तराभावादज्ञेयो न त्वसत्तया ॥

पञ्चदशी 13, पृ० 68

23. माधुर्यादिस्वभावानामन्यत्र स्वगुणापिणाम् ।

स्वस्मिंस्तदर्पणापेक्षा नो न चास्त्यन्यदर्पकम् ॥

पञ्चदशी 14, पृ० 68

अर्पकान्तरराहित्येऽप्यस्त्येषां तत्स्वभावता ।

मा भूतथानुभाव्यत्वं बोधात्मा तु न हीयते ॥

पञ्चदशी 15, पृ० 69

24. पञ्चदशी 16, पृ० 69

25. पञ्चदशी 17, पृ० 69

26. पञ्चदशी, रामकृष्ण व्याख्या, पृ० 68

27. स वेत्ति वेद्यं तत्सर्वं नान्यस्तस्यास्ति वेदिता ।

विदिताविदिताभ्यां तत्प्रथग्बोधस्वरूपकम् ॥

पञ्चदशी 18, पृ० 70

28. बोधेऽत्यनुभवो यस्य न कथंचन जायते ।

पञ्चदशी 19, पृ० 70

29. जिह्वामेऽस्ति न केत्युक्तिर्लज्जायै केवलं यथा ।

न बुध्यते मया बोधो बोद्धव्य इति तादृशी ॥

पञ्चदशी 20, पृ० 71

30. अस्ति तावत्स्वयं नाम विवादाविषयत्वतः ।

स्वस्मिन्नपि विवादश्चेत्प्रतिवाद्यत्र को भवेत् ॥

पञ्चदशी 23, पृ० 72

31. की दृक्तर्हीति चेत्प्रच्छेदीदृक्ता नास्ति तत्र हि ।

यदनीदृग्तादृक् च तत्स्वरूपं विनिश्चिनु ॥

पञ्चदशी 26, पृ० 73

32. अक्षाणां विषयस्त्वौदृक्परोक्षस्तादृगुच्यते ।

विषयी नाक्षविषयः स्वत्वान्नास्य परोक्षता ॥

पञ्चदशी 27, पृ० 73

33. अवेद्योऽप्यपरोक्षेऽतः स्वप्रकाशो भवत्ययम् ।

पञ्चदशी 28, पृ० 74

34 Ibid. 24. रा० कृ० व्याख्या पृ० 74-75

Chapter VI References

1. न् जास्यैकोपपत्तेः । सर्वदेशकालपुरुषाद्यवस्थामेकमेव ज्ञानं नामरूपाद्यनेकोपाधिभेदात्, सवित्तादि जलादि प्रतिबिम्बवद् अनेकधावभासत इति ।

प्रश्नोपनिषद्, शांकरभाष्य, 6. 2

2. न चार्थं व्यतिरिक्तमपि विज्ञानं स्वयमेवानुभूयते स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधादेव ।

ब्रह्मसूत्र शांकरभाष्य, II. 2. 28

3. विज्ञानग्रहणमात्र एव विज्ञानसाक्षिणो ग्रहणाकाङ्क्षानुत्पादादनवस्थाशङ्कानुपपत्तेः । साक्षिप्रत्यययोश्च स्वभाववैषम्यादुपलब्ध्युपलभ्यभावोपपत्तेः । स्वयंसिद्धस्य च साक्षिणो प्रत्याख्येयत्वात् । किञ्चान्यत् । प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासका तरनिर्गपेक्ष स्वयमेव प्रथत इति ब्रुवता प्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात् । शिलाघनमध्यस्थप्रदीपसहस्रप्रथनवत् ।

वृ० सू० शां० भा० II. 2. 28

4. संवेदनं नाम गुणो द्रव्यं कर्म वा भवति ।

वितरण, पृ० 249

5. गुण इति तार्किक-प्रभाकरदृष्टान्तयोक्तम्, द्रव्यमिति सांख्यमतानुसृत्य कर्मेति भाट्टमतानुसारेण ।

तत्त्वदीपन, 9. 314

6. विवरण, पृ० 249

7. पञ्चपादिकाविवरण, पृ० 249-250 [Trans. D. Venkataramaiah]

8. तस्मात् नीलादिज्ञानफलमनुभवः स्वयंप्रकाशमानो ग्राह्यमिदन्तया ग्राहकं च अनिदन्तया अवभासयति ग्रहणं च अनुमापयतीति युक्तम् ।

पञ्चपादिका, पृ० 90 [Trans—D.]

9. किमात्मा चैतन्यप्रकाशः अनुभवो जड़प्रकाशः ? उत सोऽपि चैतन्यप्रकाशः अथवा स एव चैतन्यप्रकाश आत्मा जड़स्वरूपः ? इति । तत्र न तावत् प्रथमः कल्पः जड़स्वरूपे प्रमाणफले विश्वस्यानवभासप्रसङ्गात् ।

पञ्चपादिका, पृ० 90 [Trans. D]

10. स्वयं चैतन्यस्वभावोऽपि सन् विषयप्रमाणेनाचेतनेनागृहीतः प्रकाशते इति

नैतत् साधु लक्ष्यते । किं च—प्रमाणफलेन चेत् प्रदीपेनेव विषयमात्मानं च चेतयते तदा चेतयति क्रियानवस्था प्रसङ्गः ।

पञ्चपादिका, पृ० 90-91 [Trans—D]

11. चेतयति क्रियापि पूर्वानुभवफलवज्जडरूपानुभवफल चेत् तस्यापि प्रदीप-स्थानीयत्वः चेतयति क्रियानवस्थेति दूषयति ।

पञ्चपादिक विवरण, पृ० 248

12. द्वितीये कल्पे आत्मापि स्वयमेव प्रकाशेत किमिति विषयानुभवमपेक्षेत । अथ चैतन्यस्वभावत्वेऽपि नात्मा स्वयंप्रकाशः, विशेषे हेतुर्वाच्यः । न हि चतन्यस्वभावः सन् स्वयं परोक्षोऽन्यतो परोक्ष इति युज्यते । किं च समत्वान्नेतरेतरापेक्षत्वं प्रकाशने प्रदीपयोरिव ।

पञ्चपादिका, पृ० 91 Trans—D

13. तृतीयऽपि कल्पे अनिच्छतोऽप्यात्मैव चित्तिप्रकाश आपद्यते, न तदतिरिक्त तथाविधफलसद्भावे प्रमाणमस्ति ।

Ibid.

14. गुणत्वे सति आत्मेव प्रकाशगुणः इति प्रदीपवदात्मा स्वयंप्रकाशः स्यात् । स च गुणः स्वाश्रयोपाधौ न जायते प्रकाशगुणत्वात् आत्मन्यव्यभिचारात्, आदित्यादिप्रकाशगुणवत्, इति आत्मैव स्वयंप्रकाश इति ।

विवरण, पृ० 250

15. न—विषयप्रकाशजननेन चक्षुषः प्रकाशकत्वात् सविद्वैलक्षण्यात् । सवेदनं तु स्वयंप्रकाश एव, न प्रकाशान्तरहेतुः । अतः चक्षुरादिवैलक्षण्यात् प्रदीपवदवभासमान एवानुभवोऽर्थं प्रकाशयति । न च प्रदीपालोकस्यार्थानुभवजननेनैव चक्षुरादिवदर्थस्य प्रकाशकता । किन्तु पृथगेव । तथा हिज्ञानप्रकाशत्वादज्ञानविरोधिनोऽन्यदेवा लोकप्रकाश्यत्व तमोविरोधितया प्रसिद्धम् । तत् अव्यवधानेन आलोकेन क्रियते । न तदुभयं करोति चक्षुः ।

विवरण, पृ० 245-246

16. अनुभवस्य च स्वसत्तायांप्रकाशव्यतिरेकादर्शनाच्च ज्ञानान्तरागम्यता-सिद्धिः ।

विवरण, पृ० 241

17. तस्मादनुभवः सजातीयप्रकाशान्तरनिरपेक्षः प्रकाशमान एव विषये प्रकाशादिव्यवहारनिमित्तं भवितुमर्हति । अव्यवधानेन विषये प्रकाशादिव्यवहारनिमित्तत्वात् प्रदीपालोकवत् ।

विवरण, पृ० 246-7

18. तद्विषयज्ञानप्रकाशं जनयति चक्षुरिति चेत्, तथापि विजातीयज्ञानेनैव प्रदीपस्यप्रकाश्यतेति न सजातीयालोकापेक्षा ।

विवरण, पृ० 247

19. प्रमाणजन्यश्चेदनुभवः, तथा सति स्वगतेन विशेषेण प्रतिविषयां पृथक् पृथक्गवभासेत, सर्वानुभवानुगतं च गोत्ववदनुभवत्वमपरमीक्ष्येत । न च नीलानुभवः पीतानुभवः इति विषयविशेष-परामर्शशून्यः स्वगतो विशेषो लक्ष्यते ।

पञ्चपादिका, पृ० 92

20. ननु विनष्टाविनष्टत्वेन विशेषः सिध्यति । सिध्येत् यदि विनिष्टाविनष्टता सिध्येत् । सा च जन्यत्वे सति, तस्यां च सिद्धायां जन्यत्वं, इति परस्परायत्तस्थितित्वेन एकमपि न सिध्येत् ।

Ibid.

21. तस्मात् चित्स्वभावाद्वात्मा तेन तेन प्रमेयभेदेनोपधीयमानः अनुभवाभिधानीयकं लभते । अविवक्षितोपाधिरात्मादिशब्दैरभिधीयते, अवधीरितवनाभिधाननिमित्तैकदेशावस्थाना इव वृक्षा वृक्षादिशब्दैः इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

पञ्चपादिक, पृ० 93

22. किमप्रकाशमानमेवान्य प्रकाशनम् अहोस्वित् प्रकाशमानं विज्ञानमिति ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 137

23. किमप्रतिभासमानमेवान्यत्रार्थे ज्ञाततालक्षणं प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा मतिभेदेन करोति किं वा प्रतिभासमानमेव स्वकार्यं करोतीति विकल्पार्थः ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 137

24. न तावदप्रकाशमानं तथा सति घटोऽयं मया ज्ञातो न वेत्यनंतरक्षणे सन्देहयोग्यतापाताद्, न च कश्चिदप्यद्राक्षीदमुं नो वा भवानीति पृष्ठोऽप्यनन्तरं सन्दिग्धे किमहमद्राक्ष नोवेति किन्तु निश्चिनोत्येवाहमद्राक्षमिति ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 138

25. विज्ञानमर्थप्रकाशसमये प्रकाशते, तदुपाधावन्तरं सन्देहायोग्यत्वात्, अर्थवदिति ।

Ibid. पृ० 138

26. प्रकाशमानताभ्युपगमे तु यदि विज्ञानान्तराधीनमस्यप्रकाशनं तदैव तत्रापि विज्ञानान्तरमवश्यम्भावीत्यनवस्था प्रसज्येत, न चास्त्येकदैवानन्त-विज्ञान-प्रतिभासः ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 138

27. न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 134

28. नापि पश्चिमः, तथाहि कुंभज्ञानोत्पत्ति-समकालं मनसिक्रिया ततो विभागस्ततः पूर्वसंयोगविनाशस्तत उत्तरसंयोगोत्पत्तिस्ततो ज्ञानान्तरमिति बहुतरकालकलापविलम्बितं कथमिव वर्तमानमाकलयेद्विज्ञानं प्राचीन-मिति परिशेषतः स्वप्रकाशतैवास्याश्रयणीया, किंच कुम्भादयो जडत्वान्न स्वनः प्रकाशन्ते नाप्यन्योन्यप्रकाशाः, तत्र संवेदनमपि चेज्जडं किन्तेना-धिकमाचरितम् ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 141

29. न च नयनादिवज्जडात्मनोपि सत्तामात्रेणास्यार्थप्रकाशकता, विकल्पा-सहत्वात् तथाहि—किं विज्ञानादन्यदप्रकाशनमर्थस्वभावस्ततोर्थान्तरं वा स्यात् ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 141

30. न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 142

31. यथान्तरमेवार्थप्रकाशनमाश्रीयेत विज्ञानमेव तत्सजान्तरेणापन्नं, तच्चे-ज्जडं न प्रकाशेत, नाप्यर्थः केवलो नात्मप्रकाशत्वाद् इत्यायातमान्ध्य-शेषस्य जगतः ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 142

32. तस्माद् विज्ञानमेव स्वपरप्रकाशस्वभाव प्रकाशत इत्याश्रयणीयम् ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 142

33. स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधान्न स्वसंवेदनं विज्ञानमिति चेद् मैवं वृत्त्यनभ्यु-पगमाद् आलोकवद् ।

न्यायमकरंद, पृ० 142

34. न खलु इति स्वसंवेदनं संवेदनमित्यत्र स्वशब्दः स्वयंदासास्तपस्विन इतिवदन्यव्यावृत्तिपरो न तु स्वात्मवृत्तिविधायक इत्यर्थः ।

चित्मुखाचार्यकृत टीका ।

35. संवेद्ये च मुखे आनन्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धः, ब्रह्मानन्दश्च यदि संवेद्यः स्याद् युक्ता एते ब्रह्माण्डानन्दशब्दाः ।

36. "यत्तत्त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कं विजानीयात्"
(वृ० उ० ४/५/१५) "यत्त नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्वि-
जानाति स भूमा" (छा० उ० ७/२४/१) "प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्ता
न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद" (वृ० उ० ४/३/२१) इत्यादि ।

Ibid

37. आनन्दादिश्रवणत् "जक्षत् क्रीडन् रममाणः" (छा० उ० ८. 12. 3)
"स यदि पितृलोक कामो भवति" (छा० उ० ८. 2. 1) "यः सर्वज्ञः
सर्ववित् "मुण्डक० 1. 1. 9) सर्वकामान् समश्नुते (तै० उ० 2. 5. 1)
इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यो मोक्षे सुखं संवेद्यमिति ।

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् शांकरभाष्य, III. 9. 28/7

38. वृ० उ० शां० भा० III. 9-28/7

39. एकत्वविरोधाच्च परं चेद् ब्रह्म आनन्दात्मकमात्मानं नित्यविज्ञानत्वा-
न्नित्यमेव विजानीयात्, तन्न, संसार्यपि संसारविनिर्मुक्तः स्वाभाव्यं
प्रतिपद्येत, जलाशय इवोदकाञ्जलिः क्षिप्तो न पृथक्त्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते
आनन्दात्मक ब्रह्म विज्ञानाय, तदा मुक्त आनन्दात्मकमात्मानं वेदयते
इत्येतदनर्थकं वाक्यम् ।

वृ० उ० शां० भा० III. 9. 28/7

40. अथ ब्रह्मानन्दमन्यः सन् मुक्तो वेदयते, प्रत्यगात्मानं च अहमस्म्यानन्द-
स्वरूप इति, तदेकत्वविरोधः, तथा सति सर्वश्रुतिविरोधः ।

वृ० उ० शां० भा० III. 9. 7

41. वृ० उ० शां० भा० III. 9. 28/7

42. अत्र विच्छिन्नमात्मानन्दं विजानाति—विज्ञानस्य आत्मविज्ञानच्छिदे

अन्यविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः, आत्मनश्च विक्रियावत्वं ततश्चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः,
तस्माद् विज्ञानमानन्दमिति स्वरूपात्वाख्यानपरेव श्रुतिः, नात्मानन्द-
सवेद्यत्वार्था ।

बृ० उ० शां० भा० 9. 28/7

43. न च वाच्यमतस्तदवगमस्यापि सत्ताऽभ्युपेयेति, तस्यापि सत्ता
चिन्तायां तत्सत्तावगमान्तरस्यैव शरणत्वात् । न चैवमनवस्था, तदनु-
सरणावश्यम्भावानङ्गीकारात् । एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मना नाधिकामतिः
इति न्यायात् ।

खण्डनखण्डखाद्य पृ० 14-15

44. तथापि त्रिचतुरज्ञानकक्षागवेषणमात्रविश्रान्तेन विचारेण ततः परमननु-
सरणरमणीयेनैव च समयं वद्ध्वा कथायां मिथः सम्प्रतिपत्त्या प्रवर्त-
नात् । अन्यथा प्रमाणादिसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि ज्ञानानवस्थायाः दुःपरि-
हरत्वात् ।

Ibid. पृ० 15-16

45. यथा च त्वत्पक्षे स्वरूपसत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि विज्ञानस्वरूपसत्तय परं व्यवहा-
रोपपादिका । न घटादिसत्ता, एवमेवासत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि ज्ञानमेवासत्
व्यवहारोपपादकं नान्यत् ।

Ibid. पृ० 16

Chapter VII References

2. ननु स्वप्रकाश इति कोऽर्थः ? किं स्वमेव स्वस्य प्रकाशो ज्ञानं उत स्वयमेव स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयति, किं वा स्वयमेव प्रकाशो ज्ञानमात्रम् ?
निबन्ध, पृ० 77
11. कर्मकर्तृभावविरोधेन लक्षणस्यसम्भवात् ।
तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 6
14. नापि चतुर्थः, सुखादावतिव्याप्तेः सुखादेरपि स्वसत्तायां प्रकाशाव्यभि-
चारात् ।
Ibid. पृ० 7
17. नाद्यः, मोक्षप्रलयादौ अव्याप्तेः ।
Ibid. पृ० 7
२०. स्वयंप्रकाशकत्वसाधकानुमानागमादिजन्यज्ञातविषयत्वेन लक्षणस्यासम्भ-
वित्वात्तस्याप्यविषयत्वे कथाप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।
Ibid. पृ० 8
22. ज्ञानाविषयत्वज्ञानविषयत्वयोर्व्याघातात् ।
नयनप्रसादिनी, पृ० 5
23. सर्वस्यैव ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशताश्रयणेन व्यर्थविशेषणत्वापातात्, अपरोक्ष-
ज्ञानाभावाच्च ।
Ibid. पृ० 5
25. नाप्यष्टमः, प्राचीनदोषानुसङ्गात्, शुक्तिरजतादिसंसर्गोऽख्यतिवादिनामति-
व्याप्तेश्च ।
तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 8
28. नापि नवमः, स्वप्रतिबद्धव्यवहारे सजातीयपरानपेक्षत्वस्य प्रदीपादौ
घटादौ च भावेनातिव्याप्तेः । सत्तया सजातीयत्वविवक्षायां तु तद्व्य-
वहारस्यापि सत्तया सजातीयादृष्टादिजन्यतया तदपेक्षत्वेन लक्षणस्या-
संभवित्वप्रसङ्गात् ।
तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 9
30. नापि दशमः, अवद्यत्वेऽनुमानाद्यगोचरतया कथानवतारप्रसङ्गस्य दर्शि-
तत्वात्, अपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वमिति शब्देन प्रत्यक्षज्ञानविषयत्वस्य
कण्ठोक्तत्वात् तद्विररीतावेद्यत्वाभिधाने मे माता बन्धयेतिवद्व्याघाता-
च्च सुषुप्तिप्रलयमोक्षेष्वव्याप्तेश्च तथा व्यवहारस्यैवासंभवेत तद्विषय-

ताभावात् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 9

32. न तावत्स्वयंप्रकाशे लक्षणासंभवः, अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यता-
यास्तल्लक्षणत्वात् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 16

33. न च योग्यतालक्षणधर्माङ्गीकारेऽव्याप्तिर्मोक्षदशायां तदसंभवादपसिद्धान्तापत्तिश्चेति शङ्कनीयं, योग्यत्वात्यान्ताभावानधिकरणत्वस्य तत्त्वात्, गुणत्वात्यन्ताभावनधिकारणस्य द्रव्यत्ववत्, तेन नाव्याप्तिः ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 16

34. अतो धर्मादिव्यवच्छेदार्थमपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणम् ।

Ibid. पृ० 19

37. अवेद्यत्वेऽपि नापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यता तेषाम्, अध्यस्ततयैव तेषां सिद्धेः ।

Ibid. पृ० 19

39. नन्वेवं सत्यवेद्यत्वविशेषणस्य न व्यच्छेद्यमस्ति, त्वन्मते घटोदेरप्यध्यस्ततया अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावात्, मैवम्, व्यवहारदशायां तेषां प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणविषयाणामपरोक्षव्यवहार योग्यताङ्गीकारात् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 20

40. न च मोक्षेऽव्याप्तिः, अनधिकरणत्वस्य स्वरूपतया तदपि सत्त्वात् ।

अद्वैतासिद्धि, प्र० 768

42. सुषुप्त्यादौ व्यवहाराभावेनाव्याप्त्या नावेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वम् । योग्यत्वरूपधर्मस्य ब्रह्मणि मोक्षकालेऽभावेनाव्याप्त्या न तद्योग्यत्वम् । अतएव न तद्योग्यत्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वम्, तस्यापि धर्मत्वेन मुक्तावभावात् । स्वरूपस्याल्लक्षणत्वान्नानधिकरणत्वं ब्रह्मस्वरूपम् । वस्तुतस्तु—योग्यत्वस्य मिथ्यात्वात् तदत्यन्ताभावाधिकरणत्वमेव ब्रह्माणि विद्यते इत्यसंभवः

न्यायामृत उद्धृ. अद्वैतसिद्धि, पृ० 855

44. किंचानुभूतिपदाभिधेयस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वमभिधीयते भवद्भिः ? उत लक्ष्यस्य ? नाद्यः, अपसिद्धान्तापातात् । न द्वितीयः, प्रतिवादिनं प्रत्याश्रयासिद्धेः । सफलधर्मातीतस्याद्वितीयस्यानुभूतिपदलक्ष्यस्य परैरनङ्गीकारात् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 15

45. किं च स्वप्रकाशतायां सति प्रमाणे तद्वैद्यत्वमसति च साधकाभावादेव न तत्सिद्धिरिति सैषोपनिषदानामुभयतः पाशारज्जुरित्यलभतिवि तरेण ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 15

46. अनुभूतिः स्वयंप्रकाशा अनुभूतित्वाद्यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा घट इत्यनुमानम् ।
न चाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका पृ० 21

48. अयं घट एतद्घटान्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वानधिकरणान्यः, पदार्थत्वात्पटवदि-
त्यादिमहाविद्याप्रयोगैरप्यवेद्यत्वप्रसिद्धिरप्युहनीया ।

Ibid. पृ० 24

49. सामान्यतः सिद्धस्यानुमानेन धर्मविशेषे साधनान्नानर्थक्यमित्यर्थः ।

नयनप्रसादिनी, पृ० 22

51. ज्ञानं वेद्यं वस्तुत्वाद्, घटवदिति प्रतिप्रयोगसंभवाच्च ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 13

52. नाप्रसिद्धविशेष्यतापि, अनुभूतेः प्रसिद्धत्वात् । अतएव नाश्रयासिद्धिरपि
हेतोः ।

Ibid. p. 24

53. नापि स्वरूपासिद्धिः, कल्पितव्यक्तिभेदनिष्ठस्य चन्द्रत्वसामान्यस्येवानु-
भूतित्वसामान्यस्याभ्युपगमे सिद्धान्ताविरोधात् ।

Ibid. p. 25

54. कल्पितस्यापि प्रतिबिम्बादिवत्साधकत्वसम्भवात् ।

Ibid. पृ० 25

55. न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः, सोपाधिकस्यैव तथात्वात्, केवलव्यतिरेकिणि
चोपाधेरसंभवात् ।

Ibid. पृ० 26

56. नापि विरुद्धः वेद्येषु विपक्षेष्वनुभूतित्वहेतोरवृत्तेः ।

Ibid. पृ० 28

57. नाप्यनैकान्तिकः, विपक्षादव्यावृत्तेर्वा ।

Ibid. पृ० 28

58. नाप्यसाधारणः, सपक्षाभावात् ।

Ibid.

59. तदेवमनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वेऽनुभूतिस्वरूपासिद्धिप्रसङ्गस्यैव विपक्षे बाधक-
तर्कत्वात्, न संदिग्धनैकान्तिकता ।

Ibid. पृ० 29

61. Ibid. p. 29—30

62. तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 30—31

63. वेद्यत्वव्यतिरेकेण तस्याः स्वतःस्फुरणेनापि तादृगव्यवहारोपपत्तेः ।

Ibid. पृ० 32

64. किञ्च विदितो घट इत्यत्रानुव्यवसायेन घटस्यैव विदितत्वमवसीयते न तु वित्तेः, विदितत्वस्य घटविशेषणत्वात् ।

तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ० 32

65. अपि चानुभूतेः प्रत्यक्षतायामपि तत्प्रत्यक्षेणैव तदनुभाव्यत्वस्याप्रत्यक्षीकरणान्न प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धता । अन्यथानुव्यवसायेन व्यवसायस्य स्वविशेषितवेद्यत्वग्रहणे विशेषणतया स्वस्यापि स्वेन वेद्यत्वापातात् सौगतमतानुमति प्रसङ्गः ।

Ibid. पृ० 31

67. न च वेद्यत्वापादकवस्तुत्वाद्यनुमानविरोधः, व्याप्तिग्रहणासिद्धेः ।

Ibid. पृ० 33

68. द्वितीये तु संवित्प्रक्षणवस्तुविशेषस्यास्फुरणादेव सर्वोपसहारवती व्याप्तिरेवास्तमित्यात्तत्र कुतोऽनुमानप्रसरः ।

Ibid. पृ० 33

69. पृथुवुध्नोदराकारस्य घटशब्दवाच्यस्य स्पर्शरूपादिमतश्चक्षुः स्पर्शनप्रमाणसिद्धत्वेन संमतस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वसाधने प्रत्यक्षविरोधादतद्विषयस्य चाप्रसिद्धत्वेन धर्म्यसिद्धिः ।

Ibid. पृ० 35

70. अनुभूतेः प्रमाणजन्यस्फुरणाश्रयतया स्फुरणकर्मतया वा घटानिवद्विषयभावाभावेऽपि प्रमाणजनितान्तःकरणवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन विषयताङ्गीकारेऽपि स्वप्रकाशत्वाव्याघातात् ।

Ibid. पृ० 35

72. अनुभूतिपदवाच्यस्य लक्ष्यस्य वा स्वप्रकाशत्वमित्यपि विकल्पोऽनुपपन्नः उभयवादिसम्प्रतिपन्नस्फुरणमात्रस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वप्रतिपादनात् ।

Ibid. पृ० 34-35

73. यद्यपि न पूर्वपूर्वपक्षदोषपरिजिहीर्षया सर्वत्रोत्तरोत्तरपक्षपरिग्रहस्तथापि संभाव्यमानत्वाद्विभिन्नदूषणत्वाच्च विनेयमतिविकासायोपन्यस्यन्ते ।

नयनप्रसादिनी, पृ० 5

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ABBREVIATIONS

Advaita Siddhī	A.S.
Aitareyopaniṣad	Ait. Up.
Aitareye upaniṣad Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	A.U.S.B.
Brahma Sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	B.S.S.B.
Brāhma Sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya-Bhamati	B.S.S.B.Bh.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad	Br. Up.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	B.U.S.B.
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika	B.V.
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika Sāra	B.V.S.
Buddhist Logic	B.L.
Chāndogyopaniṣad	Chand. Up.
Kaṭhupaniṣad	Katha. Up.
Kenopaniṣad	Kena Up.
Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad	Mand. Up.
Manorathanandī vṛtti on Pramāṇa Vārtika	M.N.V.
Muṇḍakopaniṣad	Mund. Up.
Muṇḍakopaniṣad Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	M.U.S.B.
Nayanaprasādinī vyākya	N.P.
Nyāya Bhaṣya	N.Bh.
Nyāya Bindu	N.B.
Nyāya Bindu Tīka	N.B.T.
Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa	Vivaraṇa
Praśnopaniṣad	Prasna. Up.
Praśnapaniṣad Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	P.U.S.B.
Slokavārtika, Snnyavāda	S.V., Sūnya.
Taittirīyopaniṣad	Tait. or Tait Up.
Tattva Pradīpika	T.P.
Tattva Saṁgraha	T.S.
Yoga Sūtra	Y.S.
Yoga Vārtika	Y.V.
Svetāśvatarpaniṣad	Sveta. Up.
Brahma Sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya	A
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Tark-Saṁgrah	



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